THE ISSUE NOW IS OPEN OCCUPANCY:
THE STRUGGLE FOR FAIR HOUSING IN INDIANAPOLIS, 1890–1968

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INTRODUCTION

The "American dream" encompasses the ideals of a democratic and prosperous society. Although the image can incorporate various social and material values, with the rise of suburban homeownership during the twentieth century, living the American dream frequently came to connote possessing a home outside the inner city. Despite the dual concepts of democracy and prosperity in the American ideal, fair housing in both the private and the public sectors only became federal law in 1968. The Fair Housing Act was enacted, in large part, because of the terribly poor, segregated state of minority housing in inner cities across the United States.¹

From around the turn of the twentieth century until 1970, northern cities in the U.S. became increasingly segregated by race. As southern rural minorities, primarily African Americans, moved to northern urban areas, individuals and groups in the majority population—including those who controlled the housing industry and government—restricted these migrants to densely populated, homogenous neighborhoods composed of substandard housing. At times overt and malicious, these practices seemed unchallenged for decades.

However, during the late 1930s liberals began to confront these assumptions, and writers started to find residential discrimination a potent subject. Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal’s signal study, *An American Dilemma*, outlined the difficulties faced by African Americans in obtaining decent housing from 1915 to the 1940s. Myrdal argued that African Americans felt pushed and pulled to migrate northward despite the segregated and substandard housing found there. He cited three factors that
contributed to residential concentration of African Americans: poverty, ethnic attachment, and forced segregation. In discussing the final factor Myrdal implicated government action, especially the stress placed upon the importance of neighborhood homogeneity by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), as well as prevailing attitudes that condoned the use of social pressure and terrorism to keep majority residents “protected” from minority inhabitants. An American Dilemma provided the basis for much of the literature to follow, including Charles Abrams’s Forbidden Neighbors (1955).

These books and other works helped fuel a national open housing movement, spearheaded by the National Committee against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH), which brought residential segregation to the forefront of civil rights issues in the North. During the open housing movement’s peak in the 1960s, supporters and opponents wrote and read an enormous number of books, pamphlets, and articles. Although activists, sociologists, and political scientists had long since examined the subject, historians only began to interpret this as a separate theme during the 1990s.

Few historians have undertaken national studies of twentieth-century discrimination in housing and the civil-rights-era solution of open housing, but Stephen Grant Meyer did so in As Long as They Don’t Move Next Door: Segregation and Racial Conflict in American Neighborhoods (1999). Meyer posited that previous studies of housing discrimination, like Charles Abrams’s Forbidden Neighbors, were weak because they placed too much stress on the actions of government and the housing industry. He argued that the choices and actions of individual white homeowners contributed more to residential segregation than institutional means of discrimination.
Far more scholars, including Thomas Sugrue, have undertaken local studies. In *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Detroit* (1994), Sugrue asserted that by the postwar period, the concept of race in America was as much defined by New Deal politics as by societal values. Therefore, residential segregation resulted as much from "the actions of the federal and local governments, real estate agents, individual home buyers and sellers, and community organizations" as from racial prejudice. This argument directly opposes Meyer's assertion that the choices and actions of individuals contributed more to residential segregation than institutional means of discrimination. Authors of other local works tend to concur with Sugrue's position.4

In many ways, the housing situation in Indianapolis mirrored that of other northern cities such as Detroit. Beginning in the late nineteenth century the city became increasingly segregated, and in 1926 the City Council passed a municipal ordinance that restricted African Americans from moving into all-white neighborhoods. Despite a court decision that overturned the measure, Indianapolis's minorities continued to be restricted, and the economic depression of the 1930s only made the housing situation worse. The outbreak of World War II and an influx of defense workers in the 1940s further intensified segregation in housing and exacerbated the housing shortage. After the war urban renewal, primarily completed without the aid of federal dollars in Indianapolis, only complicated matters. Although the 1950s brought some relief to the housing shortage, discrimination continued; however, changes in attitudes began to take place, and by the early 1960s, a vocal minority of open housing activists worked to promote their views in the city.
Thus, in 1963-64 a group of residents drafted a municipal open occupancy ordinance. These liberals believed that legally proscribing discrimination in housing would end it in all forms and lead to peaceful integration—the goals of open housing. They also hoped to improve the lot of African Americans. However, passage of the ordinance resulted from compromise, so the law remained largely symbolic. Although the municipal law accomplished less than activists wanted, it encouraged them to pursue their objective through other means.\(^5\)

Building upon the initial findings of Indiana historians such as Emma Lou Thornbrough, the following thesis examines issues of minority housing, concentrating on different individuals’ and groups’ efforts to control the demographics of neighborhoods and Indianapolis as a whole. The first chapter traces the minority housing situation in Indianapolis from 1890 when the city was the most segregated city in the North to 1948 when the U.S. Supreme Court declared restrictive racial covenants unenforceable. The second chapter outlines the beginnings of change in Indianapolis following that finding. An in-depth examination of an open occupancy ordinance passed by the city council encompasses chapter three, and the final chapter examines the continued push for open housing that resulted in wider acceptance of the concept, if not practice, of fair housing.\(^6\)

Although this case should not be considered archetypal, the story of minority housing in Indianapolis 1890-1968 parallels that of many northern cities. It illustrates how African Americans faced increasing residential segregation throughout the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, and how activists struggled to obtain not only decent but also open housing in the city. Finally, it confirms the argument that the ac-
tions and rhetoric of government, real estate interests, community organizations, and the media, coupled with the actions of individual home buyers and sellers, profoundly influenced housing patterns in Indianapolis.
CHAPTER 1
Legacy of Residential Segregation, 1890–1948

During the first half of the twentieth century, many Americans viewed “homogeneous” and “stable” neighborhoods as one and the same. Although this belief could be viewed as an extension of the nineteenth-century ethnic neighborhood, the definition of homogeneity rested more upon race than country of origin in the twentieth century. Whereas second- or third-generation Americans of European descent could earn their way out of ethnic ghettos, members of racial minorities could not. As decades passed and more African Americans moved from rural southern to urban northern settings such as Indianapolis, the housing industry, government, and the majority population remained convinced of the positive results of neighborhood homogeneity.

Discrimination in housing during the twentieth century stemmed from nineteenth-century precedents in Indianapolis. From the city’s inception in the 1820s, African Americans lived in Indianapolis, and over the decades, and especially after the Civil War, the African American population grew steadily. As early as 1860 homes of blacks were noticeably concentrated on the city’s near northwest side. This trend of clustering continued for decades to come, intensifying as time passed.¹

Although these circumstances can partially be attributed to cultural affinity, African Americans in Indianapolis claimed in 1889 that segregation also played a role. In that year the State Afro-American League formed to improve conditions in the city and elsewhere, and housing topped the organization’s list of concerns. The league charged
that landlords in Indianapolis compelled African Americans to live in poor housing or alleys and only in certain parts of the city.²

At the time slightly less than 8 percent of city residents were African American, and most resided in the five wards centered around Indiana Avenue or in a smaller area on the city’s near east side. According to the index of isolation—the average percentage of African Americans per ward—Indianapolis scored a 12.9, ranking the city as the most “ghettoized” of seventeen nonsouthern cities in 1890.³

Despite relinquishing its dubious standing as most segregated, Indianapolis continued to rank almost double the national average. Over the next four decades the African American population of Indianapolis more than tripled and isolation simultaneously increased. During World War I and the Great Migration, when blacks moved from rural areas of the South into industrial cities of the North for war work, the African American population of Indianapolis grew dramatically. In 1920 the census counted 29 percent more African Americans than in 1910, and blacks comprised 11 percent of city residents in 1920. Although many reaped economic benefits from their migration to Indianapolis, most did not experience freedom from residential discrimination. Despite comprising a greater portion of Indianapolis’s population, the city’s blacks tended to inhabit the same areas they had in the nineteenth century. Just as in 1889, African Americans in the 1920s decried being forced to live in backyards and alleys.⁴

Generally, the end of World War I brought tension between the white, Protestant majority and racial and ethnic minorities in America. In the years following the war, racial violence erupted in many major cities, Congress enacted laws that severely restricted immigration from outside the western hemisphere and western Europe, and
the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and other white supremacy groups experienced a rebirth. In Indiana the Klan dominated Republican politics for much of the 1920s.

In the midst of this era, the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), a national organization of real estate agents, codified practices to encourage residential segregation. In 1922 NAREB introduced a series of textbooks that emphasized the desirability of racially, economically, and religiously homogenous neighborhoods and that supported the use of restrictive covenants to ban certain categories of people from purchasing homes in choice neighborhoods. Two years later, the board adopted a code of ethics that established segregation in housing as a regular practice. The section on “Relations to Customers and the Public” provided: “A Realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a character of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationality, or any individuals whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood.” This meant that ethical realtors did not show houses in all-white neighborhoods to African Americans and other minorities, including immigrants and Jews. The Indianapolis Real Estate Board (IREB), which prided itself on cooperation within its membership, agreed with this practice and abided by this code. Decisions made in the 1920s by NAREB and the local board affected the attitudes of realtors and the general public for decades to follow.5

Classified advertisements in Indianapolis’s daily newspapers during the 1920s indicate broad willingness to segregate the city. Most ads listing homes for sale or rent described properties beginning with a street location. However, some ads began with the heading “colored” or “for colored,” delineating which homes and neighborhoods African Americans could occupy.6
In addition to specifically announcing where African Americans were welcome to live, residents of all-white areas united in neighborhood civic associations. In cities across the nation whites joined these organizations to protect the value of their property investment by banning African Americans from residing near them. They defended their neighborhoods by pledging not to sell or rent to nonwhites and by encouraging minorities to leave through acts of intimidation and violence.

In the case of Indianapolis's North Capitol Avenue Protective Association, a group organized to prevent African Americans from moving northward along Capitol Avenue, neighbors built six-feet-tall fences on either side of property belonging to Lucian H. Meriweather, a young African American dentist. Meriweather sued his neighbors for their actions, but the defendants claimed that they did not build the "spite" fences. Instead, unnamed members of the neighborhood association supposedly erected them. After a week-long trial in January 1921 and nearly four months of deliberation, Judge T. J. Moll of Marion County Superior Court ruled in favor of Meriweather, awarding the dentist $500 in damages. At the close of the case, the *Indianapolis World*, an African American weekly newspaper, praised not only the judge's decision but also the woman who initially sold the property to Meriweather.7

Because African Americans who could afford better housing continually "invaded" white neighborhoods during the 1920s, white-supremacy groups spurred the Republican-dominated Indianapolis City Council to take action. In March 1926 the council voted for a racial zoning ordinance. This law required prospective residents to gain the consent of current property owners in order to move into a neighborhood comprised of citizens of "opposite color." Although the ordinance seemed to allow the pos-
sibility of multiracial neighborhoods, supporters meant to keep African Americans from moving into all-white areas. The White Supremacy League—an organization that promoted separate spheres for whites and blacks—touted the statute as a way to stabilize property values and to regain confidence in city government.⁸

Leading African Americans in Indianapolis rallied to fight the ordinance. Because the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had significant experience in fighting racial restrictions in housing, the Indianapolis chapter immediately enlisted the help of the national office. With this expertise behind them, the executive and legal committees of the local chapter began a month-long campaign to raise both community awareness and a legal fund. Days after the ordinance’s passage, an estimated 1,000 people rallied at Bethel AME Church. Too agitated to draw up resolutions, those in attendance called for action by their political leaders and made pledges to the legal fund. Although the community successfully raised $5,000 over the next month, a delegation sent to city hall failed to dissuade the mayor. John L. Duvall (Republican) signed the ordinance, disregarding the displeasure of the African American community and a warning by corporation counsel, Alvah J. Rucker, that the law would likely be found unconstitutional. Both Rucker and members of the local NAACP leadership knew that the U.S. Supreme Court in 1917 nullified a similar ordinance enacted in Louisville, Kentucky, in the Buchanan v Warley case.⁹

As Indianapolis lived under this racial zoning ordinance, the Indianapolis Recorder, an African American weekly, reported on various aspects of housing in the United States. Many articles indicated a crisis for African Americans. For instance, one story described a case in Detroit in which a judge affirmed the right of an African
American to own property in an eastside neighborhood yet denied him or other African Americans the ability to reside on the property due to an agreement by white property owners. In addition, reports from Washington, D.C., announced that the U.S. Supreme Court validated the use of restrictive covenants in Corrigan v Buckley, and in another case, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a racial zoning law enacted in New Orleans.¹⁰

A few articles left readers with a sense of hope. For instance, business magnate and philanthropist John D. Rockefeller purchased a number of apartments in New York City to help solve housing problems suffered by African Americans there, and members of the NAACP reserved an entire day of the annual conference to discuss its active campaign against residential segregation. Issues included updates on the organization's fight against racial zoning ordinances in Indianapolis and New Orleans.¹¹

Just weeks before the NAACP conference, a case testing the Indianapolis ordinance came before the Marion County Superior Court. Gaillard v Grant arose because Edward S. Gaillard, an African American who owned property at 2311 Bellafontaine Street, offered this parcel situated in a white district to Guy L. Grant, another African American. Although the property was located near an African American neighborhood and was only five blocks from Douglass Park, the recreation area designated for blacks only by the city's parks department, Grant refused to complete his purchase because of the city's racial zoning ordinance. Thus, Gaillard sued, petitioning the court to declare the ordinance void.¹²

Not surprisingly, Marion County Superior Court Judge Harry O. Chamberlin agreed with the plaintiff. In the case, locally prominent African American attorneys,
including Robert L. Brokenburr, represented Gaillard while Alvah Rucker, the corporation counsel who had warned the mayor against signing the ordinance, and others stood for Grant. Although the defense cited the Louisiana court’s recent ruling on the New Orleans ordinance, Judge Chamberlin struck down Indianapolis’s racial zoning ordinance, using Buchanan v Warley, the Louisville case, as precedent.¹³

African Americans in Indianapolis could no longer be contained in ghettos through racial zoning, but Gaillard v Grant did not change attitudes within the city’s majority. “Ye Olde Town Plat,” a map printed in a 1927 publication of the Indianapolis Athletic Club (IAC), illustrates the standpoint supported by club members (see Illustration 1 in the Appendix). The stylized view of the city pokes fun at many city institutions, but it reserves true disdain for anything deemed as inferior. While the map depicts the IAC building as a “muscle factory,” it refers to residents of one west side working-class neighborhood as “white mules.” Indiana Avenue, the traditional African American business district, becomes “L’Avenue de la Ebony” and the blocks south of the avenue are “regions very dark.”¹⁴

With real estate interests, government, neighborhood civic associations, and many individuals supporting residential segregation, Indianapolis became more still segregated. By 1930 the isolation index rose to 26.1, with twelve of 108 census tracts containing no African Americans.¹⁵

The economic depression of the 1930s resulted in both negative and positive gains in the minority housing situation in Indianapolis. On the one hand, many African Americans lost their jobs in the economic crisis, and those who could not afford rent doubled and tripled up in available housing. On the other hand, the New Deal brought
Public Works Administration (PWA) funds to Indianapolis, including public housing projects such as Lockefield Gardens, one of the first developments of its type. In addition, the federal government entered the mortgage industry through the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) and Federal Housing Administration (FHA).

The creation of HOLC in 1933 and FHA the following year standardized appraisal methods and allowed a greater percentage of Americans to purchase homes; unfortunately, the policies of these government bodies extended and legitimized segregationist assumptions. HOLC, devised to protect urban dwellers from foreclosure by extending long-term and low-interest loans, created a four-tier rating system for neighborhoods. This classification scheme took into account the density, mix, and age of neighborhoods. Based upon prevailing assumptions in the housing industry, the system bestowed the highest ratings upon homogenous neighborhoods, those composed of families headed by native-born, white business and professional men, while areas populated by African Americans invariably received the lowest rating. FHA and eventually private lenders adopted the same system.16

The 1938 FHA underwriting manual, which offered a weighted rating scale for determining location appraisals, also made direct reference to race. Of 100 total points, the scale allotted twenty points for “Protection from Adverse Influences” defined as “prevention from infiltration of business and industrial uses, lower class occupancy, and inharmonious racial groups.” This section encouraged the use of restrictive covenants and physical barriers as ways to preserve real estate values. In addition, “Adequacy of Civic, Social, and Commercial Centers” (five points) and “Appeal” (ten points) assumed that all-white institutions, including schools, were best and were most
attractive to future buyers. Thus, thirty-five points, more than a third of the rating, rested upon racial compatibility within neighborhoods. This point system severely limited the ability of African Americans to obtain loans with government guarantees, and it discounted the possibility of positive effects of mixed neighborhoods; therefore, it promoted segregation of residence by race.\textsuperscript{17}

An incident in Indianapolis illustrates the insensitivity demonstrated by some FHA decision-makers. In January 1935 the city’s business and political leaders attended a meeting in which Percy Wilson, FHA regional director from Chicago, intended to present the housing administration’s program. Wilson began by warming up the audience, regaling them with offensive stories that featured the worst negative stereotypes of African Americans. Incensed by the regional director’s crassness, a number of African Americans in the audience stormed out of the hall, wondering how these jokes related to the government program.\textsuperscript{18}

Despite the regional director’s deportment in Indianapolis, the Recorder repeatedly urged readers to take advantage of government aid for housing. Editorials called for owners to modernize their homes with the help of government loan programs and encouraged those who rented to seek funds in order to purchase a home. At the time, the editors of the newspaper obviously did not understand how severely rules of government loan programs limited the buying power of African Americans.\textsuperscript{19}

Still, one New Deal program benefited a number of African American families in Indianapolis. In 1934 the PWA proposed to build modern apartment buildings for low-income African Americans, thus “combating slums and their effect on American life.” The plan required clearing twenty-two acres of land bounded by Indiana Avenue
and Locke, Blake, and North streets and replacing the unsightly, unsafe dwellings located in this area with twenty-four modern apartment buildings and landscaped grounds. Like HOLC and FHA policies that emphasized the importance of homogeneity in neighborhoods, the PWA plan placed the project, which it intended solely for African Americans, in the ghetto that had existed since the nineteenth century.  

Despite its segregation, Lockefield Gardens received the support of the Indianapolis Recorder. Editorials described how the project would be a boon to African American rent payers who had been hit hardest by the economic recession and who had been forced for decades to live in substandard housing. Like most housing reformers of the time, the newspaper inferred that the psychology, lives, and habits of those who moved into the modern apartments would be transformed, making them better, healthier citizens. The editors of the newspaper also believed that this experiment in housing would demonstrate to cities across the country that blighted areas could be restored.  

