Intelligence Led Policing:
Conceptual and Functional Considerations for Public Policy

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**Abstract**
Policing in the post-9/11 era is experiencing a philosophical change that is expanding community and problem-oriented policing to include the broader philosophy of intelligence led policing (ILP). Building on the British experience, the application of ILP to American policing has been complicated by a number of challenges. While stimulated by 9/11, the movement toward ILP is being furthered by a number of federal public policy initiatives. As a result of these diverse demands, law enforcement must revisit operational policies and creatively adjust their organizations to reflect this new paradigm. This paper provides insight on the conceptual background of ILP, public policy standards, and the integration of ILP with community policing.

**Keywords:** intelligence led policing; homeland security; law enforcement intelligence; homeland security intelligence; community policing


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Policing in the post-9/11 environment has entered what may be referred to as the Homeland Security era (Ratcliffe, 2008). Specifically with respect to intelligence led policing (ILP), there are a number of public policy factors that are shaping this new paradigm. The authors will discuss the conceptual foundation for ILP as influenced by the British experience followed by an examination of significant policy developments in the U.S. that are influencing the adoption of ILP by American law enforcement agencies. While concern has been expressed by police leaders that intelligence activities may undermine community policing initiatives, the authors argue that ILP is a complementary expansion of the community policing concept.

British National Intelligence Model and Intelligence led Policing

When seeking to employ a new concept, policy makers often look to other models in an attempt to learn “what works” and adopt (or adapt) that practice. The British have a long and more sophisticated legacy in criminal intelligence than U.S. law enforcement, hence the value of examining the British experience. All forty-three provincial British constabularies, as well as the London Metropolitan Police, have had some form of fairly long-standing intelligence function to deal with organized crime, drugs, and other complex crimes unique to their jurisdictions.

At a national level, the National Drugs Intelligence Unit was created in the 1980s to deal with the significant increase in transnational drug trafficking and associated crime. In 1992, the drugs intelligence service was expanded and renamed the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) to deal with all forms of organized crime, not just illicit drugs. In particular, the NCIS evolved in response to the changing political environment associated with the European Union (EU), where, among other factors, immigration and customs checkpoints were eliminated for persons traveling between the EU member countries thereby making it easier for criminal
enterprises to operate in Western Europe. In 2006, a new “intelligence-led” agency was created, the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), that integrated the NCIS along with a national investigative body, the National Crime Squad (NCS), and the drug enforcement functions of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) Service. As will be seen, these changes were influenced by government-wide philosophical changes that occurred over the previous decade.

In the 1990s, the British government began implementing a “business plan” philosophy for all elements of government service (Ratcliffe, 2002). This had two fundamental initiatives: either “privatize” portions of government service or apply a business model to remaining government services. This move had wide-ranging effects. For example, the British National Rail Service – BritRail - was sold in pieces to various private companies. Similarly, local governments “privatized” such functions as vehicle maintenance and janitorial services. The national police training function in England and Wales was also changed to a quasi-private organization called CENTREX, which has evolved once again to be part of the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA)\(^2\). The point to note is that the mandate to use “business processes” permeated virtually every aspect of British government, including the police.

As part of this movement, in the late 1990s, NCIS, with advice from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)\(^3\), developed the British National Intelligence Model (NIM), which was initially released in 2000 and formally adopted in 2002 as accepted policy by the British Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), which is a national police policymaking body. The NIM followed the government policy of using a business process model to deal with crime control and employed the ILP philosophy to introduce intelligence into virtually all aspects of the policing business plan.

The adoption of the NIM by ACPO meant that the Chief Constables of the provincial police forces in England and Wales agreed to adopt the NIM and adapt it to meet the needs of their
policing area – this change represented the transition between “traditional” intelligence processes to intelligence led policing\(^4\). The intelligence function within the provincial constabularies largely deals with violent crime, football hooliganism, non-serious (local) organized crime, and unique local recurring crime problems. At the national level, the intelligence function of SOCA is responsible for transnational organized crime, terrorism and other criminal threats to Britain that emerge from outside the United Kingdom.

