TO DO SOME SMALL GOOD: PHILANTHROPY IN INDIANAPOLIS, 1929-1933

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23 January 1998
This thesis is dedicated to all the teachers, academic and non-academic, who have taught me to demand the best of myself because they would not accept less, especially my first teachers—my mother and father—Sara Patricia and Ronald Edward Sample.
Acknowledgements

I have looked forward to writing this section of the thesis because it signifies the end of a very long effort. This thesis, however, could not have been completed without the help of many people. Dr. David Bodenhamer, as the chair of my thesis committee, deserves my warmest appreciation. Dr. Bodenhamer constantly questioned my assumptions, encouraged my efforts, and gave me guidance when I needed it. He spent countless hours pouring over manuscripts, at times mediocre at best, in an attempt to make this author a better writer. He is a teacher who demands the best effort from his students, and in the end it is the student who receives a better understanding of himself and his work through Dr. Bodenhamer's guidance.

Dr. Robert G. Barrows and Mr. Robert Payton, the other members of my committee, also spent several hours looking over my last draft. After Dr. Bodenhamer, Dr. Barrows spent the most time helping me complete my work. Dr. Barrows had the unenviable task of looking over my thesis for endnote errors and other rule violations; to say the least he caught many more mistakes than I would ever like to admit I made. Mr. Payton provided me with instruction concerning philanthropy and its place in American culture. The articles he recommended gave me great insight into the
philanthropic culture. His deep knowledge of all things philanthropic led me away from a few erroneous assumptions.

Appendix A, which details the results of the network analysis completed for the thesis, could not have been interpreted without the considerable help of Dr. Eric Wright of Indiana University’s Sociology Department. Dr. Wright not only ran the numbers through several computations, but also helped me interpret the data received. I now have a greater appreciation for a multidisciplinary approach to answering historical questions, in large part due to Dr. Wright.

Some of the hardest working people I know are rarely acknowledged. The librarians, secretaries, and aides that completed numerous tasks and suggested new avenues of inquiry deserve a hearty thank you. Throughout my time at IUPUI, Mary Gelzleichter, the superb secretary of the history department, was a constant and cheerful help. She has always gone above and beyond her formal duties and I do not know a history student who has not at some time needed her to help them.

The various archives are filled with very special people. I spent countless hours at the IUPUI Archives and Barbara J. Mondary, Gregory H. Mobley, and Connie Hume were always willing to help me track down a source or find a new
way to look at the period through diverse records. While at the Indiana State Library, Barney Thompson, David Lewis, and Martha Wright continually found the books and manuscripts I needed. The Reverend Dr. Jack Porter, Historian and Director of the Catholic Archives, was always willing to fit me into his schedule and seemingly never tired of my questions concerning the Catholic faith and the Catholic culture of the 1930s. Gregory E. Lynn, Fay McBride and Jo Ann Pogue, of the Indianapolis Foundation, were always courteous and helpful. Ida Zavala of the United Way deserves a special mention. For more than two weeks she bent her schedule to accommodate mine and always found a quiet room where I could look over the Community Fund’s records. Lori Hogan, and later Jeff Barnett, allowed me to look at the records of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce for several weeks and always seemed interested in the results of my study. The staff of the Indiana Historical Society were always informative and willing to answer difficult questions.

Some material never makes it into a thesis because it is either not needed to tell the tale or it is out of date. Carol Oyefusi of Flanner House allowed me to look over the records from the settlement house. Unfortunately for my purposes, the managers of Flanner House did not begin
keeping records until after 1935. Lisa Bain, the archivist for the Lilly Archives, sent me material concerning the Lilly Endowment and newspaper clippings covering several members of the Lilly family, but they did not prove to be useful.

Outside of those who directly aided me are those who lent an ear to hear my musings or encouraged me to finish. Dr. Elizabeth B. Monroe has, throughout my time at IUPUI, been someone who would listen to my ideas or questions and always gave me the soundest advice. Dr. Peter Sehlinger was also a source of constant encouragement.

Lastly, and more than anyone else in the world, my wife, Michelle Ellen Gutierrez Sample, deserves my thanks. She encouraged me to complete the task, and sometimes threatened me with bodily harm if it was not completed before the end of the century. She looked over one draft for critical grammatical errors and read the paper and suggested changes in the character of the wording to make the message clearer. Her love and devotion lifted my spirits when they needed a boost and much of this effort would never have been possible without her support and understanding.
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Introduction

During the 1920s, most people, whether progressive or conservative, believed that the solutions to economic prosperity and regularity had been found. The stock market crash in October 1929 came as a shock to those who followed it. For most, it was a distant event that concerned only those in the East or the rich. As 1929 turned into 1930 unemployment rose and commentators began to worry about a recession. Hopes were pinned on a warm weather upturn in employment, but there was to be little improvement in unemployment in the spring or summer of 1930. It only became worse thereafter.

At the beginning of the Depression civic and political leaders urged private philanthropy and local public resources to carry the burden of helping the unemployed. As the economic crisis deepened, calls for federal intervention mounted. The pleas remained largely unheeded until a new president with a different philosophy took office in 1933. Between the stock market crash and the beginning of direct federal government intervention private help and local public sources tried to cope with the immensity of the crisis.

The period from 1929 to 1933 amounted to the supreme test of the voluntary philanthropic ideal. Throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most Americans deemed public welfare on the national level as something to be avoided. But by 1941, when the United States entered World War II, the federal government's responsibility for relief was well established. Its role has not been seriously challenged since.

The early years of the Great Depression present an opportunity to study the experimentation in the ways the nation dealt with the needs of its citizens, especially at the local level. Since the mid-1970s various writers have dealt with the local reactions to the Depression. Some have studied the early years before federal intervention; others have focused on particular cities only after the advent of direct aid from Washington. A few have endeavored to tell the entire story from the stock market crash to the beginning of American involvement in World War II. A question that begs to be asked is: why study Indianapolis if so many other authors have written a detailed analysis of the state of urban America during the Depression?

Indianapolis is usually overlooked when most commentators scan the nation for the problems that faced the larger cities. Stories surrounding Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit lessened interest in Indianapolis. Chicago and Detroit were larger, had a higher percentage of unemployed,
and possessed more colorful national figures. Cleveland led
the Mid-west in experimentation with relief and had a larger
immigrant population. Indianapolis, proclaimed the most
"American" of cities by a national magazine in 1931, seemed
too boring, too American, too normal both in the 1930s and
later when authors went in search of cities whose Depression
stories needed to be told. Indianapolis contained no
figures as dangerous as Capone, as famous as Ford, or as
flamboyant as Boston's Mayor Curley. Indianapolis was, and
continues to be, a city of the second tier. It is not equal
in size to New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, or Detroit.

In 1930 only 59 percent of the American people lived in
cities and towns with more than 2,500 people. Large cities,
like New York, contained fewer than 20 percent of the
nation's population. Indianapolis should be studied because
it was a truly "American" city. With 400,000 citizens, it
was large enough not to be ignored by federal studies but
small enough for newly transplanted rural residents not to
be overwhelmed. Its percentage of immigrants, African-
Americans, and native stock compared favorably with the
national figures. My purpose is not to tell the entire
story of how Indianapolis faced the Great Depression.
Rather I will concentrate on how the private groups in
Indianapolis, in partnership with the local public sector,
aided those individuals who lost their jobs during the early years of the economic downturn. The individuals, groups, formal organizations, and companies that helped in the relief of those thrown out of work will be chronicled here. Unlike many of the articles and books in the secondary literature this thesis does not focus on government relief. Instead the work of what has become known as the "philanthropic community" is my primary concentration.

Little secondary literature examines the attempts of the Indianapolis community to attack the problems of the Depression, although several books touch on the deeds of both individuals and groups. James Madison's two books on Indiana and his work on Eli Lilly provide interesting details of the political atmosphere of the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the actions of a generous man, but private philanthropy as a whole is passed over briefly. George Geib's work on the history of the Second Presbyterian Church and Ruby Little's manuscript concerning the Family Services Association provided vivid accounts of individual actions. Geib's book remains more of a church history than a source book on philanthropy. Little's work traces the internal struggles of the organization as well as its continual fight for control of its operations with the Community Fund, of which it was a member. James Divita's histories of Catholic
churches convey the overpowering nature of the Depression, but they are a sparse record on the deeds of the Church during that period.

Outside of Indianapolis, most work concerning the Depression and relief in cities can be grouped regionally. The cities along the East Coast, in the South, and in the Midwest have been studied the most. Works concerning the West, in particular Los Angeles and San Francisco, are beginning to appear.

The story of the East, with America's oldest cities, reveals a region seemingly prepared for economic problems. Boston and New York City already possessed a publicly funded welfare system, and Philadelphia's municipal government used bond sales and state aid for work relief; only Baltimore depended largely on private aid. By mid 1932 local resources, both public and private, had been exhausted. The East Coast was especially hard hit. Heavy manufacturing and textiles were flat, economically, before October 1929, and remained so throughout the 1930s. Unemployment was high before the stock market crash and private aid had been falling for some years.

Most studies focusing on the Midwest tended to report on Chicago, but some authors have written about Fort Wayne, Detroit, and Cleveland. Fort Wayne, like Indianapolis, was
not on the verge of collapse, as private and public resources had been coordinated to eliminate waste, but nonetheless by 1933 the New Deal was well received. Detroit and Chicago barely made it until Federal funds and projects came to their rescue, primarily because of municipal government corruption and state intransigence in regard to urban aid. Public services, including education, were cut or even suspended. The situation was worse in a one-industry town like Detroit. By 1933 Midwesterners, even in relatively low unemployment cities such as Fort Wayne, welcomed federal aid.

In the South the story was different. The region was not as depressed as the nation as a whole in 1929, largely because of its lack of large manufacturing companies. Public funding did not begin in most cities until 1933. There were wide discrepancies in private and public relief for blacks and whites. The South actually gained, in terms of its percentage of national income, during the Depression, so that after World War II it was in its best shape, economically speaking, since before the Civil War.

Indianapolis resembles Southern cities in regard to municipal public aid. The city did not have a public welfare department, but it did have publicly funded township trustees, paid for by the county, who gave out minimal
support. Indianapolis was not as hard hit as sister cities in the industrial Northeast, but due to the presence of a large manufacturing sector unemployment was heavier than in the South. Indianapolis did not feel the growing pains of the West, but transients moving from East to West sometimes lingered looking for short-term relief.

No study has been made of the contributions of private groups or their partnership with local government in Indianapolis between 1929 and 1933. The standard interpretation of the Great Depression relies on the premise that federal government intervention was necessary because private and local public aid was exhausted and would not have been great enough to counter the effects of the problem.

The truth is that federal government intervention was not absolutely required everywhere. The people of Indianapolis could find food, clothing, and shelter without using federal resources. Indianapolis philanthropy and its public sector allies were able to meet the needs of its citizens through local action using local resources before the New Deal nationalized relief work. The city was able to accomplish what so many other cities could not because of the presence of a public-private partnership that, as the crisis deepened, became more active and integrated.
A tradition rooted in local culture kept solutions to the economic crisis practical and locally controlled. A culture of self-help and localism pervaded elite thinking. Louis J. Borinstein perhaps said it best when he stated that when serving on the several boards he was just trying "to do some small good." Local elites expected to have to carry the burden of helping to provide for their poorer neighbors. A public-private partnership evolved from antecedents to efficiently provide relief for the distressed and comfort for the expectations of local leaders.

When federal aid became a reality Indianapolis was not economically exhausted, although severely tested. Local men were chosen to head vital state agencies, leading in part to overwhelming support for the first New Deal among elites. Indianapolis became one of the leaders in getting men and women onto the payroll of federal agencies due to the machinery in place before the 1932 elections.

Cooperation, due to the partnership, followed from the crisis and affected federal-city relations for three decades after the inauguration of the New Deal. The success of the elites in the early 1930s led to a reaction against outside control, a tendency already inherent in local culture. From the 1940s until the 1960s the city of Indianapolis resisted federal aid for fear that it would lead to federal control.
Only with the election of Mayor John J. Barton, and his successor Richard G. Lugar, was the trend reversed, but not totally abandoned.
Chapter 1

A Truly Midwestern City: Indianapolis on the Eve of the Great Depression

"A distinguishing feature of the work-relief program in Indianapolis is that it was preceded by several months of deliberation and planning." This assessment by Joanna Colcord of the Russell Sage Foundation differed markedly from her evaluation of emergency-relief in other cities. Colcord described most of these efforts as ill-conceived and poorly executed. What distinguished Indianapolis was its united community effort, one that drew upon the resources and leadership available in both the public and private sectors. The success of this project, and others undertaken in Indianapolis, while neither bold nor original, can be traced, at least in part, to strong leadership and cooperation.

Scholars have long chronicled the unsuccessful attempts of local governments to address the devastating social problems brought on by the Depression. Local relief projects proliferated after the stock market crash in October 1929, but the Depression quickly depleted local resources and most projects folded soon after they were begun. By the summer of 1931 local governments and charities could no longer shoulder the responsibility for
the unemployed.\textsuperscript{2} Large cities with many unemployed and limited funding sought state and later federal intervention. Scholarly study has rarely focused on local projects in medium-size communities. Most often, historians have concentrated on the largest cities, where, in 1930, fewer than 19 percent of the nation lived but where demands for relief were the heaviest.\textsuperscript{3} 

The Great Depression affected the nation unevenly. The industrialized North East and North Central regions experienced greater hardship than the rest of the nation, but differences appear within regions.\textsuperscript{4} In the Midwest, Fort Wayne faced less unemployment than Chicago, while in the South, Birmingham suffered more than Atlanta.\textsuperscript{5} 

In 1929, Indianapolis was a large city in one of the most productive and industrialized regions in the United States. Ranked 21st in population size among the nation's urban areas, its population of 364,000 placed it in a group of cities that included Rochester, New Orleans, Birmingham, Atlanta, Cincinnati, and Seattle.\textsuperscript{6} It lagged by a wide margin the largest cities of the region--Chicago (3,376,000), Detroit (1,568,662)--and the nation (New York City, 6,930,446). 

Population mobility and growth characterized the Indianapolis of the 1920s. Between 1920 and 1930 the city's population increased 15.9 percent.\textsuperscript{7} Although large,
Indianapolis departed significantly from the demographic pattern of other urban areas, especially in the Midwest and the Northeast. It had a much smaller ethnic population, but a much larger African-American community than other northern cities. Only 3.8 percent of the city's population were foreign-born. Comparatively, Chicago, Detroit, and New York averaged between 24 and 34 percent while Cincinnati claimed a foreign population almost double that of Indianapolis. The Jewish population of Indianapolis, about 6,000 by 1929, was also significantly smaller than other cities in the East and Midwest. Conversely, the city had one of the largest black communities in the North, numbering 44,000 persons. The black community, buoyed by southern migration, grew by 28.6 percent during the 1920s, accounting for 12 percent of the population in 1930.

Indianapolis resembled the smaller towns that dotted the Midwest, mostly white and largely native. City leaders claimed this lack of diversity as a strength. Local publications touted the city's "American" character. Editors of the Book Of Indiana, published in 1929, emphasized the fact that over 94 percent of Indianapolis' workforce was "thoroughly American." Leaders attributed the city's increasing wealth to its less ethnic character.
In its political structure, Indianapolis resembled other large cities. Citizens elected a mayor and a city council, two active political parties vied for votes, and newspapers took sides on debated topics. Its most powerful interest group, the Chamber of Commerce, was, in effect, local government's most trusted outside advisor. What Indianapolis did not have, at least on most questions, was any real disagreement by the two parties. Both parties were pledged to fiscal restraint and social conservatism, policies valued by the populace.

The character of Indianapolis and its people remained almost the same as the cautious, pragmatic, and generally conservative Midwestern town of the late nineteenth century. Historians Andrew Cayton and Peter Onuf describe the culture of the early twentieth-century Midwest as one that exalted personal independence, hard work, and equality of opportunity. Its sense of community ran deep and tended to foster participation in voluntary associations. Individualism, moral self-restraint, and economic self-reliance marked the values of the business culture shared by blacks and whites alike.

Mass immigration had dented the middle-class cultural consensus in other cities. New immigrants embraced the capitalism of their new country, but did not always agree
with bourgeois standards of conduct. Because of its lack of ethnic diversity, Indianapolis had kept the insular and clannish instincts lost in many large cities in the Midwest. Its leadership group was small and closely tied to one another. The elite accepted a pro-business outlook that approved of the community it had helped to build. While its residents were mostly native-born, the city avoided much of the nativist passion usually associated with Indiana in the 1920s. Local leaders worked to build bridges to minority groups, and several members of the elite were of the Jewish and Catholic faith.

Individual accounts echo historians and confirm that a business sense pervaded the city. Lawrence S. Connor, a resident of Indianapolis during the 1930s and later a reporter and editor for the Indianapolis Star, characterized Indianapolis residents as "generally hard working, conservative and isolationist." People were expected to be responsible for themselves and their families. Moderation too was important and citizens consistently supported politicians and plans that emphasized a moderate course of action.

Reginald Sullivan, a Democrat, who served as Indianapolis mayor during much of the Great Depression, illustrates the moderate, business-like, almost non-
ideological character of the city's politics and people. Elected in 1929, he captured almost every election district against a non-incumbent challenger. Many of these same districts had, four years earlier, elected a Republican. Sullivan garnered high praise from the Republican-leaning Indianapolis Star, and many prominent Republicans later supported him for a second term. Sullivan balanced the city's budget and did not challenge its social arrangements, such as segregation in public education. During the Depression, like the Republican governor, he refused to authorize bonds for relief. Sullivan was a practitioner of traditional Midwestern values. Elected twice to office, his popularity was, in part, confirmation of the general approval of those values by city residents.

The mayor was not the only one to subscribe to a pro-business philosophy. All of the city's major newspapers approved of a general business approach to government and society, as did many ordinary citizens. In the late 1920s, residents desired increased efficiency and less political influence in government decision-making. They adopted laws designed to minimize politics and maximize efficiency. Citizens overwhelmingly passed a referendum adopting a city manager type of government, widely regarded at the time as more efficient, less political, and more business-like than
a mayor-city council structure. The Indiana Supreme Court struck down the measure in 1930, but the referendum made clear that residents approved of and wanted a government run on business principles.

Indianapolis experienced solid economic growth during the 1920s. By 1929, industrial production in Indianapolis accounted for 17 percent of Indiana's total value of products. While Indianapolis ranked 21st in population, nationally it stood 13th in retail sales. Total output shows Indianapolis to be in good economic health before the Depression, at least as good and usually better than the similarly situated cities (see Figure 1.1). Indianapolis' economic base proved fairly diverse and led some in the community to boast that the city was "practically shock-proof in periods of depression." Reflections of the city's prosperity can be seen in the nearly 8 percent increase in home ownership during the 1920s. Such statistics encouraged community leaders who believed that homeowners and those fully employed had a stake in their community and would work to improve it.

**Figure 1.1 Economic Values 1929**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Industrial Sales</th>
<th>Retail &amp; Wholesale Sales</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>$428,362,004</td>
<td>$ 681,709,711</td>
<td>$ 1,114,382,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>$214,785,945</td>
<td>$ 683,990,822</td>
<td>$ 899,946,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>$241,279,545</td>
<td>$ 388,926,863</td>
<td>$ 634,101,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>$729,019,086</td>
<td>$1,026,795,651</td>
<td>$ 1,761,217,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>$148,388,315</td>
<td>$ 764,929,050</td>
<td>$ 913,914,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochester</td>
<td>$380,701,903</td>
<td>$ 436,616,138</td>
<td>$ 829,405,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>$228,354,787</td>
<td>$ 829,426,652</td>
<td>$ 1,073,125,419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unemployment was not a serious problem in the Circle City before the stock market crash. In March of 1929 over 3,000 help wanted ads appeared in the Indianapolis Star and the general industrial production index, an indicator of general economic health, stood at 110.1, its highest level since 1917. Other large cities such as Philadelphia and Baltimore faced high rates of unemployment before the October crash, straining local relief budgets.

Workers attracted to Indianapolis were as well paid as their counterparts in other medium-size cities (see Figure 1.2). Average family income in Indianapolis was above the national average. The typical worker earned $1474 per year, slightly less than the national average of $1540.

**Figure 1.2 Average Wages by Trade Type 1929-1930**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Industrial</th>
<th>Wholesale</th>
<th>Retail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>$1324.66</td>
<td>$1884.97</td>
<td>$1211.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>$ 991.74</td>
<td>$1824.84</td>
<td>$1153.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>$1178.06</td>
<td>$1784.41</td>
<td>$1214.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>$1349.05</td>
<td>$1974.04</td>
<td>$1379.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>$ 934.84</td>
<td>$1798.53</td>
<td>$1028.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochester</td>
<td>$1405.54</td>
<td>$1788.04</td>
<td>$1505.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>$1432.63</td>
<td>$1969.83</td>
<td>$1393.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite good economic times, wages were insufficient to provide for savings, making it hard for workers to buy a
house or a car. A 1929 Brookings Institution report estimated that the average family of four required $2,000 in income for its basic needs and $3,000 a year to permit modest saving. Reports from the Dime Savings & Loan, an organization set up by the Family Welfare Society to help working families set aside money, confirm that workers had a difficult time doing so. Most Indianapolis families fell below the $3,000 threshold needed to save money and provide for a better life, but this was also true of their counterparts in other second-tier cities.

Low tax rates helped to alleviate the problems of low wages. State taxes actually fell between 1926 and 1928, rising nominally in 1929. Among comparable cities only those in the South taxed their citizens less than the Hoosier capital. Additionally, the Civic Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Commerce found that only two cities out of twenty-six with a population of over 300,000 had lower per capita debt than Indianapolis. The low debt burden was one of the reasons cited by the Mowry Company, a large manufacturing concern, for moving to the city in 1929. Thus, Indianapolis could offer businesses the lowest taxes per capita for a city of its size in the North Central region, an “American” workforce, and low city debt.

Nationally, blacks suffered economically due to
discrimination and poor educational opportunities, and the same was true in Indianapolis. City leaders recognized the problems in the black community. In a survey of leisure published by the Indianapolis Foundation the authors acknowledged problems and tried to alert their fellow citizens:

Death rates for "colored" wherever given is always higher than those for "white," due largely, we believe, to the unfortunate housing and neighborhood conditions under which so many are forced to live. In certain sections of Indianapolis these conditions are so bad as to form a serious menace to the whole community and at the same time they point a finger of shame toward the municipality, which allows them to exist. Yes, Indianapolis has slums! 

Mortality rates were worse for blacks than for whites but were generally better in Indianapolis than they were in Kansas City or Cincinnati. Newspapers conveyed some of the problems to the general public. The Indianapolis Star and the Indianapolis Recorder, the city's largest black newspaper, cited unsatisfactory conditions in the city hospital's segregated ward and in some of the city's worst neighborhoods. While African-Americans in Indianapolis fared economically as well as their counterparts in other cities, all was not well and the city's leaders acknowledged as much.
For over a century political and civic leaders had built a structure of private philanthropy and public charity to aid those who were in need, both black and white. Structured public charity existed before Indiana was granted statehood in the form of an overseer of the poor. As a territory, Indiana adopted Elizabethan poor laws so that those not covered by private charity would not starve. Once Indiana became a state, the township trustee, an official of the county, was responsible for administering public aid. Each township elected a trustee and an advisory committee. Trustees, in conjunction with advisory committees, gave out public aid to the needy. They managed budgets, oversaw social work, and were the county’s primary public welfare officers. The trustee for Center Township of Marion County (within which most of Indianapolis was located), by spending $100,000 annually for relief, eased the burdens of private philanthropy and allowed it to experiment and plan for the future.

In the Midwest during the nineteenth century, voluntary associations were the most active force pushing for social change. Accordingly, organized private charity in the city began early in its history with the creation of the Indianapolis Benevolent Society in 1835. By the end of the nineteenth century it had become the Charity Organization
Society, a well-organized and financed effort to aid the deserving poor. By 1929 the philanthropic sector included the Indianapolis Foundation, Community Fund agencies, and other groups not associated with the Community Fund, including churches and settlement houses. Almost every private group was controlled by a board of directors and managed by a paid executive, who was usually a trained social worker. Many Protestant churches handed out charity through a deacons board or through some other form, while the Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis aided the poor through a centralized community center.

The primary private agency responsible for experimentation in non-relief measures of philanthropy was the Indianapolis Foundation. Its vision provided a path for other agencies and even other cities to follow. It facilitated the introduction of new techniques and technology to older agencies and created new organizations to solve ailments not previously noticed. Grants were not given to individuals. Instead, money was allocated to groups for experimentation, for educational achievement, or given to agencies that needed additional money to make up deficits in their budgets. Created in 1916, the Foundation was one of the nation’s few community trusts in 1929. Three banks held funds donated by individuals to use for the
general welfare of Indianapolis. Its six-member board of
directors was chosen by the mayor, the Circuit Court judge,
and the judge of the Southern District of Indiana.45

Funding for relief and character-building agencies fell
primarily to the Community Fund, the predecessor of the
United Way.46 The Community Fund succeeded the War Chest,
organized during the First World War to raise funds both for
relief and for the war effort. Money from the Fund
supported most of the relief and character-building efforts
of the city. Organizers hoped the Fund would alleviate
funding shortages, reduce duplication of services, and limit
the number of solicitations by agencies to city residents.

By 1929 thirty-nine agencies belonged to the Community
Fund, with most of the emphasis on character-building
efforts. Social workers viewed character-building
organizations as places where social work, in its efforts to
change the individual for the better, could do the most
good.47 The YMCA and YWCA provided for adult character
building programs, but also granted a small amount of
relief. The Girl Scouts and the Boy's Club addressed the
needs of children and youth. Settlement houses, such as
Flanner House, dispensed relief and sponsored character-
building programs. Relief was increasingly seen as a
responsibility of the public sector. The Family Welfare
Society dispensed most of the relief given to families while Wheeler Mission, the Salvation Army and volunteers of America took care of the largest number of transients and vagrants.

In fiscal year 1929 (November 1, 1928-October 31, 1929) Community Fund agencies shared over $700,000, with most receiving close to what they requested. The Indianapolis Community Fund mirrored national trends as both the number of community organizations and donations to them increased throughout the 1920s. Since its inception in 1921, the Fund had become more popular with the public and more beneficial for its member agencies with each passing year. From 1922 to 1928 overall contributions increased from $445,000 to $762,000, while the number of donors increased from 16,000 to 52,000. Character-building agencies were slightly better funded than relief organizations, at least before the stock market crash. The Fund awarded the non-relief agencies 53 percent of the 1929 Community Fund budget, a percentage that had been increasing during the later part of the 1920s.

The 1920s had not prepared the Fund for any large catastrophe. The Community Fund did not envision the possibility of an economic calamity and therefore did not give attention to the capacity of relief organizations.
While the Fund successfully provided its member agencies with enough money, it did not seriously try to use its economic power to coerce agencies to streamline their operations or consolidate their functions. Many "character-building" agencies still had sizable "relief" departments. Efficiency remained a goal of the Fund, but not one that it was willing to enforce.

Groups outside the Fund included churches and some settlement houses. Certain churches even created relief-giving community centers that were not part of the Community Fund. Mayer Chapel, a southside mission of the Second Presbyterian Church, provided both relief and character-building programs. Religious organizations of all stripes tended to only give short-term relief, relying on the other agencies for persistent needs. 51

Philanthropic organizations expressed much concern for problems facing African-Americans and promoted self-help organizations as a means of addressing these problems. Several philanthropic organizations worked in the black community giving both relief and advice. Local philanthropist Frank Flanner, and the Charity Organization Society, created Flanner House to allow blacks to help themselves to a better economic position. Inter-Racial Committees were created by the YWCA, the Church Federation,
and the Council of Social Agencies. The Church Federation sponsored an annual Interracial Banquet that aided in the airing of problems. These groups worked within the segregated system to aid individuals and families in the black community who needed help, and at times challenged local opinions on social issues.\textsuperscript{52}

No single coordinating agency directed all philanthropic work. The Community Fund raised money for its agencies and in some ways constrained those agencies or allowed them to develop various avenues of action, but control was loose. The Indianapolis Foundation and non-Community Fund agencies were independent of the Community Fund board, but many times board members from the various organizations were connected through informal ties of friendship, mutual interests, or religious affiliation. Board members often enjoyed long tenures and could therefore establish contacts over a long period of time, but this did not lead to a centralized controlling mechanism. The agency that came nearest to a centralizing force, one that gathered information on all others, was the Council on Social Agencies. It only collected information, however, and was never used to direct all philanthropic endeavors.

Philanthropic funding and leadership came predominately from businessmen. Since the seventeenth century, merchants
had dominated philanthropy, both in England and the United States.\textsuperscript{53} Businessmen continued to be at the forefront of philanthropic giving and leadership in the 1920s, so that the business elite also comprised the philanthropic elite.

In 1929, the Community Fund still depended on rich benefactors for the majority of giving. The Special Gifts Division of the Community Funds's annual campaign, which targeted those who could give $250 or more, accounted for 74 percent of funds raised for use in 1930. Perhaps more interesting is that those giving $10,000 or more accounted for 22 percent of all gifts.\textsuperscript{54}

The elite presided over the philanthropic boards, giving the organizations the benefit of their experience, connections, and wealth. A sociological network analysis of seventy-nine board members from the most prominent boards reveals a very dense network. The average board member interacted with 64 other board members from approximately two other agencies on a regular basis. A clique, in sociological terms, denotes a grouping of people that are closely and informally inter-related and who share a number of bonds with one another. Typically, there are three layers in a clique--a core group, a primary group, and a secondary group. Clusters of cliques represent independent bases of power.\textsuperscript{55} In 1929 there was a single network in
Indianapolis. Most everyone, within the leadership paradigm, knew and related with everyone else. While there was a core group of powerful people, which included pharmaceutical manufacturer J. K. Lilly, Sr., all groups within the analysis overlap. Organizations were also centralized. On average 14.62 pairs of actors were involved in more than one organization, meaning that over fourteen different sets of people were active in at least two agencies together.

In practical terms, the analysis suggests that information gathered by one board was easily transferred to other groups throughout the network. Resources, usually trapped within cliques or unexploited due to imperfect information among cliques, could more easily be used within the larger network. What one would expect from a tightly knit network, as the one described above, is a large degree of information and resource sharing with less friction between sets of actors. In addition, because of the cohesiveness of the network, a group identity and a generally shared consensus often appear.56

Philanthropic leaders were strikingly similar in their backgrounds and activities. Of the seventy-nine men and women who sat as directors of the boards of Indianapolis’ most prominent philanthropic agencies, most were either born
in Indiana or the surrounding states. All were white and more than three-quarters were men. More than a third belonged to the elite Columbia, Athletic, or Woodstock clubs, with most belonging to at least two of the three. Almost half of the seventy-nine were Masons; more than half were members of the Chamber of Commerce. At a time when fewer than 15 percent of the population attended college, more than two-thirds of board members had graduated and many had gone on to earn higher academic honors. The average age of the leaders was 52 in 1930, almost a decade older than the city’s average. Of those whose political orientation could be established, more than two-thirds were Republican. In addition, of the sixty board members whose addresses could be determined, fifty-seven lived north of Tenth Street, East of Capitol Avenue and west of Fall Creek Parkway, an area that corresponds closely to the city’s two richest real estate districts.