Although the Indianapolis Recorder and the federal government held high expectations for Lockefield Gardens, some Indianapolis politicians were not convinced. A 7 September 1934 article in the Indianapolis Star noted that Representative Louis Ludlow, Senator Frederick Van Nuys, and Senator Arthur R. Robinson had not contributed to the decision-making process. Ludlow, in particular, objected to Lockefield because he believed that public housing competed with private enterprise, a mantra often repeated over the next few decades in Indianapolis and elsewhere.  

Indianapolis’s real estate board agreed that the federal project competed with private interests. IREB immediately objected to Lockefield and continued to voice opposition throughout the project’s building phase. Members of IREB complained that
Lockefield held few advantages because it would upset the city's real estate market, it offered no better and no cheaper housing than private interests, and it would not eliminate slums.²³

The real estate board's contention that the federal project would upend the real estate market held little validity. In April 1937 IREB predicted an imminent rental housing shortage because the vacancy rate sat at 1.5 percent; yet, five months later the board stated that families moving into government housing would cause enough vacancies to harm property owners. Lionel Artis, manager of Lockefield Gardens, countered IREB's criticism by stating that to qualify for the project, families had to be doubled-up in substandard housing; thus, when they moved to government housing their former residences would not be left empty. The rentals would still be occupied by family or friends with whom they had been sharing living quarters.²⁴

The 748 families that moved into Lockefield Gardens beginning in February 1938 received affordable housing that far exceeded the quality of private accommodations in the same neighborhood. Amenities included modern plumbing for hot and cold water; steam heat; electric lights, refrigerators, and ranges; fully equipped children's play areas; club rooms; incinerators; and central laundries. An illustrated information brochure for the project proclaimed the "efficiency," "abundance of light," and "attractive arrangement" achieved in these apartments and row houses (see Illustration 2, in the Appendix). At a time when more than 20 percent of Indianapolis homes were unfit for human habitation and more than 27 percent had no indoor toilet, these apartments certainly exceeded the standards of a sizable portion of private housing in the city.²⁵
As for the project's failure to eliminate all slums, the limited scope of the undertaking prevented it from being a panacea. Flanner House, Inc., a social service agency that aided poor African Americans in Indianapolis, agreed that slums remained in 1939, the year following the opening of Lockefield Gardens. Flanner House found that many African Americans occupied substandard housing with the worst third of it requiring major repairs and installation of indoor plumbing. According to the study, African Americans generally lived in "areas of transition—characterized, for the most part, by old, outworn and discarded buildings and high land values—but generally highly undesirable for residential purposes."26

Flanner House could easily determine where African Americans lived because the population had become even more segregated during the 1930s. The least racially mixed area remained on Indianapolis’s near northwest side. In five contiguous census tracts, between 80.5 and 99.7 percent of the population was black. The population of four tracts along Martindale Avenue (later Andrew Brown Avenue) on the northeast side ranged from 51.9 to 98.9 percent African American, and two tracts in the southeast section of the city contained 49.1 and 51.8 percent black population. Fourteen of 108 census tracts still contained no African Americans. Overall, the city’s index of dissimilarity, a measure of segregation on a block-by-block basis, stood at 90.4, above the average of 85.7 in twenty-nine cities in nine north central states.27

African Americans lived in a city that was not only segregated but one that provided generally poor housing for low-income families. A report issued in 1940 by the Citizen’s Housing Committee, one of dozens of organizations formed across the country to reconstruct urban slums, indicated that few rental vacancies existed in the city,
that many rentals remained unsafe and unsanitary, and that low-income families could not afford decent dwellings provided by private enterprise. Therefore, the committee, which included Lockefield Gardens's Lionel Artis as the head of tenant selection, encouraged the establishment of a local housing authority that would solicit federal funds for more public housing in Indianapolis. 28

In making its arguments, the Citizen's Housing Committee cited several federal government studies. One survey conducted by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in 1939 found that of the 6,448 residential units located in an eleven-block wide by twenty-six-block long area that encompassed Monument Circle, the center of the city's original mile square, 45 percent were substandard, 46 percent had no private toilets or baths, and 267 were unfit for human habitation. 29

Indicting the actions of private enterprise, the committee saw multiple benefits to public housing. Contrary to arguments proffered by real estate interests, the Citizen's Housing Committee believed that government housing would protect the investments of homeowners by preventing the spread of blight and improving neighborhoods. In addition, the wages earned by those who constructed public housing would stimulate the economy, and most importantly, it would offer safe housing to the city's estimated 25,000 low-income families.

Under a 1937 state housing law, Indianapolis could establish its own local housing authority if the City Council passed a resolution to do so. The council could act on its own volition or respond to a petition by twenty-five city residents. To initiate a housing authority, the council merely had to find a shortage of safe and sanitary hous-
ing affordable to low-income families. Although the committee clearly outlined the necessary conditions in its report, the council declined to create a local housing authority.

Thus, housing in Indianapolis became the special subject of a special state commission in 1941. The governor formed this commission because in addition to longstanding difficulties, the city suffered under a new problem—housing an influx of defense workers and their families. With the onset of the European war in 1939, large numbers of workers migrated to industrial centers like Indianapolis. Between 1940 and 1943, Indianapolis received 79,000 new civilian inhabitants. Those arriving in Indianapolis came to a city with a low rental vacancy rate that had been demonstrated to be below par. To assess both old and new housing problems, the special commission held hearings in November and December 1941.30

The November hearing centered around issues that seemed, so to speak, black and white. Because African Americans did not move to cities for defense jobs en masse until after 1942, those interested in defense housing wanted to provide decent shelter for white war workers. Those concerned with the “social aspects” of housing called for better dwellings for poor African Americans, an attempt to deal with the problem in the longterm. Although these issues seemed separate to many, New Deal housing activists, including Nathan Straus, head of the United State Housing Authority (USHA), wished to combine the two at this time.31

Views of the housing situation differed widely as well. Earl B. Teckemeyer, president of the real estate board and representative of a citizens’ committee on defense housing, believed that no problem existed since private enterprise had encouraged the construction of almost 1,700 homes through private capital during 1941; thus, the city
had averted a housing crisis and need not concern itself further. Speakers addressing the social aspects of the subject remained less sanguine.

African Americans, in fact, testified that their housing situation had worsened. Late in 1939 the federal government revised its rules for Lockefield Gardens, lowering rents but also the allowable income for tenants. A number of families exceeded the income standards and had to relocate. One resident, who had been ordered to vacate the project by 1 January 1942, testified that despite his best efforts he could not find suitable housing. In his search he visited thirteen realty agencies. Only six offered houses to African Americans, and he considered all unsatisfactory and some "unfit for human habitation." Another man, forced to look for other accommodations, stated that any other dwellings that he could find proved to be "a step backward" after living in Lockefield. Finally, Henry J. Richardson—a prominent African American attorney representing the Federation of Associated Clubs, an alliance of organizations formed to fight for economic, civil, and social justice for African Americans—cited a shortage of housing for African Americans. Richardson also accused local lenders and the FHA of failing to grant or insure mortgages for minorities, reducing their ability to build homes. In addition, Richardson complained that African Americans paid more for poorer homes than whites and that the recent influx of defense workers only made the situation worse. As the Citizen's Housing Committee had done twenty months earlier, Richardson called for the establishment of a local housing authority that would provide low- and medium-rent housing.32

Two weeks later, the special commission held another hearing focusing on problems in defense and social aspects of housing. The Citizen's Housing Committee
and the Indianapolis Industrial Union Council joined the Federation of Associated Clubs in its call for a local housing authority. \(^{33}\)

At the next meeting of the Federation of Associated Clubs, the organization passed a resolution officially recommending the establishment of a local housing authority. Although some members objected to the resolution because they preferred not to pressure city government, the organization sent copies to the mayor and the president of the City Council. \(^{34}\)

The council still did not establish a local housing authority, but defense housing, including housing for African Americans, came to Indianapolis. Instead of a local authority, the federal government made provisions for housing defense workers. Sometimes it worked with local private builders to provide homes; in other cases it proceeded despite protests from business and government leaders in Indianapolis.

One project particularly attracted the city's attention. In October 1943 the regional office of the National Housing Agency (NHA), which planned and constructed defense housing after 1942, determined that Indianapolis required more housing units for African American migrants. Therefore, the agency arranged the transfer of temporary units from La Porte County, located in northwest Indiana. To be erected in Indianapolis, these prefabricated dwellings had to be dismantled, transported from Kingsford Heights, and then rebuilt on lots in the capital city. Instead of choosing open land for the project, NHA officials selected a populated but blighted area on Martindale Avenue between 25th and 33rd streets near Douglass Park. The population of this area was almost entirely African American. As with other government agencies, NHA showed a
preference for homogeneous neighborhoods even though it intended the housing to be temporary.\textsuperscript{35}

This defense housing project, like others implemented in the city, faced opposition from various groups. Ray M. Howard, city building commissioner, said he objected to the houses primarily because they failed to meet city code requirements. The dwellings would be outfitted with electricity and baths, but they would sit on pier foundations and be heated by stoves. Although federal government officials usually worked with local governments to implement housing plans, Howard said he remained "helpless" to stop the federal agency's actions. The real estate board also opposed the project. In spite of a rental vacancy rate that remained at less than 1 percent, IREB argued that demand for housing had declined significantly. Therefore, the private sector could handle the remaining need with 300 properties already being converted into rental units, and if the NHA would allow any further allotments for new homes for African Americans, private builders would gladly accommodate. Thus, there was "absolutely no excuse for any additional Federal public housing" in the city.\textsuperscript{36}

Despite the protests, NHA brought seventy-three units to Indianapolis, and the project opened in April 1944. To qualify for housing in the project, African American war workers had to have migrated after 1 July 1941 and been unable to secure proper housing. Contrary to arguments by real estate interests, the mayor's emergency housing committee complained that a real housing shortage remained in the city and that regulations remained too stringent and prevented the creation of enough housing in the city.\textsuperscript{37}

As African Americans moved into the Douglass Park defense housing, civic and business leaders began to prepare a postwar plan for Indianapolis. Paul L. McCord, a
local realtor, headed a committee to study housing, focusing mainly on slum clearance. This committee determined that Indianapolis should take a two-pronged approach: encourage residents in salvageable areas to rehabilitate their homes and rebuild neighborhoods too rundown to renovate. The Postwar Planning Committee, a body of fifteen influential men that included McCord, developed a seven-year, $25,000,000 plan with ten priorities. Slum clearance ranked second after improvements to the municipal sewer system. Other objectives included elevating railroad grades, widening thoroughfares and providing better parking downtown, building and remodeling public buildings, erecting and enlarging public schools, expanding Weir Cook Airport (later Indianapolis International Airport), enlarging City Hospital (later Wishard Memorial Hospital), improving sewerage and trash disposal facilities, and augmenting the city’s park and playground system. The committee determined that the entire plan would follow a “free enterprise” program led by an appointed Redevelopment Commission. The committee and its supporters took pride in what they saw as an independent and economical approach to civic improvements. The program not only allowed Indianapolis to avoid federal money but supervision from Washington as well. The Redevelopment Commission, empowered by a 1945 act of the state legislature, could declare an area blighted, clear it, and then sell it to other city departments or to individuals or private companies.38

In rebuilding homes, the committee proposed a “self-help” program, which was modeled after a development in Pennsylvania by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). The program would teach qualified family men to build their own homes and provide initial financing. Since the Postwar Planning Committee approached Planner House, affiliated with AFSC, to implement the program at the outset, the body
evidently intended to redevelop traditionally African American neighborhoods, which had long been demonstrated to be the city’s worst. Using this program, Indianapolis hoped to avoid using federal dollars for public housing.\textsuperscript{39}

Although the postwar plan included an outline for redevelopment, it did not provide for immediate growth in housing. Thus, when veterans returned home and war workers failed to leave the city, the housing situation became even more dire. In late 1945 the Indiana Real Estate Association saw a home-building crisis in the offing, and in early 1946 the \textit{Indianapolis Times} ran a series of articles that demonstrated the crisis had arrived. Virtually no rental vacancies existed, the city still had not made plans for housing both war workers and returning veterans, and it had no housing authority to oversee the construction of low-rent housing.\textsuperscript{40}

In spite of the postwar plan’s failings, the Redevelopment Commission proceeded, announcing its first area of slum clearance in November 1946. It determined that an area bounded by 10th, 16th, Milburn, and West streets was blighted, and a five-judge panel later agreed. Almost entirely populated by African Americans, the section, also known as Project A, had been studied during the housing plan’s initial phases in 1944. Flanner House, under the aegis of Flanner Homes, Inc., agreed to start its self-help plan in the area after the clearance phase.\textsuperscript{41}

Actions of the Redevelopment Commission did not go without concern or notice. Some residents of the west side neighborhood objected to the plan, and the housing committee of the local NAACP chapter, revitalized during the postwar period, investigated the commission’s operations.\textsuperscript{42}
On the national level, the NAACP remained active in the issue of housing for African Americans, winning a major court battle against restrictive covenants in 1948. In the twenty-six years since NAREB introduced its textbooks that encouraged the use of restrictive covenants and the fourteen years that the federal government did the same through HOLC and FHA policies, restrictive covenants covered almost every American neighborhood outside the inner city. 43

For decades the NAACP fought covenants in the courts. In 1926 the body suffered a notable loss with the case of Corrigan v Buckley in which the in the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that restrictive covenants were constitutional. In the intervening years, however, attitudes toward race had changed and the NAACP's legal team redefined its line of argument. Named Shelley v Kraemer for a complaint originating in St. Louis, the decision also involved cases from Detroit and Washington, D.C. The NAACP legal defense team, led by long-time civil rights lawyer Thurgood Marshall, used both constitutional and sociological arguments. As in past cases, dozens in the 1940s alone, the NAACP lawyers contended that restrictive covenants violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866; in addition, the team used sociological evidence regarding the negative effects of covenants on the availability of housing for African Americans. Finally, the NAACP was successful, winning with a unanimous judgment although three justices—Robert Jackson, Stanley Reed, and Wiley Rutledge—recused themselves for undisclosed reasons. In essence, the court ruled that although restrictive covenants remained constitutional as declared in Corrigan v Buckley, it found the enforcement of these covenants unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 44
In a banner headline, the *Indianapolis Recorder* announced, "U.S. SUPREME COURT OUTLAWS COVENANT BANS ON RACE LINES." In addition to the report from Washington, Andrew W. Ramsey, a weekly columnist on the newspaper's editorial page, used the opportunity to write about a variety of ills suffered by African Americans in the local housing market. He described how members of his race remained confined in Indianapolis's ghettos not only by restrictive covenants between white owners but also by the reluctance of lenders to provide financing and the inflated prices charged.  

As in 1926, following the court ruling that rejected a racial zoning ordinance in Indianapolis, *Shelley v Kraemer* did not convince everyone of the evils of residential segregation and discrimination, and the tactics of intimidation remained. In one instance, a menacing group of about seventy-five men, women, and children met prospective African American buyers and their real estate broker at a northside address on 6 November 1948. As the crowd looked on Thomas A. Cleghorn, the owner, talked with the buyers and their real estate broker. Cleghorn at first indicated his willingness to sell to anyone since he wished to sell quickly; further, an African American family lived on the next block and several resided one block away. Within days of the meeting, however, Cleghorn changed his mind, evidently intimidated by his neighbors.  

Obviously, litigation was not a panacea. Although residential segregation continued to increase after *Shelley v Kraemer*, activists were able to count it as a victory. This achievement led to a more widespread and coordinated effort in the following decades to attain equality in housing.
Although restrictive covenants based on race could no longer be enforced, African Americans in Indianapolis still faced a struggle to obtain suitable residences. Indianapolis's tight housing market persisted into the late 1940s and few African Americans could find decent, affordable homes in the city or in the suburbs. During the 1950s, however, the situation eased and the focus shifted from a fight simply for any type of housing to a campaign for open housing, the idea that people should be allowed to live wherever they can afford.

January 1949 brought two possible answers to the minority housing crisis in Indianapolis. In one case, the Home Buyer’s Security Association, a nonprofit organization of ninety-five African Americans, purchased Lexington Apartments, a building located in the 1100 block of North Capitol Avenue. With a $350 down payment, families could buy into the ninety-two-unit cooperative comprised of two- to six-room apartments. The brainchild of Reverend W. M. Edwards, the Lexington cost the association more than $200,000 and several years’ planning.  

The other solution required action by legislators in Indiana and Washington. At the beginning of the Indiana General Assembly’s 86th session, two Democratic representatives from Indianapolis, Harry T. Littlejohn and Judson F. Haggerty, introduced a bill to amend the Redevelopment Act of 1945. Littlejohn and Haggerty intended to modify the act so that the Redevelopment Commission would be responsible for not only coordinating the capital city’s urban renewal efforts but also for functioning as a
housing authority since Indianapolis still lacked such an administrative body. If enacted, the bill would require the Redevelopment Commission to build and operate low-rent housing projects instead of selling property to private interests for redevelopment. In addition, the bill would alter the appraisal process and offer expanded rights of appeal to residents of condemned areas. Moreover, it would obligate the Redevelopment Commission to create written plans for relocating residents slated for displacement. Finally, the Littlejohn-Haggerty Bill would require the commission to accept federal funds for slum clearance and public housing, if and when available.²

Representatives Littlejohn and Haggerty introduced their bill in response to complaints regarding the process of redevelopment in Indianapolis. Although most city residents agreed that replacing tumble-down shacks with standard housing merited support, some believed that the Redevelopment Commission, which was headed by a prominent realtor, primarily served the interests of business and the housing industry. Homeowners in the Project A area, the Redevelopment Commission’s most vocal opposition, contended that only substandard dwellings, not substantial residences like theirs, should be condemned, and they called for more rights of appeal and greater reimbursement for condemned property. According to their arguments, the Redevelopment Commission not only reduced their ability to purchase a future home by offering prices almost half the market value, but the commission also left displaced residents without clear plans for future accommodations. To further their cause, the homeowners hired Jack B. Kammins, an attorney and president of the City Plan Commission, as their representative. Not only did Kammins represent these clients in court, but he also convinced Haggerty and Littlejohn to sponsor the amendatory bill.³
Newspapers gave the proposed legislation mixed reviews. The Indianapolis Recorder saw its introduction as a positive move, especially since it benefited the African Americans who lived within Project A. The daily papers, primarily the Indianapolis News and Indianapolis Star, viewed the bill negatively. Both termed it the "doom" of the Indianapolis plan, which was touted as a model of redevelopment for all American cities.