The British police adoption of ILP, as per the NIM, has not been easy. Many did not understand the concept; it required a reallocation of resources and added a significant analytic component to each police force. The NIM was criticized by many as being an esoteric model that created a great deal of data and new processes that were not providing “good value for money” (Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO], 2005). Its full implementation has been much slower than anticipated, and as one might assume, some of the police forces have embraced the concept much more broadly by others.

Despite these problems, there have also been important successes attributable the NIM. There are many lessons learned from the British experience that can be adopted in the United States, and there is a unique body of model practices, including analytic models, that are available from the HMIC. However, American law enforcement agencies have a significantly different experience in law enforcement intelligence that prohibits wide-scale adoption of British ILP, with some notable exceptions in the predominantly larger U.S. major urban areas. Some perspective will provide greater understanding.

The creation of Britain’s forty-three police forces was a product of amalgamating many smaller police agencies in the 1960s. The smallest of these constabularies has around 900 sworn constables who are policing sizeable geographic areas with both urban and rural characteristics. Most of the provincial police agencies have 1,200 to 1,600 sworn personnel. While not a national
police force, there are national standards that apply to all of the agencies for training, promotion, operations, and salary (Bayley, 1992). Indeed, personnel may laterally transfer between the constabularies.

Given the size of these police forces and their reasonable operating budgets, all have the resources to hire analysts and the flexibility to reassign personnel to meet the needs of a comprehensive new initiative such as ILP. This is not meant to infer that the constabularies are flush with money and personnel; rather, one finds significantly more flexibility, resources, and diverse expertise in large agencies than in the small departments typically found in the United States. Moreover, having a solid history of sophisticated law enforcement intelligence, the British police service was able to adopt the NIM and, consequently, ILP with greater ease than in the U.S.

**The American Experience with Law Enforcement Intelligence**

Historically, the vast majority of American law enforcement agencies have had no intelligence capacity or training on the intelligence process – intelligence was typically viewed as something only needed by the largest agencies. For many American agencies that did have an intelligence capacity, the legacy has also been somewhat problematic. Early law enforcement initiatives typically had no analysis and essentially consisted of dossiers kept on individuals who were “suspicious” or were deemed to be threats of some sort, often based on intuitive, rather than empirical, threat criteria (Carter, 2004). In the 1960s and 1970s, many agencies were sued under federal civil rights legislation for maintaining intelligence records on people who had not committed crimes but were engaged in expressive behaviors and ideologies that were deemed to be unconventional or un-American. While these practices generally no longer exist, the legacy lives on, with many members of the public remaining suspicious of current law enforcement intelligence initiatives (German & Stanley, 2007).

Beyond the civil rights issues, the intelligence function was often ill-defined, typically
remaining out of the mainstream of state and local law enforcement activities. There were few analysts and many of these were poorly trained, often inheriting the title of “analyst” as a result of longevity, not expertise. Hence, it was often difficult to distinguish what the intelligence unit, as an organizational component, contributed to the total law enforcement mission. While there were certainly exceptions to this characterization, this was the status quo for many American law enforcement agencies. Although this has changed dramatically, history remains a difficult obstacle to overcome.

Comparing U.S. and U.K. Law Enforcement Intelligence

In comparison to the British police structure, the roughly 16,000 U.S. law enforcement agencies, most of which have ten or fewer sworn officers, have diverse policing standards both between and within states. They often have limited budgets, all of which typically come from local funds with some exceptions in the form of short-term federal grants. Federal standards and recommendations are largely unenforceable unless tied explicitly to special conditions of a grant.

In light of these radical differences and the significantly different history of law enforcement intelligence, when one compares U.S. and U.K. policing, it is unreasonable to assume that the basic practices of the NIM, as found in the United Kingdom, and, by extension, ILP can be effectively implemented in the United States on a short-term wholesale basis. In the United States, law enforcement needs to start at a far more basic level. A functional model of ILP must be developed that has both the flexibility and applicability to the U.S. law enforcement landscape.

At the outset, ILP should be viewed as a philosophy, not a process (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Indeed, American law enforcement agencies should rely on this philosophy to develop new intelligence-based processes that functionally balance each agency’s jurisdictions, characteristics, and resources (Ratcliffe, 2005). The lessons learned from community policing can be a valuable guide (Carter, 2002). Developing intelligence led policing in a law enforcement agency requires
two developmental activities. One activity is devising the information collection framework to manage threats within a jurisdiction and the other is to develop the organizational infrastructure to support the ILP initiative. The foundation for these two changes has been laid in post-9/11 intelligence developments.