Members of the various philanthropic boards, and the social workers whom they chose as executives, constituted a tightly knit network of social and economic interests. Board members were linked together in social clubs, churches, businesses, and other organizations. Many members served on several boards and in this way could convey information and differences of opinion to several agencies.
Of the thirty-six members of the Community Fund board, six were also members of the board of directors for the Chamber of Commerce and two sat on the board of the Indianapolis Foundation. Eleven were members of the Woodstock Club, seventeen belonged to the Columbia Club, while eighteen joined the Athletic Club. All thirteen Masons belonged to the Scottish Rite lodge where they were joined by another member of the Indianapolis Foundation board and several from the board of the Chamber of Commerce. Religious orientation did not affect the mix, but race did play a factor in the make up of the elite. Blacks were notably absent from the elite and only served on philanthropic boards that dealt primarily with the black community. 59

Because of the integration of the board members into their community no clear divisions existed between religious, philanthropic, and business leaders. J. K. Lilly, Sr., chairman of the board of Eli Lilly and Company, chaired the Indianapolis Foundation and served as an officer in Christ Episcopal Church. Francis H. Gavisk, Rector of St. John’s Catholic Church, sat on the boards of several public and private social agencies, was a member of the Chamber of Commerce, and served as vice-president in one of the local savings and loan organizations. Eugene C. Foster, a social worker employed by the Indianapolis Foundation as
its executive director, sat on several public and private philanthropic boards of directors, and was later elected president of the Church Federation. In addition, Foster and Lilly both belonged to the Columbia Club, and all three men sat on the board of the Indianapolis Chapter of the American Red Cross.

In pre-Depression Indianapolis, the city's civic leaders knew one another intimately, attended similar social functions, had similar educational backgrounds, and interacted with one another frequently in philanthropic activities. The names of Allison, Atkins, Ayres, Efroymson, Jordan, and Lilly carried much weight due to their economic importance and social prominence. Of the seventy-nine board members cited earlier, nearly half were either the president or the vice-president of a local company. The local economy and local charity depended upon these men and women for support and guidance. The social importance of these people related not only to their economic power, but also to their prominence in almost every facet of life. It is impossible now to document all of the informal talks and correspondence that must have taken place, for they were surely considerable. Sharing the same clubs, having similar educational backgrounds, and enjoying similar economic circumstances set these people apart. They formed the
social and economic elite of the community.

The same respect for business principles found in the general Indianapolis population pervaded board member dealings with one another, providing the basis of their policies. In many ways this is not surprising. Most board members were themselves businessmen, and they formulated policies conforming more to business principles than to those of charity. Rather than coordination among like agencies emphasis was placed on elimination of competing agencies to achieve optimum efficiency. Throughout the late 1920s and into the early 1930s the Community Fund pressured the Family Welfare Society (FWS) to transfer its Children’s department to the public Marion County Children’s Guardian Home, and at one time even withheld funds for five months until the FWS agreed to do so.61

A careful and studious approach brought these board members to vote for conservative and efficient arrangements. Indianapolis leaders took no bold moves, instead preferring proven methods and sure financing. This was, in many ways, more a reflection of community values than of individual choice. Evolution rather than innovation was the hallmark of Indianapolis philanthropy. The Indianapolis Foundation, for example, was formed after several prominent citizens observed the successful community trust invented in
Cleveland. Indianapolis leaders prudently improved on the Cleveland model by spreading donated funds among several banks rather than only one as was done in Cleveland.

Similarly, the executives chosen to manage the daily operations of philanthropic groups interacted with one another and shared similar backgrounds. Their close involvement with one another was due to both professional and personal interests. Several prominent social workers organized a local chapter of the American Association of Social Workers in 1923. They met monthly to hear speakers on the future of social work and to discuss common problems and concerns. They also could greet one another at state social work conferences.

Social workers in Indianapolis, at least those in charge of directing social work, were also hesitant to embrace new, untested ideas. Nationally, most social workers agreed that work relief was better than a "dole" and that private case work was better than that done by the public sector. However, when various speakers at the National Social Work Conference in 1929 dismissed the idea of an "unworthy" relief recipient a few gasps undoubtedly issued forth in the Indianapolis section. The presenters were mostly from larger urban areas and had accepted that socio-economic criteria determine circumstance more than
some inborn character trait.

Indianapolis social workers and the board members who hired them held to beliefs in "unemployables" and those with "low character." While work relief allowed an individual to keep his dignity and strengthen moral reserve, a lack of will to work and a flawed character marked one as "unworthy" of relief and "unemployable" by industry. Board members and social work executives praised self-sufficiency, thrift, and hard work, all middle-class, Midwestern virtues. Further, they believed that case work and character building could instill these virtues in others.

The leaders of social work in Indianapolis believed in the ability to characterize an individual as worthy or unworthy of relief. There are many examples of this. In a 1929 letter from George Gill, the executive director of the Indianapolis Free Employment Bureau, to Eugene Foster, the Indianapolis Foundation's executive director, requesting funding for the Free Employment Bureau for 1930, Gill reported that one mission of the bureau was to discourage those not "employable." Frequent remarks made by both social work professionals and board members suggest that private social work was superior. In March of 1928, the Service and Relief Committee of the Family Welfare Society was concerned with both the low number of social workers and the
inadequate training they received at the public township trustee offices. Ten years later, the General Secretary of the society still was questioning the "rigid" policies and "inadequate" relief being given by the township offices.65

Perhaps nothing illustrates the variations and similarities of social workers and business leaders better than studying the backgrounds of four businessmen and social workers who were at the center of decision-making during the early years of the Great Depression. Arthur Brown, Leo Rappaport, Eugene Foster, and George Gill had all been raised and received their primary education in the Indianapolis area. All attended college and graduated before World War I. They conformed to the model of the average philanthropic board member in the city. They were white men over age thirty-nine who were born in Indiana and who had spent a long period of time in Indianapolis.

Arthur Brown fits the traditional conception of a businessman. He served as president of the Union Trust Company and sat as a member of the board of directors for several businesses including the Indianapolis Gas Company, Indianapolis Power and Light, Kingan & Company, and Real Silk. He was active in the Meridian Street Methodist Episcopal Church. Brown feared radical agitation and insisted on a traditional philanthropic response to the
economic emergency. He trusted in the ability of private philanthropy to meet the needs of the populace in a time of economic adjustment, in part because he served on many of the boards of directors for philanthropic agencies: the Salvation Army, the Flower Mission Society, Christamore House, and Methodist Hospital among others.

Leo Rappaport shared Brown's social standing, but held different views on the ability of private philanthropy to meet the needs of the populace during an economic emergency. Rappaport believed in private philanthropy, but realized that public funding for emergencies and basic aid were necessary and even obligatory. A local social work executive confidentially described Rappaport as a man who "realized the part which social problems play in the breakdown of individual families in a manner which some of the other board members are not willing to accept." Rappaport lived in the old northeast side, one of the city's oldest suburbs. Sixteen years younger than Brown, he served on the Board of directors for Fletcher American National Bank, Aetna Savings and Trust Company, Lewis Mier & Company, and the Republic Finance and Investment Company, where he served as secretary-treasurer. He was also involved heavily in the city's philanthropic organizations. He sat on the board of directors for the Community Fund and Circle
Theatre, and served as president of the Family Welfare Society.

Eugene Foster fit the more conservative wing of the social work community. He was both a social worker and a board member. He mixed both roles easily. As a member of the prestigious Columbia Club he mixed with Brown and Rappaport. He served as a deacon at the First Baptist Church, one of the largest churches in Indianapolis. He sat on the board of directors of Christamore House, Wheeler Mission, the American Red Cross, and the Flower Mission Society. Businessmen could agree with him on matters concerning private welfare. In 1930 he had served as executive director of the Indianapolis Foundation for six years, but had ties to the Family Welfare Society where he had been employed as director before 1917.

George Gill, more socially liberal and the youngest of the four men at age forty in 1930, became the secretary-manager for the Indianapolis Free Employment Bureau the same year that Foster assumed the reins of the Indianapolis Foundation. He actively supported socially liberal programs such as publicly funded old age pensions and unemployment insurance. Like Foster, Gill actively participated in his church, the Downy Avenue Christian Church. He did not serve on any prestigious boards, but did belong to the Service
Club, the American Legion, and was a Mason. Gill graduated from Indiana University and Columbia and served in World War I. He lived with his wife and two children in a nice, comfortable, middle-class neighborhood.

A sense of moderation generally guided the business-social work dialogue. Conservative and prominent men such as J.K. Lilly and William Fortune agreed with Rappaport and Gill that relief should be publicly funded. Rhoda Morrow, executive secretary of the Family Welfare Society, argued that the best social work was done by private groups, giving voice to the thoughts of Foster and Brown. None of the four men highlighted objected to local public relief, but several viewed private philanthropy as superior to public relief.

Over the years the Charity Organization Society and other private groups collaborated with public officials in their efforts to aid the poor, building an unofficial partnership. Over the years the public-private partnership grew. Some of the growth was due to Indiana's history of incorporating private institutions doing public work. Indiana's State Board of Health, for example, existed as a private entity for three years before it became a public one. Women and children were some of the first to come under the umbrella of private-public funding. In 1875, the
General Assembly passed laws authorizing counties to subsidize private orphanages, and from 1870 to 1900 city and county official heavily subsidized the Indianapolis Home for Friendless Women, created in 1866 with private Funds. The Indianapolis Free Kindergarten Society furnished an education for children before it was incorporated into the public school system. Private entities also used funds to aid the public. During the depression of 1893 the newly created Indianapolis Commercial Club gave food and fuel to public employees who the city could not afford to pay.

The informal yet strong partnership involved the sharing of personnel and information. The Family Welfare Society (FWS), successor to the Indianapolis Benevolent Society and the Charity Organization Society, frequently loaned social workers to the Center Township Trustee, who carried the largest relief burden. Social workers in private agencies normally worked closely with the public township trustee's office. Public agencies also used the FWS's registration service, a cataloged registry containing the names of all past relief recipients. The officers of each agency knew one another well and contact between agencies was frequent, as employees shared information concerning clients and attended the same social work conferences.

Board members and social workers alike had good reason
to be ebullient in the fall of 1929. Philanthropic agencies were doing well. The Indianapolis Foundation ranked second nationally in philanthropic expenditures by community trusts for 1929. The Foundation spent over $100,000 annually. In 1929, the Foundation supported both the Phyllis Wheatley YWCA and the Wheeler Mission building campaigns, seeing them as social investments in the community. Other investments included scholarships to high school, college, and graduate students, and the furnishing of a free employment bureau to the citizens of the city.72

Indianapolis experienced a placid 1929. The city's economic strength and diversity allowed relief organizations as much an extra year relatively free of hardship compared to several cities throughout the nation. There were more potential donors for the 1930 Community Fund campaign and fewer people who needed relief in Indianapolis than in other cities. The township trustees met the minimal relief needs of the citizens of Indiana, giving other social agencies the opportunity to provide both short-term and long-term care.

Until late 1929 board minutes of the philanthropic institutions reveal few major problems. Transfers of money from one account to another, the choosing of a campaign chairman, assigning campaign dates, and casual afternoon luncheons dominate the agenda of the Community Fund. A look
at particular agencies that depended on Community Fund support likewise suggests few serious issues. The annual support letter, sent in early 1929, by Wheeler Mission stressed its religious work, not relief. In fact, the number of meals served by the Mission for the entire fiscal year of 1928 did not equal what it would serve in one month in 1930.73

By October of 1929 Indianapolis was economically strong and her business community sufficiently diverse. Her leaders, especially those in the business community, were active in civic affairs. The city’s philanthropic concerns were popular and well funded. When the stock market crashed in late October Indianapolis was as ready to test the adequacy of local responsibility as any city of its size.

Indianapolis would not suffer a massive depletion of resources as did many other communities between 1929 and 1933. The city had a clear philanthropic tradition that reminded civic leaders of past achievements and present responsibilities. Strong and consistent philanthropic leadership, provided by the economic and social elite of the city, alleviated the problems of unemployment.

The network of elites, who were strategically positioned in the city’s philanthropic sector, provided a seedbed for a strengthening of the public-private
partnership. Individual leaders were in a position to be in contact with almost every other philanthropic agency and with local government officials. In the next several years the partnership would lead to more formal, centralized, ties not realized in the 1920s.
Notes for Chapter 1

In citing archives in the notes, short titles have generally been used. Works frequently cited have been identified by the following abbreviations:

- **CATH Papers**: Papers of the Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Indianapolis Archdiocese Archives, Indianapolis, Indiana.
- **CF papers**: Papers of the Community Fund, United Way of Central Indiana Archives, Indianapolis, Indiana.
- **CoC Papers**: Papers of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Indiana.
- **CoC-CoC**: Papers of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, Offices of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, Indianapolis, Indiana.
- **DL Papers**: Papers of Daniel B. Luten, Manuscripts Division-Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, Indiana.
- **FWS Papers**: Papers of the Family Services Association, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Indiana.
- **GCUR Papers**: Papers of the Governor’s Committee on
Unemployment Relief, Indiana State Archives, Indianapolis, Indiana.

Papers of the Indianapolis Foundation, Offices of the Indianapolis Foundation, Indianapolis, Indiana.

Papers of the YWCA of Indianapolis, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Indiana.

Papers of Wheeler Mission Ministries, Indiana University-Purdue University Archives, Indianapolis, Indiana.


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<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
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<td>Cincinnati</td>
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<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>458,762</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rochester</td>
<td>328,132</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>365,583</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>6,930,446</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>3,376,438</td>
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<td>Detroit</td>
<td>1,568,662</td>
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<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>1,238,048</td>
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7. Ibid., 330.

8. Percentages of foreign birth can be gleaned from the
U.S., Fifteenth Census, 1930, III, Population (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), for the following cities (with relevant page numbers): Indianapolis (1:696); New Orleans (1:457); Chicago (1:601); Atlanta (1:226); Birmingham (1:67); Detroit (1:1130); Seattle (2:1219); New York (2:270); Cincinnati (2:468); Rochester (2:277).


10. Other cities reported similar increases, including Birmingham and Atlanta, while Seattle's non-white population increased by only 14 percent. However, Indianapolis' black population, as a percentage of the whole, was comparatively very large. Rochester and Seattle's black communities comprised less than 1 percent of their respective city's total population figures. The percentages of black population averaged about 7 percent in Chicago and Detroit, while Los Angeles and New York only had about 4 percent each. Information cited can be found in U.S., Fifteenth Census, 1930, III, Population, 61.

11. Ibid., 61.

12. Kin Hubbard, ed., Book of Indiana (Indianapolis: The
Indiana Biographical Society, 1929).

13. In the 1920s the Chamber of Commerce became a semi-official advisor. Representatives of the Civic Affairs Committee were routinely asked to aid the city council finance committee concerning budgets and priorities. The Civic Affairs Committee even outlined a ten-year budget for future bond sales that was sent, in a confidential form, to all city council members. See "Monthly Reports - Report of the Civic Affairs Committee, December 9, 1929, Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce," Folder 21, CoC Papers.

14. Both parties in the 1929 race for mayor pledged to balance the city's budget and no promises were made concerning major social questions.

15. This can be seen in Indianapolis through study of its black newspapers. The city's first black newspaper, the Indianapolis Leader, encouraged free enterprise and moral rectitude. See the author's entry "Indianapolis Leader" in Encyclopedia of Indianapolis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 787-788, David J. Bodenhamer and Robert G. Barrows, eds. See also Andrew R. L. Cayton and Peter S. Onuf, The Midwest and the Nation: Rethinking the History of an American Region (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

17. Endelman reported that she did not find that any reports of physical abuse to Jews in the 1920s in Indianapolis, although there were some threats and an attempted KKK boycott of Jewish stores. This is not to say that Indianapolis was some kind of Xanadu of racial and ethnic understanding, only that some of the worst kinds of actions, associated with nativist fervor, were avoided by the city and even denigrated by the elite.

18. For an interesting look at Indianapolis during the Depression from the vantage point of youth, see Lawrence S. Connor, Hampton Court: Growing Up Catholic in Indianapolis Between the Wars (Indianapolis: Guild Press, 1995), 43.

19. For the Indianapolis Star’s opinion of Sullivan see Indianapolis Star, 2 October 1929, 8. For a brief account of Sullivan’s administration see Ray Boomhower’s entry “Reginald H. Sullivan” in the Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, 1308-1309. For opinions on the ability and leadership of Sullivan see an admittedly partisan publication, The Sullivan Record, copy in the Indiana Division, Indiana State Library. Various community leaders contributed opinions including some prominent Republicans.

20. Residents of Indianapolis voted 53,912-9,954 in favor of
the city manager plan. See Harrison C. Neal III and Jeffrey Duvall's entry "City Manager Proposal (1920s)," Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, 431.


22. George and Miriam Geib, Indianapolis First (Indianapolis: Chamber of Commerce, 1990), 53.

23. I have chosen these six cities for comparison to Indianapolis based on population size and geographic diversity. Cincinnati is Indianapolis' midwestern sister city, Atlanta is a southeastern city, Rochester is an inland eastern city, Birmingham is a deep southern city, Seattle is a western coastal city, and New Orleans is a southern city with a large export business. All of these cities fit within the 250,000-500,000 population category.

24. Quote can be found in Logan Esarey's History of Indiana: From Its Exploration to 1922 4 vols. (Dayton: Dayton
It is difficult to give accurate comparisons in terms of diversity of industry. The 1929 Census of Manufacturers placed many industries, in which only one or a few companies competed in one industrial sector, in an "other" category so that in most cities "other" accounted for the largest share of industries. All seven cities have "other" as their largest industrial type. In addition the 1929 Census did not include any company whose total value of product did not reach $5,000. Indianapolis had 917 firms employing 51,117 wage-earning employees and 9,862 white collar employees. Its five largest non-"other" listed industries included meat packing, motor vehicle production, foundry and machine shop products, electrical machine, apparatus, and supplies production, and motor vehicle bodies and parts creation. Twenty different companies were involved in producing car parts and vehicles, employing a little more than 6,000 blue and white collar workers, who accounted for nearly 10 percent of the city's manufacturing work force. Ten percent seems like a large number, until one notes that in Rochester one industry accounted for nearly 15 percent and that lumber and timber production employed more than 20 percent of the work force in King County (Seattle). A city with a large percentage of its companies in one sector, such as Detroit
with car manufacturing, fare far worse in periods of recession than other cities because of their economic vulnerability.


By April of 1929 Philadelphia reported a 10.4 percent unemployment rate, while Baltimore claimed that as many as one in ten of its workers were out of a job by the end of 1928.

29. According to the Indianapolis Star, an average of 44.7 percent of Indianapolis families earned more than $2,000, slightly better than the national average. Twenty-four percent of Indianapolis families earned more than $3,000. The richest real estate districts income averaged $4,739. In the second wealthiest area, families, on average, brought home $3,619 (Indianapolis Star, 18 July 1929, 9). Winifred D. W. Bolin in "The Economics of Middle Income Family Life: Working Women During the Great Depression," Journal of American History 65 (June 1978): 62, reports that only 21.5 percent of American families earned more than $3,000 and only 40 percent of Americans nationally earned more than $2,000 per year. The average worker in the Hoosier capital received $1,474 in yearly compensation from wages. However, this was much better than the average Hoosier; when rural income is included the average falls to only $612.

30. Gene Smiley, "Did Incomes for Most of the Population Fall from 1923 through 1929?" Journal of Economic History
43 (March 1983): 209. Smiley concludes that between 1923 and 1929 real income rose 9.8 percent.


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<thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1927</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>$52.35</td>
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<td>Seattle</td>
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<td>Atlanta</td>
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Many cities in Indianapolis' population class also incurred increased debt over the two-year period, but a few decreased their debt. Rochester increased its per capita debt by nearly fifteen dollars, Atlanta by nearly nine and Seattle's per capita debt stood at $222.03, much higher than Indianapolis' $95.56. Many cities, including Indianapolis, found it hard during the 1920s to either balance their budgets or raise taxes to cover increased spending. In fact, Indianapolis had been in the habit of issuing bonds to pay for its electric bills. Per capita debt shows Indianapolis to be relatively healthy, but slipping into insolvency as the decade progressed. Between 1927 and 1929 city per capita debt increased by almost twelve dollars (see Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1929 and 1931).


39. The Council of Social Agencies, The Leisure of a People: 54
40. The Leisure of a People, 41.

Mortality Rates

<table>
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<th>City</th>
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<td>18.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>28.4</td>
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41. Besides lower mortality rates, blacks in Indianapolis enjoyed the lowest rental property and housing prices of the northern cities in the comparison group. In addition, using information gleaned from the Indianapolis Recorder, there seemed to be little unemployment. This is not to say that blacks did not face discrimination nor is it possible to say that blacks were viewed as equal citizens. However, many of the city's minority citizens enjoyed a fairly good standard of life when compared to other minority communities. For reports on the problems of the city's black community, see Indianapolis Recorder, 2 March 1929, 1; Indianapolis Star, 7 April 1929, 21; and Indianapolis Recorder, 30 March 1929, 1.

42. Alice Shaffer et al., The Indiana Poor Law: Its Development and Administration with Special Reference to the Provision of State Care for the Sick Poor, Social Service
Monograph #28 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936). Chapters 1 and 2 on the development of poor laws in Indiana are especially helpful.

43. Nine townships comprised Marion County, five of which Indianapolis covered or touched. Center Township was by far the most urban.

44. Cayton and Onuf, The Midwest, 55.

45. See entry "Indianapolis Foundation" by Gregory Lynn in Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, 780.

46. Ibid., 780-781.

47. This can be seen in the shifting priorities of the Community Fund budget before the Crash. The Family Welfare Society garnered 28.5 percent of the budget for 1929, a much smaller amount than the 41 percent it received in 1924.


49. Indianapolis Star, 19 April 1929, 3.

50. Only ten agencies were described as "relief-giving." They were: the Catholic Community Center, Family Welfare Society, Indianapolis Day Nursery, Jewish Federation, Red

51. See George W. Geib, Lives Touched by Faith: Second Presbyterian Church, 150 Years (Indianapolis: Second Presbyterian Church, 1988), 122-125.

52. Seeley, Community Chest, 52. Indianapolis has been acknowledged to be "the most Southern of Northern cities." Coupled with the notorious power of the Klan in the 1920s, one would have expected more discrimination in relief giving. In fact there was not a differentiation of relief given to whites and blacks by these groups, as was the case in other, mostly southern, cities. See Smith, The New Deal in the Urban South, on the relief practices of Birmingham, Atlanta, and New Orleans.


56. For information on group consensus building and agreement formation, see Scott, Social Network Analysis, 12-26. For data on the transfer of information and goods see Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 293-297.

57. See Appendix A and B for list of 79 leaders in Indianapolis, 1929-1933. Source information for the various leaders can be found in Hubbard, A Book of Indiana; the Indiana Biographical Service located in the Indiana Division of the Indiana State Library; Indianapolis Men of Affairs (Indianapolis: The American Biographical Society, 1923), ed. Paul D. Brown; and Charles R. Roll, Indiana: One Hundred and Fifty Years of American Development (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Co., 1931). In addition the various editions of Who's Who and Who Was Who were helpful.
58. *Indianapolis City Directory* (Indianapolis: R.L. Polk & Co., Publishers, 1929). For family income see the Real Estate Board Survey results as published by the *Indianapolis Star*, 18 July 1929, 9. For another view of board members in this period, see the study by Robert K. Taylor "Characteristics of 200 Board Members of Private Social Agencies in Indianapolis, 1930-1940" (M.A. thesis, Indiana University, 1941). My own research confirms his essential findings that board members were wealthier, more highly educated, more religious, and older than the general population.

59. Taylor, "Characteristics of 200 Board Members," 18. It is interesting to note that many Jews were a part of the philanthropic elite. In fact by 1931 several men of the Jewish faith held leadership positions in the Community Fund, the Indianapolis Foundation, and the Chamber of Commerce, as well as Jewish charities.

60. *1929 Indianapolis City Directory*. National economic integration in the 1920s and early 1930s is often overemphasized. Most businesses were still local or regional, but were dependent upon other local and regional businesses. Few truly national chains of stores or industries existed. For instance, 37 percent of retail drug
stores were part of a chain; however, retail chains received just 21.9 percent of the total retail business nationwide and in Indianapolis only 14 percent of retail sales went to sectional or national chains. Information on chains can be found in U.S., Fifteenth Census, 1930, I, Distribution, 28-30, and Mowry and Brownell, The Urban Nation, 5-11. Percentages for the state of Indiana can be found in U.S., Fifteenth Census, 1930, I, Distribution, 710.


63. Miriam Van Waters in her presidential address derided concepts such as "worthy" or "unworthy." She stated: "We hear no more about the 'worthy poor.' The attitude of the social worker toward human beings is one of 'Respect.'" Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work: At The Fifty-Seventh Annual Session Held in Boston, Massachusetts, June 8-14, 1930 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1931), 14. See also "Minutes," 1928-1932, Book 3, IF Papers.

64. At the 1929 Social Work Conference, C. M. Bookman and
John Brown acknowledged the attitude then prevalent that public sector social work was deemed inferior. See Bookman’s address, “The Place of the Community Chest in Human Relations” and Brown’s “The Organization of State and County Welfare Departments” in Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work: At the Fifty-Sixth Annual Session Held in San Francisco, June 26-July 3, 1929 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), 523-530. In Indianapolis government service was accorded inferior status. See “Minutes of the Case Committee, Family Welfare Society, 1923-1954,” Box 7, Folder 3 and Box 3, Folder 2, page 3, FWS Papers.


68. George Gill relates that Foster was a man who mixed easily with businessmen. Further, the fact that he held so
many board posts without raising fundamental questions concerning the nature of social welfare policies connotes a comfortable acceptance of contemporary social philosophy. See "Transcript of Taped Interview with George Gill," Oral History Project, 1972, page 3. Indiana State Library, Indianapolis.

69. Gill professes his beliefs in these programs in "Transcript of Taped Interview with George Gill," 10-11.

70. Since the 1890s prominent national businessmen active in social welfare instituted programs in their own businesses and expected society would follow their example. Lilly and Fortune were a part of this trend. See Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, "The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the Public Sphere, 1890-1930," Minerva 19:2 (1981): 236-270. Karl and Katz argue that private philanthropy, in the absence of national standards, set social goals and social work standards until the mid-1930s. People with great wealth, such as Andrew Carnegie, set up foundations to create national standards, find solutions to social problems, and perpetuate the ideas and wealth of the benefactor. See also Edward Berkowitz and Kim McQuaid, "Businessman and Bureaucrat: The Evolution of the American Social Welfare System, 1900-1940," Journal of Economic
History 38 (March 1978): 120-147. Berkowitz and McQuaid argue that price stabilization at the beginning of the century allowed businesses to create ambitious employee benefit programs. Companies such as Kodak, General Electric, and United States Steel, gave employees stock ownership and retirement plans so as to decrease dissatisfaction and increase employee retention. The authors conclude that employers created the model for the welfare system to come in the 1930s and 1960s.

71. See Seeley, Community Chest, 74-94. See also Alice Shaffer et al., The Indiana Poor Law: Its Development and Administration with Special Reference to the Provision of State Care for the Sick, Social Service Monograph No. 28 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), 43-86. These books touch on the private-public partnership only lightly and do not directly draw the reader to the conclusion that there was in fact an informal partnership. The number of public charities multiplied after Indiana became a state.


served 3,905 meals whereas in fiscal year 1928 the Mission served only 3,017. In addition, total meals served in 1929 also appear to not exceed those of October 1930, but the Mission relief kitchen was closed for several months due to construction and records are unclear as to the exact number of meals served in 1929.

Family Welfare Society records also reveal a relatively calm 1929 in terms of aid given to needy families. Inquiries to the Indianapolis Foundation show much of the same. In 1929, requests for aid came from several areas, but most were not relief oriented. For example, the local Boy's Club requested money for a swimming pool, while the city hospital asked for additional funding in order to hire another social worker for its staff.
Chapter 2
The Creation of a More Formal Public-Private Partnership in Indianapolis, October 1929-July 1931

On October 29, 1929 the New York Stock Exchange crashed after three months of economic decline. Across the nation the number of unemployed grew by two million within a month and fears of social unrest mounted. Business leaders and philanthropists worried about the possible social and political consequences of widespread unemployment.¹ In February and March of 1930 thousands marched to city halls in Cleveland and Chicago demanding more aid.² In response, local governments created make-work projects, increased welfare budgets, and distributed free food to ease the burdens of the unemployed.

Leaders in Indianapolis fought to maintain both the dignity of those without a job as well as their sustenance. Civic leaders backed work relief projects, at least in part, because they believed that work engendered certain values antithetical to both communism and despair.³ Civic leaders created a relief structure capable of handling larger increases in unemployment by creating formal ties between the public and private sectors.

Both nationally and locally, political and business
leaders projected an image of strength and activity. Conferences and commissions assured the public that steps were being taken to ameliorate the effects of the economic downturn. President Herbert Hoover initiated a series of conferences in November and December of 1929 in which he promised a speeding up of capital improvement spending, encouraging businesses to hasten construction projects. Following Washington's lead, Indiana Governor Harry G. Leslie also held a business conference, which promised continued employment and pledged to push forward on public construction projects.

In Indianapolis, Mayor Reginald Sullivan and Paul Q. Richie, president of the Chamber of Commerce, announced the formation of an Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment (ICSE). The commission promptly went to work on a study of unemployment, sought short-term work for the unemployed, and looked for long-term solutions. Within a year the ICSE launched the Emergency Work Committee, an effort at work relief similar to an Indianapolis program in the 1890s.

In the press, pundits remained hopeful that the economic downturn would be temporary. Two days after the crash an editorial in the Indianapolis Star echoed President Hoover's assessment that the economy was "sound." The
president's optimism was reinforced by the city's apparent quick recovery from the early unemployment dip. Six months after the first editorial the Star's editor concluded that "business is definitely on the upgrade." 6 Few businessmen would have dissented. Prominent businessman and philanthropist Arthur Brown, for example, speculated that the depression would not last much past 1930. 7

The optimism felt by many business and political leaders at the beginning of the Great Depression was not unfounded. Throughout the 1920s depressions of short duration had hit the United States. The last, in 1927, was very mild. Although the first six months were bad, by March 1930, the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce reported that employment had risen by 6 percent since January. 8

Large cities adjusted to increases in unemployment using traditional means. Municipalities with welfare offices increased relief budgets. Urban areas that relied on private relief and had a centralized charity agency, such as the Community Fund, increased the budgets of their primary welfare agencies or created work-relief projects. Sometimes cities attempted to do both. Municipal employees contributed funds to open soup kitchens or clothing dispensaries, not always voluntarily.

In America's largest city, New York, the Association
for Improving the Condition of the Poor launched an emergency make-work program as early as December 1929. Cincinnati had created a publicly funded, privately managed, make-work program a year earlier. Almost 200 cities followed the example set by New York and Cincinnati between 1929 and 1931. Other urban areas--Boston, Los Angeles, and Detroit, for example--relied primarily on public welfare programs. Spending by both public and private agencies for relief increased rapidly. In 1930, agencies in 200 cities increased spending by 63 percent over 1929 levels. In 1931, they expended 142 percent more than in 1930.

Indianapolis civic leaders reacted in much the same manner as their counterparts elsewhere. Township trustees increased their budgets, Community Fund welfare agencies received priority in budgeting, and various commissions and committees were created by both public and private entities. Throughout 1930, groups in Indianapolis cooperated in expanding the existing system of relief that linked volunteer and tax-based operations. They were able to do this, at least in the beginning, because of the city's low unemployment rate and relatively manageable relief requests.

The most challenging problems of unemployment did not occur during the first year of the Depression. Between October 1929 and the winter of 1930 average unemployment
across the nation grew but did not reach unprecedented levels. The national unemployment rate hovered around 8.9 percent in 1930. The real emergency began in 1931 when, by July, the unemployment rate rose to around 16 percent in the nation's 120 largest cities.\(^{11}\)

In Indianapolis, unemployment did not conform to the national model until after the summer of 1930. Eugene Foster, executive director of the Indianapolis Foundation, noted an "unusual increase in street beggars" four days before the stock market crash. What Foster, and other philanthropists experienced was a high unemployment rate, probably caused by the city's economic diversity.\(^ {12}\) After the initial market collapse however, city companies rebounded, rehiring workers and sometimes expanding employee lists. In March 1930, a report by the ICSE pegged the city's unemployment rate at only 2.8 percent above that of March 1929.\(^ {13}\)
In Figure 2.1 one can examine the unemployment figures for the period covered by this chapter. In May 1929 unemployment was less than 1 percent. By May of the next year it had reached 8.5 percent, an incredible increase but not out of line with national figures. After July 1930 it reached unprecedented heights. By July 1931 Indianapolis faced as large an unemployment problem as the rest of the nation.