Although the Indianapolis News considered the bill little more than a power grab by the city administration, Mayor Al Feeney indicated that he also objected to the bill. "I'm for housing and I'm for redevelopment," he said, "but I don't want the two mixed." In fact, the mayor felt strongly enough that he threatened to ask for Jack Kammins's resignation. Feeney believed that Kammins—president of the City Plan Commission—wanted more control over the Redevelopment Commission, a conflict of interest that could translate into an advantage for Kammins's clients in Project A.

Members of the Redevelopment Commission and their representatives also blasted the Littlejohn-Haggerty Bill. Primarily, they argued that the bill would end urban renewal in Indianapolis by compelling the commission to fulfill tasks that it could afford neither in time nor money. The city ran its redevelopment program on a minimal budget, relying upon investment by private enterprise. Thus, the Redevelopment Commission insisted that Lockefield Gardens, private real estate agencies, and Flanner Homes, Inc. should rehouse those displaced by slum clearance.

On 27 January 1949 the House Committee on the Affairs of the City of Indianapolis, the committee responsible for studying the Littlejohn-Haggerty bill, heard testimony in a four-hour meeting. Paul L. McCord, president, and Harry T. Ice, attorney
for the Redevelopment Commission, reiterated the commission’s stance. Cleo Blackburn, executive director of Flanner House, also opposed the bill, indicating that it would delay the plans of Flanner Homes, Inc. On the other side of the issue, Kammins and representatives of the NAACP, the Federation of Associated Clubs, and the Central Labor Union (AFL) advocated for the bill. Supporters saw positive outcomes in every aspect, especially for residents of the slum clearance area.  

Despite objections from the Redevelopment Commission and its allies, the Littlejohn-Haggerty Bill received overwhelming support in the House. Eleven days after the hearing, the Committee on the Affairs of the City of Indianapolis reported the bill favorably. Following a second and third reading, it passed the House with a vote of ninety-three to zero. Despite the House’s unanimous action, opponents held strong hopes that the Senate would stop the bill.  

To encourage defeat, Flanner Homes, Inc. announced progress on its redevelopment plans. By mid-February 1949 the organization had received $200,000 in donations from Indianapolis citizens. This seed money would serve as equity for the $1,000,000 in financing needed to construct 200 units of low-rent housing and a small development of self-built homes. According to opponents of the Littlejohn-Haggerty bill, this plan solved the city’s minority housing problems, and it obviated the need for changes to the Redevelopment Commission’s purpose.  

As Flanner House announced its plans, the Senate Committee on the Affairs of the City of Indianapolis studied the bill. Unlike the House, which unanimously supported the measure, the Senate decided to table the committee report on 2 March 1949. The action effectively killed the legislation.
Soon after the Indiana Senate shelved the housing bill, the U.S. Congress began consideration of federal housing reform. A legislative issue since 1945, housing reform finally appeared to have sufficient support for passage in Congress, and President Harry S. Truman included it as a major element of his Fair Deal plan. Bills were introduced in both houses, and although the issue received bipartisan backing in the Senate, it faced greater opposition in the House. To help inform its decision-making, the House Committee on Banking and Finance held fourteen days of hearings in April and May 1949 regarding the pending housing bill. A variety of groups argued their cases, including representatives of business, who tended to oppose the bill, and city mayors, veterans groups, labor unions, and civil rights groups, who supported it.11

In his testimony on behalf of the national office of the NAACP, Leslie S. Perry described a number of obstacles to adequate minority housing. In particular, Perry cited difficulties in slum clearance that clearly echoed the complaints heard in Indianapolis. The NAACP official stated that redevelopment programs were taking $10,000–$12,000 homes from African Americans and were only offering half the amount in compensation. To complicate the issue, many displaced persons could find no suitable housing because of racial discrimination and other market conditions. As a remedy, Perry suggested amendments to disallow discrimination and segregation in all renewal projects and in other government housing programs, including those administered by FHA.12

Residential segregation had already become a divisive issue in Senate debate. Conservative Republicans John Bricker of Ohio and Harry Cain of Washington, eager to defeat the Senate bill, introduced an amendment to end discrimination in all public housing built under it. Bricker and Cain knew that the anti-segregation measure would
split the southern and northern-liberal alliance that backed the bill. Although voting against this amendment pained staunch civil rights supporters, northern liberals and southern Democrats defeated the provision in order to save housing reform. Their sacrifice allowed the Senate bill to pass by a comfortable margin.\textsuperscript{13}

The House bill passed as well, and after differences were reconciled and approved, President Truman signed the Housing Reform Act of 1949 on 15 July, one of the few victories experienced by Truman in his Fair Deal program. The Housing Act provided for 810,000 public housing units in six years with annual subsidies of $308,000,000 for forty years, and it included $1,500,000,000 for slum clearance. All moneys would be funneled through local housing authorities.\textsuperscript{14}

With so much at stake, even Indianapolis considered accepting federal funds. As soon as the Housing Act became law, Mayor Al Feeney began to state that the city needed low-cost housing, and local branches of the American Veterans' Committee, Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), American Federation of Labor (AFL), and NAACP became more emphatic in their requests for a local housing authority. In a special session on 6 September 1949, the City Council authorized the legal department to draft a resolution that would form a housing authority.\textsuperscript{15}

Before making its decision the City Council held a lengthy hearing on 3 October 1949. Several hundred citizens listened to arguments that focused on the need for and effectiveness of federal public housing. Similar to the national debate over public housing, real estate interests and other business leaders opposed the establishment of a housing authority while civil rights organizations, unions, and veterans groups supported the measure. The Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, IREB, and other real es-
tate interests joined forces, allowing Marshall Abrams of the Indianapolis Construction League to act as spokesperson. Abrams made a lengthy statement that called public housing "a definite slap in the face and an unwarranted indictment of the Indianapolis building industry" that would rob private enterprise of building materials required to end the city's housing shortage. Edna Johnson, who spoke for the state NAACP, acknowledged that private builders had made some progress, but she argued that more needed to be accomplished in the area of minority housing. Johnson claimed that for every twenty-eight housing units erected for whites, private industry built only one unit for the city's growing African American population, which as a whole was poorer than the rest of the city's residents. After four hours of testimony and discussion, the council voted to table the issue temporarily. 16

Twice the more the council considered the issue. On 17 October a closed-door committee meeting elicited fiery debate between those who wished to pass the resolution immediately and those who wanted more time to study the opinion of the city's counsel, but in the end, the issue remained unresolved. Three weeks later the City Council again considered the establishment of a housing authority. In this instance the resolution escaped another motion to table and was approved with a vote strictly along party lines with six Democrats for and three Republicans against it. After the meeting Mayor Feeney indicated that he would make appointments to the five-member housing authority within the next few days, thus allowing Indianapolis to obtain a share of federal funds. 17

Democrats on the City Council voted for the housing authority resolution, in part, because Indianapolis's population had grown since 1940. The U.S. census of 1950
revealed that the city had added over 40,000 citizens in the decade. It also showed that the African American population had more than kept pace, comprising 15 percent of the city total.\textsuperscript{18}

Just as the population had grown, residential patterns had changed. In 1950 more people lived outside the city limits but inside Marion County than in 1940. Suburban residents, primarily whites, constituted 23 percent of the county population in 1950 as compared to 16 percent ten years earlier. Within the city African Americans moved into a wider area than before. Twenty nearly contiguous census tracts reported more than 1,000 African Americans while only eleven tracts reported none. Yet, on a block-by-block basis the city had become more segregated. The index of dissimilarity rose a full point between 1940 and 1950, reaching 91.4.\textsuperscript{19}

Despite increasing segregation, 1950 brought some improvement to the housing situation for African Americans. Seventeen families that could afford new housing moved into a small housing development in the 2300 block of Greenbriar Lane, located southwest of Douglass Park. For a down payment of $595 on a $6,400-home, people could move into this FHA-approved development. Moreover, Barrington Heights, a 338-unit rental project managed by and for African Americans, opened in the 1600 block of Keystone Avenue.\textsuperscript{20}

In addition, Flanner Homes, Inc. started its first twenty-one self-help homes in the Project A redevelopment area. African American families chosen for the project had been carefully screened for “character, dependability and general ‘good neighbor’ rating.” In addition to holding a full-time job, each husband agreed to contribute at least twenty hours per week in a cooperative effort to build all twenty-one homes. In
exchange Flanner Homes, Inc. obtained financing for the land, advanced money for materials, and trained participants in construction techniques. For this contribution of "sweat equity," each family gained a home for about half of its appraised value.\(^1\)

Although supporters of the self-help project argued to the contrary, opponents charged that Flanner Homes, Inc. was merely building a modern ghetto. Andrew Ramsey emphasized this idea repeatedly in his column, and at times he offered such strong opinions that the *Indianapolis Recorder* reminded readers that Ramsey did not necessarily speak for the newspaper. In a March 1949 column, Ramsey contended that realtors on the Redevelopment Commission were trying to "stem the tide of Negroes who are seeking better housing outside the neglected slum areas." Ramsey also called for an end to the segregated nature of the self-help project saying, "If segregation is to go, the plan of the Redevelopment Commission must either be changed and, however laudable, the satellite project called Flanner House Homes must be equally open to all and all must know it."\(^2\)

In addition to questioning redevelopment, segregation in public housing became an issue at this time. Lockefield Gardens, still the sole federal project in Indianapolis, came under scrutiny first. In October 1950 a white couple was admitted to the development. Some residents of Lockefield Gardens thought this action signaled a change in policy and perhaps a shift to all-white occupancy, but Lionel Artis, manager, denied that he had done anything noteworthy. Although government officials had planned and built Lockefield Gardens specifically for occupancy by African Americans, Artis said, 

Lockefield has never been designated as a Negro project, although it is in a predominately Negro community. . . . We do not discriminate. Our
admission policy is based on need without regard to race, creed, or
color. I hope the same policy will prevail at other developments. There
have always been white people living in Lockefield Gardens.23

These integrationist comments led the *Indianapolis Recorder* to ask the city
housing authority if it would challenge segregationist assumptions, too. If Artis’s atti-
tude had raised hopes, the housing authority soon lowered them. After consideration,
housing officials indicated that the authority would simply supply low-rent housing to
tenants who could not afford sanitary dwellings. It would not “settle other social prob-
lems.” Disappointed, the *Indianapolis Recorder* ran an editorial that chastised the city
government for its stance, suggesting that anyone who did not wish to adhere to demo-
ocratic principles “may be advised to move to Birmingham[, Alabama].”24

Even in 1952 the question of segregation in public housing remained unsettled.
In the sixteen months since its inception, the housing authority had borrowed nearly
$300,000 from the federal government and had begun plans for seven public housing
projects. As the authority fleshed outs its program, debate became intense, and discus-
sions regarding the merits of segregation came to the forefront. The housing authority
proposed to allocate new facilities proportionately. It would construct six projects for
whites only and allot one new development plus Lockefield Gardens to African Ameri-
cans. Proponents of segregated public housing argued that the plan avoided racial strife
by separating inharmonious groups; contrarily, opponents asserted that segregation
would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and would only
intensify racial problems.25
Although it seemed that those who championed the benefits of segregation had the advantage, the City Council chose a different course. On 3 March 1952 the council called representatives of various groups to argue the pros and cons of public housing. Once again, union members and civil rights advocates pleaded for public housing while real estate interests and the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce called for an end to federal funds. Highland Park Citizens' Committee, a number of homeowners united against a project planned for their south-side neighborhood, joined the business groups in opposing public housing. Instead of deciding whether the city would benefit from racially divided public housing, the council supported an ordinance that terminated the entire program. Stripped of its ability to build new public housing, the authority remained responsible for running Tyndall Towne and other temporary housing developments built for veterans and their families immediately after World War II.26

Following the termination of federal funds, Donald R. Hanson, executive director of the housing authority, expressed his dismay at the City Council's actions. Hanson not only lamented the end of public housing in Indianapolis, but he also questioned the motivations of the opposition. Arguments against public housing always centered around objections to "socialism" and "federal control," but Hanson asserted that political ideologies only served as veneer for deep-seated classism and racism.27

Although debate about residential segregation found particular focus in public housing, the issue resonated in most Indianapolis neighborhoods during the 1950s. Prevailing attitudes still favored segregation, so much so that the daily newspapers continued to run real estate advertisements with the heading "colored." Even years later, some residents could recall clearly delineated areas in which African Americans lived.
For example, Lawrence Brookins, an African American who participated in the Flanner Homes program, remembered, “You were restricted to just one certain area. . . . From, at that time from the railroad track, which is this [the east] side of, of College.”

The African American population in the inner city was growing, however, and could not be confined inside the traditional ghetto areas. Because white homeowners were convinced that they would never recover their investment if neighborhoods became integrated, many feared the day when the first African American family moved near them. Media tended to confirm these beliefs, especially in the early-to-mid 1950s. In a series of articles about residential patterns in Indianapolis, the Indianapolis News explained that once an African American family moved onto a block the white market virtually disappeared. In fact, one article stated that the values of homes even two blocks away depreciated by 10 or even 15 percent, and an owner might wait two years before finding a purchaser willing to pay full price. Despite hearsay to the contrary, African American buyers were not willing to “pay a ‘premium’ out of racial considerations.”

Some real estate agents, eager to profit from apprehensions about neighborhood integration, practiced what was known as “blockbusting.” Unscrupulous brokers introduced minority families into all-white neighborhoods and then spread rumors of neighborhood transition. Whites, afraid of what would happen to their property values, would sell to these agents, relieved that they had left before prices dipped even further. Brokers in turn sold these houses to minorities at a healthy profit.
Because of the ill will created by blockbusters, membership in a recognized real estate organization remained the hallmark of an ethical agent. The National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) ranked as the premier association, and members claimed exclusive rights to use the title “realtor.” Unfortunately for African American brokers in Indianapolis, the local affiliate, IREB, could not admit nonwhites according to its bylaws. Consequently, in 1952 African Americans in Indianapolis formed the Central City Real Estate Board (CCREB). The chapter, which was open to agents of any race or creed, belonged to the National Association of Real Estate Brokers, an organization of African Americans who employed the title “realtist.”

Both IREB and CCREB claimed to protect their clients from unscrupulous practices through national standards of conduct, but the organizations had different views on ethics. The mostly white NAREB had become slightly more liberal since the 1920s. In 1944 it created a committee on African American housing that studied problems faced by minorities, and in 1950 revised its Code of Ethics to read: “A Realtor should not be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a character of property or use which will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood.” The new code no longer referred to race or nationality but left much to interpretation. Members of IREB continued to follow the local custom of refusing to show houses to African American families unless minorities already occupied two homes on the block. In contrast, CCREB members sought housing opportunities for their clients regardless of race.

Antipathy toward unethical real estate agents and their effect on neighborhoods was so prevalent and consistent across the United States that the Commission on Race and Housing, a national advocacy group, published a report in 1958 that listed myths of
residential integration. Titled *Where Shall We Live?*, the work cited four specific fears common to American whites apprehensive about neighborhood integration. The first fear involved status. The authors found that while many whites said minorities worthy of respect, meaning doctors or other professionals, made fine neighbors, they were concerned that outsiders would only see skin color and would think less of their neighborhoods. Whites also worried that intermarriage might occur, further lowering their status. Second, whites feared that property values would fall and never rise again because minority owners would introduce slum conditions. Third, they dreaded inundation, the idea that entire neighborhoods would become nonwhite once the first minority families arrived. Finally, whites thought that gangs and crime, problems reported in ghettos, would endanger their personal safety. Sometimes these fears were realized in neighborhoods during transition, but as Taeuber and Taeuber and others noted, they were often self-fulfilling prophecies.32

If an *Indianapolis Times* article from 1959 was any indication, people in Indianapolis held many of these views. White residents of a mixed neighborhood told a reporter how they felt about African Americans living near them. One woman said that she did not mind one of the African American families on the block but another was not “educated or clean like the others.” Another white said, “You feel when somebody knows they’re living next to you, it hurts your pride.” Yet another indicated that his family had no plans to move soon, but he did not want to be the last white on the block.33

As the face of their neighborhoods changed, white homeowners made individual decisions regarding appropriate solutions. Some chose to defend their neighborhoods by
refusing to sell to African Americans and by intimidating those who bought or at­tended to buy homes. Others moved to more exclusive neighborhoods, and still others accepted and even welcomed all newcomers. As African Americans took residences farther north and west, white residents in neighborhoods surrounding Crown Hill Cemetery on the city’s northwest side found themselves in the area of greatest transi­tion. Homeowners chose among all of these responses.