**Post-9/11 Changes to Law Enforcement Intelligence**

In the post-9/11 era, law enforcement intelligence experienced a rapid change. In October 2001, about six weeks after the 9/11 attacks, at the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) annual meeting in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, the Police Investigative Operations Committee discussed the need for state, local and tribal law enforcement (SLTLE) agencies to re-engineer their intelligence function; for more law enforcement agencies to develop an intelligence capacity; and the need for national leadership to establish standards and direction for the intelligence process in these agencies. From this meeting, the IACP, with funding from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), held an “Intelligence Summit” in March 2002. The summit made a series of recommendations including development of a criminal intelligence sharing plan and the adoption of intelligence led policing (International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP], 2002).

The Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global), a formal advisory group funded by the Office of Justice Programs, was already in existence with the charge of developing processes and standards to efficaciously share information across the criminal justice system. In response to the IACP Intelligence Summit recommendations, Global created a new sub-group: the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG). The purpose of the GIWG was to move forward with the recommendations from the summit. The first GIWG product was the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan* (NCISP).

The intent of the NCISP was to provide SLTLE agencies (particularly those that did not have an established intelligence function) with the necessary tools and resources to develop, gather,
To accomplish this, the plan established a series of national standards that have been formally recognized by the professional law enforcement community as the proper role and processes for the contemporary application of law enforcement intelligence (Carter, 2004). The plan is having a significant effect on organizational realignment, information sharing philosophy and training in America’s law enforcement agencies.

One of the key recommendations from the NCISP was for American law enforcement agencies to adopt intelligence led policing “…to provide public safety decision makers the information they need to protect the lives of our citizens” (Global Intelligence Working Group [GIWG], 2003, p.v). Ironically, while the plan extensively discusses the need and importance of ILP, it never defines the concept, identifies the components of ILP nor explains how the concept should be implemented.

At virtually the same time the NCISP was created, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was developing plans to meet its mission, mandated in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, “…to prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened and actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies…(Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2003, p.h)“. A critical part of this initiative was to define critical knowledge, skills, abilities and processes – i.e., “capabilities” – that were necessary for law enforcement and emergency services personnel to perform these tasks. These capabilities have been articulated in detail in the Target Capabilities List (TCL). Intended to protect the nation from all hazards, “…the TCL is a national-level, generic model of operationally ready capabilities defining all-hazards preparedness” (DHS, 2007, p.1). The list is broken down into different “areas” associated with prevention and response. In the “Prevent Mission Area” there are two specific intelligence-related target capabilities: “Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings” and “Intelligence Analysis and Production”. The importance of these developments was that a new component of intelligence
was added to the ILP mission: “homeland security intelligence”, defined as…

…the collection and analysis of information concerned with non-criminal domestic threats to critical infrastructure, community health and public safety for the purpose of preventing the threat or mitigating the effects of the threat (Carter, Forthcoming).

These new intelligence responsibilities have emerged within the homeland security framework that intelligence activities at the state, local and tribal levels must assess threats posed by “all hazards”. While there are certainly “gray areas” within this framework, the key challenge is for law enforcement agencies to focus on threats posed by hazards that have implications for public safety and order maintenance responsibilities in addition to criminal threats. Thus, another component was entered into the ILP equation.

A final element in the evolution of law enforcement intelligence as related to the current discussion was the creation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) as required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. While this legislation focused on the Intelligence Community, nearly one-third of the “action steps” in the Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan is also directed toward SLTLE agencies. The ISE seeks to “…implement an effective, widespread culture of information sharing, balanced with a need for security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties…” (Program Manager – Information Sharing Environment [PM-ISE], 2007, p.63). The Implementation Plan provides a detailed process and action plan that indicate significant expectations for SLTLE to be participants in the ISE. The heart of information sharing and generation of raw information at the state, local and tribal levels is intended to be via ILP.