The black community was the hardest hit by the Depression, even in this early period. No early recovery, however brief, eased the problems of black unemployment. The Recorder had, since early 1929, been attempting to find solutions to unemployment. Nationally, blacks were two to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>&gt;1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
three times as likely to be unemployed as whites. In Indianapolis the same was true. Even though blacks made up only 12 percent of the total population, they accounted for 48.5 percent of the FWS's unemployment cases in November 1930. In February 1931, that number reached 66.4 percent, decreasing only slightly three months later to 65.8 percent. In addition, the Emergency Work Committee (EWC) found that close to 50 percent of its workforce was black. The problem became apparent to social workers at the FWS. Because of the large black unemployment problem, Rhonda Morrow, the executive secretary of the FWS, suggested the creation of a separate black district with a black supervisor, such as was done in other cities. The idea was vetoed by the board members as inefficient and costly, but they were forced to recognize the large unemployment needs in the black community.

Organizations in the black community were active in trying to ease the burdens of the unemployed. Flanner House had always been proud of its self-help tradition. During the Depression it continued its employment bureau, baby clinic, savings club, and vocational classes. Added to these programs were a food cooperative and additional vocational classes for men. The Indianapolis Recorder, alarmed at the growing rate of black unemployment, created
the "Good Fellows" organization to collect money to give out relief baskets during the Christmas season and search for employment opportunities. The Second Baptist Church opened a soup kitchen, open to blacks and whites alike.20

Regardless of the bright future laid out in the press by businessmen and politicians, a sense of crisis did affect some social workers and philanthropic leaders in the first six months of the Depression. Reports issued by the various agencies as early as November 1929 were troubling. The tasks of feeding the hungry, housing the homeless, and finding employment for the jobless proved daunting compared to one year earlier. While most philanthropists knew it would be hard to aid all those who needed help, they were determined to meet the need and accept responsibility for carrying out all relief work.

Philanthropic leaders confronted the unemployment problem almost immediately after the stock market crash. Their first reaction was to give relief agencies priority. During the December 31, 1929, special meeting of the Community Fund, the board approved a motion that relief agencies be given first priority during budget negotiations. Leo Rappaport concluded from the reports of the FWS that the unemployment situation was "serious," but doubted if the public realized just how serious the problem was.21
The Special Gifts Division of the Community Fund failed to meet its fall 1929 campaign goal by $50,000. Some member agencies reported the non-payment of individual pledges. The perceived crisis and the failure to make up the Fund drive shortfall led to some economizing and a few unorthodox moves. Agencies were told not to expect an increase in their 1930 budget allowance. This led to open grumbling by several agencies. Perhaps because of the budget problems and the poor economic conditions, the Fund board allowed Christamore House and the Girl Scouts to conduct quiet, separate campaigns to raise money. This special allowance violated the Fund's rule of coordinated fund-raising, but it reduced tensions that could have broken the Fund apart.

Board member Fred Hoke believed he had a partial answer to the Community Fund's shortage. He urged the Fund's board of directors to stage a quiet campaign in January 1930. The campaign would focus on elites who had failed to give as much in the general campaign as the board thought they should. The proposal passed. Men who themselves came from the elite volunteered to conduct the campaign: Hoke, the auto manufacturer Walter Marmon, and Herman Lieber, president of the Merchants Association. Hugh McK. Landon, vice-president of Fletcher Trust Company, and his co-worker
Leo Rappaport also joined. The special campaign failed to reach its $50,000 goal by almost $30,000.23

Relief agencies, so long a shrinking concern of the Fund, became a priority. At the end of January 1930, a relief committee of representatives from the Family Welfare Society, the Community Fund board, the budget committee of the Community Fund, the Catholic Community Center, and the Jewish Federation advocated a $50,000 increase in relief funding for 1930. In addition they urged increases in staffing at the relief agencies and creation of a city-wide, publicly funded body to set up a central registration bureau to act as a money raising group.24 The $50,000 increase would have to be made up by reductions in the budgets of character-building groups. One week later their recommendations became board policy. The relief committee’s efforts, in cooperation with the mayor’s office and the Chamber of Commerce, led to the creation of the ICSE, but the ICSE did not become the powerful group the committee had envisioned.
Figure 2.2 Fund Budgets of Relief Agencies, 1929-1930

<table>
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<th>Relief Agency</th>
<th>1929</th>
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<tr>
<td>Family Welfare Society</td>
<td>$179,733</td>
<td>$228,500</td>
<td>27.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indianapolis Day Nursery</td>
<td>$8,166</td>
<td>$8,166</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travelers Aid Society</td>
<td>$6,325</td>
<td>$6,425</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jewish Federation</td>
<td>$49,548</td>
<td>$49,500</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Cross</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army</td>
<td>$29,100</td>
<td>$29,100</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thedora Home</td>
<td>$3,454</td>
<td>$3,700</td>
<td>07.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers of America</td>
<td>$13,007</td>
<td>$14,297</td>
<td>09.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheeler Mission</td>
<td>$7,500</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>60.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The increases in funding provided by the Community Fund to the individual organizations were due to increases in need more than influence, but influence seems to have given certain institutions larger increases. Some Community Fund budget committee members had first-hand knowledge of the problems of individual agencies. The largest percentage increase went to Wheeler City Rescue Mission, an agency that served transient men. It probably helped Wheeler, though, to have influence on the budget committee in the form of Eugene Foster. The Catholic Community Center and the Family Welfare Society received the next largest increases, again probably due to a combination of need and influence. The Red Cross requested that its increase go to the Family Welfare Society. No justification appears in the board member notes for the slightly reduced allocation to the
Jewish Federation, but the Federation was mostly a character-building agency and handled far fewer relief cases than other agencies.

Agencies scrambled for additional relief funds as the requests for aid reached unprecedented levels. In the first six months of fiscal year 1930, relief agencies of the Community Fund spent $100,000 out of the $104,000 allocated for the entire year. In March, seven months before the 1931 campaign, the Community Fund forecasted a budget deficit of $38,000. In the public sector the Center Township Trustee was spending $16,000 per month, nearly two times the 1929 level. Total relief expenditures in Indianapolis, both public and private, amounted to $494,823 in 1930, more than double the amount spent in 1929.

Needs increased two fold or more during the winter of 1929-1930. The number of men receiving aid at Wheeler Mission tripled between October and December 1929. By May the number of meals served at Wheeler Mission decreased, but were still over 1100 percent more than the year before.

The summer of 1930 provided a brief respite. By June, the FWS reported only 205 cases due to unemployment. The July report was slightly higher, but less than a third of the January case load. Wheeler Mission distributed fewer garments, served fewer meals, and lodged fewer transients.
during June, July, and August than during the previous three months. The Community Fund needed to borrow less than expected. In addition, reports on employment seemed to be headed in the right direction.

The fall and early winter of 1930-31 proved more challenging to relief agencies. Between August and December needs and costs rose quickly. Wheeler Mission served 2444 percent more meals in August than during the previous August. By December the number of men receiving shelter had increased almost twice compared to the same month in 1929. In November the FWS received 822 applications for aid due to unemployment, 48 percent of which were from blacks.

The new year brought more relief needs rather than fewer. Money was running out and budgets were already tight. By February 1931, wages paid to transients at Wheeler Mission consumed close to $700 of the agency's monthly $2100 budget. Active cases at the FWS in February were more than double that of November 1930. In May 1931, Wheeler Mission gave 12,474 loaves of bread to needy families. At retail prices this meant that the Mission gave away $623.70 in bread alone, or approximately two hundred dollars less than the cost of a new Dodge car. The FWS reduced its load, mainly by dumping case loads onto the township trustee, but it still held more cases in May 1931, than in
November 1930. The Community Fund agreed to borrow at least $30,000 for June and July of 1931, mostly for the FWS.³³

A shortage of money was not the only problem. Workers at agencies were working far harder than during normal times. Each FWS social workers in Indianapolis carried more than three times the normal number of cases compared to their counterparts in other cities.³⁴ Indianapolis lost several social workers to other cities because of the stress.

Character-building and civic agencies, too, felt the pressures associated with the Depression. Most character-building and civic agencies relied on dues-paying members. The YMCA ended 1930 with a deficit of $3,150, most of it from drops in membership and increases in free memberships.³⁵ By mid-September 1930, non-payment of dues left the Chamber of Commerce with a shortfall of $80,000. By the end of the year the Chamber had to rely on one of its largest trustee funds for operating expenses.³⁶ When several pledges went unpaid, the YWCA had to borrow $50,000 from an insurance company to pay mortgage payments on the newly constructed Phyllis Wheatley Branch.³⁷ Money pressures led these agencies to compete directly with relief agencies for a place in the Community Fund budget and with independent supporters. It also restricted the amount of
help they could render to relief agencies.

Inside the meetings of the various philanthropic agencies, the need for more money was foremost in discussion. Strategies for solving the financial strain abounded. Sometimes this need manifested itself in anger vented at other organizations. During the March 14, 1930, FWS board meeting a board member chided the representative of the ICSE for not modeling itself after the board that ran the Cincinnati make-work program. The township trustee system was also blamed. Private groups asserted that trustees had not assumed their share of the rising case loads. However, almost two months before the March meeting, Leo Rappaport and other Community Fund board members had advised family agencies to dump as many cases as possible into the hands of the trustees. In part the anger was misdirected. FWS board members had not yet realized that the trustees were handling at least twice as many cases as the year before. Many believed that the trustee was neglecting her duty to provide for the minimal requirements of the poor.

Several agencies sought aid outside the normal channels of the Community Fund. Traditionally, organizations with religious or sectarian programs had been allowed to seek funding for their non-relief, sectarian programs outside of
the Community Fund drive. Several organizations used this strategy to make up their deficits incurred for relief work. The Catholic Community Center reached thousands through their column in the Indiana Catholic and Record, urging parishioners, for example, to "adopt" a child's milk bill for a week.\textsuperscript{39} In addition to outside sources, agencies expected their board of directors, and sometimes their executives, to give generously. At one point in 1931 the finances of the FWS were so precarious that Leo Rappaport pledged up to $500 for one month, in addition to his yearly donation.\textsuperscript{40}

Organizations outside of the Fund were not prepared for a massive economic crisis. Most churches faced large debts or received declining revenues, making them unable to give significant aid. Church and school construction during the 1920s left the Catholic Archdiocese more than two million dollars in debt. Bishop Joseph Chartrand urged parishioners during his 1929 Christmas address to double the amount they normally gave to the needy, but there was little more he or the Catholic Church could do.\textsuperscript{41} A few churches where wealthy benefactors attended were still able to give considerable sums. Second Presbyterian continued its funding of Mayer Chapel, expending more than $15,000 per year in the early 1930s for benevolent purposes.\textsuperscript{42}
The Indianapolis Foundation could not be of very much assistance to relief agencies without giving up its vision of building the foundation of a socially better Indianapolis through experimentation in non-relief measures. Additionally, litigation had stripped the Indianapolis Foundation of $17,000 generated by the A.P. Pettis fund in May 1929, dropping the community trust from fifth place in funds distributed by community trusts to sixth.\textsuperscript{43} It did agree to give the Fund an additional $4,000, raising the Foundation's total allotment to the Fund to $20,000 for 1930. This figure amounted to almost 17 percent of the Foundation's budget. In 1931 the Fund received only $10,000 from the Foundation because of its decreasing income.\textsuperscript{44}

Despite the scope of the problem, local philanthropic leaders were determined to meet the existing need, even if it meant going into debt. After the February 6, 1930, Community Fund Board meeting, David Liggett, the recently installed executive secretary, wrote:

> While no formal action was taken, it was the sense of the board that while the total of expenditures for the year seemed beyond the possible resources of the Community Fund, the Board of Directors must of necessity assume responsibility . . . and must devise ways and means of securing funds necessary.\textsuperscript{45}

There seemed no question either by the Community Fund board or the boards of the various agencies that the need would and must
be met. The only question was how the agencies were to get the money they needed. The response was consistent with the history of philanthropy in Indianapolis; local resources would meet local needs.

The late spring and summer months of 1930 relieved the sense of crisis felt by members of philanthropic boards. As fall approached the Community Fund board clarified its policies. In a memo dated July 31, 1930, the Fund put member agencies on notice that in the fiscal year beginning on November 1 no class of agencies, character building or relief, would be given preference to the detriment of other agencies’ normal functions. It also announced that there would not be another budget deficit. The Fund warned agencies that its responsibility ended with the disbursement of funds. Each agency was responsible for its own program, provided it could administer that program within the budget guidelines set by the Fund budget committee. The Fund apparently had abandoned its earlier pledge to meet existing needs, no matter the cost, and to give relief agencies special preference. The lower summer needs may have buoyed hopes that the Depression would not last much longer and therefore a resumption of the trend toward giving character agencies the majority of funding could resume.

For the fall 1930 campaign the Community Fund board
appointed Arthur V. Brown campaign chairman. Brown urged businessmen to give in order to avoid social unrest. All three major newspapers endorsed the campaign. The Recorder noted Fund support of agencies operating in the black community. The Church Federation purchased quarter-page ads in the Indianapolis Star promoting the idea of giving to the Fund as a Christian duty.

In previous years both Christian duty and community involvement had been the theme of businessmen and the Recorder. In many ways the differences in emphasis for the 1931 drive reveal latent biases or fears. Businessmen wanted to prevent social unrest. Although no large public demonstrations had occurred in Indianapolis, other large cities had experienced unsettling demonstrations by unemployed men and women who had stormed city halls demanding more aid.

In the past no such threat was apparent, so the need to show pride in community was used as a reason for support. The Indiana Catholic and Record relayed the warning of William O'Connell, the Archbishop of Boston, that businessmen must do something to avert catastrophe. Board meeting notes also reveal talk of the need to help others, in part, to avoid social unrest. In a later letter to Wheeler Mission donors, H.B. Eberhardt, executive secretary
of Wheeler Mission, wanted non-financial contributions, of
time and prayer, to "protect America against Revolution and
Communism."

For African-Americans the motives were more mixed. The
black community throughout the early 1930s was fearful of
losing the small amount of economic independence it had.
Editorials in favor of the creation of black businesses or
businesses that would hire blacks appeared in almost every
issue of the Recorder throughout the 1930-1933 period.

The Recorder as well as several other organizations
enthusiastically supported the Community Fund and the EWC,
even though not one member of the Community Fund board or
the board of the EWC was black. The reasons for the support
given by blacks in Indianapolis were, at least in part,
because neither Fund agencies nor the EWC overtly
discriminated in the distribution of aid. Because of the
Recorder, blacks knew that overt discrimination in relief
aid was the norm in cities such as Baltimore, Birmingham,
Atlanta, and New Orleans. The Indianapolis tradition of
non-discriminatory relief, began in 1835, continued
throughout this early period.

The fall 1930 Community Fund campaign exceeded its goal
of $860,000 by $20,642. The hardest decisions came after
the campaign. The Fund board kept its promise not to favor
one group of agencies over another. In 1931 the ten agencies marked as “relief-giving” received less than half of the total money raised and accounted for by the budget, a reduction of $19,209.58 compared to total allotments, including emergency loans, in 1930. However, the budget committee created an emergency fund of $45,000 for future needs, which could only be given to relief agencies.54

Figure 2.3 Fund Budgets for Relief Agencies, 1930-1931

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<tr>
<th>Relief Agency</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
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<td>$30,000</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army</td>
<td>$29,100</td>
<td>$31,527</td>
<td>08.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thedora Home</td>
<td>$3,700</td>
<td>$4,255</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers of America</td>
<td>$14,297</td>
<td>$16,028</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler Mission</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>08.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The recommendations of the budget committee of the Community Fund allowed more for character-building agencies for fiscal year 1931, to make up for the decreases of the previous year. In 1931 they received a 5.2 percent increase, amounting to $19,209.58. The largest percentages of relief funding went to the Catholic Community Center and the Travelers Aid Society. The FWS received only an 8.6 percent increase. The board was not pleased with the FWS or with Wheeler Mission. The board believed that the FWS was
not doing its job efficiently while Wheeler was taken to task for its unauthorized publicity of a Sunday breakfast for the poor in the Indianapolis Star. The FWS was receiving mixed signals from the Community Fund. Earlier in 1930, the FWS was told not to take more cases without first hiring more social workers. They were later blasted for spending too much money, supposedly because of inefficiencies that were never specifically identified by the Community Fund.

Despite the public declaration of July 31, Liggett noted that relief organizations would be given priority. He wrote "it was the consensus of opinion that the Community Fund must use all possible available funds for relief this year."

Relief organizations were told that relief situations would be taken care of. Rappaport was given a verbal promise from Edward Kahn, president of the Community Fund, that the FWS's program would not suffer. Events did not allow the Community Fund to resume its policy of favoring character building agencies.

The creation of the relief fund was in part due to the influence of Leo Rappaport. Rappaport, as president of the FWS, resented the $28,500 deduction in the FWS allocation for fiscal year 1931. In the November board meeting he successfully campaigned for a relief fund citing the
possible future needs for relief agencies should the Depression continue. He helped convince the board that special donations by the Sears and Roebuck Company during December and January should be held back for a relief fund. The board sided with Rappaport. The Fund could keep all of its promises. All agencies could be promised the same allocation as last year, the deficit from fiscal year 1930 could be paid, and a large relief fund could be created without appearing to slight character-building institutions.

Figure 2.4 Family Agency Case Loads and Expenditures, 1929-1931

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Case Loads</th>
<th>Expenditures On relief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family Welfare Society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>3,087</td>
<td>$115,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>6,169</td>
<td>$127,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>7,121</td>
<td>$172,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Federation Social Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>$6,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>$8,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Community Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,352*</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>&gt; 750**</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
*denotes families rather than individuals  **unknown total for year, but by December the CCC had 750 families under its care.

As unemployment climbed 194 percent between 1929 and 1930 and jumped an additional 279 percent between 1930 and 1931 relief agencies heeded the call for additional aid.\(^{58}\)
The five township trustees who served Indianapolis increased spending 123 percent between 1929 and 1930 and an additional 171.5 percent between 1930 and 1931. The private sector spent an additional 103 percent during the period.\textsuperscript{59} Caseloads at the FWS increased 99.8 percent between 1929 and 1930 and increased an additional 15.4 percent in 1931. Obviously private and public sector spending did not increase in the same proportion as increases in unemployment, but it would be a mistake to assume that only commensurate increases in funding could have kept pace with the need that existed.

Greater efficiency and cooperation between agencies allowed the needy to be clothed, fed, and their rent paid at lower than expected costs. Agencies compensated by finding ways to save money. The Community Fund stressed efficiency. Taking meals, lodgings, clothing and bread as units, Wheeler Mission gave out 16,131 units in 1929, 52,565 in 1930, and 100,780 in 1931. Per unit cost in 1929 was $1.19, but by 1931 unit costs were cut to only $0.233.\textsuperscript{60} Wheeler saved some money by cutting insurance premiums and dry cleaning expenses, and by reining in costs on their radio programs. Wheeler encouraged more volunteer work, gifts of food, sponsorship of the unemployment breakfasts they created, and donations of clothing. The Depression also affected prices.
The cost of living in Indianapolis dropped by 16.2 percent between December 1929 and December 1930, so some of Wheeler's efficiency was due to lower costs, but not most of it.61

Other agencies did not do as well as Wheeler Mission, in terms of gaining greater efficiency. Possible savings were not implemented by some agencies. The Children's Bureau cost the FWS around $31,000 per year between 1929 and 1934.62 The FWS resisted requests by the Community Fund that it relinquish its management of foster children and hand over all cases to the Marion County Children's Guardian Home. The FWS also continued to employ a district system of administration, used since the nineteenth century, which required higher overhead costs than a more centralized system. However, the FWS was not an agency that was prepared for relief emergencies. Its focus was on the long-term reform of an individual. If some relief was required, as suggested by the social worker in charge of an individual's case, then it was given. Responsibility for pure sustenance was considered a public matter.

Speakers at the National Conference of Social Work considered emergency relief a public duty. Social work standards at the private agencies needed to be maintained as much as possible. The public system should therefore
disperse emergency aid, while private agencies provided case
work studies and supervised implementation of social work
standards. Leo Rappaport, as president of the FWS, directed
that high standards of social work continue. Rappaport
defended dumping cases into the hands of the township
trustee because it allowed the FWS to continue its role as a
long-term care provider. Interestingly, however, as costs
rose the FWS sacrificed social work standards to fund a
greater amount of relief for a larger number of cases. The
five districts of the FWS were to be kept because they
played a crucial part in their estimate of what good social
work entailed. They considered the high cost of having
separate district centers as an almost non-negotiable
expense. 63

Reports on the number aided do not reveal the ongoing
strengthening of the private-public partnership. A general
belief in cooperation was apparent before the stock market
crash. Contact between private and public agencies, in
particular between the FWS and the Center Township Trustee,
became frequent after October 1929. Although there were
tensions concerning relief aid and proper social work
technique, both sectors were forced by necessity to deal
amicably with one another. By March of 1931 this
partnership became formal. Its most visible symbol was the
Emergency Work Committee (EWC).

In Indianapolis public and private activities united to fight the Depression. Eugene Foster proved instrumental in guiding the Church Federation to organize church employment programs. Many businessmen, including Arthur Brown and Leo Rappaport, urged the Chamber of Commerce to take a leadership position. The Chamber gathered information for the ICSE, encouraged members to help the EWC, and undertook campaigns to bring businesses to Indianapolis. A. Kiefer Mayer, Leo Rappaport, Eugene Foster, and many others aided in the development of the mayor's emergency committee. The mayor brought together executive departments and the EWC to create work projects.

The EWC began operating December 3, 1930. The ICSE created the EWC to operate as its relief-giving arm. Foster, along with George Gill, and William Book, secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, were members of an ICSE committee that visited Cincinnati to study its make-work program. 64 The Cincinnati program was a joint county-city project operating on public funds. It paid approximately 1100 men 40 cents an hour for 24 hours work per week. The project also ran a soup kitchen. By December 1930 the project was costing the city and county governments $40,000 per month. The Indianapolis committee derided the
Cincinnati project’s high wages, believing that high wages were both uneconomical and reduced incentives for the unemployed to find a "real" job.\textsuperscript{65}

After the trip, Gill created the plan that would be used by Indianapolis in the years to come. Gill recommended that the Commission adopt a publicly funded make-work program. He, Book, and Foster wanted wages to be paid to unemployed workers in lieu of charity.\textsuperscript{66} They did not recommend full adoption of the Cincinnati program. In many ways this refusal to fully create an expensive program illustrates social work executives’ basic conservatism. They did not want a permanent public work force; instead, they desired a short-term solution similar to the Chamber of Commerce’s work committee of 1893.\textsuperscript{67} From the summer until December of 1930, Book and Gill held meetings with most social agencies and public departments in order to develop support and to determine the number of people who could be usefully employed by the committee. Forty years later Gill remembered that it seemed an "unlimited" number.\textsuperscript{68}

Gill’s plan included both public and private support and guidance. Gill served as the executive director of the EWC. He was given paid leave from the Indianapolis Free Employment Bureau, an agency underwritten by the Indianapolis Foundation. The mayor selected a board of
directors. Workers for the positions were selected from the relief rolls of both private and public relief agencies. The board of directors created committees which helped to find funding for the EWC, coordinated public and private agency cooperation and planning, and searched for work venues.

Despite the three-member committee’s recommendation for public support, the EWC had to be content with money from private sources. Public money never directly funded the EWC. The Community Fund gave a total of $43,000. Firewood sales, benefit ball games, and other activities resulted in smaller amounts. From December 3, 1930 until mid-January 1931 the EWC provided an average of $7.09 in wages for twenty-four hours of work (29.5 cents per hour), but there was not enough money to continue the experiment. A switch to $2.20 in wages and $5.00 in groceries, provided by the township trustee, was made January 12. By May 16 not even the reduced wage could be paid and, except for veterans whose wages were paid by the Red Cross, all wages ceased and only the grocery orders were given. Work was cut to sixteen hours per week. Board members hoped that the Community Fund or the city government would include the EWC in their next budget. Board members proposed that during the summer of 1931 the EWC shut down, except for a skeleton crew to
continue minimal operations.

On the operations side, the EWC proved as successful as the Cincinnati program. It hired as many as 1766 men per week, paid out over $48,000 in relief wages, gave out $67,532 in food and supplies, and provided 387,301 hours of labor to fifteen different social agencies and public departments. The labor provided these agencies completed tasks that probably would have been left for years undone. Over 3,800 different families were aided.\(^7\) In addition cooperation between the township trustees, social agencies, and municipal government was achieved through the efforts of the EWC board and staff. However, the absence of adequate, stable, funding concerned the EWC board.

On May 16, 1931 the Community Fund’s allotment to the EWC ran out. In the June EWC board meeting, members asked for $600 per month from the Community Fund, and later asked the Indianapolis Foundation for $6,000 for office expenses. In June they received an additional $600 from the Fund and $400 from the Red Cross, but failed to get longer term commitments from either group.\(^7\) In July, EWC board members rejected a motion to join the Community Fund for fear that their budget would be too constrained by the Community Fund’s budget committee. The results of this action were made painfully clear only a few months later. As non-
participants in the campaign and without a voice on the Fund board, they were treated as outsiders.

More traditional agencies formed stronger bonds between one another throughout the period. Contact between township trustee offices and the FWS had not been unusual before 1930. Township trustees routinely used the FWS's registration bureau, borrowed its social workers, and staff from both agencies went to the Indiana Social Work Conference. Meetings between FWS board members, or the FWS's executive secretary, and township trustee officials increased after January 1930. Between February 1930 and April 1931, the township trustee gave more aid to FWS clients, took a larger percentage of the client load, increased aid given generally, loaned the Society a half-time worker in one over-worked district, allowed clients to choose at least some of their own groceries, and sent a representative to the FWS's district advisory committee. 73

In order to resolve differences and discuss strategy, Leo Rappaport, Rhonda Morrow, the executive secretary of the FWS, and Nadia Deem, an assistant to Morrow, met regularly with the Center Township Trustee, Hannah Noone, or Amelia Harding (after 1930), the county commissioner, and the township trustee advisory committee between February 1930, and April 1931. This relationship became formal when a
consultative committee was formed in April 1931. After this body was created, discussion concerning the township trustee virtually disappear from the board meeting notes of the FWS.

The FWS-Center Township trustee relationship was but one example of the growing public-private partnership. The ICSE was created by both public and private entities. Its Central Registration Bureau identified the unemployed, sought job opportunities for them, and later acted as a clearinghouse for relief requests. A "Private-Public Agencies Conference," held June 19, 1930, was a product of the ICSE, but was also supported by the Community Fund in its desire to determine the scope of current cooperation between private and public agencies.

The EWC symbolized the newly formalized public-private partnership. Although the EWC never received public funding directly, the individuals who were employed by the EWC, after January 1931, were paid in kind by the township trustee. Men and women were certified as deserving of relief by either public or private agencies through a central registration center. Private groups donated Office supplies and paid for the executive's salary. While Mayor Reginald Sullivan did not, and could not, use taxpayer funds for the EWC, he did authorize the city to spend $60,000 to improve Pleasant Run Parkway, a project largely worked by
EWC employees with material and supervision provided by the city. The EWC provided statistics and names to civic officials concerning unemployment and relief. EWC projects included work on public roads and buildings as well as service to private, semi-public, agencies, such as Christamore House and the Phyllis Wheatley YWCA.

This increasing partnership fit the Indianapolis pattern of cooperation between public and private spheres. Few leaders recognized a significant difference between locally controlled public and private activities that helped the unemployed, or the less fortunate in general. The men and women who sat on the various boards of directors believed they were fulfilling a public duty. At the local level, the demarcation between private and public spheres was unclear.

Many of the men who sat on philanthropic boards were also members of public charity committees. In an interview sixty years later, George Gill rarely distinguished between those holding private positions and those in the public sphere. While some derided township trustee efficiency or rejected national aid, they felt compelled to act in any way possible to help the unemployed in their community. When the Community Fund board members believed they could not continue to fund relief work at current levels, in March
1930, they turned to the city hoping the public sector could give them a direct grant. Their idea could not be implemented, but only because state law prevented cities from giving money for relief. In fact, several plans were not carried through because the public sector was prohibited by state law from giving cash wages for relief.

Actions illustrate this cooperative mindset. Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Community Fund board wanted the FWS to turn over its children’s bureau to the Marion County Children’s Guardian Home. Why did the board of a private philanthropic group want one of its organizations to give up one of its oldest programs? The board believed it more efficient to have one agency deal with all child welfare programs. Before the New Deal nationalized welfare programs, board members refused to recognize the dividing line of public and private when it came to helping the underprivileged or meeting civic goals.

The Depression did not change this pattern. J.K. Lilly, for example, gave $25,000 to both the Community Fund and to the Purdue Research Foundation, an entity that aided a public institution, in 1931. For Lilly, both actions supported the public good. It did not matter that one check went to a private organization and another grant aided a public university. Public and private entities, sometimes
guided by the same people, worked together because they saw no reason not to do so.\textsuperscript{75}

The various boards changed very little over the early years of the Depression. The Indianapolis Foundation’s board had not changed at all since 1918. The Community Fund board increased its membership from twenty-four to thirty in early 1931, but then created a ten-member executive council to deal with most matters so that the entire board’s power was actually reduced somewhat.\textsuperscript{76} Membership on the new emergency boards were mostly filled with the same individuals who already had prominence on other philanthropic boards, although these new emergency boards contained somewhat more social work executives. This may have been due to the belief that these boards were to be temporary and that technical knowledge, in the form of social work practice and philosophy, should be present.\textsuperscript{77}

The relationship between boards and their executives began to change throughout this period. Before October 1929, most executives were expected to convey social work opinion to boards and handle the daily affairs of the organization, but major questions were handled by board members themselves. The voices of executives were rarely recorded in board meeting notes. By May 1931, Rhoda Morrow was making suggestions for large structural changes,
assistant executives were representing the FWS at meetings with the township trustee, and certain executives were becoming influential board members in their own right.

Sometimes social workers and board members differed over how to cope with the Depression, but both groups still strongly supported local control and direction over relief. Social workers, in general, did not believe enough was being done to aid the unemployed. Indianapolis social workers offered no coherent solutions but harbored a general belief that more needed to be done, evidently by the public sector.

When the EWC began operation, the idea of the make-work program was pitched as a way to alleviate large case loads. When the EWC switched to vouchers and partial cash wage payments social workers registered no disagreement, in part because many social workers did not totally trust a cash-only system of relief. As money became scarce for the EWC, the system of payment again changed. Workers now had to work two days and all they received was a voucher for groceries from the township trustee. The two-day system where workers received only a $5 basket of food was considered foolish by some in both the business community and by social workers. It meant that the EWC only duplicated services rendered by the township trustee, did
not alleviate the case loads of the FWS or the Catholic Community Center, and forced the destitute to work for something that before the Depression they received for free. Eugene Foster was the first to object, believing it to be counterproductive and unfair to those who lost their job through no fault of their own. 80

Nationally, social workers expressed themselves at their national meetings. Foster, Gill, Morrow, and others traveled to Philadelphia and Minneapolis, the sites for the 1930 and 1931 National Social Work Conferences. The conferences suggested a continuation of local relief, but called for more aid. Linton Swift, head of the national FWS, wanted the local public sector to take on the full relief burden and challenged local FWS's to concentrate on character building through case work. 81 In 1931, the idea that private philanthropy could not meet the need became explicit. Jacob Billikopf, executive director of the New York Federation of Jewish Charities, stated "private philanthropy is no longer capable of coping with the situation." 82 Billikopf urged social workers to be advocates of government reform in the areas of unemployment insurance and old age pensions. Their ideas registered with local social workers who passed on these ideas to board members. 83
Pleas to do something more than charity grew louder in late 1930 and early 1931, not only in the halls of Philadelphia or Minneapolis, but in Indianapolis as well. Red banners flew in Indianapolis streets in early January. About 150 unemployed workers marched to the State House and then to city hall demanding more aid. The Indiana Catholic and Record dismissed the action, commenting that “these men are not seeking work, but rather some way to make trouble.” Almost a month later, almost 300 waited outside the State House. In an unprecedented move, the Indiana House of Representatives allowed one of the march’s leaders to speak to the Assembly, after he swore he was not a communist. The leader warned that if relief were not given “something serious will result,” although he assured the House it was not something he wanted to happen. It is possible that the same fear of radical action prompted a part of the responsiveness of philanthropic agencies.