As in earlier decades some white homeowners formed protective associations to defend their neighborhoods. For example, the Fourth Ward Improvement Association, roughly bounded by Meridian and 38th streets and Fall Creek, was organized after a woman “spited” her neighbors by selling to African Americans. In the same area the Blue Ridge Club, Inc. circulated inflammatory mailings. A more unusual case involved residents north of Crown Hill Cemetery who organized the Fairmap Realty Company. As homes went on the market, members pooled their money to purchase and then resell residences on a whites-only basis. At the outset supporters were enthusiastic about blocking African American buyers; however, as a greater percentage of homes in the neighborhood were listed, they found it increasingly difficult to keep pace financially. Eventually, the venture failed.34

African Americans who considered purchasing homes in white neighborhoods were sometimes warned off by current residents. In one case, Walter and Catherine Bean, who planned to move their family north of the invisible 38th-Street “color line” on Graceland Avenue, received phone calls from an unidentified woman. She informed them, “You and your kind are not wanted among us decent people.” Even Henry J. Richardson, a former state legislator, was forced to respond to an angry caller when he
and his wife Roselyn considered purchasing a home outside the traditional ghetto. In 1954 Richardson wrote a letter to Med Compton, informing the real estate agent that African Americans could not be barred from purchasing homes in certain areas. As an attorney and a member of the NAACP national legal staff, Richardson knew that his wife had violated no statute by attempting to see a home on Michigan Road. He also believed that she had done nothing morally wrong. Not one to be intimidated, Richardson made it clear that he would take the matter to court, if necessary. 35

White residents who opposed integration but did not wish to defend their neighborhoods often left. Whites moved farther from the city center in a manner once described as a “mad scramble.” The change from blocks being a minority to the majority often took place within a short span of time. For example, the Indianapolis Times reported that the two census tracts that included Crown Hill Cemetery and proceeded west to the canal turned from 3.5 percent African American in 1950 to over 85 percent in 1957. 36

Still, not everyone favored residential segregation, and in the 1950s a nationwide effort to reduce the prevalence of discrimination in housing took shape. In 1950 a number of civil rights, religious, and labor organizations formed the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH) to coordinate efforts in combating residential segregation. Some of the most prominent member organizations included the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), American Friends Service Committee, Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, CIO, and NAACP, and long-time housing experts like Charles Abrams and Robert Weaver took leadership positions. NCDH campaigned for equal opportunity in housing at various levels. Not only did the organization lobby
the federal government, it also provided support and educational materials for local efforts to achieve open occupancy.³⁷

The NAACP took one of the most active roles in NCDH, and efforts by the national office were seen in Indianapolis. In 1954 alone, the local branch of the NAACP sponsored a panel discussion about housing at the Phyllis Wheatley branch of the YWCA, and it invited Gertrude Gorman, a national field secretary of the NAACP, to speak to the Federation of Associated Clubs about segregated housing. Gorman, who visited branch leaders around the state, emphasized the power that real estate interests held in the perpetuation of residential segregation and the need for integration in order to overcome de facto school segregation.³⁸

Some homeowners near Crown Hill Cemetery worked toward peaceful integration. In the Butler-Tarkington neighborhood—an area northeast of Crown Hill Cemetery bounded by 38th and Illinois streets, Michigan Road, and the canal—homeowners organized a new type of neighborhood association. Formed in 1956, Butler-Tarkington Neighborhood Association (BTNA) tried to improve the area in various ways. Contrary to the efforts of protective associations, members of BTNA welcomed an integrated neighborhood and proposed “to show, as an example, that open occupancy is possible, does not lead to a racial ghetto, does not destroy property values, and does not lead to the deterioration of a neighborhood.” Members welcomed any African American who could afford to purchase a home there and discouraged panic selling by whites.³⁹

In October 1960 residents of BTNA and members of other organizations held a seminar on open housing. Sponsors included local arms of organizations involved in NCDH: the AFL-CIO Central Labor Council of Marion County, American Friends
Service Committee, Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, NAACP, and Indiana Civil Liberties Union. Other civil rights organizations—the Indianapolis Church Federation, Catholic Interracial Council, Indianapolis Human Relations Council, Indianapolis Jewish Community Relations Council, Lutheran Human Relations Association of America, Indianapolis Human Rights Commission, National Council on Jewish Women, and Unitarian Fellowship on Social Justice—were part of it as well. The program incorporated keynote speaker Morris Milgram, an open housing activist from Philadelphia, and discussions of practical issues in sessions titled “Neighborhoods and Backyards” and “Public Policy in Housing.”

This seminar in open housing occurred at a time when the African American population was expanding rapidly. The 1960 census indicated that Indianapolis had grown by more than 11 percent since 1950. Annexation of ten mostly white tracts contributed to this increase, but the in-migration of African Americans, mostly southern blacks in search of northern jobs, accounted for nearly 70 percent of the growth. The African American population comprised slightly more than 20 percent of the city total, and ten more tracts than a decade before—thirty of 135—reported more than 1,000 African American residents.

Notwithstanding the doubling of the minority population, thirty-five census tracts still reported no African Americans, and two of these tracts were located adjacent to one another in working-class Haughville. Since the late nineteenth century, companies such as Kingan’s meat-packing plant and Malleable iron works had attracted eastern European laborers to Haughville, and the area remained one of the city’s few European ethnic enclaves. Since 1930, when the census first enumerated statistics by
tract, the two had reported all-white populations. For financially marginal ethnics, an integrated neighborhood signified the loss of hard-earned investment, status, and identity; thus, Haughville maintained its exclusivity as long as possible. An influx of both blacks and whites from the South emphasized the local tendency toward “clannishness” and increased tensions. At one point community leaders worried that violence might erupt, but attention by church leaders, police, and the Mayor’s Human Rights Commission helped to diffuse the situation. Luckily, Haughville—unlike European ethnic neighborhoods in cities like Chicago and Milwaukee—avoided widespread, racially motivated disturbances.42

The year 1960 featured not only the decennial census but also political elections. The presidential and gubernatorial campaigns both brought promises by candidates for progress in civil rights, including equality in housing. On the national level John F. Kennedy vowed to use his pen in order to end discrimination in housing, and in Indiana Democrat Matthew E. Welsh made a strong commitment to civil rights, announcing his plans on the steps of the Walker Theater in Indianapolis on 27 October 1960. Welsh emphatically stated his support for open housing, saying

We must act now to obtain decent housing without discrimination. More than 20,000 new homes were built in Indiana last year, yet less than 500 were available to non-whites. In our free enterprise system, we must encourage a genuinely free and open housing market. Without it we create slums by crowding people together and denying dignity to a substantial number of our citizens.43
Following Welsh's election as governor, civil rights activists felt optimistic about governmental support for their cause. They looked forward to the passage of equal rights legislation in the 1961 session, and NAACP lawyers began pressuring state legislators to back favorable bills. Their efforts were rewarded by a bipartisan public accommodations bill that came before the Senate. The bill included a section, based on a Connecticut law, that proscribed discrimination in public housing, publicly assisted housing, and developments of five or more units. Although the final version, approved 9 March 1961, was considerably weaker, the prohibition against discrimination in public housing owned by cities or the state remained, but the provision had little effect in Indianapolis. 44

Just weeks after the approval of the state public accommodations law, the Indiana Committee of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights heard testimony in Indianapolis that revealed various types of discrimination in Indianapolis, including inequality in housing opportunities. On 25 March 1961 participants revealed that not only did the city suffer from a shortage of 6,000 minority housing units and IREB refuse to admit nonwhites, but religious discrimination also existed. Robert Gordon, director of the regional office of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, described how Jews were restricted from some neighborhoods. For example, to live in Hawthorn Hills, purchasers of homes had to join the country club; however, Jews could not become members. In another instance, Delaware Trails devised a quota system for Jews. The committee concluded, "Discrimination in housing is a common practice in Indianapolis, and Negroes find it difficult to find adequate housing." 45
A study of white and nonwhite populations prepared by the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) in March 1962 seemed to concur with this statement. Researchers compared 1950 and 1960 census statistics in Indianapolis and Marion County, concentrating on location and occupancy, condition, and overcrowding. Generally, nonwhites fared worse than whites—and sometimes significantly so. For example, in 1960 less than 16 percent of the city’s white population lived in deteriorating or dilapidated dwellings whereas more than 35 percent of African Americans found themselves in residences that fit these definitions. In addition, more than 21 percent of Indianapolis’s nonwhites suffered overcrowded dwellings in comparison to under 10 percent of the city’s whites. However, the greatest imbalance concerned suburban Marion County. According to census statistics, whites resided in 61,470 suburban housing units, but nonwhites occupied just 424 such dwellings.46

With housing statistics like these being revealed in cities nationwide, activists such as Charles Abrams of NCDH determined to hold President Kennedy to his pledge of ending housing bias. After receiving a number of letters and not-so-subtle reminders in the form of pens and ink, the President finally took action. On 20 November 1962 Kennedy signed Executive Order #11063, which proscribed racial or religious segregation in any property that the federal government owned or operated or that received government financing, mortgage insurance, or guarantees. This included public housing and new developments financed by FHA or the Veterans’ Administration (VA). The order was not, however, retroactive, and it did not apply to private lenders; therefore, a large portion of housing remained unaffected. Still, the president’s order required gov-
ernment agencies that previously promoted residential segregation to support integration of neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{47}

News of the executive order immediately resonated in Indianapolis. A week after President Kennedy signed the order, the Indianapolis chapter of the NAACP announced its plan for action. As soon as the federal government and the national office of the NAACP interpreted and clarified details, it would send African Americans to attempt to purchase homes in FHA-approved subdivisions.\textsuperscript{48}

On the heels of Kennedy's nondiscriminatory order, Harold O. Hatcher, director of the ICRC, forecasted that the "housing issue will be warming up fast." Hatcher's prediction for 1963 proved absolutely correct.\textsuperscript{49}

In March 1963 hearings held by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission underscored the housing situation. William T. Ray, a prominent member of CCREB and former president of the Indianapolis NAACP chapter, testified that IREB prevented African Americans from purchasing homes in 90 percent of Marion County and that the all-white board only showed homes if two other minority families already lived on the same block. Robert E. Houk, president of IREB, denied both charges, but another member, Bruce Savage, stated, "[I am] ashamed of my community for what it has not done to take care of our minority groups."\textsuperscript{50}

In May 1963 Governor Welsh took steps toward tackling housing discrimination in Indiana. Speaking at the annual meeting of the Butler-Tarkington Neighborhood Association, Welsh described discrimination in housing as the "toughest and thorniest problem in race relations." He believed that by studying the nature and breadth of these inequities, sympathetic people would be prepared to find solutions; thus, he announced
a statewide housing conference that would be held in September. Two weeks later, Welsh integrated the Indiana Board of Realtors by naming Henry J. Richardson as its first African American member. The thirteen-member board controlled licensing, but as the *Indianapolis Star* was quick to note, the board did not have legal authority over local agreements between real estate agents regarding segregation.\(^{51}\)

The governor wholeheartedly backed the housing conference and contributed to its design. On 16 July Welsh invited about twenty housing industry leaders to meet in his office in a planning session.\(^{52}\)

Members of the ICRC also met to develop the program, and suggestions included an impressive list of goals. In addition to presenting the governor’s view of the housing problem, planners wanted members of the housing industry to define problems and propose steps for advancing the cause of open occupancy. Further, they wished to discuss implications of the NAREB ethics code regarding minority sales and to encourage local real estate boards to admit African Americans. Moreover, they wanted attendees to commit their communities to programs of action.\(^{53}\)

To plead the case for open occupancy most effectively, the ICRC chose to present as many facts as possible. Members of the commission gathered city maps that indicated residence by race, and they analyzed block and census tract data. Further, they tried to ascertain housing needs from the perspective of community leaders and from random samples of African American families. For the latter, interviewers asked both open- and close-ended questions about current and ideal living situations, including price and their desire to reside in integrated neighborhoods.\(^{54}\)
Held on 10 September 1963, the conference acquainted members of the housing industry with problems faced by African Americans. William T. Ray, who spoke in front of nearly 175 attendees, declared that of 4,500 new and used homes for sale in Indianapolis, only 100 were available to African Americans. He further asserted that no major apartment building occupied by whites also housed blacks. Yet, a poll of attendees showed that most favored service to all, regardless of race. For his part Governor Welsh made it clear that he preferred a voluntary end to discrimination, but if change did not occur, then it would come through force of law.55

IREB, the 450-member all-white board in Indianapolis, soon revised its official policy. In 1963 the National Association of Real Estate Boards approved a ten-point policy that declared realtors had no right or responsibility to determine the “racial, creedal, or ethnic composition of any area.” Further, it said that “Each realtor should feel completely free to enter into a broker-client relationship with persons of any race, creed or ethnic group.” IREB endorsed the policy although members interpreted it to mean that any homeowner or broker had “the right to refuse to sell homes to Negroes or handle transactions with Negroes if they choose.” One Indianapolis realtor said that if African Americans wished to buy houses in all-white neighborhoods, realtors did not stand in their way but told minorities to see white owners directly.56

Less than fifteen years had passed since Shelly v Kraemer, but attitudes had changed considerably. Although many people still did not want to live in integrated neighborhoods, civil rights and housing activists had made progress. Minorities in Indianapolis continued to face a housing deficit and opposition; however, government seemed poised to make a difference.
CHAPTER 3
Indianapolis Open Occupancy Ordinance, 1964

By 1964 open housing advocates in Indianapolis believed that they had gained sufficient support, so they decided to attempt to change city policy through a municipal open occupancy ordinance. Proponents—primarily civil rights organizations, religiously affiliated bodies, and social action groups—hoped that legally proscribing discrimination in housing would end segregation in all forms and lead to peaceful integration, thus improving the lot of African Americans and other minority groups. Sympathy for the cause, which resulted from the ongoing open housing movement at local and national levels, led to introduction of the open occupancy ordinance, but opponents—the most vocal of whom had ties to the business community—nearly prevented passage of the measure. Still, at the conclusion of long debate the City Council enacted the ordinance.

Open housing advocates began to draw up the ordinance about the time of the November 1963 municipal elections, which resulted in the seating of City Council representatives and a mayor with strong civil rights views. In these elections Rufus C. Kuykendall, Republican for District 2, and Reverend James L. Cummings, Democrat for District 3, became the first African Americans to sit on the City Council since 1948. With the firm support of the African American community, both men won by ample margins; in fact, Cummings secured his seat with record numbers. Democratic Mayor James J. Barton won his election only by a slim margin, but solid voting for Barton in African American wards secured the new mayor his position.¹
Rufus C. Kuykendall could credit much of his community support to a lifetime of service to Indianapolis. Kuykendall grew up in the city, attended its public schools, and then received undergraduate and law degrees from Indiana University. After being admitted to the bar in 1942, he served as a deputy prosecutor, first assistant city attorney, and public defender in criminal court. He also earned an impressive record as a civil rights leader, a record that included long-term membership in the NAACP and an appointment as assistant staff director of the Indiana Committee of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission during the Eisenhower administration.²

Reverend James L. Cummings, the pastor of Trinity CME Church, was also well connected in the African American community. An alumnus of Indianapolis’s Christian Theological Seminary and Butler University, Cummings sat on the city’s zoning board, and Henry J. Richardson, a civil rights leader and state representative in the 1930s, considered Cummings a “former protege.”³

Both Kuykendall and Cummings made housing an issue during the 1963 campaign. In an open letter published in the Indianapolis Recorder, Kuykendall described segregation in housing coupled with the reluctance of private industry to build low-cost housing in redeveloped areas as a significant problem in the city. In a parallel item Cummings listed Indianapolis’s four major problems as housing, unemployment, crime, and taxes, and he asserted that overcrowding in redeveloped areas could be alleviated by low-cost housing.⁴

Barton, who recognized that African Americans lived in overcrowded conditions resulting from discrimination, also campaigned on issues of housing and equality during his first run for public office. A native of Indianapolis and currently the state police su-
perintendent, Barton aimed to revitalize city neighborhoods using any helpful source, including funds from the federal government. Although the Indianapolis power structure had shown little support for outside aid, Barton would certainly have the backing of the head of the Indiana Housing Authority, his brother Pat Barton. One of Barton’s campaign ads expressed his goals simply, saying that a win for Barton would translate into jobs, housing, and freedom. The Indianapolis Recorder concurred in an editorial that congratulated the new mayor upon his victory, proclaiming that Barton would style Indianapolis “no mean city of homes.”

With two future council members and a mayor-elect sympathetic to issues of housing, a group of forty liberals drafted an open housing ordinance for Indianapolis. They remained secretive about their membership but rumors indicated that the group was predominated by representatives of civil rights organizations, including the Human Rights Commission; religious groups, such as the Indiana office of B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation League and the Jewish Community Relations Council; and area lawyers. Other groups—primarily the Indianapolis Social Action Council (ISAC), NAACP, and CCREB—had also indicated that they would push for open housing legislation in statements outlining their goals, so members of these organizations likely participated, too.

Before the group could formally introduce the ordinance, an Indianapolis Star reporter scooped the story in the newspaper’s 20 February 1964 issue. Although none of the alleged framers owned up to having seen a draft, the news story included all of the proposed ordinance’s essential points, including its goal of eliminating various types of discriminatory acts, enforcement by the Human Rights Commission, and possible criminal penalties. The Star viewed the secretive nature of the liberals who drafted the
ordinance suspiciously and later accused the group of trying to pass the ordinance without informing city residents, all of whom would be affected by the antidiscrimination law.\textsuperscript{7}

Six days later, Kuykendall and Cummings made their official announcement of the proposed ordinance at a press conference. The two men offered a proposal that would make refusing to sell, rent, lease, or lend on the basis of race, religion, or nationality a criminal violation. The ordinance would also prohibit the advertisement of specifically segregated housing and proscribe discrimination by appraisers. The mayor’s Human Rights Commission would provide enforcement, backed by fines and possible jail sentences for violators. Furthermore, it would allow exemptions for owner-occupied two-family homes, boarding houses, and homes with religious affiliations.