**The Concept of Intelligence Led Policing**

ILP is envisioned as a tool for information sharing both within law enforcement agencies
and between all participants in the Information Sharing Environment. The concept aids law enforcement agencies in identifying threats and developing responses to prevent those threats from reaching fruition in America’s communities (IACP, 2002). Despite the demand for increased partnerships for information sharing among agencies being emphasized (McGarrell et al., 2007); there remains a common misunderstanding of how this will be achieved. The challenge, however, is that there are differing views of the ILP concept and its application. Indeed, there is a movement toward the adoption of ILP without a universally accepted definition or operational philosophy. The intent of this discussion is to provide a perspective of ILP in the context of contemporary law enforcement intelligence developments in the homeland security era, integrating the more commonly accepted principles of community and problem-oriented policing.

It is clear that there is an expectation that SLEIE agencies will adopt ILP, however, the question remains: How is this accomplished? There is no “manual of practice” for ILP because, like community policing (Carter, 2002; Manning, 1984), it must be tailored to the characteristics of each individual agency. ILP may be characterized as

“…an underlying philosophy of how intelligence fits into the operations of a law enforcement organization. Rather than being simply an information clearinghouse that has been appended to the organization, ILP provides strategic integration of intelligence into the overall mission of the organization (Carter, 2004, p.4).”

Thus, the concept of ILP must be created through an inclusive development process that ensures it is integrated with an agency’s goals and functions, its capabilities, and the characteristics of both the agency and the jurisdiction it serves. It is not an “add on” responsibility to the agency but an adaptation to more efficiently and effectively deal with multijurisdictional threats and serious crime that touches communities. However, obstacles will be prevalent with this shift toward an
intelligence led operations approach. Shifts in organizational decision making and problem solving approaches have been problematic for law enforcement agencies (Weisburd et al., 2003; Willis et al., 2003). There are no shortcuts in the process - it requires creativity, organizational introspection, and a willingness to adapt the organization.

Commitment to the ILP concept is not simply a macro- or micro-level decision, but a multilevel process. Given the nature of police organizations as highly bureaucratic and structured, successful policy implementation can often be difficult (O’Toole & Montjoy, 1984). As such, it is necessary for training programs to provide educational opportunities for personnel at all levels of law enforcement agencies. Chief executives often have a more comprehensive understanding of ILP as compared to line level officers, similar to community policing (Kratcoski & Noonan, 1995). This lack of understanding among line level officers with respect to ILP can be attributed to resistance to “new” policing methods (Ratcliffe, 2008) or poor perceptions of outputs on behalf of sworn officers and civilian analysts (Cope, 2004). The principles of ILP are similar to those of community policing (Clarke, 2006) and as such, educational training across all levels of the police organization explaining the benefits of ILP should yield positive results (Meese, 1993).

Defining ILP

There is no universally accepted definition of ILP, although the components of most definitions are the same, or at least similar. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) produced an unpublished memorandum which was intended to guide the solicitation and review of violence reduction grants using ILP processes (Bureau of Justice Assistance [BJA], 2007). The conceptual foundation of ILP provided by BJA was articulated as building on the lessons from problem-oriented policing and CompStat, applying these principles to a threat-based environment of multi-jurisdictional complex criminality. The conceptual foundation embraces post-9/11 initiatives in law enforcement intelligence as previously discussed.
In the document, BJA states, “ILP can be defined as a collaborative law enforcement approach combining problem-solving policing, information sharing and police accountability, with enhanced intelligence operations (BJA, 2007, p.1).” Building on this conceptual foundation, the authors propose an operational definition of ILP as:

The collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats.

Dissecting this definition provides further insight. An essential part of the intelligence process is collecting raw information that may be used in the analysis. Collection should be focused to identify and understand threats that emerge within a jurisdiction. This focus is often determined by an analyst, who will define intelligence requirements and be based on information received from both officers and citizens in the form of suspicious activity reports (SARs). The key point to note is that collection seeks raw information within defined threat parameters that is essential for effective analysis (Carter, 2004).