Philanthropic and community leaders also spoke out for more relief aid, but not from the state or federal government. After the city ruled that it could not help the Community Fund, the Fund board did not pursue other publicly funded avenues of support. No mention is ever made in this period of possible state aid and no attempt is recorded requesting such aid. Local resources could and would meet
local needs, and local control would remain.

Some city leaders spoke of the need for additional aid. Indiana's senior senator stated that "the time has come when there must be jobs for the jobless." Dr. Jean Milner, pastor of Second Presbyterian Church, a church that several board members attended, served as the guest speaker at the annual meeting of the Community Fund in 1931. Milner derided the current attempts at helping the poor. Near the end of his address he urged his listeners to press for something better, stating:

Jesus certainly taught social service, but he also taught something very much better than that. He believed there was something better than charity. He believed in social justice. Taking his words literally, there is perhaps enough dynamite in them to break into bits our whole Western economic system. . . . The Kingdom of God . . . was a two-fold thing, a kingdom which must exist within the heart of man, in his inner attitudes, from which would emanate the outward and material expression, and the building here on earth of a form of human society which would be based upon social justice, righteousness and love."

The early mild period of the Great Depression came to a symbolic end in July 1931. Walter Clarke, attorney for the Center Township trustee, reported an increase, not the expected decrease, in the relief requests for June. Unemployment was definitely on the rise. Troubling also was the needed increases in the EWC summer budget, the new deficit projections for the Fund, and the surging needs
presented by the staffs of Wheeler Mission and the Family Welfare Society. It was becoming clear to everyone that the Depression would not end soon.
Notes for Chapter 2

In citing archives in the notes, short titles have generally been used. Works frequently cited have been identified by the following abbreviations:

CATH Papers
Papers of the Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Indianapolis Archdiocese Archives, Indianapolis, Indiana.

CF papers
Papers of the Community Fund, United Way of Central Indiana Archives, Indianapolis, Indiana.

CoC Papers

CoC-CoC

DL Papers
Papers of Daniel B. Luten, Manuscripts Division - Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, Indiana.

FWS Papers
Papers of the Family Services Association, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Indiana.

3. See George E. Gill, "Bringing Job and Worker Together," *Nation's Business* (February 1931), copy in the Indiana Division, Indiana State Library. See also William H. Book's two articles "Helping the Man and the City, Too," *Nation's Business* (September 1931), and "How Indianapolis Combines Poor Relief with Public Work," *National Municipal Review* 20 (September 1931): 513-517, copies in the Indiana Division, Indiana State Library. Throughout these works Gill and Book reveal that work decreases a number of social problems.

4. The ICSE was composed of 31 business, political, philanthropic leaders, and social work executives. The board was appointed by the mayor. Most were prominent businessmen with ties to philanthropy. See Appendix for a full list of members.

5. Indianapolis Star, 31 October 1929, 8.


8. Report compiled by the Industrial Commission of the
Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, attached to the 2 March 1930 minutes, p. 1, in "Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1930," CoC-CoC.


12. According to Curtis Simon and Clark Nardinelli "industrially more diverse cities experienced higher rates of unemployment" at the onset of the Depression. Inaccurate market information caused companies to lay off workers. During normal economic times this acted as a pressure relief valve as companies in unaffected sectors took up the slack.
During the early part of the Depression the mechanism created a rapid increase in unemployment without a corresponding increase in employment in other sectors. See Simon and Nardinelli, "Does Industrial Diversity Always Reduce Unemployment? Evidence From The Great Depression and After," *Economic Inquiry* (April 1992): 384-397.

13. Indianapolis Commission for Stabilization of Employment, "Problems of Unemployment in Indianapolis" (Indianapolis 1930), 6. This number is not consistent with the number in Figure 2.1. The numbers in Figure 2.1 were assembled from the Indiana University-Chamber of Commerce figures. These figures are probably too high. Along with the census, the numbers in Figure 2.1 only counted businesses that had at least $5,000 in sales. Smaller businesses, and thus numerous employees, were not figured in to the equation. Since larger businesses were the hardest hit by the Depression this had the effect of skewing the numbers. The EWC numbers are probably very close to correct, however they do not span the entire period and thus cannot be used in this study for a consistent source. See John Joseph Wallis, "Employment in the Great Depression: New Data and Hypotheses," *Explorations in Economic History* 26 (1989): 45-72, on his realignment of
these numbers. Wallis cites numerous problems with the way the official Bureau of Labor Statistics conducted its employment surveys. For instance, manufacturing firms and large firms in general were overrepresented and sometimes even the sampling of the large firms was too small. In addition non-manufacturing industries were not as hard hit. Since Indianapolis had a large non-manufacturing base as well as a low organized labor ratio it should have been better off than many of its sister cities. (For cities with a rate of union organization over 17 percent there was a decrease of 2 percent in employment for every 1 percent increase in unionization).

14. Percentages with attendant approximate real numbers attached to the 20 August 1931 Chamber of Commerce Board Member Notes. “Confidential Memo on Unemployment Relief,” in “Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1931,” CoC-CoC.

15. William A. Sundstrom, “Last Hired, First Fired? Unemployment and Urban Black Workers During the Great Depression,” Journal of Economic History 52 (June 1992): 415-429. By April 1930, in Northern cities, black male unemployment was 14.3 percent while white male unemployment averaged 8 percent. By January 1931 the percentages were
41.7 and 27.8 respectively. Sundstrom wrote that “within the North, unemployment rates were 80 percent higher for blacks than for whites.”


17. Between April 27, 1931 and August 20, 1931, 49.5 percent of EWC workers were black and the greatest number were between 36-40 years of age. “Director’s Report, 20 August 1931,” Box 4, File 42, p. 10, CoC Papers.

18. Minutes from the 16 April 1931 meeting in “Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Family Welfare Society,” BV1231b, FWS Papers.


20. The Recorder began advertising its campaign in the December 7, 1929 issue. The next winter it began earlier. See Indianapolis Recorder, 7 December 1929, 1, and 22 November 1930, 1. Most donations to the “Good Fellows” fund were between $1 and $5. A number of relief activities are noted, including the Second Baptist Church, in the Recorder, 13 December 1930, 2.
21. Rappaport knew that the FWS had aided 1429 unemployed families or individuals during 1929 and that over half sought aid during November and December alone.


23. February 1930 Community Fund records show a total of $27,000 more than reported at the close of the campaign as reported in the 28 November 1929 Indianapolis News. While it was not unusual to receive a few thousand dollars of additional pledges after the campaign, this large of an increase, or at least most of it, must be the result of the special campaign.


25. Minutes from the 31 January 1930 Meeting in "Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Family Welfare Society of Indianapolis," BV1231b, FWS Papers. Recorded within the minutes is the fact that the township trustee was spending $15,905 per month. In 1929 the trustee had spent close to $100,000 for the entire year.


34. The FWS had 2140 active cases in February of which 1818 were related to employment problems. In November 1930, only 822 cases were due to unemployment. A normal case load was between 40-50 cases, but Indianapolis social workers were carrying as many as 200. See "Council of Social agencies Study on Relief," in Minutes of the 12 December 1930 meeting, "Fund Board Minutes," January 1931-December 1934, CF Papers.


36. Board Minutes 18 September 1930 in "Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1930," CoC-CoC.

37. Minutes of the 4 October 1930 meeting in "Board of Trustees Minutes, 1929-1936," Box 2, Folder 2, M485 OM185, YWCA Papers.

38. Meeting minutes from 14 March 1930 in "Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Family Welfare Society of
Indianapolis,” BV1231b, FWS Papers.

39. Indiana Catholic and Record, 9 May 1930, 5.


41. A majority of money taken in by the church was spent on Catholic education, maintenance of local and national charities, upkeep on church buildings, and the small salaries for the priests and nuns. Compilation of reports by various churches concerning their indebtedness. “Catholic Archdiocese Reports 1929-1935.” CATH Papers. For Bishop Chartrand’s Christmas address see same.


43. Letter from Director to Fred L. Hollweg dated 28 February 1930 concerning the litigation. The family contested the will of Pettis, who had lived in Indianapolis


45. Board minutes 6 February 1930 in “Fund Board Minutes,” September 6, 1923-December 31, 1931, CF Papers.

46. Two page memo adopted 31 July 1930, Board Minutes 31 July 1930 in “Fund Board Minutes,” September 6, 1923-December 31, 1930, CF Papers.

47. Brown stated “If Indianapolis is to avoid further business depression and if we are to avoid grave social unrest the goal of the Community Fund must be reached.” Indianapolis Star, 20 September 1930, 1.


49. Indianapolis Star, 18 October 1930, 7.

50. That revolution was a real fear is apparent in the editorial pages of many papers. Arthur Brown advocated giving to the Fund to avoid social unrest. The Indiana Catholic and Record accused the Indianapolis Times of
spreading "pro-Bolshevist" propaganda (*Indiana Catholic and Record* 7 March 1930, 4). *Indiana Catholic and Record*, 17 October 1930, 1. Eberhard’s letter, dated December 1933, found in Box 3, File 11, WM Papers.

51. EWC workers were paid a flat rate, not one based on race. This researcher has not reviewed, on a case by case basis, the FWS cases, but no overt discrimination was apparent from the sample cases given to the Community Fund board in the summer of 1931. In addition there was not a segregated apparatus set up for the dispersal of funds. Also, the *Recorder* did not mention any belief that Indianapolis agencies discriminated in relief giving. Agency policy booklets advocated purely non-discriminatory relief practices.


55. Minutes from the 26 June 1930 meeting in "Fund Board Minutes," September 6, 1923-December 31, 1930, CF Papers.

56. Notes from the 20 November 1930 meeting in "Fund Board Minutes," September 6, 1923-December 31, 1930, CF Papers.


58. "Confidential memo on Unemployment Relief" attached to the 20 August 1931 Chamber of Commerce Board Meeting notes in "Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Community Fund, 1931," CoC-CoC.

59. See Table B, "Total and per-captia expenditure from public and private funds for relief in 117 specified urban areas, 1929-35" in Emma A. Winslow Trends in . . . Public
and Private Relief, 74.

60. Letter to the Community Fund sometime in late 1932 from Herbert Eberhardt, Box 4, Folder 11, WM Papers. Costs for units: $19,270.77 (1929); $20,496.80 (1930); $23,556.59 (1931).


64. "Transcript of Taped Interview with George Gill" (1972), 5, Oral history Project, Indiana State Library.


66. See "Transcript of Taped Interview with George Gill,"

5. See also Gill's last Manager's Report to the Emergency Work Committee, February 2, 1934, which gives an overview of the entire project, in Folder 4, DL Papers.

67. In 1893 the forerunner to the Chamber of Commerce
created a temporary make-work project for the unemployed. It hired men to work on public projects and paid them a small wage. The Emergency Work Committee consciously emulated the 1893 project. See George Geib and Miriam Geib, Indianapolis First (Indianapolis: Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1990), 23-25.


69. In January 1931, the Community Fund gave $37,500 to the EWC from the emergency relief fund it had created. Throughout the rest of the year the Fund gave smaller amounts that added up to $43,000. See Manager’s Reports for 31 January 1931 and Activities Reports 1 January 1931-27 June 1931, Folders 2 and 3, DL Papers.


73. Minutes for 7 February 1930-16 April 1931, in "Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Family Welfare Society,"
74. A Mr. Ohr of the State Board of Examiners told board members that the city could not legally give money for relief purposes. After this meeting discussions concerning possible public funding for the Fund stopped. See Board Minutes, 17 March 1930 in "Fund Board Minutes," September 6, 1923-December 31, 1930, CF Papers.

75. J.K. Lilly made up a Community Fund shortfall the same year he gave $25,000 to the Purdue Research Foundation. He saw both as public commitments. See Fred C. Kelly, David Ross: Modern Pioneer (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1946), 113, 151-152. According to John Paul Duncan most municipal legislation was controlled by the members of the Chamber of Commerce between 1925 and 1941. See Duncan’s dissertation “Control of the City Government of Indianapolis, Evidenced by the Forces Determining its Ordinances, 1925-1941” (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1945). A copy of an abstract of the work is located in the Indiana Division, Indiana State Library.

76. The executive council was announced at the Community Fund Annual meeting 24 February 1931, in "Fund Board Minutes," January 1931-December 1934, CF Papers.
77. When boards were created for social work type of operations they were usually filled with social work executives. The Indianapolis Free Employment Bureau, for example, had five social work executives on its board, out of a total of fifteen seats.

78. FWS Meeting Minutes reveal concern expressed by Morrow over township trustee failure to give proper food orders. Liggett recommended having FWS board members with political influence see the trustee's advisory board to increase public funding. In addition, the meetings of the local chapter of the American Association of Social Workers focused on publicly funded solutions to the unemployment problem. See Bertha Leming, "Indianapolis chapter, American Association of Social Workers," copy in Indiana Division, Indiana State Library.

79. See Joanna C. Colcord, Cash Relief (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1936), 17-18, for contemporary social work views on cash relief. According to Colcord, with the increase in clients due to the Depression, private agencies had less time to get to know their clients. As a result, social workers turned to in-kind rather than money aid in order to make certain that clients received basic necessities. It seems that social workers did not trust
clients to always make intelligent decisions with money if they had not been adequately counseled by the social worker.


83. George Gill reported that he brought such ideas to board members in Indianapolis. See "Transcript of Taped Interview with George Gill," 1-5.

84. Indiana Catholic and Record, 9 January 1931, 4.

85. Indianapolis Star, 3 February 1931, 3.

86. Indiana Catholic and Record, 24 October 1930, 4.

Milner was part of the Social Gospel tradition. Social salvation depended upon good works and lifting up the poor.
The end of significant voluntary relief work was symbolized by the death in 1932 of Monsignor Francis Gavisk, rector of St. John’s Catholic Church and renowned philanthropic leader. His funeral reflected the tenor of private philanthropy’s efforts to aid the unemployed. It came at a time when the older, locally centered relief work began to give way to the forces of the New Deal and the modern welfare state.

Gavisk was a leader who had worked tirelessly on behalf of others and who fit into the dominant local culture. He had served for over twenty-five years on the State Board of Charities. Gavisk was well-known and beloved by many. Frank S. C. Weeks, a fellow member of the State Board of Charities and a Unitarian minister, noted in his Sunday sermon that Gavisk “did much to bring all sects together in philanthropic work and made good feeling among all.”

Father Gavisk would not have quite recognized the role and structure of philanthropy in the years that followed his death. During his tenure on the State Board of Charities local resources funded locally controlled institutions.
Orphans and widows received some national funding, as did disabled veterans, but typically, local workers such as Father Gavisk gathered local funds and directed area organizations with relief work the primary focus of their effort.

After the summer of 1931 local resources were heavily tested. Until circumstance and the national mood forced the partnership to change, Indianapolis leaders continued to remain within a tradition of locally controlled philanthropy. Most of the money raised between July of 1931 and October of 1933 came from local sources. As unemployment rose, coordination and integration of resources between public and private sectors increased. When financial pressures threatened to break apart the Community Fund or the public-private partnership, community ties prevailed. Only the New Deal shifted control away from local authority, but that was not until after 1933. Unlike some cities, Indianapolis did not exhaust its resources. The state did not give its capital city grants for relief nor did local government issue bonds for unemployment relief, although township bonds were issued for poor relief, as in the past. In the end local resources met local needs, although barely.

In Washington, President Herbert Hoover created the
President’s Emergency Committee on Employment, later reconstituted and renamed the President’s Organization on Unemployment Relief, to coordinate fund-raising activities around the country. As the volume of need increased, coordination gave way to direct aid.

In July 1932 the Emergency Relief and Construction Act set up the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which allowed each state as much as $45 million in loans to spend on self-liquidating projects to fight unemployment. Overall the bill provided for over $1 billion worth of construction and other projects in an attempt to counter the stagnating economy. Although this was thinly disguised national aid, local control remained. States could disperse the funds as they saw fit because the money came in the form of loans and was thus considered state property. Hoover rejected direct national aid, believing that the “spirit of responsibility of states, of municipalities, of industry and the community at large, is the one safeguard against overwhelming centralization and degeneration of that independence and initiative which are the very foundations of democracy.”

Before the advent of the New Deal, several states created unemployment relief committees to spend money on a statewide level. Franklin D. Roosevelt, as New York’s governor, pledged to spend $20 million and was the first to
create such a program in September 1931. By the spring of 1932, five other states followed New York's lead, including two of Indiana's neighbors, Illinois and Ohio. Illinois appropriated approximately $20 million in 1932, most marked for Chicago. The Hoosier State, however, did not create such an organization.

In Indiana, Republican Governor Harry G. Leslie (1929-1933) saw little need to follow New York's lead in the area of social policy. He had earlier proclaimed that "Hoosiers stand unalterably opposed to the false doctrine of federal paternalism or 'dole' system." In his last address to the General Assembly in 1933 he boasted that Indiana remained debt free, reminding Hoosiers that "this single fact makes our State unique among her Sister States. While other States must carry heavy burdens in the form of huge bond issues which mortgage their futures and menace their taxpayers . . . Indiana faces the economic difficulties growing out of the prolonged depression with a 'clean slate.'" As he left office he was proud of his fiscal strategy, believing it had served the state well.

After July 1931 many of the work-relief programs in American cities were bankrupt and even long-standing philanthropic agencies had closed or had to rely on state or federal assistance. Most cities applied through the RFC for
loans or begged state legislatures for money. In Philadelphia the FWS closed its doors in 1931. The work committee established by prominent citizens faltered by mid-June in 1932, leaving 57,000 families without help. In Boston, public sources were heavily taxed and the private-public work committee closed just over a year after it had formed. Smaller cities were also troubled by the strain of the economic emergency. Birmingham’s $500,000 bond issue, to fund a relief program, was spent within a year. The Mayor’s Relief Commission of Memphis, a modest attempt to coordinate resources, closed in 1932.

Many cities reacted to the increased relief needs by slashing municipal budgets and raising taxes to cover expenses. Seattle cut its budget by 14 percent in 1931 and by 33 1/2 percent in 1932. Detroit cut its spending by as much as 25 percent in 1932-33. Most municipal taxes were assessed on property. Tax delinquency soared as many hard-pressed property owners faced ever-increasing taxes they could not pay.

The worsening employment situation only added to government and philanthropic expenditures during the period. Unemployment increased nationally from 8.7 percent in 1930 to 24.8 percent by December of 1933. In Indianapolis unemployment in the same period averaged close to 30 percent
(see Figure 3.1). These percentages were far out of proportion with any other known period and solutions to the problem seemed as numerous as the men who stood in the soup lines.

**Figure 3.1 Unemployment Rates for Selected Months in Indianapolis, 1931-1933**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>37.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Little good news arose from the business community in Indianapolis after July 1931. Business production in Indianapolis dipped to only $168,139,983 in 1933, a drop of 61 percent from its 1929 high. Tax valuations of property in Indianapolis dropped 25 percent to $598,222,550 in the same period. By mid-1931 wages had fallen by more than 42.5 percent since the stock market crash. More than half of the banks in Indianapolis, in operation before 1930, had folded by June 30, 1933. Increased unemployment and restricted wages become apparent in the city's tax delinquency rates. Those not able to pay their taxes on time rose from 1 percent in 1929 to 17 percent in 1933, leaving the city's coffers low. To make up for losses in
tax receipts, city leaders cut expenses. Indianapolis Public Schools funding was slashed by 22.1 percent between 1931 and 1934, and sanitation, parks, and other departments faced similar decreases.\textsuperscript{17}

Many businesses, including the Marmon Auto Company, closed. Those who did keep their jobs faced massive cuts in pay. Lawrence S. Connor relates that in 1932 his father, an executive at the Halcomb and Hoke company, had his pay cut by more than two-thirds from its pre-Depression level.\textsuperscript{18} Only a few businesses, such as Eli Lilly and Company, could afford to keep wages high and employees working.\textsuperscript{19}

Political and civic leaders responded to the challenges of the Depression, after the summer of 1931, with as much action as they could muster. The Chamber of Commerce continued to try to boost the city's economy, but the organization itself was wracked by a loss of funding. While it remained quite active, limited funding hampered the Chamber's effectiveness.\textsuperscript{20} The Chamber lobbied Congress for a new air-mail route through the Circle City. It promoted the consolidation of all townships within Marion County to achieve uniform assessment of property and equal distribution of the costs of poor relief. It tried to lure businesses to town and individual members contributed to the EWC.\textsuperscript{21} The Chamber helped convince the city council to cut
spending in 1932 and 1933 so that increases in taxes would be as low as possible.\textsuperscript{22} Without the funding to actually subsidize the EWC though, the Chamber of Commerce was limited in what it could do. Most of its efforts went toward lobbying the government and enticing businesses to move to the Circle City, but most of those efforts failed.\textsuperscript{23}

As a result of unemployment and cuts in pay many philanthropic organizations across the nation faced a budget crisis. Cities showed decreases in giving between 1932 and 1933. Spending overall, though, increased between 1931 and 1933 due largely to public funding.\textsuperscript{24}

Indianapolis followed the national trend. Gifts to private philanthropic agencies were higher in 1933 than in 1929, but not as high as in 1931. Private contributions for relief increased 42.6 percent from 1929 to 1933, but actually fell 37.9 percent from 1931 to 1933. Overall spending for relief in Indianapolis, however, including both private and public agencies, increased dramatically, 735 percent, during the period.\textsuperscript{25}

Unemployment was especially hard felt in the black community. FWS records show that blacks made up more than 30 percent of relief cases throughout the period. The EWC also shows large percentages of African-Americans on its rolls after the summer of 1931, although the percentage of
African-Americans on EWC work lists did shrink as more whites became unemployed. If national estimates hold for Indianapolis, when general unemployment reached 36.4 percent in January 1933, black unemployment hovered around 65 percent.26

Between the fall of 1931 and October 1933, the unemployed faced terrible hardships. A composite of relief recipients from late 1931 shows that the average family size was 7.4, and that one member was under the age of six. Seventy seven percent of heads of households were unemployed, and 18 percent were absent from the home due to imprisonment, desertion, or death. Less than half of those involved in the study on unemployment had any source of income. The average family needed an income of $23.12 a week to live in an adequate manner, but most families in the study brought home less than half that total. The township trustee and the FWS gave 92 percent of these families a total of $8.35 in cash and in-kind relief. Most families in the study brought in about $19 including wages and philanthropic gifts, but still fell short of the total needed per week by $4.32.

Almost all of the shortfall could be traced to the inadequate township trustee relief food basket, which contained only $5.25 worth of food. A subsistence diet for
the average family required at least $9.23 for food. Combining this information with a study of milk distribution, which showed 88.6 percent of children under age six were not getting enough milk, one can concur with the findings of the first study which averred "Our study seems to warrant the conclusion that the relief which is being given is inadequate to meet a bare subsistence level." Somewhat incredibly, however, 63 percent of respondents reported no decrease in their standard of living. According to one contemporary social worker, the use of public assistance by much of the middle class made accepting such aid socially acceptable and actually may have contributed to both an increased standard of living for poor families and an increase in demands for relief services. Many poor families, before the Depression, refused to seek aid because it was discouraged and derided by the middle class. Once the middle class began accepting aid, large numbers of people, including those not recently unemployed, began seeking help.

Indianapolis was not the only city to give inadequate relief. Even when state agencies or funds boosted relief budgets the unemployed could expect little more than a subsistence amount. Even one of the most liberal providers of relief, New York City, gave couples only $2.39 and handed
families with children $6.60 per week. In smaller cities it was, in many instances, much worse. The Central Relief Committee of Atlanta gave only $.75 per week to black families and $2.50 to white families for food relief. In fact, Indianapolis may have provided one of the better services to the poor. Maximum totals for individuals and family relief in Indianapolis were not cut, as in other cities. If one factors in deflation over the period, relief giving in Indianapolis actually increased. A $5.00 basket of food in 1929 became by 1933 a basket worth approximately $6.05. In addition, milk, dried fruit, and other items were added in 1932 and 1933 at the behest of the FWS or other agencies. This is not to refute the message of contemporary social workers, it is only to say that, comparatively, Indianapolis citizens could expect a more consistent amount of relief. Unfortunately, however, it may have been consistently inadequate.

The public sector faced considerable problems in adjusting to the unemployment situation. The township trustee system came under fire from private philanthropic groups and the general public. The Indianapolis News charged township trustees of favoritism, unequal relief, and fraud. Later, Governor Leslie ordered an investigation of the system. The News noted that some families were
getting more food and fuel than they should receive while others obtained less. Some families, according to the News, should have been ineligible for relief.

Many of the problems may have been caused by the tremendous increases in caseloads and the inability of township trustees to handle them. Spending by these offices in Marion County increased 13.8 times from 1929 to 1933. If one takes as $260 the average annual relief given to each family, then case loads increased from 45 to 6365 in the same period. Even before the Depression hit, township trustee offices had not employed enough trained social workers. Now, the system simply could not handle the load.

The Central Investigation Office, an agency that investigated relief claims, undoubtedly equalized relief cases, because of the township trustees' acceptance of private philanthropy's case work methods, but cases taken before the invention of the Office in 1932 were rarely reviewed, so that fraud and inefficiency should have been expected.

Philanthropic leaders learned to accept new priorities and cope with limited budgets before the advent of the New Deal. The trials of the Community Fund during the entire period can never be fully appreciated, though notes of board members detail some of the pressures they faced. During
fiscal year 1932 (November 1, 1931-October 31, 1932), the board sought to aid all of those who needed basic necessities first. Character building agency budgets were cut and organizations were created to make philanthropy more centralized and efficient. Throughout the period, board members worried that not everyone in the community, especially children, received enough nourishment. Efficiencies had to be found, cuts made, and necessities taken care of. Throughout fiscal year 1932 Fund agencies made greater strides toward efficiency. In fiscal year 1933 (November 1, 1932-October 31, 1933), the Community Fund had to cut every agency's budget and turn over much of the responsibility for relief care to public agencies.

The fall 1931 campaign, in cooperation with the national drive of the Hoover Administration's Employment Committee, went "over the top," earning over $1 million for agencies to use in 1932. Almost 60 percent of the funds gathered came from those making donations of over $250. Eli Lilly, alone, gave $75,000. That the Community Fund attained its goal is somewhat surprising; in most cities community organizations had to be content with only 78 percent of their goal. Reaching the goal was made possible, in part, by donations made before the 1931 campaign to erase the deficit from fiscal year 1930-1931.
The deficit had been accumulated because the board had borrowed money to give to relief organizations, specifically the FWS, Catholic Community Center, and the Volunteers of America.⁴⁰

Despite the city’s large donation, character-building agencies still faced cuts in their programs. Increased funding of character building programs was rare. Agencies with a mixed relief and character-building tradition or ones that were almost fully relief centers received additional funds. The Catholic Community Center, FWS, and Volunteers of America registered increases, but those were “practically all for relief,” or for “hiring better people.”⁴¹ The “Colored YMCA” received an increase that went for providing shelter and food to black transients.⁴² Indianapolis leaders, though, did not abandon character-building institutions. In other cities these organizations were wholly defunded in order to give all money to relief agencies. Focusing all available money on relief was not necessary because of the existence of a local public system of relief.

Even with the successful 1931 campaign, increases in unemployment and requests for additional aid tested the financial abilities of relief agencies. By March 1932, the FWS, the Catholic Community Center, and other agencies
clamored for new loans. Additional cuts, from character-building institutions, and greater efficiencies needed to be made. In March, the Community Fund Board gave $40,000 to the FWS, Catholic Community Center, and the Central Investigation Office. As needs increased the Fund looked internally for additional sources of savings. In September, the manager and his assistants took a pay cut of more than 20 percent. Office expenses were kept to only 3 percent, down 1 percent since 1929. 43

The Fund board also looked to member agencies to cut spending. Repeatedly the Community Fund board warned individual agencies not to go over budget. Agencies were told specifically where cuts were to be made. 44 Transportation and registration fees to national conferences were slashed out of all Community Fund agency budgets. The Fund board also ordered all agencies to cut employee wages by at least ten percent and warned all member organizations that they could no longer sign lease agreements without Fund approval. Support letters had to be cleared by the Fund board and were only allowed a small window of time to be mailed.

Some agencies, such as the Girl Scouts and the Florence Crittenton Home, were allowed to conduct short campaigns for specific needs, but these were aberrations. Community Fund
leaders feared that numerous mini-campaigns would sap the strength from the annual campaign and would ultimately lead to the destruction of the Fund itself. Several agencies were denied the right to open a funding drive.\textsuperscript{45}

Board control over internal policy had never been so prevalent as in the years after 1931. Efficiency had to be enforced while duplications had to be cut, not only for the good of the Fund and the individual agencies in question, but ultimately for the city itself. The FWS provides an example of the extent to which the Community Fund board tried to control internal agency policy. For almost a decade the Community Fund board had advocated the merger of the FWS's Children's Bureau and Marion County's Children Guardian's Home. By 1932 the Fund board insisted that the merger occur. The Community Fund board also pressured the FWS to fire its manager because of her purported incompetence and ordered the FWS to get a reduction in its rent. The manager of the FWS submitted her resignation to the FWS board, they accepted it, but she continued performing the duties of executive secretary for several years. The fact that the manager remained in her office illustrates the limitations on Fund board power and the ability of member agencies to evade some action, but ultimately, Fund agencies had little choice. They had to
comply with Community Fund directives or face a substantially curtailed mission and funding base.

When Leo Rappaport questioned the Community Fund board, as to the legitimacy of Community Fund involvement in FWS internal policy, Hugh McK. Landon responded that “It should be made clear to the Family Welfare society that the Community fund is not an ‘outside source,’ but is the paymaster and has a right to go into the proper administration of that agency.” The Fund board even contemplated eliminating some agencies, or at least not including them in the Community Fund annual campaign, so as to deprive them of financing in order to more fully fund other agencies.

Individual agencies were not above using the fear of a Community Fund split or bad publicity to get additional money. Nadia Deem, of the FWS, implied that it would be wise for the FWS to get increased funding or the upcoming Community Fund drive might suffer. Rents for clients needed to be paid in several cases. One case especially affected the friend of a Community Fund supporter and campaign agent. This individual had raised more money at the railroad yards than any other in the last campaign and it would be a good idea, Deem explained, if his friend were helped, but that could not happen if the FWS did not get an emergency loan.
The board acceded to Deem’s request, but added that all cases should be reviewed for possible savings. Throughout the period the Community Fund board constantly wrestled with restless agencies who themselves were under tremendous economic pressure.

In an effort to cut costs the Community Fund board, along with public sector entities, created and funded the Central Investigation Office and the Central Registration Bureau. The new organizations represented the only new spending acceptable to the Community Fund board.

The Mayor appointed Hugh McK. Landon, of the Community Fund board, as the president of the Central Investigation Office. Eli Lilly and Company donated the services of one of its executives to act as a manager. The Central Investigation Office created a place where private relief agencies, the five township trustees serving the metropolitan area, the social service department of the public schools, and outside organizations such as the Red Cross and the American Legion, could compare notes and hopefully avoid costly duplications of service. Aid would immediately be given to an individual or family if so recommended by a trustee official. Other groups might also aid the individual if needed. The case would then be turned over to the Central Investigation Office for further
research.