In the immediate wake of the press conference the ordinance elicited mixed reactions. Although some commented that a number of cities and states had similar laws, others did not believe that the measure would be found constitutional. In addition, the unanimous defeat of a similar ordinance in South Bend, Indiana, only days before cast doubt on whether the ordinance had any hope of passage.\textsuperscript{8}

Civil rights and religious groups, most of which were rumored to have drafted the ordinance, offered their support without hesitation. The Jewish Community Relations Council had organized the meeting for the councilmen, and Rabbi Maurice Davis of the Indianapolis Hebrew Congregation cited the need for such a bill at its unveiling. In addition, ISAC and NAACP guaranteed their backing, and a representative of Plan­ner House also spoke of the need for such legislation.\textsuperscript{9}
Members of city government were less enthusiastic. Mayor Barton, in fact, expressed real doubts, saying he believed that neighborhood associations satisfactorily alleviated tensions caused by integration. Barton also worried that the ordinance would be found unconstitutional. About to face opposition from the business community for his plan to revive the Indianapolis Housing Authority, Barton turned over the ordinance to the Human Rights Commission for further study before making comment.10

In the meantime, the City Council and the mayor took action on an ordinance to repeal the 1952 measure that disallowed the Indianapolis Housing Authority and ended all federal funds for urban renewal. Despite vocal opposition from the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce and the Indianapolis Real Estate Board (IREB), the ordinance passed the council on 16 March 1964 with only one dissenting vote, that of Republican Harold Egenes. Barton signed the ordinance the next day, and on 19 March he made public the membership of the bipartisan committee.11

On the same day that Barton named members of the Indianapolis Housing Authority, the twenty-person Human Rights Commission met to discuss endorsement of the open occupancy ordinance. Members held wide-ranging views. Two spoke in favor of the ordinance: J. Griffin Crump, who allegedly helped to write the proposal, and Reverend Laurence T. Hosie, executive director of the Church Federation of Greater Indianapolis and head of the Human Rights Commission's housing committee. Members of the commission with ties to the business community, on the other hand, objected to the proposed ordinance. Paul S. Partlow, a realtor, declared that the ordinance would hurt the cause of civil rights, would make it difficult to sell a house, and would drive from the city residents who objected to the ordinance. William H. Book, the for-
mer executive director of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, opposed the ordinance for his own reasons, which he made clear in a lengthy statement. Book believed that the current rate of voluntary integration, aided by a now-plentiful housing supply, precluded the need for an ordinance. Further, he stated that a “vast majority of the citizens” viewed the proposed ordinance as heavy-handed and would overturn it by referendum just like voters in Seattle and Tacoma, Washington. Moreover, Book stated that supporters of the ordinance would come to regret progressively more stringent measures that surely would follow what he perceived to be a punitive law. Like many, Book also doubted whether the city had the power to enact an open occupancy ordinance, and if the ordinance did stand up to constitutional tests, he believed it would only result in further white flight and thus more severe segregation.12

Despite the reservations of some members, the Human Rights Commission chose to back the idea of an ordinance. Defining open occupancy as “the right of an American to purchase or rent a residence without regard to his skin color or religious beliefs,” the commission declared that this right “should be unquestioned and to deny such right is morally wrong and un-American.” To make the ordinance more palatable, the commission recommended a revised enforcement section and further study before formal introduction in the City Council.13

After the Human Rights Commission made its recommendations, a group of the ordinance’s supporters met with Mayor Barton to convince him of the bill’s worth. Councilmen Cummings and Kuykendall, James Gibson of Flanner House, and David H. Goldstein of the Jewish Community Relations Council discussed the proposal with Barton on 30 March 1964. Although the mayor remained reserved in his endorsement
of the ordinance, he offered to back the proposal if the Human Rights Commission ap­proved changes made to it.14

After reading the commission’s positive report, the mayor decided to favor the ordinance. Barton even offered suggestions for a better proposal. He asked that the drafters change the ordinance so it would cover the entire county (most new housing was being built outside the city limits) and that the enforcement and penalty provisions be changed. Although Barton originated neither idea, these recommendations for the first time indicated the mayor’s support of the ordinance.15

As the ordinance gained the mayor’s support, the Chamber of Commerce began to discuss its position. During a board meeting on 9 April 1964 Charles E. Wagner, president, reported that an executive committee had met in response to the proposed open occupancy ordinance, and he indicated that legal counsel had questioned the ordi­nance’s legality. He also recommended that the chamber not take an official position until after the ordinance’s introduction to the City Council, which promised to be soon.16

After months of revisions and debate, Kuykendall and Cummings introduced General Ordinance Number 56, 1964 to the City Council on 18 May 1964. The ordi­nance now included an antiblockbusting section and a penalty section that set maximum fines at $300. Both Kuykendall and Cummings, who had been elected in 1963 by a growing African American constituency, argued that the ordinance would alleviate the housing problems suffered by minorities. Cummings’s Public Health Committee took responsibility for studying the proposed ordinance, and the council scheduled a hearing for 1 June.17
In its coverage of the ordinance’s introduction to the City Council, the Indianapolis Recorder reported that similar legislation was in effect in many other localities. The article indicated that such laws covered seventeen states and eighty cities had similar ordinances. This was an exaggeration since the National Committee against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH) only counted twelve states and twenty-six cities that had enacted open housing statutes by this time. The Indianapolis Recorder also failed to mention the recent trend of overturning these laws by popular referenda. 18

To prevent the passage of the ordinance, IREB began its campaign against the proposal immediately. Robert Graves, president of the real estate board, called the ordinance unconstitutional, saying, “We think a property owner should have the right to decide who he wants to rent and sell property to. You can’t legislate social acceptability or pass a law to make one man love another.” The board had taken a poll of its members and reported that only twelve of 329 supported it. Yet, the realtors complained that they had not been able to see the proposal. 19

Editorials by the Indianapolis Star, Indianapolis News, and Indianapolis Recorder—the latter the voice of the African American community and one of the ordinance’s strongest boosters—demonstrated the spectrum of support/opposition. The Star described the ordinance as a “closed eyes law,” contending that buyers would have to purchase without the benefit of all information available—an objection to the antiblockbusting section, which it saw as an infringement on free speech. It also called the exemption for church-sponsored housing a flaw, saying that the bill approved of discrimination as long as it was the “right kind.” The News, also highly critical, claimed that the ordinance would infringe upon property rights, the antiblockbusting
section would be difficult to enforce, and a backlash would occur. It encouraged defeat. The weekly *Indianapolis Recorder*, on the other hand, said that the city needed the ordinance because segregation led to the “socio-economic (moral and spiritual) deterioration of a nation of people,” and that restrictions in housing lay at the root of all other discrimination.\(^{20}\)

The *Indianapolis Times*, the most liberal daily, ran a story that demonstrated both sides of the argument instead of offering an editorial. J. Griffin Crump, executive director of the Human Rights Commission, represented proponents of the ordinance, while IREB president Robert Graves stood for those opposed to it. Both used constitutional arguments, pitting the right of sellers to dispose of property against the right of buyers to live where they chose and could afford. Crump cited a history of housing problems for minorities that soon would be exacerbated by interstate highway construction. He said that the displaced wanted to move to decent neighborhoods and restrictions on their ability to do so would only bring more tensions. He also named other cities, including Philadelphia and New York, that had implemented similar ordinances successfully. Graves, on the other hand, said that integration had already begun in Indianapolis and President Kennedy’s executive order would continue the trend. In his mind, this violation of free speech and free press (referring to sections prohibiting blockbusting and advertisements of segregated housing) would lead to the loss of other rights.\(^{21}\)

This juxtaposition of rights formed a familiar dialectic, encompassing competing definitions of liberty. Political theorists have explained this opposition in terms of positive versus negative freedoms. Crump argued the positive side, calling for African
Americans to be able to participate fully as citizens and act as their own masters.

Graves, on the other hand, favored negative freedoms in which citizens live in an absence of coercion by other people, laws, or institutions that limit freedoms of speech, behavior, and association. Although some theorists believe that much of politics since the eighteenth century can be viewed as a clash between negative and positive liberties, others have argued that they can coexist. 22

IREB’s campaign for negative rights received constant press throughout the debate. The Indianapolis Times reported that Edward E. Mendenhall, president of NAREB, spoke to members of IREB and told them to oppose “forced housing laws” because they destroyed property rights and that “social acceptance . . . cannot be legislated.” Ten days later Graves went on record against the ordinance. Again he brought up property rights and free speech and reiterated that the city did not need an ordinance to integrate peacefully. He also declared the penalty portion too severe and noted that the ordinance made churches, some of its strongest proponents, hypocritical since they remained exempt from it. 23

Graves’s arguments against the open occupancy ordinance were strikingly similar to those of Mendenhall’s NAREB. The national board opposed the U.S. Civil Rights Bill, proceeding through Congress concurrently with debate over the open housing ordinance. NAREB argued that the Civil Rights Bill threatened property owners’ rights and constituted “forced housing.” The board also objected to provisions for public housing—anathema to strong proponents of home ownership—and penalties for those who continued discriminatory practices in housing. 24
In public debate most opponents used reasoning similar to the realtors; however, champions of positive liberties came from both sides of the ordinance issue. Letters to the editor, which remained even “for” versus “against” in the daily papers, demonstrate some of these arguments. Arthur J. Schnieder, a clerk at the Ross Hotel, wrote to the News, calling the ordinance a “sneak” open housing bill that repealed freedoms of choice, speech, and property. In a letter to the Star, Louis Wolf, president of the H.P. Wasson department store, pointed out that the bill would not create the ideal city, but that people should all have the same rights. Using the pen name Patriot, one resident declared the ordinance unnecessary because the city already had open housing since individual parties could mutually agree to complete a sale. Henry J. Richardson, who sat on the Indiana State Real Estate Board, reasoned that segregation of housing was detrimental to the city and had been declared unconstitutional by the Indiana Supreme Court, a decision upheld by the federal District Court in Indianapolis.25

Amidst this debate, the day of hearing for the open occupancy ordinance, 1 June 1964, began with a demonstration by the newly formed local chapter of the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE). Across the North and West in the late 1950s and early 1960s CORE chapters figured prominently in the securing of open housing legislation. The Indianapolis chapter modeled its direct-action picketing after tactics used in other cities, such as Ann Arbor, Michigan, as it picketed the Delaware Street entrance of the City-County Building in support of the ordinance.26

That evening a vocal crowd, estimated between 500 and 650, packed into the City-County Building’s 400-seat auditorium to hear the debate. Twenty-one speakers
gave testimony, and five of eight representatives for the opposition belonged to IREB. Proponents represented civil rights and social action groups, including the NAACP, ISAC, CORE, B’nai B’rith, and Conference on Race and Religion. The director of the Church Federation of Greater Indianapolis, Laurence T. Hosie, asserted that property rights were not absolute and human rights took precedence. The opposition primarily reacted to the penalty section. Realtor Fred C. Tucker proposed a committee be formed to study segregation instead of adopting the ordinance, and Carl Dortch, executive vice-president of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, urged a gradual education program in lieu of an ordinance.27

As spokesperson for the Chamber of Commerce, Dortch made a statement that acknowledged a historic pattern of housing discrimination in Indianapolis but did not assume that an open occupancy ordinance would rectify the situation. The declaration maintained that segregation “cannot be justified in any moral or economic considerations,” and with this change in attitude toward segregation, Indianapolis would integrate more quickly than some might imagine. The Chamber of Commerce opposed the ordinance, first, because it would either be unenforceable or would lead to extreme police measures following enactment and, second, because it would lead to further out-migration by those who opposed it. As an alternative to the ordinance, the Chamber suggested that the council adopt a resolution of policy and an education program. For its part, the Chamber of Commerce would continue “to encourage the business community to give support to full opportunity for all people without regard to race or creed.”28

Despite rhetoric of white flight and minority rights, elected officials stood on their own convictions as opposed to the racial makeup of their constituencies following
the hearing (see Illustration 3 in the Appendix). Council members in districts with areas heavily populated by African Americans did not necessarily support the measure, and those with nearly all-white populations did not oppose it vociferously. Thomas C. Hasbrook, Republican, and Max E. Brydenthal, Democrat, represented the mostly white First District, which happened to include the Butler-Tarkington neighborhood. Brydenthal offered support for the ordinance, if amended. Hasbrook remained less enthusiastic, opposing the antiblockbusting section and the fact that it applied to private sellers. Rufus C. Kuykendall, Republican, and council president Joseph Wallace, Democrat, were councilmen for the heavily African American Second District. As a sponsor, Kuykendall supported the measure, but he indicated willingness to compromise. Wallace, though, gave no commitment. Harold Egenes, Republican, and James L. Cummings, Democrat, represented the Third District. The western end of the district held a dense minority population, but regions to the east remained mostly white. Like Wallace, Egenes kept silent. Cummings stood by the ordinance and its penalties, saying that the law would not be effective without enforcement. Daniel P. Moriarty, the Democrat who represented the mostly white Fourth District, gave support to the ordinance pending amendments. Democrat R. Thomas McGill, representative for the Fifth District—an area with pockets of biracial and all-minority blocks—was not present at the hearing. Albert O. Deluse, Democratic councilman for the Sixth District, opposed the ordinance because of its penalty section. His district contained a section heavily populated by minorities to the east, but constituents to the west were mostly white. Mayor Barton remained uncommitted, indicating that he wanted to end discrimination but did not oppose amendments to the proposed ordinance.29
Two days after the hearing, IREB sent a letter to the mayor urging the adoption of an “action committee” instead of an ordinance. This was an idea that Fred C. Tucker, realtor and chair of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce’s committee on low-cost housing, had proposed at the hearing. In this proposal, a committee—composed of representatives from the NAACP, Marion County Residential Builders, Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, Indianapolis Church Federation, Construction League, organized labor, IREB, and neighborhood associations—would study the minority housing problem, coordinate realtor activities to make more housing available voluntarily, and convince the public that housing values did not have to decline as neighborhoods became integrated.

Harold O. Hatcher, director of the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, supported this idea. He came out against the ordinance’s penalty section because he thought that public opposition would prevent enforcement. Hatcher’s attitude disappointed some civil rights activists, including Henry J. Richardson. In a letter to Governor Matthew Welsh, Richardson expressed his dismay about Hatcher’s opinion, and he informed the governor that rumors indicated Welsh had directed the negative stance. Support from the state government, headed by the liberal governor, remained important in the capital city.  

Unlike Hatcher’s acceptance of IREB’s action committee proposal, the plan led CORE to step up its campaign. On 9 June the civil rights organization held a news conference that led to a tit-for-tat with IREB. At the press conference CORE urged adoption of the ordinance and charged IREB with systematic discrimination against African Americans that should not be tolerated. CORE claimed that IREB excluded African
Americans from membership, refused to show African Americans houses, failed to show concern for the city’s housing problems, frightened the white community into opposing the ordinance, and took more interest in profits than property rights. CORE also said that if IREB did not respond, it would take “militant measures,” later defined as picketing and sit-ins. In a subsequent article in the *Indianapolis Recorder*, CORE further explained its position. The group wanted to meet with IREB to discuss integrating the board immediately and altering rules so realtors would have to show homes to minorities.

In response, IREB denied all charges and delayed action on all issues that CORE raised. Robert Graves, the president of IREB, condemned CORE’s threat of demonstrations and what he considered “violence,” saying that these actions would only cause more tension. When IREB met that week, the organization deferred action on a resolution to amend its by-laws that would allow nonwhites to be members of the board. Graves blamed the ordinance for the delay, saying that if IREB changed its position in the midst of the fight over open housing, then it would appear that the realtors had “caved in.”

Even as IREB dug in its heels, the mayor remained lukewarm about the ordinance. In February the ordinance’s framers had believed that Barton would support the measure with few reservations. Instead, the mayor continually deferred to the Human Rights Commission. The *Indianapolis Recorder* reported that the African Americans felt disappointed by his unenthusiastic attitude since the black community had helped to elect him. Even after the Human Rights Commission’s 18 June endorsement of the ordinance, the mayor continued his silence. In an interview with the *Indianapolis Times*,

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Barton said that he "should voice an opinion . . . before the July 6 City Council meeting," but would go no further. Irving Leibowitz, political columnist for the Indianapolis Times, poked fun at the mayor in his column by conducting an imaginary interview. In Leibowitz's imagination, Barton responded to a question about open housing by saying, "Well, I don't know. I want to study it. Certainly everyone should live in a home . . . or an apartment . . . or, what do you think?" Although Barton had revived the Indianapolis Housing Authority despite opposition from the business community, he appeared reluctant to touch this divisive political issue.32

Like the mayor, CCREB seemed strangely silent at this point in the debate, but the multiracial real estate board argued otherwise in the 20 June issue of the Indianapolis Recorder. Edna Johnson, board president, accused the city's other newspapers of failing to print interviews and opinions given by the organization. Therefore, the board decided to send the mayor and council a letter directly. In this correspondence CCREB asserted that discrimination was profitable for IREB, listing reasons to support this claim. Many of the charges were similar to arguments made by open housing advocates. CCREB contended that in addition to its all-white membership, IREB followed an unwritten rule against selling to African Americans before two other minority families lived on the block. Further, if an African American showed interest in an all-white block, the realtor would remove it from the listing. Following rumors of transition, though, houses were purchased and sold to African Americans at great profit, taking advantage of pent-up demand. The letter also alleged that although African Americans filled the void left by whites fleeing to the suburbs and realtors obtained profits from
sales of homes to African Americans, IREB still opposed both the U.S. Civil Rights Bill and the ordinance. 33

As debate continued, another real estate association voiced its opposition, the Independent Real Estate Brokers of Indiana, yet another organization of agents active in Indianapolis. It called the proposed law "a gross violation of basic American freedom and the United States Constitution" and a poor piece of legislation. One member, William W. Johnston, stated that the majority of Indianapolis residents were being affected but not consulted. "If this [ordinance for Indianapolis] were put to a vote [of the people] it would be defeated 25 to 1." 34

Days before the City Council vote, the ordinance's supporters did what they could to gain attention for their cause. The Human Rights Commission called a news conference in which it criticized IREB for its stance on the ordinance. A group of fifty college and high school students backed the ordinance by holding a ten-mile rights march on 4 July, and the Indianapolis Social Action Council (ISAC) called for 10,000 supporters to attend the upcoming council meeting. 35

Passage remained uncertain, however, and a month of debate had realigned the council members. Kuykendall and Cummings, of course, backed it. Councilman Deluse, who had opposed the ordinance following the 1 June hearing, joined Brydenthal to support an amended ordinance. Egenes, who had been uncommitted after the hearing, and Moriarty, who had favored an amended ordinance, now preferred a declaration of policy. Wallace, the president, and McGill still had no comment. Kuykendall admitted that he could not tell where the fifth and decisive vote might come from, and the mayor
still had not given his wholehearted support. Cummings told the *Indianapolis Recorder* that he would blame Barton if the measure did not pass.\(^{36}\)

The much-anticipated meeting took place on 6 July 1964. Although Kuykendall walked in late, all council members sat in chamber for the discussion and vote. As the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce and others had suggested, Hasbrook first introduced a special resolution stating the city’s concern for the housing issue and calling upon the housing industry and newspapers to eliminate discrimination in housing. The council did not take action on it immediately; instead, council members proposed amendments. Cummings began by offering to eliminate the jail sentence and antiblack-busting sections. Both amendments passed unanimously. Brydenthal, who had supported the ordinance but only with amendments, put forth the next two. These broadened exemptions to all owners and to all dwellings owned and occupied by the seller. After the last amendment Cummings commented, “We have tried to be cooperative but this is hard to swallow.” Both amendments passed easily, six to three, with Kuykendall, Moriarty, and McGill dissenting each time.