Analysis is the scientific approach to problem solving. It relies on deductive and inductive reasoning to define requirements and forecast threats (Ratcliffe, 2008). Analysis may be quantitative, notably for strategic analysis, but it is frequently qualitative (for both tactical and strategic analysis). The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has explained that analysis is a process in the production of intelligence in which intelligence information is subjected to systematic examination in order to identify significant facts and derive conclusions (Ramsey, 2007). The analytic process is synergistic, providing integrated meaning and deriving knowledge from diverse raw facts. Moreover, analysis is used to define intelligence gaps and articulate requirements.
Since ILP focuses on threats, it becomes essential to identify variables within a community and the surrounding region that support the generation and maturation of crime. These can be wide-ranging: The emergence of organized criminal elements within the region who traffic in drugs or guns; the emergence of an extremist group that articulates hate or violence; conflict within a region that may be a breeding ground for violence between racial, ethnic, or religious groups; and a variety of unique characteristics that are idiosyncratic to a given community, such as proximity to an international border, that contributes to criminal threats. It is important that the information collected provide insight on the existence of the conditions, factors that will exacerbate the conditions and individuals who may be instrumental in exploiting the conditions to commit terrorism or crime.

Another critical element of the analytic process is to produce “actionable intelligence”. Paraphrasing public presentations by former FBI Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence Maureen Baginski, intelligence helps law enforcement officers make decisions. Essentially, for intelligence to be useful it must provide direction to develop and execute plans. A law enforcement agency must be able to take an intelligence report and implement some type of activity that will prevent or mitigate crime. This means that the intelligence produced by an analyst will drive operational responses and strategic planning for threats.

With actionable intelligence, a law enforcement agency has sufficient information to develop interventions to threats. The intelligence report may describe either imminent threats to a community or region, wanted persons who may pose threats, or threat methodologies about which law enforcement officers should be aware. The basic premise is this: The agency must be able to use the information in an operational manner. Moreover, actionable intelligence should ensure that the right information is placed into the hands of the people who can do something about the threat.

Building on the concept of intelligence being “actionable”, is the provision of both tactical
and strategic analysis. Depending on the nature of the threat, a wide array of tactical responses may be deemed appropriate, ranging from increasing mass transit security procedures to being aware of suspicious activities at a potential intelligence target. Intelligence from tactical analysis is all about prevention: Using information related to terrorism and crime threats for strategies that will eliminate or mitigate short-term and immediate threats (Kelling & Bratton, 2006). Tactical intelligence is epitomized by the question: What type of operational response can be developed using this intelligence?

Threats within a community typically change over time. Strategic analysis is used primarily for planning and resource allocation to understand the changing nature of the threat picture. Information is provided to decision makers about the changing nature, characteristics, and methodologies of threats and emerging threat idiosyncrasies for the purpose of developing response strategies and reallocating resources. For example, if a community has never had a problem with right-to-life extremists and a new clinic opens providing abortion procedures, a strategic analysis may provide insight on whether the clinic and its personnel will be subject to any type of threat by extremist groups.

When strategic analysis is used, plans may be developed to either prevent a threat from maturing or mitigate the threat should it emerge. It is epitomized by the question: What future plans and resources must be developed, and how must they be configured, to meet threats defined in the strategic analysis?

**Community, Problem-Oriented, and Intelligence Led Policing**

A common concern expressed by police executives is that the shift toward ILP – largely as a result of increased homeland security responsibilities – may require a shift of resources away from community policing. It becomes a question of how community policing and ILP are integrated. As will be seen, there are more commonalities between the two than one may intuitively expect.
Indeed, new dimensions of ILP depend on strong community relationships. Crime will continue to be a critical responsibility for the police as will the need for community support. Moreover, with increased social tension as a result of homeland security initiatives (Moynihan, 2005), the need is even greater to maintain a close, interactive dialogue between law enforcement and the community.

Community policing has developed skills in many law enforcement officers that directly support new ILP responsibilities: Problem solving, environmental scanning, effective communications with the public, fear reduction, and community mobilization to deal with problems are among the important attributes community policing brings to this challenge (Haarr, 2001). The NCISP observed these factors, noting:

Over the past decade, simultaneous to federally led initiatives to improve intelligence gathering, thousands of community-policing officers have been building close and productive relationships with the citizens they serve. The benefits of these relationships are directly related to information and intelligence sharing: COP officers have immediate and unfettered access to local, neighborhood information as it develops. Citizens are aware of, and seek out COP officers to provide them with new information that may be useful to criminal interdiction or long-term problem solving. The positive nature of COP/citizen relationships promotes a continuous and reliable transfer of information from one to the other. It is time to maximize the potential for community-policing efforts to serve as a gateway of locally based information to prevent terrorism, and all other crimes (GIWG, 2003, p.4).