The more in-depth study could reveal that the individual had sufficient means to care for himself. In fact by October 1932, 25 percent of cases turned over to the Central Investigation Office did not qualify for aid. The Community Fund created the Central Registration Bureau to register transients and more efficiently assign them to shelters. They also acted with local police to send transients back to their home communities, so they would not become a "burden" on the city's philanthropic institutions.\textsuperscript{48}

In light of their attempts to reach maximum efficiency, some board actions seem questionable. For instance, if they truly wanted to reward efficiency why did they not give Wheeler Mission more funding? Wheeler's Community Fund budget actually shrank from $13,000 in 1931 to only $11,728 in 1932. At the same time the Mission had opened up more space to transients, provided them with more meals and housing than either the Salvation Army or Volunteers of America, and all at a lower cost. In addition, in several instances Wheeler Mission handled the overflow from both organizations, without compensation. It would seem that if the Fund board wanted to encourage efficiency it would have rewarded the Mission with more funding, at least in 1932.
when they had additional funds to give to some member agencies. The Community Fund board, however, could not simply defund the Salvation Army or the Volunteers of America. Space was at a premium and Wheeler could provide little more space than they were already supplying. If the Fund board wanted enough beds and meals they would have to pay the less efficient agencies to do the work, at least in the short run. 49

Figure 3.2 Community Fund Appropriations 1931-1932 50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Type</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Character building</td>
<td>$314,008.92 (42.5%)</td>
<td>$310,193.37 (36.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>$443,994.39 (58.5%)</td>
<td>$540,088.83 (62.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralizing Organizations</td>
<td>$ 9,654.30 (1.1%)</td>
<td>$ 9,654.30 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the Community Fund budget had been set for 1932, the Mayor's Relief Committee requested a meeting with the executive committee of the Fund. George Torence, an advocate for the EWC, asked the Fund board to give the EWC money for 1932. He suggested that the Community Fund take out a loan for the EWC with payment due after the autumn 1932 campaign. The EWC had waited until after the Community Fund's campaign was finished before it began its own fund raising, but its efforts resulted in only about $6,000 being raised. The money from the Community Fund, Torrence explained, would give each worker a cash wage of $1.00 per week.

Leo Rappaport, and several others, were in favor of the
wage, although Rappaport noted that it was insufficient. Rappaport forwarded the idea of a "quiet campaign" among the elite to raise the money, but the board had rejected a similar idea as unworkable more than six months before. J. W. Fesler and William H. Insley opposed the entire notion. A study that revealed children were not getting enough milk had recently come before the board. They believed that giving babies and children the basic necessities, such as milk, was far more important than an additional wage.\(^5\)

It is important to note that the leading opponents to the plan, J. W. Fesler and William H. Insley, were members of the EWC board. The older traditional philanthropic agencies, and their mission to aid the most vulnerable, should not suffer so that the newly formed EWC could provide a very small wage of negligible value. The EWC, by not participating in the Community Fund's campaign, had not shared in the work of gathering the money, had not agreed to abide by Community Fund board policies, and should not therefore share in the spoils of a successful campaign. With money scarce, the Fund could not be as generous to the EWC as it had been in 1931. The Community Fund's fortunes were too precarious to risk taking out a loan or operating a quiet campaign, if the only return on its' investment was a very small wage given to people already aided by other fund
agencies and the township trustee.

Individual agencies within the Community Fund faced unusually high demands to provide relief. When the economic calamity first appeared board members assumed responsibility for all the relief care they could finance. In 1922 the FWS pledged, as one of its first purposes, to "perform general family social welfare work." By the end of 1931 its attempts to meet the first directive were overwhelming. It had assumed responsibility for paying for general relief, providing rent subsidies, giving food to the hungry, and a whole host of other social welfare payments, including hospital bills. Between the end of 1930 and December of 1931 the FWS experienced a 64 percent increase in active caseloads, almost half due to unemployment. The Community Fund continually pressured the agency to find new savings so as to remain within budget. Despite the largest grant ever received by the FWS from the Community Fund, by April 1932 the FWS needed an additional $24,500 to subsidize rent payments for its clients. By March 1932 several board members were questioning whether the FWS should narrow its focus and, as in so many other cities, challenge the public sector to take over all major forms of relief for the unemployed.

Between March and October 1932 the FWS stopped paying
rents, because of its increased expenses, except to widows, abandoned women, and the elderly. Demands for relief were 57 percent higher in 1932 than in 1931. The Community Fund took money from other agencies and, against its written policy, borrowed $25,000 for the FWS. By the end of March, with six more months left in fiscal year 1932, the FWS was spending money on relief at an unprecedented rate. The organization needed $137,000 to continue giving relief as it had in the past, but its entire relief reserves for the rest of the fiscal year stood at only $60,000.

A joint FWS-Community Fund board decided that the Society would stop paying the rents of the unemployed. The Community Fund board would ask the Central Investigation Office board, a semi-public body in which all five township trustees were members of the board, to request that the township trustee begin paying rents for the unemployed. In addition, the Fund board would talk to Josiah K. Lilly and Fred Ayres and ask them to convince the Real Estate Board to “work out a plan for vacant properties.” Leo Rappaport, president of the FWS, believed that the public sector needed to expand its functions to cover all unemployment relief currently being provided by private sector entities like the FWS.

The meeting and the attempt to create a plan for vacant
houses led to the creation of an "Emergency Housing Committee" within the FWS. As the FWS found it could no longer assume as large a share of rent payments as in the past, the Central Investigation Office, the EWC, and the FWS worked to create an organization that would repair abandoned homes. The houses would then be occupied by those needing rent relief, thus saving the FWS money paid for rent subsidies. The city's Tax Board exempted such housing from taxation while the EWC repaired the residences. For people with limited resources, the partnership provided a home.

Those without homes could turn to a number of organizations that helped the homeless and wandering transients, including Wheeler Mission, the Salvation Army, and Volunteers of America. Wheeler Mission was, perhaps, the Community Fund's most efficient agency. During fiscal year 1932 it cut costs, received less from the Fund than in fiscal year 1931, reduced expenses by 3.4 percent, and faced increases of from 57 to 84 percent in meals and lodging. By June 1932, even with increased efficiency and reduced costs, Wheeler Mission needed $1600 to break even. Herbert Eberhardt, the Mission's executive director, mailed a letter requesting support at the same time he discontinued the shoe repair shop and free laundry service. Another letter and
additional cuts in programs and personnel came in October. Because of the letters, and additional cuts, Wheeler Mission stood even, financially, at the dawn of fiscal year 1933. Few options existed for cutting more programs or expenses and prospects for additional funding looked bleak. In a September 13, 1932 letter to the Community Fund, H. W. Krause, president of Wheeler Mission, begged the Fund for either more money in fiscal year 1933 or more freedom to raise their own funds. 61

Throughout fiscal year 1932 private philanthropy was able to handle its part of the relief load. It continued to take care of about 50 percent of the relief burden and possibly a little more. The FWS did forgo its responsibility for the rents for the unemployed, but continued to pay the rent of the elderly and women in vulnerable situations. Wheeler Mission cared for more transients and families than at any time in its history. Overall, local resources met local needs, but it became more difficult to do with every passing day. Importantly, private-sector leaders had to depend on the local public sector more than ever before.

Solutions to mutual problems led to new cooperative ventures including the Central Investigation Office, and the Central Registration Bureau. These offices strengthened the
partnership creating an even denser network than before, by including township trustees and social work executives within the clique. The creation of the Emergency Housing Committee illuminates how the network was able to create formal ties to answer mutual problems. Individuals were called upon to negotiate with organizations or individuals and to create solutions. It is important to note that in several instances, when tension could have caused severe stress in inter-agency relations, joint meetings served to iron out mutually agreeable solutions.

A structural overview of the partnership by mid-1932 may help illuminate the various threads that brought the community together to solve its relief problems. If an individual were unemployed, he could go to any Community Fund agency, the township trustee's office or the EWC to register for aid. The EWC sent unemployed people to jobs where, depending on their status, they might receive a supplementary wage and the township trustee's food voucher. The unemployed worked on various projects for several organizations including city services, philanthropic institutions, or public construction projects. The Central Investigation Office would check the validity of any request for public or private aid. If available, and if the family qualified, they might move to free housing provided by the
Emergency Housing Committee of the FWS. The Central Registration Bureau sent all transients to the several agencies that cared for them. Almost all of the major social agencies in the city were funded directly, or indirectly, by both the Community Fund and local government.

The strongest link in the public-private partnership was between the Central Investigation Office and the EWC. Both were partially created and their board members chosen by the mayor. Both shared the same office space, acted with public agencies, and cooperated with one another. The Emergency Work Committee began as a way to combat unemployment. In its pamphlet "Problems of Unemployment in Indianapolis" the ICSE forwarded the idea that the EWC could "mitigate the effects of future unemployment [and] carry on an organized effort to prevent seasonal and cyclical unemployment in the future insofar as it is possible." It assumed, however, that workers would receive wages in compensation for their work. By mid-1931 workers received only the township trustee's food vouchers in exchange for their labors. The bold experiment envisioned, even as late as the fall of 1931, could later only be justified by its supporters as a better way of handling relief and giving something back to the city for its investment. The EWC was a failure in terms of stimulating employment or
relieving the burdens of relief agencies, but it was a success in terms of bringing public and private agencies together and creating a reservoir of community good will.

Its failure to participate in and join the Community Fund carried a price. Several Community Fund leaders objected to helping the EWC when their own agencies were in desperate need of increased funding. Relief reserves in 1931 had been given to the EWC, but in 1932 they were handed instead to traditional Community Fund relief agencies such as the FWS and the Catholic Community Center.  

EWC board members wanted to supplement food vouchers with cash wages, but could never find the adequate, steady funding needed. When the EWC turned to the community for support, it usually received warm endorsements. The Indianapolis Times donated receipts from three movie performances it underwrote. Mary Rigg offered to help unemployed wives learn how to make do with less at her American Settlement House. Butler University offered free garden space and high school football teams played extra games with proceeds going to the EWC. The efforts resulted in only moderate sums that could only provide a small wage or cover administrative expenses for a short time.

George Gill, the executive director of the EWC,
continued to fine-tune the organization, creating efficiencies and greater diversification with more care taken for the workers. By August of 1931 the EWC gave workers health exams, lunches, work gloves, and other useful items. Work requirements were shortened for individuals with small families and men with large families received vouchers with increased value.\(^{67}\) In late November job classifications were created and jobs assigned according to age, physical condition, character, and proximity to self-subsistence.\(^{68}\)

The public-private partnership continued to respond to the needs of the unemployed. Disputes or problems between organizations were resolved quickly and quietly. In a move to reduce costs, the FWS encouraged its clients to double up in homes to save on rent. When township trustees refused to give two families sharing a single family home additional food vouchers, previously established FWS-township trustee linkages worked out a solution that both saved people money on rent, gave them more food, and helped the FWS reduce its rent-aid expenses.\(^{69}\)

Agencies outside of the Community Fund also faced a difficult financial situation. The Indianapolis Foundation had less money in fiscal year 1932 than in any other year of the Depression. The board endeavored to continue its non-
relief-based mission, but circumstance overtook philosophy. The Foundation board again assumed the costs for the Indianapolis Employment Bureau because the city could not afford to do so.\(^7\) In addition, 105 high school and college students received scholarships.\(^1\) Board members wanted to be able to do more. They regularly requested updates on the A. P. Pettis lawsuit, which drained some $17,000 from their normal yearly budget. Many worthwhile projects that the board wanted to aid could not be helped. The Foundation could not give additional assistance to the Community Fund when they sought more money nor could they give the EWC funding for administrative expenses.\(^2\) Help, however, sometimes arrived from unlikely and unknown sources. The Indianapolis Orphans Home, for example, could not meet its budget because several counties did not remit their relief payment for orphans for several months, money which accounted for the Home’s income. The Foundation was powerless to help. Fortunately, an “anonymous donor” sought to give the Home $9,000 if the Foundation would match it.\(^3\) The Foundation could match the donation, but could not afford to meet the entire expense. The Home continued to operate because of a wealthy leader, in spite of the inability of county governments to meet their obligations.

Character-building and recreational agencies in this
period were the hardest hit by the Depression. They had a shrinking membership base, increasing demands for their services, and decreased funding. The Kirshbaum Community Center experienced a 346 percent increase in attendance during the third year of the Depression. Activity at the YWCA tripled by May 1932 from its pre-Depression levels.

The increase in demand was reflected in the altered mission of these agencies. In response to pressing problems brought on by the Depression, these non-relief agencies attempted to provide relief. The Phyllis Wheatley Branch of the YWCA held free health services, dispensed free food, and acted as a job placement center. During 1931 the YMCA found work for a few hundred men, and gave more than a thousand individuals free food, lodging, or both. A 1932 YWCA study found that 85 percent of its members were affected by unemployment in their families. Character-building agency heads knew that they were not equipped to handle relief cases, but they could not refuse to aid those who needed help.

Churches, too, rose to the occasion by dedicating volunteer relief and financial resources to benevolent activity. In 1932 Second Presbyterian Church, alone, committed almost $18,000 to Mayer Chapel, Wheeler Mission, and other less organized philanthropic activities.
Women's Service Circles donated food and sewed clothing for the poor. At St. John's Catholic Church women from several parishes gathered to make garments for Red Cross distribution centers. Second Baptist Church, through its Relief Club, provided food to the surrounding neighborhood.

Churches flourished during the economic malaise. Throughout the Depression membership grew in most churches and churches continued to help the needy. By 1933, in part because of Second Presbyterian's funding, Mayer Chapel was able to give 72 quarts of milk per day to undernourished children, provide coal for heating homes, and also hand out clothing to those in need. After 1933 Second Presbyterian dedicated 50 percent of its income to philanthropic work.

This growth in membership, however, did not translate into increased giving. Allen Chapel A. M. E. welcomed ten new members each year, Second Presbyterian gained around 100 annually, and Christ Episcopal experienced a 44 percent increase in membership. Significantly, all three churches experienced significant decreases in income. As a result, churches turned to less orthodox ways of raising revenue. After 1931 Allen Chapel A. M. E. held annual rallies to raise additional money to pay off its building debt. Holy Rosary Catholic Church depended upon lawn fetes, festivals,
bingo games, and spaghetti dinners.\textsuperscript{85} Even older, well-established churches, such as Second Presbyterian, relied on funds that had previously been used to support non-essential projects.\textsuperscript{86}

Beyond relief, churches provided places to spend unused time and receive counseling. St. John's Catholic Church offered adult education classes and created literary clubs, which were open to all.\textsuperscript{87} Allen Chapel A. M. E. Church revived its Committee on Homes and Rooms to help members find the best housing.\textsuperscript{88} The Family Welfare Society, Indianapolis Employment Bureau, and the Church Federation worked with area congregations to set up employment services.\textsuperscript{89}

The Black community joined efforts to help the unemployed. Several African-American organizations contributed to the EWC and the Community Fund during the period. The Hod Carriers Union, for instance, donated $100 to the EWC, relating to George Gill that the donation was made because "you've been pretty nice to our people."\textsuperscript{90} The Walker Theater was one of three theaters to raise money for the EWC relief fund in 1932, and every year the \textit{Recorder} urged blacks to give to the Community Fund, reminding them that five African-American organizations stood to benefit.\textsuperscript{91} By the third winter of unemployment, however, blacks also
became more active in securing aid for themselves.

The Recorder joined a national campaign promoted by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The campaign sought jobs for African-Americans in businesses that profited from the black community. Leaders later known to the community at large helped to organize the Citizen's Employment League in October 1931, including Freeman B. Ransom. The group held its first meeting at Bethel A.M.E. Church. The League started its "Work-For-Negroes Drive" immediately. It choose grocery stores and other businesses that served the black community but rarely hired African-Americans. The League would first talk to managers of the business and, if no satisfactory response was given, would boycott area stores. The plan had worked in Chicago, Cleveland, and other Midwestern cities. The idea succeeded in Indianapolis as well.92

The general population of unemployed were also joining "self-help" groups. These groups received the hearty endorsement of members of several boards. Some of the organizations included "garden" movements which provided free space to grow one's own food, "unemployment leagues" that fought for government relief and gave counseling to those who were newly unemployed, and "leisure hour clubs" that allowed the unemployed to have places for recreation.

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As fiscal year 1932 became fiscal year 1933, Indianapolis braced for worse economic news. The city's private-public partnership structure had become more efficient, centralized, and pervasive. It seemed prepared for new problems. 1932 was an election year and promised change came in massive proportions. A new governor and president would take office in early 1933, with consequences for the public-private partnership and the role of philanthropy.

With the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency in early 1933 national aid to local areas became grants rather than loans, with attending national control. The Federal Emergency Relief Act created the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and gave it the power to designate state committees to spend the $500,000,000 contained in the original bill. The National Industrial Recovery Act empowered the Department of Labor to create the Civil Works Administration (CWA) and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The bill also set up the National Recovery Administration (NRA) which was supposed to cut competition and stabilize profits by setting prices and pooling resources. FERA administrators, with Harry Hopkins as their manager, created national social work guidelines and relief standard minimums. By the summer of 1934 over
four million Americans had been employed by the CWA and the CCC and all had received cash wages for their work.\textsuperscript{93}

Democratic Governor Paul McNutt, elected in November of 1932, created the Governor's Commission on Unemployment Relief (GCUR). At first it acted as a coordinating committee, forwarding petitions for federal loan money on behalf of municipalities, but did not dispense state funds to cities. Later it was given authorization to spend state money in order to qualify for federal grants. In May 1933, FERA designated the GCUR its agent in Indiana with the power to distribute federal funds and implement social work standards in township offices. Later, the Department of Labor made the GCUR its representative, with responsibility for assigning relief recipients to jobs with the CCC and CWA. The Department of Agriculture also empowered it to distribute surplus agricultural projects.\textsuperscript{94}

State and federal resources did not immediately rescue area agencies. Instead, local resources, increasingly public ones, shouldered the burden. Even before the New Deal hit with full force in 1934, the public sector, albeit the local public sector, had assumed responsibility for the poor and unemployed. For philanthropic agencies after fiscal year 1932 the changes promised by Washington's new leaders were far off. Throughout the winter of 1932-1933
local agencies continued to try to aid the unemployed.

At the Community Fund the euphoria engendered by the success of the 1931 campaign did not carry over to 1932. The dismal results of the 1932 campaign were especially disappointing. The shortfall amounted to over $200,000, with the Special Gifts Division failing to provide $113,000 of the total deficit. Liggett wanted the board to consider RFC money; but the board decided Washington’s money should be used only by public agencies. Although distressed, many Community Fund board members expressed agreement with Roy Adams, who noted that it was “unsound for the federal government to finance such activities.”

The Community Fund members allowed themselves few options. By refusing RFC money, their only alternatives were to give most or all available funds to relief agencies, run an additional campaign in early summer, or ask local public agencies to accept more of the relief burden. The first two options were not unprecedented in other cities, but somewhat strangely they were not given serious consideration by the Indianapolis Community Fund board. The Fund board sought new efficiencies and streamlining in programs of member agencies first. Secondly they asked the public sector to accept additional costs, previously born by Community Fund groups. Finally, they considered
consolidating or eliminating agencies or programs. Instead of long-term structural changes, board members discussed more short-term solutions. Questions over the budget continued into July 1933. The budget did not become fairly settled until sometime in March 1933. In February of the same year Liggett went to a meeting of Midwest Community Fund executives in Chicago. Various proposals were discussed on how to deal with the nation-wide reduction in philanthropic giving. None of the plans considered in Chicago and discussed with Indianapolis Community Fund board members were ever implemented.\textsuperscript{97}

Besides rejecting federal assistance, Board members seemed stuck in insular thinking. They rejected other plans because the public-private partnership seemed to be accomplishing goals deemed important to civic leaders. Community Fund agencies and township trustees were providing sustenance to the populace. Wage payments and other goals were acceptable, but not absolutely necessary. State and federal funding was later welcomed, though it was not sought.

After the fall 1932 fund raising campaign results became known the Fund board realized it would have to make new cuts in all of its programs. In January the board again resolved that it would not go into debt. Some agencies
voluntarily reduced their requested appropriation for fiscal year 1933. The Red Cross, for instance, surrendered almost 30 percent of its funding in 1933 and, in agreement with the national Red Cross board, requested that its membership in the Fund be terminated in 1934. Others received deep cuts because of perceived inefficiencies. The Salvation Army's appropriation was reduced by 43 percent in fiscal year 1933 because, in part, Fund board members believed that the group's presentation of how funds were used in fiscal year 1932 was "the worst of any." The FWS also received a significantly reduced grant because Fund board members believed general expenses and salaries had not been cut enough in fiscal year 1932 and the township trustee had taken over many relief cases.

Other money-saving ideas received consideration. In fiscal year 1933 the Community Fund board began funding Leisure Hour Clubs so as to be able to cut some of the recreational budget from agencies of the Fund. They also studied the possibility of combining similar agencies or stopping funding for agencies doing similar work. The township trustee had agreed sometime in early 1933 to start making rent payments, the most expensive FWS budget item. In addition the board believed that the FWS needed to cut general administration expenses.
Groups in Indianapolis tried to help the Community Fund. The Polk Milk Company changed its donation from milk to cash and offered all Fund agencies a 20 percent discount on the wholesale price.\textsuperscript{102} The Civic Music Association donated its profits for the year to the Community Fund.\textsuperscript{103} The Fund was not, however, willing to accept all forms of help. Board members refused to accept donations from events that they believed were beneath the dignity of the organization. The Board rejected an offer by the Red Cross to put on a benefit show. David Liggett noted that "this is obviously the type of activity the Fund does not enter into."\textsuperscript{104}

Funding to character building groups were again cut deeply (see Figure 3.3). Some character building agency members believed that they had been cut too deeply. A representative of the YMCA noted his agency's need of $10,000 for rent. For him it was simple. Moral standards were on the decline and the Community Fund must protect those values by properly funding his agency, and those like it. He told the Fund board that "moral standards is one thing that cannot be dispensed with and that is what the YMCA is establishing and maintaining at all times."\textsuperscript{105} Later in the year close to $68,000 in federal and state grants went to character building organizations.\textsuperscript{106} One of the
grants went to the YMCA to set up a junior college.

Relief agencies were given the largest percentage of total allocations. The federal government had begun, by March, to give relief; but the bulk of relief care did not begin until 1934. The FWS still had families to aid, Wheeler Mission remained the primary care giver to transients, and private philanthropy continued to be a significant, although increasingly junior, partner with the local public sector in the battle against the effects of the Depression. Despite its warnings that it would not go into debt in fiscal year 1933, the Community Fund borrowed at least $65,000 during the year, with most going to relief programs.\textsuperscript{107}

\textbf{Figure 3.3 Community Fund Appropriations 1932-1933}\textsuperscript{108}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Character-building</td>
<td>$310,193.37</td>
<td>$231,810.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>$540,088.83</td>
<td>$393,900.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized agencies</td>
<td>$ 9,654.30</td>
<td>$ 31,347.81</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Agencies within the Fund had to adjust to the reality that the Fund had little money to give them. Fiscal year 1933 tested the FWS’s ability to withstand extreme pressure. Because of the disastrous Community Fund campaign, the FWS garnered $100,000 less in fiscal year 1933 than in 1932.\textsuperscript{109} The County Council reduced per diem expense payments for orphaned children by more than 10 percent.\textsuperscript{110} In addition, needs continued to grow as unemployment rates accelerated.
The township trustee helped relieve the crisis felt by the FWS by agreeing to aid transients, large families, and to pay rent for the unemployed in January 1933. Over the course of fiscal year 1933, the township trustee accepted administrative and financial responsibility for the Emergency Housing Committee. Supplemental relief expenses were also cut, by asking the trustee to enlarge the food basket.

Despite decreased responsibility for the unemployed, the FWS failed to remain within budget. By May 1933, the FWS board expected the Society to face a $5,000 deficit. The Community Fund could not borrow any more money for the Society. Desperate measures were undertaken. No relief or rent payments were made for two months. In October three district offices were consolidated into one and many staff members released to state organizations, including the GCUR.

By early November Rappaport was convinced that the budget must be cut deeply and that every possible case had to be turned over to the public offices. Many of its other programs were merged with other agencies, including some of its oldest programs, the Children's Bureau and the Social Service Exchange. The number of cases under FWS care clearly shows the downward trend after mid-1933 (see Figure 3.4).

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In an early 1933 letter, Wheeler Mission wondered why its appropriation had been cut so deeply. Comparing itself to the Salvation Army and the Volunteers of America, the Mission protested that unlike those agencies it had done everything that the Fund had asked of it. Wheeler Mission used $1478.70 to help the Volunteers of America feed and house its clients saving the Community Fund $2209.25 in reduced costs. By March 1933, Herbert Eberhard informed David Liggett that Wheeler Mission would not continue taking care of Volunteers of America or Salvation Army clients without compensation.\textsuperscript{117} In actuality, it was an empty threat. Wheeler Mission continued to take care of transients the other two agencies could not.

Efficiencies could not ultimately make up for the 910 percent increase in the sheer numbers of transients and families needing help, without increased support from the Fund.\textsuperscript{118} Wheeler Mission board members had to acknowledge a $5,600 deficit in May. A support letter went out requesting

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>3431</td>
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<td>2450</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2140</td>
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<td>2561</td>
<td>347</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1863</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1696</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1691</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
more help in erasing this deficit and Eberhardt asked board members to recruit new supporters. A new letter, mailed to the faithful in September, 1933, reported the discouraging news that the Mission, because of a lack of funds, had closed its family relief department, discharged four employees, and again reduced salaries.

Needs continued to increase at Wheeler Mission until late in 1933 when federal and state agencies relieved it of some of its burden. Even so, in 1934 Wheeler Mission still served more people more meals and gave them more garments than it had in 1931.119

By the end of 1933 character building agencies had given up almost all "relief" activities, or had been ordered to do so by the Community Fund. If they had relief departments they were closed and many social workers transferred to other agencies. Free or subsidized rooms remained one of the last vestiges of the past. By July 1933 character-building agencies were going on the offensive inside the Community Fund, demanding more money to protect their mission.120

The 1934 Community Fund budget was slightly different than that of 1933. Funding levels for character-building agencies increased for the first time in four years. Relief agencies had turned most of their cases over to the public
sector and could therefore no longer claim a special place. Relief organizations garnered only 56.3 percent of the 1934 budget, the lowest percentage since 1930.\textsuperscript{121}  

In fiscal year 1933 many civic and political leaders seemed to have neglected the EWC. It began the year with a small deficit. Community support, through various activities, replenished the EWC bank accounts in early December 1932, but it was not enough to begin any large cash wage relief effort.\textsuperscript{122} Community support made possible the small wage, given to selected workers, of $1.00 per week, but it did not last for the entire period and was only selectively given.\textsuperscript{123} Neither the city government nor the Community Fund had found a way to support the EWC. City and county employees continued to supervise EWC projects and Community Fund agencies still used EWC labor for repair and construction projects, but no direct grants had been made to the EWC since 1931. Without adequate funding the EWC remained a tool to convert public relief into public works, but little else.  

In late 1932 and early 1933 many on the EWC board were frustrated. Financial worries led to frustration over not being able to carry out the EWC’s original mandate. Board member Daniel B. Luten noted that the EWC was supposed to give wages and relief and not act “merely as a placement
bureau." No money could be raised by appeal to the Community Fund, the city, or the county, but no attempts were made to seek federal assistance until May 1933. George Gill reported that the EWC was doing "our utmost to see everyone gets a Square Deal." 124

The EWC facilitated cooperation among private and public agencies, but in some ways this was not always positive. The state tax department denied the city government's request for $85,000 in taxes because the department decided that the money, and the taxes needed to pay for it, could be saved by the city if they used EWC workers rather than paid employees. The EWC protested the judgment, but it stood. 125

On the positive side, in a 1932 study, 81 percent of respondents working for the EWC reported satisfaction with their situation, in part because they were able to work for what they were given and therefore did not see it as a "hand out." 126 State and local public agencies constantly sought to help the EWC. State agencies helped the EWC qualify for RFC loans before 1933 and afterward helped it register for the NRA. 127 Small benefits also helped to create situational satisfaction. Children of EWC workers received free admission to movies on Friday nights. 128

The activities reports for early 1933 showed a
disturbing trend of increasing unemployment. In 1930, George Gill estimated that the EWC could easily fit about 6,000 workers into make-work jobs. In the activities report for January 1-February 25, 1933, the EWC averaged some 6,025 workers, a more than 50 percent increase over the same time in 1932.\(^{129}\) By the end of March 1933, 6,907 different men had reported for placement throughout the month.\(^{130}\)

George Gill met with Frances Perkins, the future secretary of Labor, in New York during early March 1933. After that meeting the EWC teamed with the GCUR and later forwarded names to the Governor’s Committee for placement with the CCC.\(^{131}\) By May, when the first RFC grants reached the EWC, the group and its director had become an integral part in transferring men from local relief to federal jobs with the CCC and later with the CWA.\(^{132}\) By late June, partly because of the beginnings of federal jobs programs and partly because of a slightly healthier economy, the EWC placed only 5551 people into EWC jobs.\(^{133}\) Between July and November, the EWC continued to behave as it had in fiscal year 1932, except it also placed men into federal and state jobs. On November 20, 1933 the GCUR took over the EWC’s work, staff, files, and active list of 4,924 unemployed. The cornerstone of the public-private partnership was gone.\(^{134}\) Some board members continued to hold meetings after
November, seemingly confused as to the nature of the GCUR incorporation.

For the Indianapolis Foundation, 1933 did not begin auspiciously. The Community Fund failed to make its goal and would want the Foundation to help. The Indianapolis Orphans Asylum would need further aid. As in 1932, the Indianapolis Foundation helped rescue the Orphans Home and gave more money to the Community Fund. More than $3,000 was revoked from studies and other agencies to help the Orphans Home. Eugene Foster and Mary Mueller, the secretary of the Foundation, voluntarily reduced their salaries by 10 percent. Administrative expenses were cut almost 2 percent. Education-related institutions and children's organizations received most of the funding from the Foundation. To help the largest number of students, the board decreased the amount awarded per individual and increased the number of awards given out. All of the increased amounts went to high school students.

The activity of the Foundation is significant, for it shows the desperation and the depth of need. In 1929 Eugene Foster advised a new Rhode Island community foundation executive that he should refrain from giving the Community Fund money, unless they it failed to attain its goal. In that year the Indianapolis Foundation gave the Community
Fund $15,000, or 13 percent of the Foundation's income. By 1933 the Foundation gave $35,000 to the Fund, or 37 percent of its depleted budget. In addition the budget outlays for relief organizations, not for experimental programs of those agencies but for their basic necessities, increased from almost nothing in 1929 to 58.6 percent in 1933.

The trend in scholarship aid bespeaks the fear of limited opportunities. The Foundation became more concerned with primary education rather than college or advanced training. In 1929 several women received the opportunity to gain advanced training in social services and teaching through the Foundation on top of the 66 scholarships divided between high school and college students. By 1932, no advanced training scholarships were given by the Foundation and the balance of scholarships went to high school students. By 1933, high school students received 93 scholarships compared to the 27 given to college students. Foster and board members agreed that priority should be given to high school students so they could get a basic education. A college education was not deemed as important as giving a larger number of youths a basic education. By the end of fiscal year 1933 many philanthropic agencies had virtually surrendered their previous mission. Character-building institutions endeavored to supplement
relief agencies by giving emergency aid. The Indianapolis Foundation had become not an innovator, but a second source for Community Fund agencies. Most of its money did not go to new programs or to helping agencies buy technology. Relief organizations, while functioning as providers of relief, could not perform up to the level they desired. By October 1933 almost all philanthropic resources were being diverted to relief, and it was not enough.

There are no indications that private philanthropy would have been able to retake even as little as half of the unemployment-relief burden after 1933 nor is there reason to believe most board members had the inclination to do so. Most board members had surrendered the notion that it was private philanthropy's duty to shoulder the responsibility for unemployment aid. Instead, private philanthropy became the facilitator of centralizing relief in the county through the Central Investigation Office, the EWC, the Central Registration Bureau, and other organizations.