Now the ordinance went to a vote. In the final roll call Brydenthal, Cummings, Deluse, Kuykendall, and Wallace voted “aye,” and Egenes, Hasbrook, McGill, and Moriarty voted “no.” The council unanimously defeated Hasbrook’s policy resolution after passage of the ordinance.\(^{37}\)

In the end council representatives did not necessarily vote according to party or the racial composition of their constituents. Most Democrats voted for the ordinance, splitting four to two while Republicans went against it two to one. Brydenthal (Democrat), who had introduced the ordinance that revived the Indianapolis Housing Author-
ity, and Hasbrook (Republican), representatives of the largely white First District, split. Both councilmen for the heavily minority Second District, Kuykendall (Republican) and Wallace (Democrat), voted yes, but Wallace waited to make his position known until the last moment. The Fourth District’s councilman, Moriarty (Democrat), who represented a basically white area, and McGill (Democrat), of the Fifth District, both cast no votes. Finally, Deluse (Democrat), who represented the southwestern portion of the African American ghetto and the western white subdivisions, voted yes.38

Initially, most seemed satisfied by the ordinance. Civil rights leaders and the ordinance’s two sponsors, Cummings and Kuykendall, were pleased to have an open housing law on the books despite its shortcomings. In a congratulatory letter to Cummings, Henry J. Richardson wrote, “Though... the bill was amended—even what is left appearing on the law roll of our city will be a terrific moral force, deterrent and disciplined guide for the future.” Even Robert H. Graves, president of IREB, said it was a realistic compromise that safeguarded individual property rights and that the board would abide by it.39

Editorial opinions in the daily newspapers fell on both sides. The Indianapolis Star questioned whether the ordinance truly offered equality and described it ominously as a “weapon.” Editors at the Indianapolis News, on the other hand, thought that amendments had improved the ordinance although it still violated property rights. The paper went so far as to commend those who voted against it. The Indianapolis Times, though, asserted that the community had nothing to fear from the ordinance and that the council acted responsibly.40
Within a few days after passage IREB revealed why it felt satisfied by the ordinance. Final wording exempted all owners from it; only sellers were responsible not to discriminate. IREB contended that its brokers did not sell houses but only found buyers for owners. If the city’s counsel agreed with this interpretation, the ordinance, for all intents, would be nearly useless in the sale of homes. Brydenthal claimed that he intended his amendment only to pertain to owners selling without the help of brokers and seemed taken aback by this attitude. Cummings and Kuykendall were also disappointed.41

After a week of study James W. Beatty, the city corporation’s counsel and Mayor Barton’s former campaign coordinator, declared the ordinance constitutional, and Barton signed it the same day. Beatty, however, concurred with IREB, saying that the ordinance only applied if owners, either individuals or corporations, openly entered discriminatory agreements with brokers. This decision made the ordinance, already weakened by amendments removing all penalties, nearly a dead letter—a disappointment to those who held such great hopes so many months earlier. This law could hardly end segregation in all forms and lead to peaceful integration of the city.42

Several factors led to such a weak ordinance, further undermined by interpretation. Opposition from city residents and, more importantly, from forceful business interests highlighted the disfavor felt toward a strong ordinance. Although open housing activists had gained more acceptance for their cause since the beginning of the 1960s, they could not silence the city’s conservative power structure. As it was, the compromised ordinance barely received the City Council’s approval, but its sponsors chose to enact a weak law rather than none at all.
Despite its shortcomings, the importance of the open occupancy ordinance should not be discounted. Introduction and enactment of the law demonstrated the rising political power of blacks in the central city. The ordinance's sponsors, both African Americans who had been elected on promises of better housing and greater civil rights for their constituents, were able to coax enough votes out of their fellow councilmen to win passage of an unpopular ordinance. But Kuykendall and Cummings were not alone. Enactment of the ordinance illustrated the influence of local civil rights organizations and open housing activists, coupled with the strength of the national civil rights movement. Without prior work toward open housing, the ordinance certainly would not have been approved in any form. The increasing political influence of African Americans and changing attitudes towards mixed neighborhoods, combined with the serious nature of the minority housing shortage made this debate incredibly important, and in the next few years those working toward open housing used the largely symbolic ordinance to their advantage.
CHAPTER 4
Support for the Principle of Open Housing, 1964–1968

The Indianapolis City Council approved an ordinance that looked toward open housing. Not surprisingly, enactment of the unenforceable law did not bring an end to discrimination and residential segregation in the city. In some ways the ordinance was successful, however, because open occupancy gained more acceptance in the following years and a modicum of integration took place. Civil rights groups in Indianapolis and elsewhere continued to press for equality in housing, and between 1965 and 1968 the Indiana General Assembly and U.S. Congress both enacted fair housing laws. Like the city ordinance, however, these laws left loopholes that allowed discrimination and segregation to persist. Despite the passing of decades and the strengthening of legislation, debate remains as to the accomplishments of fair housing in the 1960s.

Even in late summer 1964 African Americans in Indianapolis realized that they would have to continue the fight in order to obtain better opportunities in housing. Two people in particular, Mattie Coney and Henry J. Richardson, took immediate action. Following enactment of the housing ordinance and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Indianapolis teacher Mattie Coney organized Citizens Forum. Coney formed the group to educate African Americans about their responsibilities as good citizens. It worked with churches, schools, local government agencies, businesses, and social groups “to inspire Negroes to believe in themselves and their neighborhoods” and to improve their image in the minds of the majority. Citizens Forum offered a ten-point code that stressed proper conduct, good grooming, and well-kept property. Suggestions, which read much
like classroom rules, included “Keep your property neat and attractive;” “Respect your neighbors’ property;” Don’t be a horn-honker;” “Instruct your children in neighborhood pride, decorum, and respect;” and “Set a good example.” Members set up block groups to support these ideals, and Citizens Forum received widespread support in the city and across the nation. Councilmen Kuykendall and Cummings both approved of the organization and attended the first meeting at the Fall Creek Young Men’s Christian Association on 23 July 1964 where the two men led a question-and-answer period on the open occupancy ordinance.¹

Henry J. Richardson proceeded in other directions. He began by composing letters to various individuals involved in minority housing issues in Indianapolis. The correspondence generally demonstrated his high hopes for equality in housing; however, Richardson believed that discrimination and segregation would only end if every African American leader pressed for it. Thus, Richardson wrote to Cleo Blackburn, expressing to the director of Flanner House his views on self-help housing in light of open occupancy. Critics had long accused Flanner Homes, Inc. of building a modern ghetto that assisted only a handful of African Americans, and Richardson concurred. He reiterated this idea and said that the cooperative program, which was controlled by the city’s power structure, should not continue to exist in its current form because it did not advance issues of equality. For Blackburn’s “own good,” Richardson wrote,

The issue now is open occupancy with all barriers and legal walls down and Flanner House Homes and its backers will not agree and have gone on record opposed to constitutional open occupancy housing for Ne-

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groes. You just can't ride two horses at the same time and neither can your program demand equality and beg for favors at the same time.  

Blackburn remained circumspect about the criticism, and in a tactful reply he thanked Richardson for the “constructive analysis.” Instead of engaging Richardson in an angry exchange, Blackburn answered his critic by quoting a letter Richardson had recently written to Fanny Blackburn, the director's ill wife. “We must just accept the things that we can't do anything about . . . and then with moderation try to do something about the things that we can help to change.”

Richardson followed his own advice by helping to found an Indianapolis chapter of the Urban League. Although the moderate group led by Whitney M. Young already supported affiliates in Gary, South Bend, Fort Wayne, Elkhart, Marion, and Anderson, a chapter had never been established the capital city. Richardson and other supporters believed that an Indianapolis Urban League would effectively coordinate efforts in job training, school desegregation, and relocation of the thousands soon to be displaced by interstate highway construction and urban renewal projects. Initially, a small group met at Richardson's home to devise a strategy, and before the end of the year two large meetings with a number of civic leaders were held. In October 1964 Young visited the city and spoke to a group of seventy-five, urging the formation of an interracial committee to raise the $50,000 required to launch and run an affiliate in Indianapolis. Richardson agreed in the December meeting to head the funding campaign, which was successful. In December 1965 the Indianapolis Urban League was incorporated.

Like Citizens Forum and supporters of the Indianapolis Urban League, the Indiana Civil Rights Commission continued to study discrimination in housing and to work
toward equality. In September 1964 the ICRC released a survey that revealed attitudes of those living in the integrated neighborhoods of several Indiana cities. With the help of volunteers and the Indianapolis Human Rights Commission, the ICRC interviewed 297 city residents. Of the 258 whites interviewed, the majority were well educated and earned a decent income, and most reported positive views of their African American neighbors. Although 41 percent believed their property values had fallen since integration, 68 percent said that they intended to stay. From these statistics Harold Hatcher, executive director of the ICRC, concluded that fears about neighborhood integration were largely unfounded. However, the *Indianapolis Times* quite rightly criticized the survey for being too selective, since it only questioned families who had not contributed to white flight.

Hatcher presented these statistics at a state civil rights conference held at the World War Memorial in downtown Indianapolis. The director of the ICRC suggested the adoption of a statewide open occupancy law, and he sought recommendations from those in attendance. Hatcher planned to use these suggestions to prepare a report for the General Assembly during its next session.

Fortunately for the cause of open occupancy, the Democratic party swept the 1964 elections in Indiana. Democrat Roger D. Branigan won the governorship, and the party took both chambers of the General Assembly. The *Indianapolis Recorder* proudly reported that five African Americans were among those elected.

Following the election, the ICRC continued to call for civil rights bills, specifically twin proposals for open housing and school desegregation. The commission recommended that the housing bill, an amendment to civil rights laws passed in 1961 and
1963, cover both public and private housing and be enforced with the cease-and-desist powers of the ICRC. Although the commission desired a strong bill, it foresaw the need to exempt owner-occupied single and double residences in order to secure passage. Hatcher emphasized that if the legislature enacted the law, the commission wished to spend more time educating the public about open occupancy than punishing violators. He also assured Indiana citizens that the housing amendment would not drastically affect the status quo of neighborhoods in the short term. 8

On 19 January 1965 Senator David Rogers, a Democrat from Bloomington, introduced a housing bill similar to the one outlined by the ICRC. Described as a simplified version of the original draft, Rogers's proposal did not contain exemptions for owner-occupied single and double dwellings. The ICRC had dropped the exceptions upon the request of the Indiana Real Estate Association; yet, Robert Graves, chair of the body's legislative committee and former president of the IREB, said that his group still opposed the bill now in the hands of the Senate Committee on Public Policy. 9

Real estate interests opposed the housing bill, but the Indiana Conference on Civil Rights Legislation—a body that represented more than thirty civil rights, labor, and religious groups—supported it. Willard Ransom, chair of the conference, believed that the law would "ease panic" and would not encourage blockbusting. He said that the bill would "create in our state a free, unrestricted and competitive real estate market in which all of our citizens could participate." 10

On 21 January 1965 the Committee on Public Policy held one of several hearings regarding housing and school desegregation legislation. About 200 people attended, listening to nearly three hours of testimony. Supporters and opponents included
predictable parties using expected arguments. Representatives of the ICRC, the Indiana Council of Churches, Flanner House, and the Criterion (a publication of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis) favored the legislation. Members of the Indiana Real Estate Association and two housewives from Indianapolis spoke against the bill. One proponent stated that the housing amendment was not meant “to deny any man from selecting his home or his neighbors, but to prevent a man from denying that same privilege to another,” whereas one detractor thought that the bill would “destroy property rights and initiative.”

After listening to such testimony, the Committee on Public Policy presented a rewritten version of the housing bill to the full Senate on 27 January. Essentially, the committee changed the enforcement section, removing the ICRC’s power to issue cease-and-desist orders “unless such housing is either publicly owned or federally financed.” Although the rights commission would likely be able to use these orders in cases involving the acquisition of business property, Hatcher opposed the “watering down” of the bill. Three days later the Senate further amended the bill to exempt housing purchased with federal insurance or guaranty and then passed it with a vote of forty-seven to two.

The bill may have garnered the favor of most state senators; however, the current wording satisfied few others. The Indianapolis Star questioned the wisdom of enacting laws that could be made politically acceptable only by “pulling their teeth.” The Indianapolis Recorder was disappointed that the bill did little more than affirm rights promulgated by the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Even the Indiana Conference on Civil Rights Legislation now opposed the measure. Because the bill would apply to less
than 1 percent of dwellings in Indiana and exempted FHA and VA housing, one mem-
ber of the conference declared that the Senate had "mutilated" the bill and another de-
scribed it as "a slap in the face" to African Americans.13

The Indiana Conference on Civil Rights Legislation was, in fact, so displeased
that it staged a demonstration on 12 February. About 150 protestors from Gary, South
Bend, Fort Wayne, Muncie, and central Indiana gathered in the capital city to march
down Capitol Avenue, through the State House, across Senate Avenue to a statue of
President Lincoln, and then return to the State House to hear a Lincoln Day speech.
The demonstrators carried signs and sang protest songs.14

Meanwhile, the housing issue remained stalled in the lower chamber. Origin-
ally, the House Committee on Public Policy was assigned to study the matter, but the
committee allowed it to languish for weeks without a hearing. In order to move the
Senate bill before the end of the session, Speaker of the House Richard Bodine reas­
signed it to the Judiciary A Committee on the technicality that the House version of the
bill could require enforcement through cease-and-desist orders. The Indianapolis Re­
corder credited this action to Representative Charles A. Walton, a Democrat and Afri­
can American from Indianapolis, saying that he devised this solution when he learned
opponents had made a deal with committee members to kill the bill in the policy com­
mittee.15

Representatives in the Judiciary A Committee acted upon the issue much more
quickly than those in the former committee had. After a short meeting the day follow­
ing reassignment, the committee offered a report. It advised the House to remove
amendments reducing the ICRC's enforcement power and to add a passage making the
bill effective only in residential buildings of four or more units. With these changes the committee recommended passage. After a second and third reading and lively debate invoking both Shakespeare and the Golden Rule, the bill passed the House eighty-six to ten on 3 March.\(^{16}\)

Prior to the affirmative vote Representative Charles B. Howard, a Republican from Noblesville, made two attempts to amend the bill. Howard, an opponent of open housing legislation, wanted to require referendums on all open housing laws in Indiana. Voters in localities across the country, backed by real estate interests, had overturned open housing laws during 1964. In March citizens of Seattle, Washington, voted down that city's open housing ordinance, and in November Akron, Ohio, voters did the same, nullifying a fair housing ordinance overwhelmingly approved by the City Council in July. November elections in California brought invalidation of all open housing laws by Proposition Fourteen. These cases all received wide publicity in Indianapolis newspapers, and readers were reminded of these defeats in reference to the Indiana law. Howard wished to guarantee Hoosiers the right of approval, but his amendments were tabled, and Indiana voters did not put the state law to a referendum.\(^{17}\)

With legislation in effect at the state level, city government again moved toward open housing. In August 1965 the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee (GIPC), an advisory body named by Mayor Barton, issued a strongly worded policy statement that declared racial integration in schools and housing as two of its most important goals. The resolution recommended that African Americans who were to be displaced by the construction of the inner loop of the interstate highway system should be relocated throughout the city to avoid the creation of new ghettos. In addition, the committee
suggested that future urban renewal and public housing projects should encourage ra-
cial, economic, and social diversity. Members indicated that they believed these goals
of integration should not be compromised; however, they also acknowledged that they
had no power to force follow-through. The mayor also backed the policy, saying that he
was "100 percent in favor." 18

The Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, which worked to defeat the open
housing ordinance in 1964, seemed to support integration as well. *Life in Indianapolis,*
a marketing publication styled after *Life* magazine, described the experiences of six
families new to Indianapolis. "We've Come a Long Way" told the story of Bill and
Betty Ryder, an African American couple who lived in an integrated neighborhood on
the city's east side. Betty, a graduate of Butler University in Indianapolis, taught first
graders, while Bill, a native Detroiter who had taken a few years to settle down,
worked on an elite team at International Harvester. The Chamber publication quoted
Betty as saying, "It's an integrated world. There's room for improvement here in Indi-
anapolis, but you get out of it what you put into it. You go out and help yourself." 19

Reporting in the conservative media also indicated a change in attitudes, or at
least rhetoric, regarding residential integration. During the summer of 1965—a summer
filled with racial disturbances in the Watts area of Los Angeles and in other cities—the
*Indianapolis Star* published a series of articles that gave value to the concept of integra-
tion. These news stories indicated that in the previous few years a majority of Indian-
apolis citizens had begun to accept biracial neighborhoods as a natural progression.
Although some residents remained reluctant and preferred to move away as African
Americans lived progressively closer, biracial blocks appeared in many parts of the
city, including working-class neighborhoods like Haughville and on the city's south side. To allay the fears of those apprehensive about inundation, the Star assured readers that 25 percent of the population could never overtake the majority and that organizations like Butler-Tarkington Neighborhood Association and the newly formed Meridian-Kessler Neighborhood Association helped to alleviate the transition.20

In a telling shift of blame the series attributed the conditions of the mid-1960s to the legacy of the Ku Klux Klan. One article outlined the history of residential segregation, beginning with Klan influence forty years earlier. It related that older African Americans remembered the barriers prior to the 1920s as purely economic, not racial. The story also recounted how the Klan spread the myth of racial turnover; thus, the City Council enacted a racial zoning ordinance and a well-defined ghetto resulted. Because the article left much unsaid, including the fact that the ordinance was struck down only eight months after enactment, it likely relieved the guilt of many who had also contributed to the city's residential patterns.21

The Indianapolis News saw benefits of neighborhood integration as well. Whereas the newspaper in 1956 ran a headline that read, "White Market Sags as Negroes Buy into Area," nine years later it printed, "Integrated Suburbia: Property Values Are Stabilized." The 1965 review of integrated neighborhoods emphasized that calm reactions, communication, and hard work by neighborhood associations could make integration successful, especially in areas populated by the middle to upper-middle classes.22

For those living in poorer neighborhoods near downtown, the prospects did not seem so tranquil. Thousands—estimated from 5,000 up to 20,000—were to be displaced.
by construction of the inner loop of the interstate highway system. The urban renewal project that would make way for the Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis (IUPUI) campus near the Indiana University Medical Center would uproot even more African Americans. Residents in the affected areas complained bitterly that they were not being adequately compensated and they were not being consulted by decision-makers. One critic predicted that the proposed elevated highway would become a “Berlin wall” cutting off the ghetto from the rest of the city just as communist East Berlin was separated from capitalist West Berlin. As debate progressed into 1966, some threatened to hold an enormous protest march led by Martin Luther King, Jr.23

In 1965 and 1966 Edna Johnson, realtist and president of CCREB, wrote a number of opinion columns for the Indianapolis Recorder. Although they were primarily intended to educate readers about home buying, Johnson vented her frustrations about the restricted housing market as much as she offered advice to those who had to move from the highway’s path. In one particularly bitter column Johnson summed up the anger felt by the displaced, warning the city government of resentment toward its “paternalistic attitude.” The African American community was tired of “being planned for instead of being planned with,” Johnson said.24

To alleviate some of this tension a metropolitan housing conference was sponsored by the Church Federation of Greater Indianapolis on 14 and 15 June 1966. Titled “Adequate Housing for All,” the conference informed city residents about the current housing picture and plans for the future. It also offered a forum for the displaced. Almost 1,000 attended sessions that discussed housing supplies, relocation, and compliance with fair housing laws. A number of nationally renowned housing activists
attended, including Morris Milgram, an interracial housing developer; Thurgood Marshall, solicitor general of the United States; and David L. Lawrence, chair of President Lyndon B. Johnson's Committee on Equal Opportunity in Housing. All three offered challenging speeches that called for open and adequate housing in Indianapolis.25

Those in attendance drew up an impressive list of recommendations. At Milgram's suggestion, individuals were asked to seek interracial housing—whites should move to areas where African American lived and vice versa. Social agencies were advised to utilize all programs offered by the newly established federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and to create a council of neighborhood organizations so they could share knowledge and resources. FHA, VA, and private lenders were all called upon to end redlining, and other licensed members of the housing industry, such as builders and realtors, were requested to take and abide by non-discrimination pledges. Finally, government was given many responsibilities, including strengthening fair housing laws and enacting legislation that would benefit those displaced by urban renewal and highway construction.26

These suggestions did not go unheeded, and members of the General Assembly responded to the last recommendation during the 1967 legislative session. In the Senate Patrick Chavis, an Indianapolis Democrat, and Earl R. Landgrebe, a Valparaiso Republican, introduced a bill to permit the state to pay relocation expenses for the displaced. Two Republicans from Indianapolis, Richard M. Givan and Harriette B. Conn, presented a similar proposal to the House. Although the bills passed in their respective chambers by 21 February, it took until the last day of the session, 6 March, for the conference committee to reach an acceptable agreement. The final version of the law
allotted homeowners up to $2,500 above market value if they were displaced by the construction of highways or state-supported universities.  