These factors precipitated the development of ILP as an underlying philosophy of how intelligence fits into the operations of a law enforcement organization. As one component of its philosophy, ILP employs community policing principles, building on tactics and methodologies
developed during years of community policing experimentation. The following comparisons illustrate this point. From an information management perspective, community policing utilizes information gained from citizens to help define the parameters of community problems while ILP relies on information input as the essential ingredient for intelligence analysis. Two-way communication with the public is essential for community policing since information is sought from the public about offenders while disseminating critical information to the public aids in crime prevention and fear reduction. In terms of ILP, communications from the public can provide valuable information for the intelligence cycle. When threats are defined with specific information, communicating critical information to citizens may help prevent a terrorist attack and, like community policing, will reduce fear (Moore, 1992). Scientific data analysis provides a critical crime analysis component in the CompStat process (Shane, 2004) and also serves as a key ingredient for intelligence-based threat management. Lastly, problem solving allows community policing to reconcile community conditions that are precursors to crime and disorder. Within ILP, this same process is used for intelligence to reconcile factors related to vulnerable targets of criminal extremists or the trafficking of illegal commodities by criminal enterprises.

Like community policing, ILP requires an investment of effort by all components of the organization as well as the community (Maguire, 1997). Gone are the days when intelligence units operated in relative anonymity. Based on the precepts of the ILP philosophy and the standards of the NCISP, law enforcement intelligence is an organization-wide responsibility that relies on a symbiotic relationship with residents.

Comparing ILP and CompStat

The CompStat process, with its origins at the New York Police Department (Henry, 2003), has been an important tool for law enforcement agencies to effectively deal with crime trends on a timely basis by relying on effective analysis, relentless follow-up and organizational accountability.
The process has been adopted – in varying forms - by many law enforcement agencies across the United States and several foreign countries with consistent success. There has been a solid foundation of research supporting CompStat as a crime management tool that demonstrates the value of innovative approaches to law enforcement problems (Dorriety, 2005; Henry, 2003).

As law enforcement personnel grapple with understanding ILP, many have suggested that it is the same as CompStat (Wood & Shearing, 2007). Certainly, there are important similarities that will help in the adoption of ILP. However, there are also important substantive differences that must be similarly recognized. At the heart of the matter is this fact: CompStat and ILP are different based on a number of functional variables that are illustrated in Table 1. As can be seen, ILP is concerned with “all crimes and all threats”, not just terrorism. However, the nature of crime that ILP focuses on is typically multijurisdictional and often complex criminality, such as criminal enterprises.

Table 1
Comparison of CompStat and Intelligence Led Policing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities of CompStat and Intelligence led Policing</th>
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<tr>
<td>There are important lessons learned from CompStat that can be applied to ILP</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Both have a goal of prevention</td>
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<td>• Commitment to the concept by the Chief Executive is essential</td>
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<td>• Analysis serves as the basis for operational responses</td>
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<td>• Processes for constant raw information flow for analysis must be in place</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Community engagement is critical for reporting suspicious activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Intervention activities are driven by definable evidence of crime and threats</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Administrative and organizational flexibility are required</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Research and lessons learned serve as the basis for creative intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Managers and supervisors are held demonstrably accountable</td>
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While principles and processes are similar, there are also substantive differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CompStat</th>
<th>Intelligence led Policing</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Intra-jurisdiction</td>
<td>• Multi-jurisdiction</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Incident driven</td>
<td>• Threat driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Analysis based on known facts from reported crime data and investigations</td>
<td>• Analysis based tips, leads, suspicious activity reports and information collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focuses on crime sprees and incident trends with intent to apprehend specific offenders</td>
<td>• Focuses on “root causes” and conditions that contribute to serious crime and terrorism</td>
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The value of CompStat is the identification of a crime series or serious crime within a jurisdiction (i.e., “hot spots”), based on a timely analysis of incident reports. The analysis of data captured via crime reporting can provide important information - such as geographical parameters and modus operandi - that can be used to forecast a crime series in the immediate future, aid in problem-solving and provide descriptive information, such as behaviors, targets, and criminal instruments that operational units may use to apprehend perpetrators, disrupt criminal activity, or alter crime generating environments (McDonald, 2002).