How does one explain the change in board member's mentality from willingness to take on the responsibility of unemployment relief care in 1930 to the belief that it is the government's duty in 1933? Network sociologists believe that those who are linked through several associations and resemble one another closely, in terms of race, ethnicity,
age, and wealth, tend to form opinions that are similar and that those beliefs are reinforced through constant interaction. Surely this constant interaction had something to do with the change in belief, but experience with and frustration over not being able to fully fund projects, and therefore ably aid individuals, prodded them to accept total public funding for unemployment relief. One must keep in mind, though, that leaders did not expect the federal government to act; instead they relied on the local public sector.

Business leaders, many of whom were also leaders in philanthropy, recognized the inability of private resources to meet the need. They embraced the NRA fully, and lauded the work relief efforts of the CWA and the CCC, even if they did not particularly care for their national flavor. Although no one stated so publicly, the positive reaction to the First New Deal may have been due, in part, to the fact of its basic conservatism and allegiance to a pro-business philosophy. Many of the federal-relief duties fell to state committees whose posts were filled by local leaders, and therefore may have appeared less threatening than if they had been staffed with outsiders.

It is important to keep in mind also that board members had not held a consensus on the role of the state in relief
work. Publicly funded relief was the norm in 1929 and 1933. Many business leaders did not agree that the federal government should be involved, but they did not find local public relief problematic.140

Social work thought, and its tendency to approve of government-funded relief, also influenced board members. By October 1933, several social work executives had become part of the network through their participation in board activities. The professionalization of social workers and the dominance of social work thought coincides with the coming to real power of social work executives and those who believed in their ideas. In 1933 Eugene Foster sat on the boards of several local philanthropic organizations including the Central Investigation Office. William H. Book and Nadia Deem became the director and assistant director, respectively, of the GCUR in early 1933. George Gill became the state's employment coordinator in the same period. Most of these agencies were public state offices and were at the forefront of the war on unemployment in Indiana. They offered powerful solutions to unemployment and relief to the populace. In addition, at the national level, Harry Hopkins turned to social workers for advice and established minimum requirements based on their criteria.

In addition, social work thought did not go very far
against the assumptions of the business society. Businessmen and social workers agreed that direct relief, or the "dole," denigrated the individual and that work relief, which paid a wage, was the best form of assistance. They agreed that work relief would give the individual dignity and allow him to keep the "habits of industry." They disagreed as to the amount of the wage, but this was a minor detail. By 1933 the only real disagreement was the question of where the ultimate center of power should lie, with the local community or with Washington, D.C. Social workers had decided that it should rest with the federal government.¹⁴¹

Some board members rejected the beliefs of their colleagues and the intrusion of the federal government in local affairs, but many on the separate boards acted as did the president of the Chamber of Commerce, Louis Borenstein. He led the Chamber to cooperate as fully as possible with the federal government's initiatives. He sat on the Indiana NRA board and the GCUR board, helped decide which projects would be funded for slum clearance, and attempted to help businesses register for the NRA. Borenstein welcomed the NRA and the First New Deal. The Chamber became an organization that received Works Progress Administration funds for projects.¹⁴²

One should not believe, though, as historian Thomas C.
Cochran has suggested, that business leaders were inactive or did little in a positive way to try to combat unemployment. Several leaders in Indianapolis developed plans that would have brought real relief and hope to area residents. Marshall D. Lupton, a member of the EWC board, believed it possible not only to give work to the unemployed, but also to those who were underemployed. FWS board members wanted the EWC to pay good wages to their clients. There were other ideas that might have helped, but all suffered from the same ailment. No money was available for Lupton’s idea. The Chamber of Commerce, the Community Fund, and the mayor, who created the ICSE and thus also the EWC, never provided adequate funding. The Chamber was continually in serious debt, the Community Fund deemed the EWC an outsider, and the mayor’s office claimed that funding the organization would be illegal. After the advent of the New Deal, several prominent businessmen became board members of state committees that controlled federal assistance.

After the national victory of the New Deal the Chamber of Commerce embraced the NIRA and the NRA. Business leaders in Indianapolis did embrace the New Deal, or at least the First New Deal.¹⁴³ By the end of July, 1933, the Industrial Commission of the Chamber helped businesses file petitions with the NRA. In 1934 the Chamber created a national
legislation committee. William Block Company executives placed a full-page ad in the Indianapolis Star in 1933 promising the president their support while holding out hope for a speedy recovery.¹⁴⁴

In the black community during fiscal year 1933 the Recorder continued its "Good Fellows" Christmas campaign, giving a large number of food baskets and toys away. The Phyllis Wheatley Branch of the YWCA and Flanner House also gave out food and medical care. Flanner House alone gave out 118 bushel baskets of food in January 1933.¹⁴⁵

The New Deal was heartily welcomed by the black community in Indianapolis because, in part, it was the first time in over four years that significant increases in employment could be registered in the African-American community. Even before December 1933, when it was reported that 3,000 blacks would be employed by the CWA, the editor of the Recorder supported Roosevelt’s programs. A July editorial praised Roosevelt and stated "let all Americans join with their leader." At the end of December another Recorder editorial jubilantly read "the nation is going forward."¹⁴⁶

By mid-1933 the New Deal had begun to make its presence felt in Indianapolis. On May 6, a Department of Labor representative arrived in Indianapolis to consider Gill’s
system of selection for the EWC. During June, George Gill, Eugene Foster and other social work executives met with Department of Labor officials in the Morgan-Monroe County Forest. RFC money arrived in time to pay off EWC debts. Federal relief on a large scale, however, had not yet actually materialized. On August 8, EWC board members received news that federal funds had to be used on public projects, that even non-sectarian private organizations such as Flanner House would not be eligible for EWC work as they had been for the past three years. The public-private partnership then had to officially come to a close. The entire philanthropic community could no longer be included and even organizations such as the Central Investigation Office and the Central Registration Bureau seemed to be in some doubt because the social workers employed were, in reality, loaned to the semi-public agencies from private groups. Indianapolis was not the only city affected by the Department of Labor's edict.

The answer to the dilemma of how Indianapolis could restructure its agencies serving the unemployed quickly became known. Private social work agencies surrendered their employees, public-private groups such as the EWC were incorporated by wholly public entities, and federal agencies took responsibility for major employment initiatives. The
GCUR took over the function, files, and staff of the EWC.\textsuperscript{147} The CWA announced plans to put all relief recipients to work. Private philanthropic groups found themselves scrambling to create a justification for their presence. As 1933 became 1934 control and authority passed forever from local to national authorities.

On September 1, 1933 the most visible parts of the public-private partnership were officially dismantled by the United States government. The loss of control over relief work must have baffled some of those who had led the efforts to help the needy. Frustration must have been vented over the loss of the centralizing agencies. After four years of work nothing was left. The federal government, through the GCUR, controlled local township trustee social work standards, including the size and make-up of relief provisions. Only private philanthropy remained solidly under local control.
Notes for Chapter 3

In citing archives in the notes, short titles have generally been used. Works frequently cited have been identified by the following abbreviations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CATH Papers</td>
<td>Papers of the Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Indianapolis Archdiocese Archives, Indianapolis, Indiana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF papers</td>
<td>Papers of the Community Fund, United Way of Central Indiana Archives, Indianapolis, Indiana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL Papers</td>
<td>Papers of Daniel B. Luten, Manuscripts Division - Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, Indiana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCUR Papers</td>
<td>Papers of the Governor's Committee on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Sister Rose Angela Horan, *The Story of Old St. John: A Parish Rooted in Pioneer Indianapolis* (Indianapolis: Litho Press, 1971), 245. Sister Horan notes that over 2,000 people attended his funeral and that a Jewish Rabbi, several Protestant ministers, high Catholic officials, and many individual citizens could be counted among those in attendance.


on Voluntarism," in Bernard Sternsher, ed. Hitting Home: The Great Depression in Town and Country, Revised Edition (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1970, 1989), 60-76. Note that the FWS of Philadelphia was actually named the Family Services Agency. I used the designation FWS for comparative purposes and for easier reading. It was indeed the equivalent of Indianapolis' FWS.


11. According to historian Douglas Smith, most southern cities needed the federal government because they no longer had the tax base, voluntary zeal, or bonding power to continue funding their projects. See "The Persistence of the Past: Memphis in the Great Depression," Journal of Southern History 52 (May 1986): 190-193. See also Smith, The New Deal in the Urban South, 15-41.

12. B. J. T. Jeup, "Survey of the Municipal Government of Indianapolis, Indiana, 1932," copy in Indiana Division, Indiana State Library. See also Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce report on the city's budget included with the March
17. Meeting notes, in "Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1932," CoC-CoC.

13. *Indiana Business Review* 20 January 1932, 3; *Indiana Business Review*, 20 December 1933, 6. The magazine reported that employment was "17.5 percent above a year ago" in the December 1933 issue. The December 1932 issue reported employment at 35.8 percent below that of May 1929. While there are problems with the way the survey was compiled, a general pattern does emerge to show that employment was higher in December 1933 than in December 1932, apparently significantly so.


17. "Facts About the Finances of the Indianapolis Public Schools," Published by the Board of School Commissioners, Indianapolis, September 1940. Copy in Indiana Division, Indiana State Library.


19. While businesses such as General Motors and U.S. Steel were cutting wages and hours, Eli Lilly and Company made a large enough profit to keep their workers on full time at full wages. Lilly cut hours at the plant in 1933, but raised wages to compensate for the loss in hours. During the 1930s Lilly did face decreased profits and could have cut hours or laid off employees to make up for the loss; however, not one employee at Lilly was laid off. Many were kept busy painting, cleaning, and doing other work projects. See James H. Madison, Eli Lilly: A Life, 1885-1977 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1989), 96-97.

20. From fiscal year 1930 to fiscal year 1933 total assets of the Chamber fell 17 percent, income fell by over half, and it lost 75 percent of its membership. The Chamber cut its budget by almost a fifth to prevent further losses. See
George Geib and Miriam Geib, *Indianapolis First* (Indianapolis: Chamber of Commerce, 1990), 71-73. See also minutes for December 19, 1929 and December 21, 1933 in “Minutes of the Board of Directors for the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1933,” and “Minutes of the Board of Directors for the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1929,” CoC-CoC. The report for December 19, 1929 reports income of $93,471.36 for the 1928-1929 fiscal year. The 1933 minutes show an income of only $44,287.23 for fiscal year 1932-1933.


22. See March 30, 1930, February 18, 1932 and February 18, 1933 meeting minutes in “Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1930,” “Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1932,” and “Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1933,” CoC-CoC. Attachments to these notes concern city expenses and the Chamber’s lobbying efforts. The September 28, 1933 meeting notes reveal that board members believed that the council’s economies as presented in the 1934 budget were “very pleasing.” One board member met with Mayor Sullivan and
city council representatives and was assured the city would do all it could to reduce budget expenses.

23. See The Indianapolis Real Estate Board, 1912 to 1962: 50 Years of Community Service to the Greater Indianapolis Area for Home-Business-Industry (Indianapolis: Indianapolis Real Estate Board, 1962), chapter titled "1930 to 1940 . . . Depression Years." The Chamber did not get the unified county tax unit it wanted nor the air-mail route, but it did help bring the Paper Art and Stokely Van Camp companies to town.


25. Winslow, Trends, 74, "Table B: total and per-capita expenditures from public and from private funds for relief in 117 specified urban areas; 1929-1935."

26. For unemployment rates see Indiana Business Review 20 January 1933. William A. Sundstrom, "Last Hired, First Fired? Unemployment and Urban Black Workers During the Great Depression," Journal of Economic History 52 (June 1992): 415-429, estimates that black unemployment was as much as 80 percent higher than that of whites in northern urban areas.
Reports from the EWC, the Chamber of Commerce, and the FWS reveal that black unemployment was much higher than that of whites, especially before October 1931. The rates of aid given even out somewhat after October 1931. One must keep in mind, however, that blacks made up only 12 percent of the population, but as much as 50 percent or more of the Center Township trustee’s cases. Sundstrom believes that much of the high rates are due to the type of pre-depression employment blacks were engaged in, primarily low-skill construction, one of the first areas to suffer and the last to recover. In March 1933, the Indiana Business Review reported that construction was off by as much as 85.9 percent from its May 1929 level. See also Rita Helmbold, "Downward Occupational Mobility during the Great Depression: Urban Black and White Working Class Women," Labor History 29 (1988): 135-172. Helmbold shows that unemployment for black women was worse due to racism than that for black men.

27. Minutes for 18 January 1932, in “Fund Board Minutes,” January 1931 to December 1934, CF Papers. The township trustee gave a total of $5.47 of relief, including milk and coal.

Inc., 1969), 99. Meltzer also discloses that over 73 percent of blacks living in Harlem did not receive any relief.

29. Smith, The Urban South, 37.

30. Indiana Business Review 20 July 1933, 4, states that cost of living fell 26.5 percent between 1929 and June 1933.

31. An historian has recently found that social workers may have misrepresented the total need of families during the Depression in order to attain social work goals that would not be accepted in normal times. See Winifred D. Wandersee Bolin, "The Economics of Middle-Income Family Life: Working Women During the Great Depression," Journal of American History 65 (June 1978): 60-74.

32. Indianapolis News, 5 April 1932.

33. Indianapolis Star, 24 September 1932.

34. Actual caseloads in December 1933 were 6,885, which was actually down from the over 11,000 cases held in March 1933. "Marion County Comparative Expenditures for 1929, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935 and Appropriations for 1936 (including supplemental appropriations to June 15, 1936)," W.P.A. Project no. 6152, "Box 12, GCUR Papers.

35. See "Marion County Comparative Expenditures for 1929,
1932, 1933, 1934, 1935 and Appropriations for 1936
(including supplemental appropriations to June 15, 1936),
W.P.A. Project no. 6152," Box 12, GCUR Papers.

36. See June 20, 1931 PECE news release, attached to the
June 23, 1931 Community Fund Board Minutes, concerning
PECE's involvement in Community Fund campaigns around the
nation. See also board member notes from November 13, 1931
to December 31, 1931. "Fund Board Minutes," January 1931-
December 1934, CF Papers.

37. November 16, 1931 letter from the Community Fund's
accountants gives specific data concerning donations,
grouped by businesses, individuals, and other criteria, in

38. Letter to the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis
Foundation from the Community Fund, requesting additional
aid for 1932. In the letter, A. V. Brown discloses that Eli
Lilly gave $75,000 and challenges the Foundation to give at
least $20,000. Copy in "Minutes," Book 3, 1928-1932, IF
Papers.

39. Board notes, December 15, 1932, reveal that in 1931
Community Fund organizations around the nation collected an
average of 78 percent of their goal. "Fund Board Minutes,"
January 1931-December 1934, CF Papers.

40. Community Fund board member notes, September 24, 1931. The notes reveal that several "citizens" erased the deficit so that the Fall 1931 campaign could be a success. "Fund Board Minutes," January 1931-December 1934, CF Papers.


42. Ibid. Three percent is very good. The Indianapolis Foundation's costs averaged 10 percent.


44. Family Welfare Society executive committee minutes, November 22, 1933, reveal that board members asked the township trustees to take over financial responsibility for large families and transients. A November 15, 1933 letter from David Liggett gives specific declarations on how and where FWS money could be spent. "Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Family Welfare Society," BV1231b, FWS Papers.


48. The Central Investigation Office brought together the EWC, the FWS, and township trustees. Healthy recipients of trustee relief would be investigated by the Central Investigation Office, "employed" by the EWC, and paid, in kind, by the trustee. In addition, if the recipient had other needs it was possible that the FWS, the Red Cross, or other organizations might render assistance. Community Fund Board Minutes, March 10, 1932, in "Fund Board Minutes," January 1931-December 1934, CF Papers.

49. The Community Fund Board, though, had another reason for giving Wheeler Mission less money. They knew Wheeler had the contacts to cover the lessened grants from the Fund. They even admitted as much in a letter to Herbert Eberhardt, the Mission's director, in 1933. Proof came as the Mission
was never allowed to go too far in debt by its protectors and by the multitude of Christian supporters throughout the city. Wheeler Mission alone constituted its own sub-network. Over 200 churches supported its Sunday Breakfast Club, radio programs, and religious ministries.

50. For fiscal year 1931 see "Budget Allowances to Member Agencies" (1931-1932), attached to Board Member Notes, November 30, 1931. For fiscal year 1932 see "Budget Allowances to Member Agencies, years 1932 and 1933," attached to Board Member Notes, December 15, 1932. "Fund Board Minutes," January 1931-December 1934, CF Papers.


54. Joint Meeting of the Executive Committees of the Family Welfare Society and the Community Fund Budget Committee held
April 24, 1932, Ibid. Rappaport, Wollen, and Clifford were in favor of narrowing the FWS's focus and presented their idea to do so in the April 27, 1932 board meeting.


56. Minutes for March 24, 1932, Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Minutes for April 24, 1932, Ibid.

59. Minutes for December 9, 1932 and for April 6, 1933, Ibid.

60. Letter to Supporters from H. E. Eberhardt, dated October 17, 1932, Box 7, File 3, WM Papers.

61. Letter to supporters from Eberhardt, dated September 28, 1933, Ibid.

62. The Red Cross made available wage payments to unemployed veterans through the EWC and some individuals were chosen by EWC personnel to receive a small supplementary wage.

63. Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of

64. See George E. Gill, "Helping the Man and the City, Too," Nation's Business (September 1931), copy in Indiana Division, Indiana State Library. See also William H. Book, "How Indianapolis combines Poor Relief with Public Work," National Municipal Review (September 1931), copy in Indiana Division, Indiana State Library.


66. EWC notes February 3, 1933 relates the Butler offer to provide garden space and Mary Rigg's offer to aid wives of the unemployed, Folder 3, DL Papers. See the Indianapolis Times, 16 November 1931, concerning the proceeds of football games.


68. EWC notes, March 25, 1933, ibid.

69. See Consultant's Report for December 1931, p. 2, in


73. "Minutes," March 14, 1932, Book 4, IF Papers. The donor was probably on the board of directors of the Foundation or a close friend of one of the board members. Within three days of the previous board meeting the mysterious donor appeared willing to help the Home. The donor wanted to give the money to the Foundation for the express purpose of helping the Home.

74. Judith E. Endelman, The Jewish Community of Indianapolis: 1849 to the Present (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 167. The Center was visited by
87,289 more people in 1932 than in 1928.


76. Indianapolis Recorder, 15 October 1932.

77. Indianapolis Star, 5 January 1932.

78. Shriver, "YWCA," 79.

79. Moore, Second Presbyterian, 104.

80. Horan, Old St. John's, 259.

81. Second Baptist Church Records, Box 1, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis. See also Indianapolis Recorder. Church records reveal a relief club, but no existing records tell of its activities. An article in the Recorder in 1930 reveals that the Church opened a soup kitchen.


84. History of Allen Chapel A. M. E. Church, 37.


88. History of Allen Chapel A. M. E. Church, 39.


90. Transcript of Oral Interview with George Gill, 30.


92. Indianapolis *Recorder*, 10 October 1931, 21 November 1931, 31 October 1931. Several people were hired at Kroger stores, at least in part, because of the League.


94. Fred Hoke and William Book, "Governor's Commission on Unemployment Relief," and "Unemployment Relief," *The Indiana


96. Ibid.

97. Community Fund Board Member Notes, February 27, 1933, CF Papers. In the meeting Liggett related several options that other cities were trying. Kansas City used a commissary plan, which fed people on relief several meals at reduced costs to the Fund. Direct assistance was cut to almost nothing. Chicago used RFC money and gave agencies only 25 percent of their operating budget. The other 75 percent was expected to come from supporters of the particular agency. Three Midwestern cities divided their agencies into two groups, relief and character building, and ran separate campaigns.

98. The Salvation Army’s budget decreased from $30,667 in 1932 to only $17,500 in 1933. See “Budget Allowances to Member Agencies, years 1932 and 1933,” attached to Board Member Notes, January 9, 1933, in “Fund Board Minutes,” January 1931-December 1934, CF Papers.

99. Minutes for January 9, 1933, Ibid.
100. See Minutes of March 22, 1933 to May 25, 1933, Ibid. Leisure Clubs were given $1728.95.


102. Minutes for February 27, 1933, ibid.

103. Minutes for December 21, 1933, ibid.

104. Minutes for January 9, 1933, ibid.

105. Minutes for July 6, 1933, ibid.

106. Minutes for September 19, 1933, Ibid.

107. Minutes for September 19, 1933 and December 21, 1933, ibid.


109. The FWS's budget was cut from $330,006.24 in 1932 to $229,900.00 in 1933. See "Budget Allowances to Member Agencies, years 1932-1933-1934," attached to the September 19, 1933 Minutes, in "Fund Board Minutes," January 1931-December 1934, CF Papers.
110. Board notes for December 9, 1932, in "Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Family Welfare Society, BV1231b, FWS Papers. The FWS received $0.65 per day per child rather than $0.75 per day.

111. Board notes for January 13, 1933, Ibid.

112. Board notes, January 13, 1933, Ibid., reveal that the trustee agreed to pay the water bills for residents of emergency housing. The April 6, 1933 Board Notes detail that the salary of the director of the Emergency Housing Committee was to be paid by the trustee. Finally, in the October 6, 1933 FWS Board Notes, one finds that the trustee took over the entire project.

113. Board notes for March 24, 1933, ibid.

114. Board notes, May 5, 1933 and May 23, 1933, ibid. Rent relief was to be stopped for June and August, while general relief payments were to be discontinued for July and September.

115. Board notes for October 6, 1933, ibid.

117. Letter to Liggett from Eberhardt dated March 9, 1933, Box 4, File 11, WM Papers.

118. Information contained in a letter dated May 19, 1933 from Krause to Liggett, Box 4, Folder 11, WM Papers.

119. "Monthly Budget Reports," Box 50, Folder 6 and Box 53, Folder 5, WM Papers.

120. Minutes of July 6, 1933 meeting, in "Fund Board Minutes," January 1931-December 1934, CF Papers.

121. Relief agencies were budgeted for $308,500 in fiscal year 1934, out of a total budget of $547,816. See memo attached to September 19, 1933 Notes, in "Fund Board Minutes," January 1931-December 1934, CF Papers.

122. EWC meeting notes, November 4, 1932, show a debt of $260.58. The Meeting Notes of December 2, 1932 note that a football game raised $4,000 for the EWC. Folder 3, DL Papers.

123. EWC meeting notes, May 27, 1933, folder 4, DL Papers.

124. See Daniel B. Luten's Statement of February 3, 1934. See also the Also the Activities Report of the EWC for February 3, 1933, in Folder 4, DL Papers.

125. EWC meeting notes, February 4, 1933, in Folder 4, DL Papers.
Papers.


127. See EWC meeting notes for May 27, 1933 concerning the RFC loan and the September 1, 1933 meeting regarding NRA membership, in Folder 4, DL Papers.

128. EWC meeting notes, February 25, 1933, Ibid.

129. "Activities Report" for February 25, 1933, Ibid., noted an average of 6,025 workers reported to EWC job sites. During the same time in 1932 the average was only 3,987.


131. "Activities Report," April 29, 1933, ibid. The EWC registered 914 people with the CCC, 26 percent of who were black, sometime in late April.

132. In May and June, Gill and others met with federal and state representatives no less than three times for at least four days. See meeting notes for June 2, 1933 and May 26, 1933, ibid.


134. The EWC placed workers into state and federal jobs at
least four times between late July and late October. In the
last list given to the CCC, 44.5 percent of the men were
black. See Executive Committee Meeting Notes, October 27,
1933; "Activities Report," September 29, 1933; meeting
notes, October 6, 1933; Executive Committee meeting notes,
October 27, 1933; and George Gill's Final Report to the EWC
Board, January 2, 1934, ibid.


136. Letter from Foster to James Cook of the New Haven
Foundation dated February 28, 1929 and attached to the March

137. 1929 and 1933 fiscal year reports, "Minutes," Book 3,
1928-1932, Book 4, IF Papers.

138. In 1929 the Indianapolis Foundation gave the
Indianapolis Orphan's Asylum $2,161.29 for necessities and
$13,051.92 for a demonstration project. Money for other
relief organizations was for experimental programs. By 1933
the Orphan's Asylum was given $3,500 for necessities while a
school for crippled children was given $15,947, because its
funding was stopped by other agencies. The Community Fund
received $35,000. It is important to note that Foundation
leaders did not want to provide much money for the Fund.
Their desire was to provide experimental programming that otherwise could not be funded. Only need made Foundation leaders give the Fund so much of Foundation income. 1929, 1933 Annual Reports, Book 3, 1928-1932, Book 4, IF Papers.


142. The study on comparative expenditures for 1929, 1932-1936, W. P. A. Project number 6152 was completed by the Chamber of Commerce. See “Marion County Comparative Expenditures for 1929, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935 and
Appropriations for 1936 (including supplemental appropriations to June 15, 1936),” W.P.A. Project no.6152, Box 12, GCUR Papers.

143. Minutes for July 20, 1933-July 19, 1934, in “Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1933,” and “Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1934,” CoC-CoC.

144. Full-page ad found in Indianapolis Star, 23 July 1933. For the Chamber’s cooperation in the First New Deal see Board Meeting Notes from September 28, 1933 to July 19, 1934, in “Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1933,” and “Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1934,” in CoC-CoC. William H. Book sent a confidential memo on what the members could do to cooperate with state and federal projects.

145. Indianapolis Recorder, 21 January 1933. For the numbers of people aided by the “Good Fellows” organization see Indianapolis Recorder, 31 December 1932 and 30 December 1933. In 1932 the Good Fellows helped over 800 individuals. By the end of 1933 they gave out gifts and food to 1000 people.
146. Indianapolis Recorder, 29 July 1933 and 30 December 1933. Remember also that of the CCC workers chosen from Indianapolis, between 26 percent and 44 percent were black.

147. See Manager’s Report attached to November 20, 1933 EWC Minutes, Folder 4, DL Papers.
Chapter 4

An End to the Partnership?

In an interview in 1963 Louis J. Borinstein told a reporter for the Indianapolis Times what was most important to him. He said that he was proud to receive Manual High School’s 1963 Man of the Year award from his alma mater. Borinstein was a successful businessman and civic leader. He had been president of the Chamber of Commerce, president of his own company, and vice president of another. The most important thing he remembered, though, was that he had spent his life trying “to do some small good.” For Borinstein part of that good was serving on civic and philanthropic boards. In the 1930s he presided over the Chamber an unprecedented five years and also served on the GCUR. He sat on the City Plan Commission for twenty-eight years and devoted significant time to at least seven philanthropic agencies. Most of the men and women in this tale spent a lifetime trying to do a little good and searched for answers to the problems of their city. For Borinstein “anyone in late years of life who can’t . . . dream of some small good he might have done is lost.”¹

The public-private partnership of the early 1930s worked because a group of dedicated civic leaders were
sometimes willing to put the good of the community ahead of
the good of individual agencies. The boards of Wheeler
Mission and the FWS never seriously considered breaking away
from the Fund. The community accepted responsibility for
the crisis. As a result of the economic, political, and
philanthropic decisions of the elite, Indianapolis
philanthropy was able to aid the needy during the 1929-1933
period. The partnership did not die in 1933 and continues
today.

Financial problems plagued policy makers. Community
leaders failed to fully fund, and therefore ably empower,
their most potentially powerful private-public partnership
tool, the EWC, except for a brief period in early 1931. For
some Indianapolis citizens, the relief available to them was
inadequate to meet basic requirements, but did that mean the
partnership was a total failure?

The answer to the question is no, but neither was the
partnership a complete success. The Indianapolis community
gave its unemployed food, but failed to give them hope for
future employment, or even sometimes an acceptable form of
relief. Many agencies had to give up their stated mission
in order to take on the responsibility of relief, affecting
some long-term projects. The Indianapolis community
succeeded in better measure than other cities due to the
presence of a group of men and women who, tied through various organizations and through social commitments, were willing to use both the public and the private sectors for relief without extravagant expectations or flamboyant productions. Their search for efficiency and cooperation led to a partial success story. While this partnership failed to wholly provide adequate relief to all families, its attempts reached more, and provided relief more consistently over time, than in other cities. In addition, its measures proved adaptable and malleable.

Some will question the motives of those involved in the 1930s public-private partnership. There are many who believe that philanthropy exists as a power play against the poor by those who are wealthy. Such grandiose neo-Marxist theories need not necessarily be believed. Is it not possible that many of the men and women who have passed through this story were led by compassion, and a sense of civic duty, to help the unfortunate? It may be a simplistic answer as to their motives, but it is perhaps closer to the mark than explanations based wholly on economic motives.

Most of the men and women deemed leaders in this study came from a traditional religious background, which not only encouraged giving, but required it as a test of their spirituality. Many of the spiritual leaders of the decade,
such as Jean Milner of Second Presbyterian Church, encouraged the view that social service was a prerequisite for holiness. The religious factor, combined with years of the expectations of prominent leaders in business as to philanthropy, led civic leaders to attempt to meet the needs of the city's populace through a mixture of a sense of religious and civic duty. In addition, traditional Midwestern civic values held localism dear. As leaders of the community they were responsible for its well being. Assigning solely economic motives to the group seems trite and condescending. The fear of communism was widespread and added to the activities of local leaders, but this researcher does not believe it was their primary concern.

The traditions they practiced and passed on did not die in 1933. Civic leaders moved on and formed new partnerships with the local public sector that aided both the city at large and the public. Instead of shrinking from responsibility, local elites and local social work executives found positions and authority for themselves within local branches of state departments. Fred Hoke, William Book, Louis J. Borinstein, Leo Rappaport and many others held key appointments within the GCUR.

Leaders in Indianapolis immediately began to evade the 1933 rule against using public money to help private
philanthropic groups, a position taken in other Midwestern cities as well. By 1936 Works Progress Administration funds supported the work of Wheeler Mission's Women's Auxiliary and the Catholic Community Center.

The success of the partnership in the 1930s and the desire to keep local control may have emboldened city leaders to reject federal aid into the 1960s. William H. Book, director of the GCUR in the 1930s and president of the Chamber of Commerce in the 1950s, discouraged civic leaders from taking government money because he feared that the consequences of taking federal money was national control. Book was not alone. Every mayor elected in the 1940s and 1950s, both Republican and Democrat, concurred with Book at least in action if not in sentiment. Only with the election of John J. Barton, in 1963, and his successor Richard G. Lugar, did the city begin to apply for federal aid to cities.

Barton's term, however, did not signal the decline of local elite control over the city's fortunes. Barton created the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee (GIPC) in 1965, an entity he considered his best achievement. It brought together the elite in a single board to act as an unofficial advisor to the mayor. The board was later credited with having a powerful say in local government
The 1970s and 1980s only witnessed an acceleration of the private-public partnership. The Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee, the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, the Lilly Endowment, and the Indianapolis Foundation continued to guide the city from near ruin to what one historian termed the "silver buckle on the rust belt." The restoration of the downtown area, the refurbishment of entire neighborhoods, and the creation of Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis are among the crowning achievements of the partnership in recent decades. By 1980 Lilly Endowment President Thomas H. Lake openly suggested that the new federalism promised by President Ronald Reagan would lead to a new look at the benefits of private-public partnerships. Lake undoubtedly knew these benefits first hand because Indianapolis had been operating in such a manner for over a century.

In the end the public-private partnership continues to the writing of this thesis. In 1997 the Lilly Endowment, the City of Indianapolis, and the State of Indiana enticed the National Collegiate Athletic Association's national headquarters to the Circle City. The work of the Rappaports, the Lillys, the Efroymsons, and the Browns, to mention but a few, continues. Many quarrel with the
secretive nature of the partnership or the potential for harm, but few can argue that it has not been a boon to the city. It was certainly not a hindrance in the 1930s when federal relief was unknown and misery multiplied as the economic crisis grew. In general, local entities could not fight successfully against the economic catastrophe, but they did endeavor to aid those touched by it, and sometimes they were able to do some small good.
Notes for Chapter 4

1. Indianapolis Times, 17 February 1963, 6.

2. Even national aid did not solve the entire problem. When the United States entered World War II many incoming recruits were malnourished.