During the same legislative session the General Assembly added a controversial housing amendment to the state’s Civil Rights Act. Suggested by the ICRC and backed by neighborhood associations, the proposal was intended to stabilize the racial makeup of integrated neighborhoods. The amendment allowed an individual or group to limit the number of minorities moving into an area as long as the ICRC authorized the plan. Civil rights groups were divided on the issue. Harold Hatcher originally claimed that the Indiana Conference on Civil Rights Legislation wholeheartedly approved the bill, but that was not true. The state NAACP, in particular, took offense to it since the organization believed that segregation in any form was wrong. CCREB also opposed the amendment. In spite of the controversy, the issue received bipartisan support in the House and the Senate, and it passed both chambers easily.  

Residents of Indianapolis submitted plans for approval almost immediately. Forest Manor, one of the city’s fourteen neighborhood associations dedicated to integrated stabilization, worked with the ICRC, real estate agents, and homeowners, asking them to cooperate with the voluntary plan. In addition, mortgage bankers agreed not to lend to African Americans buying homes from whites in the Forest Manor neighborhood. In another case, the owner of Kessler Garden Apartments, a new complex on the north side of the city drew up a plan limiting African Americans to a small number in each of three buildings.  

Generally, city and state government officials believed that integration of apartments was the greatest success in open housing in Indianapolis. By June 1967 the ICRC
found that a total of thirty-five buildings or complexes were integrated, and before the end of the year the Indianapolis Human Rights Commission reported that fifteen more fit this description. Both rights commissions admitted that the trend currently bordered on tokenism and only occurred in high-end apartments, but they predicted that segregated rentals would soon disappear from the city. J. Griffin Crump, director of the mayor’s commission, was encouraged because integration was taking place in different parts of the city, particularly the north and northeast.30

Although integration of apartments proceeded fairly smoothly, neighborhoods remained a difficult issue. Daniel J. Baum, an Indiana University law professor, developed a plan to make more housing available in Indianapolis on an open basis through the FHA. First, Baum persuaded the FHA director in Indiana to petition for approval of a program that would make repossessed homes available to displaced families prior to market exposure. As he waited for word from Washington, Baum organized the Committee on Special Housing, a group composed of social workers, the Church Federation of Greater Indianapolis, and Community Action Against Poverty (CAAP). He also sought support from the ICRC and advice from the NCDH. In a letter dated 4 January 1968 Washington assented, outlining the bureaucratic procedure. No preference was given for price, credit rating, or income, but those relocating due to highway construction or other government actions were given the chance to purchase homes acquired by the FHA before brokers received the listings.31

Although the plan garnered a fair amount of interest from the displaced, it proved difficult to administer. In one year only fifty-two families moved under the program. The low placement rate resulted, in part, from regulations that required each
purchaser to obtain an affidavit from a relocation agency, to make offers within ten
days of listing, and to complete sales without the assistance of a broker. The program
folded a year after it began, having yielded mixed results.32

While the Committee on Special Housing labored for an open market through
the FHA, Congress considered federal fair housing legislation. Since 1966 congres-
sional action had been debated in Washington, and President Johnson—at the urging of
NCDH and other rights groups—continually pressed for a law to end discrimination in
the sale or rental of housing. Although a weak civil rights bill that contained equal
housing measures passed the House in 1966, open housing laws faced strong opposi-
tion. However, a string of summer ghetto riots and the resulting Kerner Commission
Report, which blamed housing discrimination (among other things) for the disaffection
felt by urban blacks, contributed to a shift in Congressional sentiment. On 11 March
1968 the Senate approved a civil rights bill that included measures to assure equal
housing rights for minorities. The bill’s prospects in the House remained grim, but
Johnson’s decision not to run for reelection announced on 31 March and the assassina-
tion of Martin Luther King, Jr., four days later changed the political will. Violence that
erupted after King’s death made many Americans fear an all-out race war, and support-
ers of the law convinced other members of the House that they must act. On 10 April
the House approved the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (later known as the Fair Housing Act)
250 to 171, and Indiana’s eleven representatives voted along party lines with five
Democrats for and six Republicans against it. President Johnson signed the bill the fol-
lowing day, remarking, “I do not exaggerate when I say that the proudest moments of
my Presidency have been times such as this when I have signed into law the promises of a century.”

Finally, open housing advocates had won passage of a federal fair housing law. By 1970 the law was to bar discrimination in housing in 80 percent of housing in the United States. Although this seemed positive, it had few enforcement provisions and exempted homes for sale by owner and owner-occupied dwellings in which four units or fewer were rented. An Associated Press article in the Indianapolis News predicted that the act would not break up urban ghettos, but it would benefit middle- and upper-class nonwhites who could afford better homes and apartments.

About a month after Johnson signed the Fair Housing Act, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further in the case of Jones v Mayer. In a broad reading of the first federal law to guarantee real property rights—the Civil Rights Act of 1866—and congressional debate surrounding passage of the statute, the High Court ruled that there could be no exemptions to fair housing. The ruling took immediate effect, overriding provisions in the Fair Housing Act that prevented the law from becoming fully effective until 1970.

The myriad open housing laws and court rulings affecting the city led the Indianapolis News to feature an article educating readers about their rights and responsibilities. The news story not only mentioned the federal Fair Housing Act but the subsequent Supreme Court ruling and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In addition, it described the state housing law and the municipal open occupancy ordinance. Although the article implied that the overlapping laws could be woven into an adequate program to encourage fair housing, it ended by charging that “discrepancies between the letter of
the fair—and open—housing laws and their practical applications exist.” The leaders of the ICRC and Indianapolis Human Rights Commission were forced to concur.36

In a surprising move to end this incongruity, on 20 November 1968 IREB adopted strongly worded policy and action statements that affirmed open occupancy. The policy statement acknowledged that equal opportunity in housing could not be wholly achieved by legislation, and it offered IREB as the ideal body to help eliminate discrimination in housing in Indianapolis. The five-point action policy challenged realtors and their sales representatives to familiarize themselves with open occupancy laws and regulations; to serve customers equally; to avoid steering buyers according to “race, color, religion, or national origin;” to “discourage ‘panic’ selling”; and to encourage discussions of equal opportunity in housing with clients, neighborhood associations, and other groups. In language remarkably similar to that of the open housing advocates whom realtors had opposed for so long, IREB stated that these policies and actions would “serve the cause of (1) equal opportunity in housing, (2) stable property values and (3) good business practice.” The Indianapolis Star lauded IREB’s policies as a standard for the whole nation.37

At the close of 1968 it seemed that open occupancy might prevail. Indianapolis functioned under fair housing laws at the municipal, state, and federal levels. Neighborhood associations around the city actively sought integration with stability, and the press defended open housing. Even realtors stated that they valued the concept. How did this happen in the city ranked as the most “ghettoized” in 1890? Numerous factors played a role.
The broadest cause was African Americans’ continual search for better housing. Historically, blacks were confined to older, poorer neighborhoods in Indianapolis. To escape the overcrowded ghetto, some African Americans risked moving to all-white neighborhoods in order to gain homes and neighborhoods with better amenities. When blocked from moving into areas of their choice by discrimination or intimidation rather than price, prospective buyers or renters naturally questioned these practices. The ability to find new locations in which to live became particularly important as traditionally African American neighborhoods were dismantled through urban renewal, highway construction, and the establishment of the IUPUI campus.

Successfully integrated neighborhoods, caused by the search for better living conditions, provided positive examples of open housing. Residents who formed inclusive associations, most notably the Butler-Tarkington Neighborhood Association, employed various methods to keep their neighborhoods peacefully integrated. Not only did they encourage others to view open housing as a noble cause, but also they worked toward the passage of laws to assure that their views would be upheld by government.

The aims of these neighborhood associations often coincided with those of civil rights groups. The NAACP, in particular, had been involved in the fight against discrimination in housing for decades. In Indianapolis it was the NAACP that helped to bring about the overturn of the city’s racial zoning ordinance in 1926, and the organization continued to agitate for open housing through the 1960s. Actions by civil rights groups and, in fact, the course of the national civil rights movement from the post-World-War-II period through the 1960s, helped to liberalize the policies of business and government that affected the city’s housing patterns.
Further, a shift of political will brought about new laws and changes in government policies. Several key leaders at the city and state levels deserve mention. Councilmen Kuykendall and Cummings, elected by the growing African American population in Indianapolis, brought about passage of the municipal open occupancy ordinance. Governor Matthew Welsh made a strong commitment to civil rights during the 1960 gubernatorial campaign, which led to establishment of the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (ICRC). The commission, headed by Harold Hatcher, supported an open housing agenda even before passage of the state law in 1965.

Finally, when government no longer officially sanctioned residential segregation, the conservative media and real estate interests in Indianapolis began to support practices that were more liberal. Even the most conservative daily newspapers, the Indianapolis News and Indianapolis Star, presented positive aspects of open housing more often after the city ordinance in 1964. The Indianapolis Real Estate Board (IREB), by far the most vocal and entrenched business organization prior to 1964, made progressively fewer negative comments about open housing until the body drew up a policy statement in 1968 that designated equal opportunity in housing a main objective. The course of this development can, in part, be explained by changes in leadership and membership, but the context of urban America in the late 1960s made overt opposition to open housing insupportable.

Thus, all of these factors coalesced to bring about a city with an open housing market. Officially, Indianapolis residents could not be deterred from living wherever they wished by race, color, religion, or nation of origin. If they could afford to rent or buy an apartment or home, then they should be allowed to do so.
Unfortunately for those who wanted immediate change, residential segregation did not end instantaneously. In fact, many believe that the course of housing discrimination has been little altered in the industrial North. Most scholars agree that fair housing laws, which typically fell short on enforcement, failed to stop discrimination in housing and residential segregation, especially for African Americans of limited economic means.¹

Sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy A. Denton have argued that extreme segregation, termed hypersegregation, persisted for African Americans throughout the 1970s and 1980s and into the 1990s. After studying the five dimensions of hypersegregation—unevenness, isolation, clustering, concentration, and centralization—Massey and Denton determined that blacks in most northern cities, including Indianapolis, suffered from this problem in 1980, and Denton found that little had changed by 1990. Primarily, Massey and Denton blamed weaknesses in the Fair Housing Act for hypersegregation.²

Others have held different views regarding residential patterns in the late twentieth century. For example, Reynolds Farley and William H. Frey affirmed that African Americans remained highly segregated in many cities, but they believed that the situation improved modestly during the 1970s and 1980s. By studying 232 cities with significant black populations, Farley and Frey demonstrated that established housing patterns persisted in old cities of the industrial North—such as Gary, Detroit, and Chicago—whereas new metropolises of the West and South—like El Paso, San Jose, and
Tucson—experienced significantly less segregation. Farley and Frey argued that the growing black middle class, the Fair Housing Act and other changes in federal housing policy, a liberalization of white attitudes toward neighborhood integration, and considerable new housing construction helped to reduce segregation in this period.3

In looking at residential patterns of African Americans in Indianapolis, Lana Ruegamer emphasized the role of self-segregation as well as discrimination by whites. As some housing and job barriers lifted during the 1970s, professionals moved to racially integrated but economically segregated neighborhoods. Less prosperous blacks left their old neighborhoods for better housing as well, but most moved to areas populated by people who looked like themselves, dissuaded from living in white areas by real estate agents and homeowners who sidestepped antidiscrimination laws and by well-publicized incidents of white hostility.4

In the closing decades of the twentieth century, Indianapolis housing patterns changed in some ways yet continued to reflect historical trends. The year 1970 brought Unigov, an action approved by the state legislature to consolidate many county and city services. Unigov instantly increased Indianapolis’s population through annexation, but over the next decade the city center lost housing units and population due to the construction of the inner loop of the interstate highway system and the establishment of the IUPUI campus. In 1970 a concentration of African Americans resided in a belt just south of 38th Street, and in 1980 this belt expanded to neighborhoods north of the same east-west artery. The trend of northward expansion continued into the 1990s.5

Preliminary analysis of data from the 2000 census shows that historical patterns of population and residence continued to have strong influence. African Americans
rated as the largest racial minority, comprising 25.5 percent of the total population of 781,870. A map from the Electronic Atlas of Central Indiana graphically demonstrated that African Americans were still clustered in the northern half of Marion County in 2000.6

Thus, the mere enactment of fair housing laws did not result in eradication of residential segregation in Indianapolis; however, the importance of the open housing movement must not be discounted. The movement exposed deeply engrained, institutionalized racism, which proved to be more complex and difficult to eliminate than once imagined. Despite the shortcomings of fair housing, scholars assert that the improvement in housing conditions and the achievements in residential integration have resulted directly from the victories won by open housing advocates.7
APPENDIX

Illustration 1. "Ye Olde Town Plat"
• EVERY BED ROOM IS ASSURED AN ABUNDANCE OF LIGHT AND AIR.

• TYPICAL KITCHEN DESIGNED FOR MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY WITH A MINIMUM OF LABOR.

• LIVING ROOMS ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE WALL SPACE FOR ATTRACTIVE ARRANGEMENT OF FURNITURE.
Illustration 3. Indianapolis Councilmanic Districts

Key

- White
- Minority
- Biracial
- Councilmanic District Boundaries

City Council Representatives

District 1  Max E. Brydenthal
            Thomas C. Hasbrook
District 2  Joseph C. Wallace
            Rufus C. Kuykendall
District 3  James L. Cummings
            Harold Egenes
District 4  Daniel P. Moriarty
District 5  R. Thomas McGill
District 6  Albert O. Deluse
NOTES

Introduction


5 Although Emma Lou Thornbrough did not frame the argument of her posthumously published Indiana Blacks in the Twentieth Century solely around this theme, she did include issues of African American housing, and in the final chapter Lana Ruegamer in part examined gains and losses in housing that resulted from integration. Emma Lou Thornbrough, Indiana Blacks in the Twentieth Century, ed. Lana Ruegamer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000).

6 In this study the terms "minority," "nonwhite," and "African American" are used nearly synonymously since persons of other nonwhite races composed less than 1 percent of the Marion County population until the 1980 U.S. census. David Bodenha-

**Chapter 1**

1 The U.S. Census counted 64 “free colored” persons in Marion County in 1830. James J. Divita, “Ethnic Settlement Patterns in Indianapolis” (1988), Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis Library, bound photocopy, 10, 13.


*Indianapolis Times*, 29 November 1926; *Indianapolis News*, 25 November 1926.

*Groom v Meriweather et al.* and *Slutzky et al. v Meriweather*, 79 Indiana Appellate 274–76 (1922); *Indianapolis World*, 6 May 1921; *Indianapolis Star*, 29 April 1921.

*Indianapolis Star*, 16 March 1926. For a fuller discussion of Indiana under the KKK and a brief treatment of housing and this racial zoning ordinance, see Emma Lou Thornbrough, “Segregation in Indiana during the Klan Era of the 1920’s,” *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 47 (March 1961): 594–618.


10 *Indianapolis Recorder*, 13 March, 3 April, 29 May, 12 June 1926; *Corrigan v Buckley*, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).

11 *Indianapolis Recorder*, 15 May, 5 June, 12 June, 23 October 1926.

12 *Indianapolis Recorder* 5, 12 June, 24 July 1926.

13 In 1927, the Supreme Court struck down the New Orleans ordinance with *Harmon v Tyler* 273 U.S. 668 (1927), confirming its ruling in the Louisville case. *Gaillard v Grant* (1926). Copy of decision in NAACP Papers.


22 *Indianapolis Star*, 7 September 1934.


24 *Indianapolis Times*, 2 September 1937; *Indianapolis Star*, 4 April 1937, 7 February 1938.

25 In 1934 the Real Property Inventory undertaken by the U.S. Department of Commerce determined that Indianapolis contained 79,623 total residential structures. Of this total, 17,226 were over 40 years old, 16,447 required major or structural repairs and were unfit for habitation, 12,533 were overcrowded, 14,519 had no running water, 7,160 had no gas or electric light, 21,712 had no indoor toilets, and 35,583 had no bath or shower. “Housing in Indianapolis, Report of the Citizen’s Housing Committee, February 1940,” Indiana Division, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, 2–3; *Indianapolis*
Star, 28 February 1938; "Lockefield Garden Apartments," Indiana Division, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, Clipping Files, Indianapolis—Housing—1939.