Conversely, ILP focuses on threats rather than crimes that have occurred. The threat information may be derived from suspicious activity reports filed by an officer, “tips and leads” submitted by community members, significant changes in socio-demographics within a region or other “indicators” (some of which may be collateral crimes) that reasonably suggest the presence or emergence of a serious multijurisdictional crime problem. Rather than analyze information and evidence derived from incident reports, the intelligence analyst must define “intelligence requirements” consisting of information that the analyst needs in order to more definitively identify the threat and factors that are contributing to the threat’s evolution (Carter, Forthcoming). Similarly, to be effective, both community policing and ILP require feedback on information analysis - whether it is crime analysis or intelligence analysis - to be consistently informed of potential problems or threats that may be encountered during the course of their shift (Carter, 2002).
In this regard, what types of information do street officers need from the intelligence function? Ideally, intelligence analysis should address four broad questions:

1. Who poses threats? This response identifies and describes behaviors of people in movements or ideologies who pose criminal threats to community safety.

2. Who’s doing what with whom? This includes the identities, descriptions, and characteristics of conspirators or people who provide logistics in support of terrorism and criminal enterprises.

3. What is the modus operandi of the threat? Intelligence analysis seeks to identify how criminal enterprises operate. It also seeks to determine what criminal, terrorist or extremist groups typically target and the common methods of attacking the targets.

4. What is needed to catch offenders and prevent crime incidents or trends? “Intelligence requirements” seek specific types of information that are needed to fully understand the threat environment.

Both CompStat and ILP are prevention oriented and are “driven” by an information flow coming from the line-level upward (Moore, 2003). Intelligence awareness training for street officers recognizes that officers on patrol have a strong likelihood of observing circumstances and people that may signify a threat or suggest the presence of a criminal enterprise. As previously mentioned, the patrol officer must be trained to regularly channel that information to the intelligence unit for input into the intelligence cycle for analysis. Like community policing, this requires new responsibilities for patrol officers and organizational flexibility to permit officers to explore new dimensions of crimes and community problems that traditionally have not been part of a patrol officer’s responsibilities (Fleming & Lafferty, 2000). While there are fundamental similarities, the methodology and focus of ILP is notably different - and more difficult - than
CompStat because of the differences in the raw data.

**Conclusions**

The authors have argued that while the British experience with ILP has provided an important foundation for U.S. initiatives, there are important differences in legacy and functional responsibilities which limit the wholesale adoption of the British model. Among those limitations has been the array of post-9/11 federal standards for the American law enforcement intelligence process, including the new dimension of homeland security intelligence. While the implementation of ILP will be a challenge for most U.S. law enforcement agencies, the authors argue that the experience and foundation of CompStat and community policing serve as important springboards for success. While there are substantive differences in the concepts, the similarities serve as reliable policy experiences to make implementation of ILP a functional reality.
Footnotes

1Much of the information in this section is based on the first author’s experience in working with the British police over twenty years.

2National Policing Improvement Agency supports police service by providing expertise in areas as diverse as information and communications technology, support to information and intelligence sharing, core police processes, managing change and recruiting, developing and deploying people.

3The HMIC is an organization in the British Home Office responsible for inspecting the British police forces to ensure they are efficient organizations employing “good practice” and providing “good value for money” in their service.

4England and Wales have forty-three provincial constabularies, whose Chief Constable is responsible to the local police authority (somewhat akin to a board of police commissioners). The Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police reports to the British Home Secretary and has much broader authority and flexibility. While ACPO policy is not binding on the London Metropolitan Police, it has also adopted the NIM.

5The British national budget, through the Home Office, provides 51% of the funding for each of the provincial police forces; 49% comes from local funds. This permits the Home Office to exert greater influence for national standards and priorities, although each Chief Constable retains significant autonomy in practice.
References