Appendix A

Network Analysis Methods and Results


The closeness of the individuals involved in decision making during the Depression in Indianapolis was both helpful and somewhat destructive. The density of the cliques that made up the Indianapolis elite between 1929 and 1933 helps to explain their aversion to new avenues of aid and their ability to sustain contemporary means of relief. The group was able to withstand criticism and not allow the stress of those early years to break the philanthropic community apart. They communicated effectively with each other, thus facilitating a flow of information and resources.
between groups. But, the close-knit nature of the leadership group made them resistant to change, in part because of the very strength that allowed them to succeed. A dense network often chokes off new ideas or at least makes heterodox ideas less palatable.

A network analysis gives the researcher a tool to impart knowledge concerning the interconnectedness of people. The popular sentiment "it's not what you know, but who you know" typifies the beliefs that underlie network analysis research and writing. Sociologists think that membership within sub-groups of society such as churches, families, formal voluntary associations such as clubs, and informal associations - termed network ties, make up the foundation of communities. Some sociologists consider cliques, one type of network tie, the most important tie, after family.¹

The overlapping clique membership integrates almost the entire population to create a social system of tiered informal relationships that are usually designated a "community." In essence, individuals who come from a similar social strata, or those who are focused on the same ideas and who participate in the same activities will tend to become interpersonally tied. The interconnectedness of these individuals is strengthened the more they interact.
with one another. If interaction is frequent and individual clusters are tight enough activity can be coordinated, and beliefs and ideas will tend to be shared, forming a general consensus. Sociologists measure the strength of a clique through its density. Density is found by measuring the number of possible connections and their frequency of occurrence within a set of social actors. Density is always shown as a percentage and corresponds to the percent of actors that are co-members of a particular organization. Centrality is another measure of how important, powerful and influential an individual is within a network or clique.

The first step in collecting historical data of the type needed for this study is to determine the major groups and individuals that affected the policies of philanthropic and government agencies in Indianapolis between 1929 and 1933. The agencies selected included both wholly private groups, public bodies, and public-private organizations created for the emergency. After determining the groups, individual members were identified. A MxN matrix was created in a database (see Figure A.1 for an example and figure A.2 for the actual matrix). In the vertical column, (M), individual names were placed. The (N) column represents philanthropic and public-private agencies to which the individuals belonged. A 1 or 0 was placed in the
line to denote activity in the group or the absence of such activity, respectively.

Figure A.1

Example of a MxN matrix

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<th>Agency 1</th>
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</table>

The computer program manages the data in two different ways. First, the interconnectedness of the individuals is determined. In the example, persons two and three are connected through agency one. Person one and two are connected through agency two and persons three and one are connected through agency three. Essentially, all three people are interconnected, but none belong to all three agencies. Further, by reversing the matrix it is easy to see that all agencies are connected through the three individuals. While this is a very simple example, one can see that it is possible for information to be shared among groups and between individuals without a particular individual actually belonging to a specific group.

In practical terms what this means is that the probability of sharing information, beliefs, and resources
are increased as individuals share memberships, and thus time and social capital, in organizations.\footnote{The more connections that are made the more likely the possibility that there will be a shared culture. The connections also may allow for coordination of resources, the sharing of personnel, or possibly an informal sharing of beliefs and philosophy. Further, it may show that most of the individuals within the sample share a similar social position, if as in example A.1, the individuals are highly connected then most probably all three individuals belong to the same social cohort or clique. It is important to note that this is an interpretive version of what the data imparts. The information gleaned from the matrices give the researcher facts concerning pairs of actors. In example A.1 each individual is a part of a pair because each person is tied to another on at least one board. } In the study on Indianapolis the groups included were social clubs, including the Woodstock Club or the Athenæum, civic groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, public-private groups, namely the Emergency Work Committee, public groups including the City Council, and philanthropic organizations. The individuals on the boards of these groups were then studied to see if they had any other connections, for example by marriage or schooling. The best way to obtain
this information was by collecting such data in archival sources. In many board minutes the member’s names were listed. In other instances it was impossible to find such information because such records are no longer available. A second way to gather the data was to go to Blue Books, Who’s Who listings and other biographical data that would list board memberships.

After all the data was collected the MxN matrix for Indianapolis between 1929 and 1933 looked like Figure A.2.

**Figure A.2**

**MxN Matrix Data for Indianapolis, 1929-1933**

**Worksheet 1**

| A       | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |
| Roy E. Adams | 48 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Henry C. Atkins | 62 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Wiliam A. Atkins | 51 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Frederic M. Ayres | 58 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Hugh J. Baker | 48 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Arthur R. Baxter | 54 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Earl Beck | 35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| William C. Borcherding | 59 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Louis J. Borinstei | 49 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Arthur V. Brown | 67 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| John A. Brown | 56 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Volney M. Brown | 31 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| James F. Carroll | 48 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Charles E. Coffin | 70 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Helen Coleman | 54 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

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Evans Woollen, Sr. 66 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Key for Worksheet 1

(A) - Name of Individual (B) - Age in 1930 (C) - Member of Republican Party (D) - Member of Democratic Party (E) - Mystic Tie Mason (F) - Scottish Rite Mason (G) - Mystic Shrine Mason (H) - Murat Shrine Mason (I) - Member of First Baptist Church (J) - Member of Second Presbyterian Church (K) - Member of Meridian Street Methodist Episcopal Church (L) - Member of Christ Church Episcopal Protestant Church (M) - Member of the Unitarian Church (N) - Member of the Indianapolis Hebrew Congregation (O) - Member of St. Joan of Arc Catholic Church (P) - Member of the Woodstock Club (Q) - Member of the Columbia Club (R) - Member of the Athletic Club (S) - Member of the Athletic Club (T) - Member of Highland Golf Club (U) - Member of the University Club (V) - Member of the Chamber of Commerce (W) - Board Member of the Community Fund (X) - Board Member of the Boys Club (Y) - Board Member of the YMCA (Z) - Board member of the YWCA.

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Key for Worksheet 2

(A) - Name of Individual  (B) - Board Member of Wheeler City Rescue Mission  (C) - Board Member of the Family Welfare Society  (D) - Board Member of the Red Cross  
(E) - Board Member of the Indianapolis Foundation  (F) - Board Member of the State Board of Charities  
(G) - Board Member of the Indianapolis Employment Bureau  (H) - Board Member of the Emergency Work Committee  
(I) - Board Member of the Mayor's Relief Committee  (J) - Board Member of Christamore House  (K) - Member of the City Plan Commission  
(L) - Member of the City Council  (M) - Member of the Marion County Board of Children's Guardians  (N) - Board Member of the Indianapolis Public Health and Charities Board  (O) - State Representative or State Senator  (P) - Board Member of the Jewish Welfare Federation  
(Q) - Board Member of the Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment  (R) - Board Member of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce  
(S) - Member of the Indianapolis Department of Law

Once the data was collected within a database it was refigured using UCINet IV software, version 1.0. The MxN information was then converted to a NxN matrix. The NxN matrix allows the overlap of individuals to be calculated. It shows the number of organizations or groups to which each pair of actors belongs. The MxN data is also imported into a MxM matrix. The MxM data shows how many pairs of actors were members of particular organizations, thus calculating the overlap of organizations.
## Data from NxN matrix

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<th>Degree</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td><strong>Standard Deviation</strong></td>
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In the co-membership matrix (N x N) the mean number is 1.82, signifying the number of people who share a common group membership. The number for density shows the average number of co-memberships. 1.82 is a high number. On average each individual belong to 1.82 boards. In other
words, 68 percent of all possible individuals are co-members. Indianapolis leaders were, therefore, highly connected through these organizations. Everyone was part of the same group, with a few people who formed a closely-knit group at the top. In essence there were no identifiably significant cliques among leaders. Everyone within the sample was part of one large pyramid shaped clique. Usually, several clusters of cliques appear, signifying different power bases that can compete for influence and resources. In Indianapolis between 1929 and 1933 there were 160 groups that made up one large clique, as defined by the number of individuals completely connected to ten other people, but an absence of clear clusters.

Degree gives an estimate of centrality. Those who hold the highest number of memberships and react with the largest number of people are assumed to be the most influential. C. H. Rottger, with 78 degree and J. K. Lilly, with 77, appear to be the most influential people in Indianapolis, as measured in terms of their involvement in the groups that were the focus of this study, in the 1929-1933 period. Numbers might be misleading, but there is evidence that in this case the data are correct, at least for J. K. Lilly. At almost every turn various organizations, including those where he was not a board member, sought his advice. In a
few instances he is mentioned as speaking at board meetings in which he does not have a seat on the board. Rottger took an active role in the Community Fund, but existing archival records do not show that he had as powerful a voice in affairs as Lilly. Archival records could also be misleading however, since they cannot describe what occurred in private rooms and business offices.

The event, or organization, matrix (MxM) tells much the same story as the NxN data. The mean is 14.62 with a standard deviation of 6.51. What the numbers translate to is that on average 14.62 pairs of people were involved in more than one organization. The network of agencies had a centralization index of 43.65 percent. Five organizations make up a core group, but the same pyramid structure existed with organizations that existed with individuals. There was no clear demarcation between patterns of relationships. Both the NxN and the MxM matrixes show a very high level of overlap and integration. The network had a centralization rate of 27.51 percent when looking at the NxN matrix. What the percentage translates to is that each individual shared membership in the network with fifty-three other people. In the MxM matrix one finds that at the minimum one person sat on a board or boards with twenty-six of the possible seventy-nine. At a maximum one person sat on several boards
with seventy-eight of the seventy-nine people.

The greatest weakness of the study is that it did not analyze the city's elite on a year by year basis, but instead uses all four years, 1929-1933, as a single unit. If there was much turnover then, indeed, one could say that the study is invalid. However, there was not significant turnover in board membership. Many of the seats that became empty after 1930 were filled by those within the clique that made up the elite in 1929. Overall the study does tend to overestimate the strength and density of the elite cohort somewhat, but not to a degree that would invalidate the study or the findings culled from the information. Many of the elite continued to have a powerful voice in the business of the city long after the Depression ceased.
Appendix B

The names of board members who served between 1929 and 1934 appear below. These are organized by group rather than by Individual. In some of these listings the name of social work executives will also appear since they were ex-officio members. Note that some of the organizations listed were not included in the network analysis described in Appendix A. The list of groups that appear in Appendix B are meant to convey the interconnectedness of individuals throughout the community, but in a different manner than in Appendix A. Sources for these lists include various archives and the Indianapolis Blue Book.

Emergency Work Committee
Formed December 20, 1930

A. Kiefer Mayer    George P. Torrence    Herman P. Lieber
John A. Goodman    Eugene C. Foster    Irving W. Lemaux
James W. Fesler    William E. Holmes    James W. Noel
Daniel B. Luten    Bowman Elder        W. H. Trimble
David C. Liggett   William H. Insley    William H. Book

George Gill, Director
Family Welfare Society

1930

George Buck
Mrs. Russell Fortune
Mrs. Howard Gay
Alexander R. Holliday
Mrs. Richard Lieber
Rev. M. W. Lyons
Leo M. Rappaport
Dr. James H. Taylor
John F. White
Dr. F. S. C. Wicks
Mrs. Frank W. Wood
Judge James A. Collins
Mrs. Elliot Hooton
William H. Insley
Mrs. J. A. Goodman
Herbert S. King
Donald S. Morris
Mansur B. Oaks
Mrs. Stanley Timberlake
John R. Welch
Warrack Wallace
John S. Wright
John A. Brown
Mrs. Joseph Daniels
Rabbi M. M. Feuerlicht
Mrs. Fred Gardner
Rev. Francis H. Gavisk
Mrs. Fred Hoke
J. I. Holcomb
Mrs. Hugh McGibney
Mrs. Gavin Payne
Rev. Floyd Van Keuren
Evans Woollen, Jr.
Louis Hollweg

Rhoda Morrow, General Secretary

1934

George Buck
Mrs. Russell Fortune
Edward Dirks
Alexander R. Holliday
Mrs. Richard Lieber
Rev. M. W. Lyons
Leo M. Rappaport
Dr. James H. Taylor
John F. White
Dr. F. S. C. Wicks
Mrs. Frank W. Wood
Judge James A. Collins
Mrs. Elliot Hooton
William H. Insley
Earl Buchanan
Herbert S. King
Mrs. Larz Whitcomb
Mansur B. Oaks
Mrs. Stanley Timberlake
John R. Welch
Warrack Wallace
John S. Wright
John A. Brown
Mrs. Joseph Daniels
Rabbi M. M. Feuerlicht
Mrs. Robert F. Scott, Jr.
Mrs. Earl Barnes
Mrs. Fred Hoke
Samuel Mueller
John F. White
Mrs. Fermor S. Cannon
John J. Madden
Evans Woollen, Jr.
## Flanner House

**1930**

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<th>Mrs. W. F. Rotherburger</th>
<th>F. B. Ransom</th>
<th>Dr. Sumner Furniss</th>
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<td>Dr. H. L. Hummons</td>
<td>Pauline Battles</td>
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<td>Mary E. Cable</td>
<td>Mrs. Charles W. Fields</td>
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<td>Mrs. Thomas Paddock</td>
<td>Dr. C. H. Winders</td>
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<td>Dr. W. F. Rotherburger</td>
<td>Mrs. J. W. Putnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mary Campbell</td>
<td>Mary Flanner</td>
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Myrtle Roper, Supervisor  
Rev. H. L. Herrod, Superintendent

## Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce

**1929**

- Paul Q. Richey  
- Frank E. Gates  
- C. L. Harrod  
- Edward Hunter  
- George S. Olive  
- Charles F. Coffin  
- Dick Miller  
- Nicholas H. Noyes  
- Curtis H. Rottger  
- Elmer Stout  
- W. A. Atkins  
- Louis J. Borinstein  
- Henry L. Dithmer  
- Theodore B. Griffith  
- Orlando B. Iles  
- Marshall D. Lupton  
- A. Kiefer Mayer  
- Hugh J. Baker  
- Walter Harding  
- Leland Huey  
- Perry W. Lesh  
- William J. Mooney, Jr.  
- Harold B. West  
- George T. Wheldon

**1934**

- Paul Q. Richey  
- J. R. Beckett  
- C. L. Harrod  
- William Fortune  
- George S. Olive  
- Sam Mueller  
- J. W. Putnam  
- W. H. Trimble  
- Curtis H. Rottger  
- E. J. Wuensch  
- M. K. Foxworthy  
- Louis J. Borinstein  
- Henry L. Dithmer  
- Theodore B. Griffith  
- F. J. Horuff  
- Marshall D. Lupton  
- Frank B. Flanner  
- Dick Miller  
- Howard Griffith  
- Clarence Crippin  
- Perry W. Lesh  
- Wm. J. Mooney, Jr.  
- Harold B. West  
- George T. Wheldon

240
Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment
Created 1930

G. M. Williams  A. Kiefer Mayer  Reginald Sullivan
Paul Q. Richey  Nicholas H. Noyes  James W. Fesler
Frank D. Stalnaker  Daniel B. Luten  George P. Torrence
Roy L. Davidson  Russell Willson  J. W. Putnam
Evans Woollen, Sr.  Otto P. Deluse  William Holmes
William H. Book  Edward A. Kahn  John E. Shearer
E. Kirk McKinney  Leo F. Welch  John E. Smith
William H. Insley  Curtis H. Rottger  Boyd A. Gurley
Ray D. Everson  James A. Stuart  Eugene C. Foster
Elmer W. Stout  Henry C. Atkins  Leroy J. Keach
Charles Lutz

Indianapolis Foundation

1929  1934
James K. Lilly  Thomas D. Sheerin
Francis H. Gavisk  Walter Meyers
Henry H. Hornbrook  Henry H. Hornbrook
Louis H. Levey  Louis H. Levey
Henry W. Bennett  Henry W. Bennett
Gustave A. Efroymson  Gustave A. Efroymson

Eugene C. Foster, Director

Indianapolis Free Employment Bureau

1929
John F. White  Daniel B. Luten  J. I. Halcomb
C. C. Winesgarner  Rhoda W. Morrow  Joseph A. Kebler
Henry E. Calland  Leonard Strauss  Louis H. Levey
Eugene C. Foster  C. H. Winders  Pearl B. Forsyth
Walter B. Harding  William A. Hacker

George Gill, Director
Mayor’s Relief Committee

George Torrence        Herman Lieber        J. I. Holcomb
Frank Stalnaker        Reginald Sullivan    Victor O. Kendall
J. S. Holliday         Henry R. Danner      Warren C. Fairbanks
William J. Mooney

Wheeler Rescue City Mission

1929                     1934

H. W. Krause            H. W. Krause
William C. Borcherding  William C. Borcherding
Jesse E. Hanft          Harper J. Ransburg
I. E. Woodard           I. E. Woodard
Chas E. Reeve           Edward Dirks
Royer H. Brown          Royer H. Brown
J. M. Milner            J. M. Milner
Ed Jackson*             Ed Jackson*
Wallace O. Lee          Wallace O. Lee
Thomas J. Owen          Robert Nipper
Dr. David Ross          William E. Osborn
Eugene C. Foster        Eugene C. Foster
F. M. Dickerman         F. M. Dickerman
Robert E. Hicks         Henry Ostrom

*former governor of Indiana

Herbert E. Eberhardt, Director.
Appendix C

Individual Accounts

The following are short accounts of individuals who were part of the philanthropic, civil, and social elite of Indianapolis between 1929 and 1933. Some of those listed below were not included in the network analysis. Most information is for 1929/1930 and so not all information gathered is listed. Some information, including associations are for the lifetime of the person listed. It is my intent to illustrate how involved these individuals were in the community. Sources Include Indianapolis Men of Affairs; Kin Hubbard, ed. A Book of Indiana (Indianapolis: The Indiana Biographical Association, 1929); Justin E. Walsh, ed. A Biographical Directory of the Indiana General Assembly, vol. 2, 1900-1984 (Indianapolis: Select Committee on the Centennial, Indiana Historical Bureau, 1984); Who Was Who in America, vol. 1; Who Was Who in America, vol. 2; History of Marion County; Indiana Lives (Louisville, Ky: Biographical Society, 1967); Indianapolis Times 17 February 1963; Clipping Files, Indiana Division, Indiana State Library.
Key to accounts

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<td>Occupation:</td>
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<td>Civic Organization:</td>
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<td>Philanthropic Activities:</td>
<td>Community Fund (director, 1929-1933).</td>
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<td>Social Activities:</td>
<td>Athletic Club; Columbia Club; Scottish Rite; Woodstock Club; Rotary; Ancient Landmarks Lodge.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Henry C. Atkins</th>
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<td>Education:</td>
<td>Classical School (Indianapolis); Yale University (B. A. 1889).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation:</td>
<td>President, E. C. Atkins Company.</td>
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</table>
Civic Organizations: Chamber of Commerce; Board of Trade; Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment (director, 1929).

Philanthropic Activities: YMCA; Community Fund (director, 1929-1932, president 1929).

Social Activities: Country Club of Indianapolis; Mystic Tie Lodge; Rotary; Columbia; University Club; Dramatic Club; Psi Upsilon.

Name: William A. Atkins
Date of Birth: July 7, 1879.
Religion: Baptist - First Baptist Church.
Education: Purdue University (M. E. 1901).
Personal: Married Suemma V. Coleman in 1901.
Occupation: President, Hotel Severin.
Civic Organization: Indianapolis Airport Commission; Purdue University Trustee; Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities:
Social Activities: Columbia Club; Woodstock Club; Athletic Club; Dramatic Club; Sigma Chi.

Name: Frederick M. Ayres
Date of Birth: February 17, 1872 in Geneva, New York.
Religion:
Political Affiliation:
Education: Classical School; Yale University
Personal: Son of Lyman S. and Maria Helen (Murray) Ayres.
Married Alma Hoegh, of Minneapolis, May 11, 1904 - Children: Lyman S., Frederick M., jr.
Occupation: President, L. S. Ayres & Company
Civic Organizations:
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1929-1932).
Social Activities: Athletic Club; University Club; Columbia Club; Indianapolis Country Club.

Name: Hugh J. Baker
Date of Birth: December 20, 1882 in Alexanderville, OH.
Religion: Church of Christ - Third Church of Christ.
Political Affiliation:
Education: Ohio State University (B. S. civil engineering, 1905).
Personal: Married Velma Fenstermaker - two sons.
Occupation: President, Hugh J. Baker Company.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund.
Social Activities: Rotary Club; Meridian Hills Country Club;
Columbia Club; Oriental Lodge; Scottish Rite; Mystic Shrine.

Name: Arthur R. Baxter
Date of Birth: December 8, 1876 in Indianapolis
Religion: Methodist
Political Affiliation: Republican (State Senator 1921-1925)
Education: Indianapolis Public Schools
Personal: Son of Emory and Mary Alice (Jordan) Baxter. Married Frances D. Doyle February 18, 1901 - Children: Emory R., R. Norman, Frederick, Marion D.
Occupation: President and General Manager, Keyless Lock Company.
Civic Organizations: Chamber of Commerce; Indianapolis Metal Trades Association; Associated Employers of Indianapolis; State Library and Historical Building Commission, president, (1930-1934);
Philanthropic Activities: James Whitcomb Riley Memorial Association; Community Fund (director, 1931-1933); Central Indiana Boy Scout Council; Red Cross.
Social Activities: Mystic Tie Lodge; Scottish Rite; Athletic Club; Columbia Club; Highland Golf Club; Rotary Club.

Name: Henry William Bennett
Date of Birth: August 26, 1858 in Indianapolis
Religion:
Political Affiliation: Republican
Education: Indianapolis Public Schools
Personal: Son of William H. and Helen (Root) Bennett. Married Ariana Holliday October 8, 1890 - Children: Edward, Jacquelin, Louise.
Civic Organizations:
Philanthropic Activities: Indianapolis Foundation; William E. English Foundation.
Social Activities:

Name: William H. Book
Date of Birth: November 22, 1891
Religion:
Political Affiliation:
Education: Franklin College (B. A. 1919).
Personal:
Occupation: Director of Governmental Research, Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce (1926-1933); Director of Unemployment Relief, Governor's Committee on Unemployment Relief (1933-1934).
Civic Organization: Emergency Work Committee (director 1929-1933); Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of
Employment (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities: Red Cross.
Social Activities:

Name: William C. Borcherding
Date of Birth: October 12, 1871 in Cincinnati, OH
Religion: Methodist - Capitol Avenue Methodist Episcopal Church
Political Affiliation:
Education: Cincinnati Public Schools
Personal: Son of Henry and Mary Borcherding. Married Mary Ethel Smith in 1897 - Children: Mary Helen, Sarah Margaret.
Occupation: President, Treasurer, W. C. Borcherding Company
Civic Organizations:
Philanthropic Activities: Wheeler City Rescue Mission (director 1929, 1933).
Social Activities: Irvington Lodge F. & A. M.; Scottish Rite; De Molay Commandery; Old Colony Club; Columbia Club.

Name: Louis J. Borinstein
Date of Birth: December 29, 1881 in Indianapolis
Religion: Judaism - Indianapolis Hebrew Congregation
Political Affiliation:
Occupation: General Manager, A. Borinstein Company
Civic Organizations: Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929-1933, president, 1931-1936); Governor’s Commission on Unemployment Relief; City Planning Commission.
Philanthropic Activities: B’nai Brith; Jewish Orphan’s Home (Cleveland); National Jewish Hospital (Denver); Jewish Federation; Salvation Army; Red Cross; Christamore House.
Social Activities: Indianapolis Club; Broadmoor Country Club; Athenaeum; Marion Club; Columbia Club.

Name: Arthur V. Brown
Date of Birth: March 17, 1863 in New Bethel, IN.
Religion: Methodist - Meridian Street Methodist Episcopal Church
Political Affiliation: Democrat
Education: Butler University (Ph. B. 1885).
Personal: Son of Dr. Samuel M. and Mahala S. (Brady) Brown. Married Katherine Malot January 8, 1896 - Children: Volney, Malott, Arthur V., Jr., Katherine M.
Occupation: President, Union Trust Company. President, Indiana National Bank (1932 -)
Civic Organization: Butler University (trustee); Chamber of Commerce; Methodist Hospital.
Philanthropic Activities: Deaconess Home; Community Fund (director, 1929-1933, president 1934); Indianapolis Clearing House Association; Butler Foundation; Christamore House; Flower Mission Society; Boys Club; Salvation Army.
Social Activities: Indiana/Indianapolis Bar Associations; University Club; Athletic; Columbia Club; Woodstock Club; Dramatic Club; Sigma Chi; Marion Lodge no. 35 F. & A. M.; Scottish Rite; Mystic Shrine.

Name: John A. Brown
Date of Birth: January 31, 1874 in Harrison, OH.
Religion: Presbyterian
Political Affiliation:
Education: Indiana University
Occupation: Agent, State Board of Charities.
Civic Organization: 
Social Activities: Pi Kappa Psi;

Name: Volney M. Brown
Date of Birth: July 7, 1899
Religion: Methodist
Political Affiliation: Republican
Education: Brooks School for Boys; Wabash College (B. A. 1922).
Occupation: Real Estate. Deputy Prosecutor for Marion County.
Civic Organization: 
Philanthropic Activities: James Whitcomb Riley Memorial Association
Social Activities: Ancient Landmarks, no. 319, F.& A. M.; Beta Theta Pi; Woodstock Club; Columbia Club; Athletic Club; Lawyer’s Club; American Legion; Scottish Rite.

Name: James F. Carroll
Date of Birth: 1882 in Greenville, IL.
Religion: Episcopal - Trinity Episcopal Church.
Political Affiliation:  Republican
Education: Hamilton College (1906).
Personal: Married.
Occupation: President, Indiana Bell.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce.
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1931-1933); Red Cross (chairman, 1943-1946).
Social Activities: Woodstock Club; Dramatic Club; University Club.

Name: Charles E. Coffin
Date of Birth: Born in Salem, IN.
Religion: Methodist - Meridian Street Methodist Episcopal Church
Political Affiliation: Republican
Education: a business college
Personal: Son of Zachariah T. and Caroline (Armfield) Coffin. Married Mary Birch Fletcher September 20, 1897 - children: Clarence Eugene, Jean Fletcher (Mrs. J. H. Ingram), Caroline (Mrs. Charles H. Bradley, Jr.).
Occupation: President, Central Trust Company. Secretary-Treasurer, Star Publishing Company
Civic Organization: Board of Public Works; Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929); Indianapolis Art Association.
Philanthropic Activities:
Social Activities: Indiana Historical Society; Society of Colonial Wars; Woodstock Club; Athletic Club; Columbia Club; University Club; Contemporary Club; Optimist Club.

Name: Joseph J. Daniels
Date of Birth: April 13, 1890 in Indianapolis
Religion: Presbyterian
Political Affiliation: Republican
Education: Wabash College (B. A. 1911); Harvard University Law School (L. L. B. 1914).
Personal: Son of Edward and Virginia (Johnston) Daniels. Married Katherine A. Holliday - Children: Katherine Elizabeth (Mrs. L. I. Kane).
Occupation: Attorney, Baker & Daniels.
Civic Organization: Trustee, Wabash College.
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund; English Foundation.
Social Activities: Beta Theta Pi; Literary Club; Columbia Club; Athletic Club; Press Club; University Club; American Legion.

Name: Henry L. Dithmer, Sr.
Date of Birth: July 13, 1869 in Brooklyn, NY.
Religion: Congregational - First Congregational Church.
Political Affiliation:
Education:
Personal: Married Gertrude Minor March 27, 1894.
Occupation: President, Polar Ice.
Civic Organization: Better Business Bureau; Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929-1933).
Philanthropic Activities: Salvation Army.
Social Activities: Oriental Lodge; Scottish Rite; Mystic Shrine; Kiwanis.

Name: Brandt C. Downey
Date of Birth: February 17, 1873 in Indianapolis.
Religion: Methodist - Central Avenue Methodist Episcopal Church.
Political Affiliation: Republican
Education: Indianapolis Public Schools; Wabash College (1892-1894).
Personal: Son of William B. and Florinda (Woods) Downey.
Married Nellie M. Bowman June 25, 1902 - Children: Brandt C., Jr. (deceased 10/12/1922), Bowman.
Occupation: Vice-President, National City Bank.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce.
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1929-1932)
Social Activities: Ancient Landmarks, no. 319, F. & A. M.; Keystone Chapter, no. 6, R. A. M.; Raper Commandery No. 1, Knights Templar; Scottish Rite; Exchange Club; Riverside Golf Club; Lions club; Columbia Club; Athletic Club; Hoosier Square and Compass Club; Delta Tau Delta.

Name: Nelle Bowman Downey
Date of Birth: July 12, 1876 in Knightstown, IN.
Religion: Methodist - Central Avenue Methodist Episcopal Church.
Political Affiliation: Republican (State Representative 1941-1955)
Education: Shortridge High School; Indianapolis Normal School; University of Chicago.
Personal: Married Brandt Chase Downey June 25, 1902 - Children: Brandt C., Jr. (deceased 10/12/1922), Bowman.
Occupation: Homemaker; Chairwoman, U. S. National Committee on Mobilization of Human needs, state committee (1929-1935).
Civic Organization: Daughters of the American Revolution; Federated Church Women; Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra.
Philanthropic Activities: Alpha Home; Community Fund (director, 1931-1933); YWCA.
Social Activities: Beta Sigma Phi; delta kappa gamma; American Legion Auxiliary.
Name: Frank A. Dunlop  
Date of Birth: October 14, 1874 in Indianapolis.  
Religion: 
Political Affiliation: 
Education: 
Personal: Married E. Garrett Brown September 23, 1896 -  
Children: Ruth Hildred (Mrs. W. Harrison Marsh).  
Occupation: Partner, Dunlop & Holtegel.  
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce.  
Philanthropic Activities: 
Social Activities: Kiwanis; Oriental Lodge, no. 500, F. & A. M.; De Molay Commanders; Mystic Shrine.

Name: Gustave A. Efroymson  
Date of Birth: January 21, 1870 in Evansville, IN.  
Religion: Judaism  
Political Affiliation: 
Education:  
Personal: Son of Jacob and Minnie (Paul) Efroymson. Married Mamie W. Wallenstein April 14, 1896 - Children: Clarence W., Robert A.  
Occupation: President, Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc.  
Civic Organization: 
Philanthropic Activities: William E. English Foundation; Jewish Federation; Indianapolis Foundation (director, 1929-1933); Community Fund (1931-1933).  
Social Activities: Columbia Club; Highland Golf Club; Broadmoor Country Club.

Name: Rabbi Morris Marcus Feuerlicht  
Date of Birth: January 15, 1879 in Tokay, Hungary.  
Religion: Judaism - Indianapolis Hebrew Congregation.  
Political Affiliation: Democrat  
Education: Hughes High School (Cincinnati); Union College (B. H. L., 1901); University of Cincinnati (B. A. 1901).  
Personal: Son of Rabbi Jacob and Kate (Deutsch). Married Mildred Mayerstein October 26, 1909 - Children: Maurice, Jr., Catherine.  
Occupation: Rabbi, Indianapolis Hebrew Congregation.  
Civic Organization: State Board of Charities; Chamber of Commerce.  
Philanthropic Activities: Jewish Welfare Board; Red Cross; Family Welfare Society (director, 1929-1933).  
Social Activities: Literary Club; Athenaeum; Athletic Club; Art Association; Elks.

Name: Eugene C. Foster  
Date of Birth: 1877 in Brecksville, IN.
Religion: Baptist - First Baptist.
Political Affiliation:
Education: Oberlin College; Associated Charities of Cleveland (social service training).
Personal: Single.
Occupation: Manager, Indianapolis Foundation (1924-1948).
Civic Organization: Church Federation; Indiana Probation Board; Indianapolis Employment Bureau (director 1929-1932); Emergency Work Committee (director 1929-1933); Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities: Christamore Settlement House; American Red Cross; Wheeler City Rescue Mission (director 1929, 1933); Flower Mission Society.
Social Activities: Columbia Club; American Association of Social Workers; Sons of Veterans; Social Workers Club.

Name: Mortimer C. Furscott
Date of Birth: Born in Charleston, SC.
Religion: Judaism - Indianapolis Hebrew Congregation.
Political Affiliation:
Education: Bryant & Stratton Business Hebrew College.
Personal: Married Claribel K.
Occupation: President, Kahn Tailoring Company.
Civic Organization:
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1929-1933).
Social Activities: Broadmoor Country Club; Columbia Club; Civil Theatre.