27 African Americans numbered 51,141 in a total population of 386,972. The index of dissimilarity, a rating between zero and 100, indicates the percentage of nonwhites that would have to move in order to achieve a proportional mixture with whites on a block-by-block basis. The higher the number, the more segregated the city. Not only did Indianapolis rate above average in the north central states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, and Ohio, it also ranked as the most segregated of five cities in Indiana, which included East Chicago, Gary, Terre Haute, and Evansville. Divita, "Ethnic Settlement Patterns," 63–64; Karl E. and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965), 29–30, 39–40.

28 The Citizens' Housing and Planning Council, a similar pro-public housing group, formed in Detroit in 1937. Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, 61.

29 "Housing in Indianapolis," 4.


31 Ibid., 84–92; Indianapolis Times, 18 November 1941; Indianapolis News, 19 November 1941.

33 *Indianapolis Times*, 3 December 1941; *Indianapolis Star*, 3 December 1941.

34 *Indianapolis Times*, 13 December 1941; *Indianapolis Star*, 13 December 1941.

35 This area was located in census tract fourteen, which in 1940 was 98.9 percent black. Divita, “Ethnic Settlement Patterns,” 64.

36 *Indianapolis Star*, 16 October 1943, 10 February, 22 April 1944; *Indianapolis News*, 15 February 1944.

37 *Indianapolis News*, 21 April 1944; *Indianapolis Star*, 30 April 1944.


40 *Indianapolis Times*, 1 November 1945, 25, 26, 27 February 1946.


42 *Indianapolis Recorder*, 10 January 1948.

43 For a contemporary study of restrictive covenants, including an analysis of their use in Chicago and St. Louis, see Herman H. Long and Charles S. Johnson, *Peo-

44 Shelley v Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Meyer, As Long as They Don’t Move Next Door, 92–95; Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, 181–182.

45 Indianapolis Recorder, 8 May 1948.

46 Indianapolis Recorder, 13 November 1948.


Chapter 2

1 In 1967 the Lexington Apartments building was purchased by the state for demolition as part of an urban renewal project. The Indianapolis Recorder published an unflattering photograph of the dilapidated-looking building when announcing this fact. Indianapolis Recorder, 11 December 1948, 1 January 1949, 26 August 1967; Indianapolis News, 20 January 1949.

2 When Harry S Truman outlined his Fair Deal on 5 January 1949, the president reiterated his commitment to public housing and slum clearance. It appeared that the U.S. Congress would soon commit significant federal funds to this effort. Indianapolis Star, 6 January 1949; Indianapolis Recorder, 22 January 1949; Indiana General Assembly, Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Indiana, 86th Session of the General Assembly (Indianapolis, 1949), 121.
Although Indianapolis received national attention for its slum clearance, and local newspapers proclaimed the plan as a model for the nation, no one from the city made an appearance at the hearings. For a full discussion of housing reform, including the Housing Act of 1949, see Richard O. Davies, *Housing Reform During the Truman Administration* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1966); House Committee on Banking and Currency, *Housing Act of 1949: Hearings, H.R. 4009*, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

12 Ibid., 218–233.


14 Ibid., 111–112; Indianapolis Times, 13 July 1949.
Mayor Feeney named five members to the authority: Harry V. Wade, president of the Standard Life Insurance Co. (chair); Cleo Blackburn, superintendent of Flanner House; Clyde McCormack, financial secretary of Central Labor Union, American Federation of Labor (AFL); Loren J. Houser, regional director of Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO); and James Ahearn, post office worker. \textit{Indianapolis Star}, 18 October, 8 November 1949; \textit{Indianapolis Times}, 18 October, 8 November 1949; \textit{Indianapolis Recorder}, 15 October, 12 November 1949, 14 October 1950.

Indianapolis contained 427,173 citizens; Marion County (including Indianapolis) residents numbered 551,777. Divita, "Ethnic Settlement Patterns," 63.

In all five Indiana cities included in Taeuber and Taeuber's study—East Chicago, Evansville, Gary, Indianapolis, and Terre Haute—the index of dissimilarity rose during the 1940–1950 period. Indianapolis saw the smallest increase while the index swelled by more than five points in East Chicago and Gary and by over six points in Evansville. In twenty-nine cities of the North Central region the index rose an average of about 1.4 points. Taeuber and Taeuber, \textit{Negroes in Cities}, 39–40; Divita, "Ethnic Settlement Patterns," 63, 71.


23 Long-term, significant desegregation did not occur at Lockefield Gardens as a result of the admittance of this family. In the early 1950s the Public Housing Administration of the Housing and Home Finance Agency began tracking low-rent housing programs with open-occupancy policies and/or operations. From 1953 to 1963 Indianapolis was included in 1958, 1961, and 1962. Only in 1958 did Lockefield Gardens appear to be nominally integrated when one unit of 748 did not qualify as “Occupancy by Negroes.” Housing and Home Finance Agency, Public Housing Administration, *Open Occupancy in Housing Programs of the Public Housing Administration* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1958), 18. See also *Indianapolis Recorder*, 7, 14 October 1950.


26 In December 1952 two members of the Indianapolis housing authority, Harry V. Wade and Cleo Blackburn, resigned from their appointments, in large part due to the authority’s loss of funding. *Indianapolis Star*, 4 March 1952; *Indianapolis Recorder*, 8 March, 20 December 1952.


28 For an example of advertisements, see *Indianapolis Star*, 13 July 1954; *Indianapolis News*, 13 July 1954; *Indianapolis Times*, 13 July 1954; Lawrence and Mary
Brookins, interview by Richard Pierce, 5 December 1995, transcript, Remembering Indiana Collection, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis.


32 At least some Indianapolis residents were aware of *Where Shall We Live?* When the Fund for the Republic, the body that financed the report, announced its support for this study in housing, the *Indianapolis Recorder* reprinted an article from the *Cleveland Call Post* that described the endeavor. *Indianapolis Recorder*, 25 June 1955; Commission on Race and Housing, *Where Shall We Live?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 18-22; Taeuber and Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities*, 21.

33 *Indianapolis Times*, 8 August 1959.


African Americans numbered 99,912 of Marion County’s total 697,567 residents in 1960. Of that number, 98,049 lived within the Indianapolis city limits. Indianapolis accounted for 478,258 or more than 68 percent of the county population. Despite the annexation of twenty-five new census tracts, more than 31 percent of Marion


45 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Fifty States Report (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1961), 143–145. Discrimination against Jews took place in other cities, too. For example, a screening system employed by realtors in the five Grosse Pointes of suburban Detroit made national news in 1960. The point system rated the personal characteristics of Poles, southern Europeans, and Jews who wished to purchase homes. Of these groups, Jews had the lowest scoring potential, and the Michigan Regional Office


52 Thirteen of eighteen prospective attendees resided in Indianapolis. They were Richard L. Jones, Marion County Residential Builders, Inc., executive secretary; Ferril I. Ressinger, Indiana Real Estate Association, executive vice president; Robert E. Houk, IREB, president; Robert D. Park, Marion County Residential Builders, Inc., president; Albert. A. Savill, Mortgage Bankers Association of America, associate governor at large, region 5; William T. Ray, CCREB; Edna Johnson, CCREB, vice presi-

53 “Suggestions for Governor’s Housing Conference,” Dickinson Collection.  


Chapter 3

1 Indianapolis Recorder, 9 November 1963.  

2 Indianapolis Recorder, 3 January 1948, 30 March, 26 October 1963.
3 Indianapolis Recorder, 6 April 1963; Henry J. Richardson to Dr. Melvin Baird, 29 November 1963, H. J. Richardson Collection.

4 Indianapolis Recorder, 26 October 1963.

5 The Recorder often used this concatenation of two city nicknames. The first half paraphrases Acts 21:39 in which Paul declared himself “a citizen of no mean city.” This passage appears in the cornerstone of the city hall dedicated in 1909, which ironically had already been replaced by the City-County Building at the time of Barton’s election. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the business community and others also referred to Indianapolis as a “city of homes.” For instance, Jacob Piatt Dunn, an early historian of the city, titled one of his books Greater Indianapolis: The History, the Industries, the Institutions, and the People of a City of Homes (Chicago: Lewis Pub. Co., 1910). Indianapolis News, 27 July 1909; Indianapolis Recorder, 26 October, 9 November 1963; Indianapolis Times, 1 January 1964.


7 Indianapolis Star, 20 February, 20 March 1964.


Indianapolis Times, 16, 17, 19 March 1964.

Indianapolis Star, 20 March 1964; Minutes of the Board of Directors, 9 April 1964, Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce.


Indianapolis Times, 2 April 1964. Although the mayor suggested that the ordinance should pertain to the entire county, extending its application beyond the Indianapolis city limits would have required further action by the Marion County Council since the city and county government did not merge under Unigov until 1970.

Minutes of the Board of Directors, 9 April 1964, Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce.


Indianapolis Recorder, 16 May 1964; National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, “Fair Housing Statutes and Ordinances, as of October 1, 1965,” copy in NAACP Papers.


Indianapolis Star, 22 May, 1 June 1964; Indianapolis News, 2 June 1964; Indianapolis Recorder, 23 May 1964.

Indianapolis Times, 24 May 1964.


24 *Indianapolis Star*, 18 May, 8 June 1964.


28 In a letter to the editor of the *Indianapolis Times*, Gerold Baumann took the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce to task, pointing out that Chamber had originally opposed the statewide Fair Employment Practices Act (1961) with constitutional arguments; however, now that the law had found success after three years in practice, the Chamber claimed the victory as its own and used the statute as a reason to oppose the open occupancy ordinance. *Indianapolis Times*, 5 June 1964; *Indianapolis Star*, 1 June 1964; Minutes of the Board of Directors, 11 June 1964, Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce.


Despite CCREB’s criticism, the board did not receive full coverage of its actions in Indianapolis’s three daily newspapers. *Indianapolis Recorder*, 20 June 1964.


Except for Kuykendall and Cummings, little evidence as to the motivations behind the voting record exists. Personal views about integration of neighborhoods, connections to business and political interests, and the lively debate surrounding the ordinance probably all factored into the outcome.
Chapter 4

1 Citizens Forum went on to sponsor many other programs, including cleanup days, concerts, a weekly television program, and safe houses for children walking to and from school. It also inspired similar groups in Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, New Orleans, New York, and Washington, D.C., and the organization and its founder received many local, state, and national, awards. Citizens Forum remained active until 1984 when financial problems, the ill health of Mattie Coney, and the death of her husband Elmo brought about the group’s demise. Sally Childs-Helton, “Citizens Forum,” Black History News & Notes, No. 41 (February 1991): 1; Indianapolis Recorder, 25 July, 8 August, 5 September 1964; Indianapolis Star, 7 August 1964.

2 Henry J. Richardson to Cleo Blackburn, 13 July 1964, H. J. Richardson Collection.
3 Cleo Blackburn to Henry J. Richardson, 27 July 1964, H. J. Richardson Collection. Willard B. Ransom, former state NAACP president and a member of the secretive group that drafted the Indianapolis housing ordinance, concurred with Richardson's assessment. In an interview with the Indianapolis News Ransom stated that Flanner House had not been able to "serve as a catalyst in breaking down barriers of discrimination." Indianapolis News, 3 August 1964.


6 Ibid., 22 September 1964; Indianapolis Recorder, 10 October 1964.


9 On 20 January two Democratic representatives, Russell J. Dean of Indianapolis and Joseph E. McGowan of Kokomo, introduced a bill identical to the original ICRC proposal. The bill was sent to the House Committee on Public Policy, which took no action on the proposal for several weeks. Indiana General Assembly, Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Indiana, 94th Session of the General Assembly.


Life in Indianapolis, copy in Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, 34, 46.


Indianapolis Star, 11, 12 July 1965.


King led a series of open housing marches in Chicago during August 1966, and the Indianapolis Recorder reported more than once that the national civil rights leader had promised Indianapolis members of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) that he would do the same in Indianapolis, if necessary. For an in-depth study of the Chicago protests, refer to Ralph, Northern Protest; "Inner City Housing Problems—A Report to the Metropolitan Plan Commission, March 1964," copy in Von Eichorn Collection, Manuscript Division, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis; Indianapolis Recorder, 19 June 1965, 1 January, 26 February, 16 April, 10 September 1966.

IREB altered its by-laws in December 1964 to allow nonwhite membership and admitted William T. Ray as the first African American realtor the following February, but CCREB remained as a separate real estate board. Indianapolis Recorder, 27 February, 28 May 1965; Indianapolis News, 10 February 1965.

26 Indianapolis Recorder, 2 July 1966.


31 For a full description of the program’s antecedents, operation, and outcomes, see Baum, Toward a Free Housing Market, 3, 25–27, 29; Indianapolis News, 18 April 1968; Indianapolis Recorder, 9 March 1968.

32 The Department of Housing and Urban Development ultimately caused the demise of the program when on 24 January 1969 it rescinded government financing of FHA repossessions. Baum, Toward a Free Housing Market, 162, 167, 192–194.


*Indianapolis Star*, 24 November 1968. Motives for this sudden change in course were not disclosed in the news article, but a number of factors probably influenced IREB. Although the context of urban America in 1968 was likely the greatest consideration, others may have included a desire to comply with the Fair Housing Act and an integrated membership. Financial motives—selling homes to the large number of African Americans in the city—may have figured into the decision as well.

**Epilogue**

1 The Fair Housing Act itself was extremely weak, but it was bolstered through court decisions, related legislation, and amendments. In the 1970s court cases like *U.S. v Mitchell* and *Zuch v Hussey* reaffirmed the illegality of discrimination in all sales and rental of housing, and *Hills v Gautreaux* established that public housing could not intro-
duce or sustain segregation. Congress passed the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HDMA), which required federally chartered financial institutions to report where they approved or denied home loans, and it enacted the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which obligated these lenders to serve their entire communities—even low-income areas. In 1974 the Fair Housing Act was expanded to protect women, and in 1988 it was significantly amended to cover families with children and persons with disabilities and to strengthen enforcement mechanisms. Many scholars and advocates, however, have continually argued that initiatives have not gone far enough to encourage integration and that more intervention is required to achieve fair housing. *U.S. v Mitchell*, 335 F. Supp. 1004 (1971); *Zuch v Hussey*, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (1975); *Hills v Gatreaux*, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). Farley and Frey, “Changes in the Segregation of Whites from Blacks during the 1980s,” 26–27; Veronica M. Reed, “Fair Housing Enforcement: Is the Current System Adequate?” in *Residential Apartheid: American Legacy*, 223–225. For examples of specific calls for programs put forth in the 1990s, see J. Eugene Grigsby, III, “Residential Apartheid: Removing the Barriers,” in *Residential Apartheid*; also W. Dennis Keating, “Fair Housing Policies, Programs, Legality, and Prospects,” part 3, in *The Suburban Racial Dilemma*.


At the time of writing, 2000 census data were not yet available in printed form. Population statistics were derived from a web site developed and maintained by the Indiana Business Research Center at the Indiana University’s Kelley School of Business, Marion County Profile, STATS Indiana Profiles, http://www.stats.indiana.edu/c2k/census_profiles/p/c36003.txt. The Electronic Atlas of Central Indiana is supported by the Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis (IUPUI) University Library. “Black, African American Population,” http://atlas.ulib.iupui.edu/Census/census_tract/ pop_race/097_mar/097bla_ct00.htm.

Appendix

1 Raymond E. Gregg, “Ye Olde Town Plat,” 4.

2 “Lockefield Garden Apartments,” Indiana Division, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, Clipping Files, Indianapolis—Housing –1939.

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Education

Master of Arts in History, Public History Concentration, Indiana University, Indianapolis, IN, July 2001
  • Mary O'Brien Gibson Endowed Internship, 1999–2000

Bachelor of Arts in History and English, Aquinas College, Grand Rapids, MI, summa cum laude, 1992

Professional Experience

Intern, Indiana Medical History Museum, Indianapolis, IN, Fall 2000–Spring 2001
  • Researched and designed exhibition, “Why Not Idealize the Doctor Some?”
  • Led tours for drop-in visitors and school groups, elementary through graduate level
  • Redesigned museum web site to make information accessible, http://www.imhm.org/
  • Assisted director with museum development, including grants

Public Programming Intern, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, IN, Fall 1999–Summer 2000
  • Conducted historical research to support monthly family programs
  • Implemented youth, student, and family programs
  • Evaluated programs and exhibitions, integrating classwork and professional experience

Researcher for Indiana Historical Research Grant, Historic Landmarks Foundation of Indiana, Morris-Butler House Museum, Indianapolis, IN, June–September 1999
  • Researched and wrote “Season’s Greetings: Ethnic Celebrations of Winter Holidays in Indianapolis, 1865–1900” for museum to develop “Victorian Holiday Traditions” exhibition

Editorial Assistant/Intern, Frederick Douglass Papers Project, Indiana University, Indianapolis, IN, Fall 1998–present
  • Research annotations and historical introductions, copyedit text, transcribe documents, proofread letters and autobiographies
  • Prepared documents for online coding of Narrative of Frederick Douglass online edition
  • Designed and now maintain project web site, http://www.iupui.edu/~douglass/

  • Created operators’ manuals and safety labels for international audience

Assistant Editor, DF Publications, Brighton, MI, 1994
  • Wrote 3-4 articles per month for trade publication, The Engraver’s Journal
  • Edited and proofread other writers’ work

Archivist Contractor, Grand Rapids Historical Commission, Grand Rapids, MI, 1993
  • Completed organization of 960,000-image photographic collection within grant deadline
  • Cataloged 20,000-record series on specialized database; revised manual for researchers
Head Librarian, Residence Education, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 1992–93
• Managed branch library in dormitory, including $15,000+ budget, reports, and statistics
• Trained and supervised 9 student library assistants

City Historian Intern, Grand Rapids Historical Commission, Grand Rapids, MI, Winter/Spring 1992
• Assisted with publication of documentary editing project, A Grand Rapids Sampler; searched for primary documents, located illustrations, copyedited, and consulted with printer
• Processed Sumner Wells Collection, photographs and records of American Red Cross military hospital unit active in France during World War I

Archives Intern, Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, Washington, DC, Summer 1991
• Processed Henri Coanda Collection, documents of inventor living in Paris
• Inventoried Engineering Drawings collection

Conference Papers and Presentations

Publications

Exhibitions
“ArtWork: Remaking the Artsgarden Information Desk.” Arts Council of Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN, April 2000.