Name: Frank E. Gates
Date of Birth: 1873.
Religion: Methodist - North Methodist Church.
Political Affiliation:
Education:
Personal: Married Bertha M. Gates in 1896 - one son, one daughter.
Occupation: President, Frank E. Gates Real Estate.
Civic Organization: Art Association of Indianapolis; Indianapolis Real Estate Board; Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities:
Social Activities: Blue Lodge; Mystic Shrine; Ancient Landmarks; Scottish Rite.

Name: Reverend Francis H. Gavisk
Date of Birth: April 6, 1856 in Evansville, IN.
Religion: Catholic - St. John's Catholic Church.
Political Affiliation:
Education: St. Meinrad Seminary.
Personal: Son of Michael and Mary (Tierney) Gavisk.
Occupation: Rector, St. John's Catholic Church (1890-1932).
Civic Organization: Indianapolis Art Association; Chamber of Commerce; Board of State Charities (1907-1932).
Philanthropic Activities: Red Cross; Indianapolis Foundation (1916-1932); Community Fund (1929-1932); Catholic Charities; Family Welfare Society (director, 1929-1932).
Social Activities:

Name: George E. Gill
Date of Birth: 1890 in Ireland, IN.
Religion: Disciples of Christ - Downey Avenue Christian Church.
Political Affiliation:
Education: Indiana University (B. A. 1912); Columbia University (M. A. 1917).
Personal: Married Urith - two sons.
Occupation: Secretary-Manager, Indianapolis Employment Bureau (1924-1933).
Civic Organization: Emergency Work Committee (manager, 1929-1933).
Philanthropic Activities:
Social Activities: Service Club; Irvington Masonic Lodge; Knights Templar; Scottish Rite; Mystic Shrine; Acacia; American Legion.

Name: Howard Griffith
Date of Birth: 1883 in Indianapolis.
Religion:
Political Affiliation:
Education:
Personal: Married Margot Doane.
Occupation: President, Udell Works.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce (1931-1933).
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund.
Social Activities: Rotary Club; Calvin Prather Masonic Lodge; Scottish Rite; Woodstock Club; Athletic Club; Dramatic Club.

Name: Theodore Barton Griffith
Date of Birth: November 11, 1888 in Indianapolis.
Religion: Episcopal - Christ Church Cathedral.
Political Affiliation: Independent
Education: Shortridge High School; Williams College (B. A. 1910).

Name: William A. Hacker
Date of Birth: May 31, 1882 in Huntington.
Religion: Unitarian.
Political Affiliation:
Education: Valparaiso Normal School (B. A. 1912); Indiana University (M. A., social work, 1932).
Personal:
Occupation: Director, Social Service Department, Indianapolis Public Schools.
Civic Organization: Indiana State Department of Public Welfare; State Conference on Social Work; Indianapolis Employment Bureau (director 1929-1932).
Philanthropic Activities: Family Welfare Society (director, 1929); Community Fund (director, 1931-1933).
Social Activities: Social Workers Club; Phi Delta Kappa.

Name: Walter B. Harding
Date of Birth: April 1 1872 in Manchester, England.
Religion:
Political Affiliation:
Personal: Son of Thomas and Margaret (Davies) Harding. Married Ethel Ellison Tweedale in 1897 (deceased 1908) - Children: Jack. Married Gertrude Ellison Tweedale November 16, 1910.
Occupation: President, G & J Tire Company.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929); Indianapolis Employment Bureau (director 1929-1932).
Philanthropic Activities: Social Activities: Victorian Society; Athletic Club; Athenaeum; Hoosier Motor Club; Kiwanis; Meridian Hills Country Club.

Name: Clifford Lawson Harrod
Date of Birth: 1886.
Religion:
Political Affiliation:
Education: Purdue University (B. S. 1911).
Personal: Married Florence Kerr - one son.
Occupation: President, Indianapolis Power & Light Company.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929-1933).
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1931-1933).
Social Activities: Rotary Club.

Name: Jacob Frederick Hoke, Jr.
Date of Birth: August 9, 1871 in Jeffersontown, KY.
Religion: Methodist
Political Affiliation: Democrat (town clerk, Sullivan, IN)
Education:
Personal: Son of Andrew Jackson and Mary Frances (Snyder) Hoke. Married Katharine Cushman April 14, 1896 - Children: Cushman, Frank, Mary (Mrs. Perry W. Lesh).
Occupation: Secretary, Treasurer, Halcomb & Hoke Manufacturing Company.
Civic Organization: Trustee, Depauw University; Trustee, Methodist Hospital; Chamber of Commerce.
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1929-1933); YMCA;
Social Activities: Mystic Tie Lodge; Scottish Rite; Knights Templar; Mystic Shrine; Rotary Club; Highland Golf Club; Woodstock Club; University Club; Athletic Club; Democratic Club.

Name: James I. Holcomb
Date of Birth: May 1, 1876 in La Salle, IL.
Religion: Methodist - Meridian Street Methodist Episcopal Church.
Political Affiliation:
Education: University of Michigan.
Personal: Son of William Henry and Rebecca (Doubler) Holcomb. Married Musetta Black - Children: Jessie (Mrs. Dr. C. R. Strickland).
Occupation: President, Holcomb & Hoke Manufacturing Company.
Civic Organization:
Social Activities: Columbia Club; Highland Golf Club; Athletic Club; Elks; Mystic Tie Lodge; Scottish Rite; Mystic Shrine.

Name: Henry Hallam Hornbrook
Date of Birth: February 15, 1870 in Evansville, IN.
Religion: Methodist.
Political Affiliation: Republican.
Education: DePauw University (Ph. B. 1892); Harvard University (1893-1894).
Personal:
Occupation: Attorney.
Civic Organization:
Philanthropic Activities: Indianapolis Foundation.
Social Activities:

Name: Edward Wilbert Hunter
Date of Birth: November 24, 1884 in Johnstown, PA.
Religion:
Political Affiliation:
Education:
Personal: Married Mary E. Duerson in 1913.
Occupation: Secretary, Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929-1933).
Philanthropic Activities:
Social Activities: Elks; Mystic Tie Lodge; Scottish Rite; Mystic Shrine; Advertising Club.

Name: Orlando B. Iles
Date of Birth: May 31, 1869 in Brown County, OH.
Religion: Baptist.
Political Affiliation: Republican
Education: DePauw University (Ph. B. 1894).
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929); Indianapolis Employers Association; Indianapolis Employment Bureau (director 1929-1932).
Philanthropic Activities:
Social Activities: Marion Club; Kiwanis; Indianapolis Lodge, no. 56, Knights of Pythias; Mystic Tie Lodge; Scottish Rite; Mystic Shrine; Columbia Club; Highland Golf Club; Athletic Club; Phi Kappa Psi.

Name: William H. Insley
Date of Birth: January 16, 1870 in Terre Haute, IN.
Religion: Methodist - Irvington Methodist Episcopal Church.
Political Affiliation: Republican
Education: DePauw University (B. Sc. 1892); Rose Polytechnic Institute (M. S. 1900, C. E. 1910).
Personal: Son of William Quinn and Celia (Whitmore) Insley.
Married Jane Williams January 1, 1903 - Children: Francis H.
Occupation: President, Insley Manufacturing Company.
Civic Organization: Board of Managers, Rose Polytechnic
Institute; Indianapolis Art Association; Emergency Work
Committee (director 1929-1933); Indianapolis Commission for
the Stabilization of Employment (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities: Family Welfare Society; Community
Fund (director, 1931-1933); YMCA; Volunteers of America.
Social Activities: Society of Indiana Pioneers; Irvington
Masonic Lodge; Literary Club; Rotary Club; University Club;
Dramatic Club.

Name: Edward Jackson
Date of Birth: December 27, 1873 in Kokomo, IN.
Religion: Disciples of Christ - Irvington Christian Church.
Political Affiliation: Republican (Secretary of State 1916,
1920 - 1926, Governor 1926-1929).
Education:
Personal: Son of Presley Jackson. Married Mrs. Lydia Beaty
Pierce November 23, 1920.
Occupation: Former Governor.
Civic Organization:
Philanthropic Activities: Wheeler City Rescue Mission
(director 1929-1933).
Social Activities: Scottish Rite; Mystic Shrine; Independent
Order of Odd Fellows; Knights of Pythias; Improved Order of
Red Men; Marion Club; Columbia Club.

Name: Arthur Jordan
Date of Birth: September 1, 1855 in Madison, IN.
Religion: Baptist - First Baptist Church.
Political Affiliation: Republican.
Education:
Personal: Son of Gilmore and Harriet Isabel (McLaughlin)
Jordan. Married Rose Burke December 15, 1875 - Children:
Robert Gilmore, Esther Day (Mrs. Orlando B. Iles).
Occupation: President, Meridian Life Insurance Company.
Civic Organization: Trustee, Arthur Jordan conservatory of
Music; Crown Hill Cemetery; Butler University.
Philanthropic Activities: YMCA; Arthur Jordan Foundation
(founded 1928); Community Fund (director 1929-1932).
Social Activities:

Name: Edward A. Kahn
Date of Birth: 1876.
Religion: Judaism - Indianapolis Hebrew Congregation.
Political Affiliation:
Education:
Personal: Married - one son, one daughter.
Occupation: Vice President, Treasurer, People's Outfitting Company.
Civic Organization: Jewish Community Center Association; Indiana Merchants Association; Chamber of Commerce; Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment (director, 1929).
Phlanthropic Activities: American Red Cross; Community Fund (director, 1929-1932); Jewish Federation; Boy Scouts; Flanner House.
Social Activities: Broadmoor Country Club; Columbia Club.

Name: Leo Krauss
Date of Birth: April 17, 1886 in Budapest, Hungary.
Religion: Judaism - Jewish Temple
Political Affiliation:
Education:
Personal: Son of Louis and Hannah Rebeccah (Fisher) Krauss. Married Rose Secttor June 12, 1900.
Occupation: Jeweler.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce.
Phlanthropic Activities: Boy Scouts; Community Chest; Jewish Federation.
Social Activities: Elks; Athletic Club; Broadmoor Country Club; Elks; Monument Lodge, no. 657, F.& A. M.

Name: Hugh McKennan Landon
Date of Birth: June 22, 1867 in Muscatine, IA.
Religion: Unitarian.
Political Affiliation: Democrat.
Education: Phillips Exeter Academy (1888); Harvard University (B. A. 1892).
Personal: Son of George Washington and Emily Alice (Reeves) Landon. Married Suzette Merrill Davis (deceased 1918) - Children: Elizabeth Davis (Mrs. Robert F. Scott), Alice Reeves (Mrs. David P. Sawyer), Margaret McLean (Mrs. John W. Delaplane. Married Jessie Sapulding Walker (deceased 1930). Occupation: President, Fletcher Trust Company.
Civic Organization: National Citizens Relief Committee; Crown Hill Cemetery; Central Investigation Office (director 1932).
Phlanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1929-1933); Goodwill Industries; Boys Club; Children's Aid Society; Indianapolis Clearinghouse Association; Greenfield Riley Old Home Society; Riley Memorial Association.
Social Activities: Woodstock Club; University Club; Athletic Club; Athenaeum.

Name: Zeo W. Leach

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Date of Birth: 1890 in Great Falls, Montana.
Religion:
Political Affiliation:
Education: Butler University.
Personal: Married Josephine M. - one son, two daughters.
Occupation: Service Engineer, Indiana Bell.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce.
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1931-1933).
Social Activities:

Name: Wallace O. Lee
Date of Birth: November 8, 1890 in Edgefield, SC.
Religion:
Political Affiliation:
Education:
Occupation: Assistant Vice-President, Indianapolis Power & Light.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce.
Philanthropic Activities: YMCA; Boy Scouts; Wheeler City Rescue Mission (director 1929, 1933).
Social Activities: American Club; Riverside Golf Club; Mystic Shrine; Scottish Rite; Square and Compass Club; Elks; Hoosier Motor Club; Advertising Club; Jovian Fraternity; Athenaeum; Athletic Club.

Name: Perry W. Lesh
Date of Birth: March 24, 1896 in Indianapolis
Religion: Methodist - North Methodist Church.
Political Affiliation: Republican
Education: Shortridge High School; DePauw University (B. A.)
Occupation: President, C. P. Lesh Paper Company.
Civic Organization: Crown Hill Cemetery; DePauw University; Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929-1933).
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund; Riley Memorial Association.
Social Activities: Scottish Rite; Mystic Tie Lodge; Woodstock Club; Press Club; Dramatic Club.
Name: Louis H. Levey
Date of Birth: January 19, 1856 in Madison, IN.
Religion: Presbyterian - First Presbyterian Church.
Political Affiliation:
Education:
Personal: Son of William P. Levey.
Occupation: Former President, Levey Printing Company (retired in 1919).
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce; Indianapolis Employment Bureau (director 1929-1932).
Philanthropic Activities: Indianapolis Foundation.
Social Activities: Scottish Rite; Country Club of Indianapolis; Woodstock Club; University Club; Columbia Club; Maennerchor.

Name: Herman P. Lieber
Date of Birth: October 9, 1873 in Indianapolis.
Religion:
Political Affiliation: Republican (City Council).
Education:
Personal: Married Alma Bachman in 1903 - two sons.
Occupation: President, Treasurer, H. Lieber Company.
Civic Organization: Emergency Work Committee (director 1929-1933).
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1929-1932); Mayor’s Relief Committee (director, 1930).
Social Activities: Athenaeum.

Name: David C. Liggett
Date of Birth: Born in Illinois.
Religion:
Political Affiliation:
Education: University of Illinois.
Personal:
Occupation: Manager, Community Fund of Indianapolis (1929-1933)
Civic Organization:
Philanthropic Activities:
Social Activities:

Name: Josiah Kirby Lilly, Sr.
Date of Birth: November 18, 1861 in Greencastle, IN.
Religion: Episcopal – Christ Church.
Political Affiliation: Republican
Education: Asbury College (now DePauw University, 1874-1876); Philadelphia College of Pharmacy (Ph.G. cum laude, 1882).
Personal: Son of Eli and Emily (Lemon) Lilly. Married Lilly
M. Ridgely - Eli, Josiah Kirby, Jr.
Occupation: Chairman, Eli Lilly & Company (1932-1948).
Civic Organization: Purdue University (trustee 1927-1938); Purdue Research Foundation (founder); Philadelphia College of Pharmacy; State Symphony Society; Art Association.
Philanthropic Activities: YMCA; Indianapolis Foundation (organizer); Community Fund; English Foundation.
Social Activities: Columbia Club; Athletic Club; Woodstock Club; Society of Indiana Pioneers; Indiana Historical Society; Newcomen Society; University Club.

Name: Marshall D. Lupton
Date of Birth: March 13, 1876 in Kentland, IN.
Religion: Presbyterian - Irvington Presbyterian Church.
Political Affiliation: 
Education: Dayton Business School.
Personal: Married Mary Whitmer October 24, 1901 - two daughters.
Occupation: Vice President, Beveridge Paper Company.
Civic Organization: Church Federation; Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929-1933).
Philanthropic Activities: 
Social Activities: Irvington Lodge; Scottish Rite; Rotary Club; Columbia Club.

Name: Daniel B. Luten
Date of Birth: 
Religion: 
Political Affiliation: 
Education: 
Personal: 
Occupation: 
Civic Organization: Emergency Work Committee (director 1929-1933); Indianapolis Employment Bureau (director, 1929-1932); Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities: 
Social Activities: 

Name: Walter C. Marmon
Date of Birth: August 25, 1872 in Richmond, IN.
Religion: Presbyterian - Second Presbyterian Church.
Political Affiliation: 
Education: Earlham College; Massachusetts School of Technology ([B. A.]).
Personal: Son of Daniel W. Marmon. Married Annie B. Hall March 29, 1898 - Children: Franklin Hall, Elizabeth C., Dorothy B.
Occupation: President, Marmon Auto Company.
Civic Organization: Crown Hill Cemetery; Board of Trade; Chamber of Commerce.
Philanthropic Activities: Boy Scouts; Community Fund (director, 1929-1933).
Social Activities: Columbia Club; Athletic Club; Highland Golf; Country Club of Indianapolis; Woodstock Club.

Name: A. Kiefer Mayer
Date of Birth: 1894
Religion: Presbyterian - Second Presbyterian Church.
Political Affiliation:
Education: Wabash College.
Personal: Married Lucy.
Occupation: President, Kiefer-Stewart Wholesale Drug Company.
Civic Organization: Emergency Work Committee (director 1929-1933); Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment (director, 1929); Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities: Children’s Guardian Home.
Social Activities: Athletic Club; University Club.

Name: Felix Marcus McWhirter
Date of Birth: June 14, 1886 in Greencastle, IN.
Religion: Methodist - Meridian Street Methodist Church.
Political Affiliation:
Education: DePauw University (B. A. 1906).
Occupation: President, People’s State Bank.
Civic Organization: DePauw University; Chamber of Commerce.
Philanthropic Activities:
Social Activities: University Club; Kiwanis; Optimist Club; Athletic Club.

Name: William J. Mooney, Jr.
Date of Birth: 1894
Religion: Catholic - St. Joan of Arc.
Political Affiliation:
Education: Notre Dame
Personal: Married Dorothy Clune - two daughters, two sons.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929-1933); Mayor’s Relief Committee (director, 1930).
Philanthropic Activities: Red Cross.
Social Activities: Knights of Columbus; American Legion; Athletic Club; Highland Golf Club.
Name: Walter Dennis Myers
Date of Birth: Born in Perry County, PA.
Religion: Unitarian.
Political Affiliation: Democrat (Attorney of Indianapolis 1914-1918; Speaker, Indiana General Assembly, 1931-1933).
Education: Bloomfield Academy (PA); Yale University (M. A. 1905); Indiana University Law School (LL. B. 1907).
Occupation: Counsel, Indianapolis Sanitary Board (1930-1934).
Civic Organization: Indiana University Foundation.
Philanthropic Activities: Indianapolis Foundation.
Social Activities: Mystic Shrine; Scottish Rite; Athenaeum; American Legion.; Phi Delta Phi..

Name: James William Noel
Date of Birth: November 24, 1867 in Melmore, OH.
Religion: Methodist.
Political Affiliation: Republican.
Education: Purdue University (B. S. 1892); Indiana University Law School (LL. B. 1895).
Occupation: Attorney.
Civic Organization: Purdue University Board of Trustees; Chamber of Commerce; Board of Trade; Emergency Work Committee (director 1929-1933).
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund.
Social Activities: Literary Club; Athletic Club; Country Club of Indianapolis.

Name: Nicholas Hartman Noyes
Date of Birth: August 8, 1883 in Dansville, NY.
Religion: Presbyterian.
Political Affiliation: Cornell University (B. A. 1906).
Personal: Son of Frederick W. and Emma Catherine (Hartman) Noyes. Married Marguerite Lilly - Children: Nicholas Hartman (deceased), Evan Lilly (deceased), Janet (Mrs. Frederick M. Aventas).
Occupation: Vice President, Eli Lilly & Company.
Civic Organization: Cornell University; Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment (director, 1929); Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1922-1926).
Name: George Scott Olive  
Date of Birth: June 4, 1881 in Lebanon, IN.  
Religion: Unitarian.  
Political Affiliation: Republican.  
Education: Manual Training High School (1899); Harvard (B. A. 1903).  
Personal: Married Louise Carpenter June 3, 1909 - Children: George Scott.  
Occupation: Senior Partner, George S. Olive & Company.  
Civic Organization: Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929-1933).  
Philanthropic Activities: Red Cross.  
Social Activities: Kiwanis; Columbia; Athletic Club; Meridian Hills Country Club; Mystic Shrine.

Name: Thomas J. Owens  
Date of Birth: August, 1870 in Kansas, IL.  
Religion:  
Political Affiliation:  
Education:  
Occupation: President, People's Life Insurance Company.  
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce.  
Philanthropic Activities: Wheeler City Rescue Mission (director 1929).  
Social Activities: Knights of Pythias.

Name: Leo M. Rappaport  
Date of Birth: June 19, 1879 in Indianapolis.  
Religion:  
Political Affiliation:  
Education: University of Michigan (LL. B. 1900).  
Occupation: Partner, Rappaport & Kipp.  
Civic Organization: State Park Commission.  
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director 1929-1932); Family Welfare Society(director 1929-1933).  
Social Activities: Columbia Club; Athenaeum.

Name: Charles A. Reeve  
Date of Birth: Born near Plainfield, IN.  
Religion: Friends.  
Political Affiliation:
Education: Earlham (B. S. 1900).
Personal: Married Katherine Osborne in 1906.
Occupation: Partner, Ballard Ice Cream Company.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce; Board of Trade.
Philanthropic Activities: Bertha Ballard Home; Wheeler City Rescue Mission (director 1929).
Social Activities:

Name: Ineva Gash Reilly
Date of Birth: 
Religion: Catholic - SS Peter & Paul Cathedral.
Political Affiliation: Democrat.
Education: Asheville College; University of Nashville.
Occupation: Home Maker.
Civic Organization: 
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund.
Social Activities:

Name: Paul Q. Richey
Date of Birth: 1886.
Religion: 
Political Affiliation: 
Education: 
Personal: 
Occupation: President, Russell M. Seeds Company.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce (president 1929-1931, director, 1929-1933); Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities: 
Social Activities: Columbia Club.

Name: Dr. James Oscar Ritchey
Date of Birth: February 1, 1891 in Otwaco, IN.
Religion: Disciples of Christ.
Political Affiliation: Republican.
Education: Valparaiso University; Indiana University (B. S. summa cum laude, 1916, M. D. magna cum laude, 1918, M. S. cum laude, 1921).
Personal: Son of Aaron F. and Christina (Batzell) Ritchey. Married Helen Hare (deceased); Married Lydia Jameson Woollen.
Occupation: Medical Doctor.
Civic Organization: 
Philanthropic Activities: Riley Memorial Association.
Social Activities: University Club; Literary Club.

Name: Curtis H. Rottger
Date of Birth: January 16, 1864 in Jacksonville, IL.
Religion: Disciples of Christ - Central Christian Church.
Political Affiliation: Republican.
Education: Brown Business College (1883).
Personal: Son of John and Emma L. (Entriken) Rottger.
Married Agnes J. Wilbur June 30, 1897 - Children: Russel Curtis.
Occupation: President, Indiana Bell Telephone Company (1920 - 1930); Chairman of the Board, Indiana Bell Telephone Company (April 24, 1930).
Civic Organization: Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment (director, 1929); Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929-1933).
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1931-1933).
Social Activities: Knights of Pythias; Columbia Club; Woodside Country Club; Elks; Scottish Rite; Mystic Shrine; Athletic Club; Knights Templar; Rotary Club.

Name: Almus G. Ruddell
Date of Birth: 1873.
Religion: Presbyterian - First Presbyterian Church.
Political Affiliation:
Education: University of the Pacific; Stanford (B. A. 1895).
Personal: Married Clementine T. - two sons.
Occupation: President, Central Rubber and Supply Company.
Civic Organization: Crown Hill Cemetery; Chamber of Commerce.
Philanthropic Activities: Boy Scouts; Community Fund (director, 1931-1933).
Social Activities: Rotary Club (president 1933); Mystic Tie Lodge; Scottish Rite; Mystic Shrine; Athletic Club.

Name: Thomas D. Sheerin
Date of Birth:
Religion: Catholic - St. Joan of Arc.
Political Affiliation:
Education: Purdue University (B. S. 1905).
Personal: Married Jane Mather Ogle in 1915 - two daughters.
Occupation: Partner, Thomas D. Sheerin and Company, Investments.
Civic Organization: Junior League.
Philanthropic Activities: Boy’s Club; Community Fund (director 1931-1933); Catholic Charities Bureau;
Indianapolis Foundation; Public Health Nursing Association. Social Activities: University Club (president 1927-1938); Knights of Columbus; Contemporary Club; Literary Club.

Name: William Richardson Sinclair
Date of Birth: September 17, 1884 in Belfast, Northern Ireland.
Religion: Episcopalian.
Political Affiliation: Republican
Education: St. Andrews Preparatory School (Scotland); Rugby School (1897-1901).
Personal: Son of Thomas D. L. and Elizabeth Lecky (Richardson) Sinclair. Married Letitia Taggart July 8, 1914 - Children: Dora Lucy (Mrs. Louis F. Loutrel, Jr.), Thomas Taggart, Emily Letitia (Mrs. Thomas F. Mumford).
Occupation: Vice President, Treasurer, Kingan & Company.
Social Activities:

Name: Elmer W. Stout
Date of Birth: March 14, 1876 in Paoli, IN.
Religion: Quaker.
Political Affiliation: Republican
Education: Earlham College (B. A.); Harvard University (LL. B. 1901).
Civic Organization: Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment (director, 1929); Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1931-1933, vice president, 1934).
Social Activities: University Club; Country Club of Indianapolis; Athletic Club; Columbia Club; Woodstock Club.

Name: Reginald Sullivan
Date of Birth: March 10, 1876 in Indianapolis, IN.
Religion: Episcopal - St. Paul's Protestant Episcopal Church.
Political Affiliation: Democrat (State Senator 1911-1913); (City Comptroller 1916-1917).
Education: Boys Classical School of Indianapolis; Wabash College (B. A. 1897); Indiana University Law School (L.L. B. 1899).
Personal: Son of Thomas L. and Alice D. (Moore) Sullivan.
Occupation: Mayor of Indianapolis (1930-1934).
Civic Organization: Mayor's Relief Committee (director, 1929); Indianapolis Commission for the Stabilization of Employment (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities:
Social Activities: Mystic Tie Lodge; Mystic Shrine; Athletic Club; Athenaeum; Democratic Club; Beta Theta Pi.

Name: Gertrude Taggart
Date of Birth: 1880.
Religion: Methodist - Meridian Street Methodist Church.
Political Affiliation: Democrat.
Education: LaSalle Seminary.
Personal:
Civic Organization: State Board of Charities; Marion County Juvenile Court Committee.
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1931-1933); Indianapolis Children's Bureau; Family Welfare Society (director 1929-1933).
Social Activities: Indianapolis Women's Club.

Name: Guy Alwyn Wainwright
Date of Birth: November 29, 1889 in Noblesville, IN.
Religion:
Political Affiliation:
Education: Purdue University (B. S. 1911).
Occupation: President, General Manager, Diamond Chain Co. (1931-1956).
Civic Organization:
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1929-1933).
Social Activities: Rotary Club; Tau Beta Pi; Sigma Chi.

Name: Harold B. West
Date of Birth: 1892 in Syracuse, NY.
Religion: Congregational - First Congregational Church.
Political Affiliation:
Education: Wharton School of Finance - University of Pennsylvania.
Personal:
Occupation: President, West Baking Company.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund.
Social Activities: Athletic Club; Woodstock Club.

Name: George T. Wheldon, Sr.
Date of Birth: 1888.
Religion: Baptist - First Baptist Church.
Political Affiliation: 
Education: Purdue University.
Personal: Married Mary Ellen Wheldon - one daughter, one son.
Occupation: Appraiser.
Civic Organization: Chamber of Commerce (director, 1929).
Philanthropic Activities: 
Social Activities: American Legion.

Name: C. C. Winegardner
Date of Birth: 1878.
Religion: Methodist - Broad Ripple Methodist Church.
Political Affiliation: 
Education: 
Personal: Married Margaret - one son.
Occupation: Vice President, Diamond Chain Company.
Philanthropic Activities: Community Fund (director, 1931-1933).
Social Activities: Broad Ripple Masonic Lodge.

Name: Evans Woollen, Jr.
Date of Birth: March 15, 1897 in Indianapolis.
Religion: Presbyterian - First Presbyterian.
Political Affiliation: Democrat.
Education: Hotchkiss School (1916); Yale University (B. A. 1920).
Personal: Son of Evans and Nancy (Baker) Woollen, Sr.
Occupation: Vice President, Fletcher Trust Company (1930-1934).
Civic Organization: Board of School Commissioners; Indianapolis Board of Public Health and Charities.
Social Activities: Woodstock Club; Columbia Club; Delta Kappa Epsilon.

Name: Evans Woollen, Sr.
Date of Birth: November 28, 1864 in Indianapolis.
Religion: Presbyterian - First Presbyterian.
Political Affiliation: Democrat.
Education: Yale University (B. A. 1886, M. A. 1888).
Married Nancy Baker (daughter of Governor Conrad Baker) -
Children: Evans, Jr., Rachel (deceased 1906).
Occupation: President, Fletcher Savings and Trust Company
(1912-1934).
Civic Organization: Indiana University Trustee; Indiana
World War Memorial Trustee; Crown Hill Cemetery; Chamber of
Commerce; Indianapolis Art Association; Indianapolis
Commission for the Stabilization of Employment (director,
1929).
Philanthropic Activities: Indianapolis Foundation
(organizer); Community Fund.
Social Activities: Contemporary Club; University Club;
Dramatic Club; Woodstock Club.
Primary Sources

Articles, Books, and Manuscripts


Book, William H. "Helping the Man and the City, Too," Nation's Business (September 1931). Copy in Indiana Division, Indiana State Library.


Gill, George E. "Bringing Job and Worker Together," *Nation's Business* (February 1931). Reprint in Indiana Division, Indiana State Library.


Indiana State Library.


Archival Records and Meeting Minutes


Indianapolis Foundation. Meeting Minutes. Indianapolis
Foundation. Indianapolis.


Wheeler City Rescue Mission. Records. Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis Archives. Indianapolis.


Newspapers and Journals


Indiana Catholic and Record, 1928-1934.


Indianapolis Recorder, 1928-1934.

Indianapolis Star, 1928-1934.

Indianapolis Times, 1928-1934.

Secondary Sources

Economic History and Statistical Information


General Indiana and Indianapolis History


_Indianapolis Philanthropy and Public-Private Cooperation_


United States, Regional, and Urban History


Network Analysis


Vitae
Bradford W. Sample

Education

Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. Currently enrolled in the doctoral degree program in American History.

Indiana University - Purdue University, Indianapolis, IN. Master of Arts, American History, July 1998.

Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Bachelor of Arts, Political Science and History, May 1991. Personally financed 100 percent of college education.

Experience

Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis.
Special Assistant: Responsible for authenticating the applications of and writing short histories for century-old businesses as part of the Society’s Historic Business Register.
Editorial Assistant: Temporary position, assigned to create an inventory of all primary and secondary documents and material objects held at the Lew Wallace Study in Crawfordsville, Indiana, completed in December 1997.

The Polis Center, Indianapolis.
Research Intern: Intern for the Polis Center’s Project on Religion and Urban Culture. Responsible for research on religious philanthropy and the creation of a religious elite culture, as well as other archival research.

Max & Erma’s Restaurant, Indianapolis.
Server: Provided customer service, office assistance and trained new employees.

Indiana University Graduate School, Indianapolis.
Research Assistant: Involved in research concerning the history of IUPUI.

Morris-Butler House Museum, Indianapolis.
Museum Assistant: Interpreted the artifacts in the house and spatial characteristics of the museum for the public. Assisted in the cataloging and dating of artifacts.
Indiana University Graduate School, Indianapolis.

Teaching Assistant: Taught four discussion classes each semester in conjunction with a large lecture course in Post-Reconstruction American History. Assisted with the assembling of resource material, counseled students, and graded examinations and papers.

Research Assistant: Assisted with research in legal history, aided in the selection of materials for undergraduate classes, worked as editorial assistant for the organization's quarterly newsletter, Public History News, proposed topics for articles, assembled copy and proofread final typescripts.

Publications And Research


Fifty short business histories in a guide to century old businesses to be published by the Indiana Historical Society.

Activities And Honors

Alpha Sigma Phi: served as Public Relations Chairman, Marshall, and Parliamentarian.

Little 500 Scholarship: Fall 1990, Academic scholarship for working students.

Alpha Sigma Phi Alumni Scholarship: Fall 1988 and Spring 1990, Academic scholarships.