INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE LOCAL RESOURCE MOBILIZATION FOR PHILANTHROPY IN AFRICA: WHY THE FORD FOUNDATION’S INITIATIVES FAILED

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September 14, 2018
Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation first to my first-born son, Charles Apolikawen Atibil, who was called to eternal life too soon, but is still very present, ever-loving, ever-protective. I felt you cheering me on during the rest of the journey to the finish line. Polo, Mma Asiba dedicates this to you with love! You will forever be in my heart till we meet again. Amor vincit omnia!

I also dedicate this work to my parents, Awusang and Ayambokpilima, who had not received a formal education themselves, but sent me to school at a time and in a culture where girls’ education was devalued. Mma, you taught me the value of hard work, persistence, and generosity. You and Baba must be looking down and beaming with pride. This is for you!

I dedicate this work also to my extended family and all my friends (living and deceased) who prayed for me and encouraged me to keep on keeping on in the face of disappointment and adversity. This is for you as well.

I finally dedicate this dissertation to my precious children --- Veronica Agyiabadek Atibil, DominicAwontemi Atibil, and Judith Adagsiuk Atibil. You stuck with me through ‘the good, the bad, and the ugly’ and took very good care of me throughout the long journey. All said and done, this is for You!
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International efforts to promote local resource mobilization for philanthropy in Africa: Why the Ford Foundation’s initiatives failed

The exportation of institutions from developed economies to developing countries has been a development strategy that international actors have employed for decades. In the 1990s and early 2000s international donors introduced philanthropic foundations into African countries. The Ford Foundation was instrumental in setting up a number of foundations in African countries to promote the mobilization of local philanthropic resources for self-reliant community-driven development. However, more than a decade after their establishment the Ford-founded philanthropic institutions continued to depend heavily on international funding. This dissertation investigates why Ford’s exportation of foundation philanthropy to African countries for the promotion of local resource mobilization was unsuccessful.

Current explanations attribute the local resource mobilization ineffectiveness of donor-founded philanthropic institutions to domestic factors --- developing country governments’ failure to provide an enabling environment for the development of nonprofit institutions. Drawing on quantitative and qualitative data, I go beyond the endogenous explanations to examine the role and institutional transplantation strategies of the external actor, the Ford Foundation. Based on in-depth interviews with former staff and consultants of the Ford Foundation, as well as staff of selected Ford-founded African foundations in Kenya, Ghana, and Senegal (namely The Kenya Community Development Foundation, the African Women's Development Fund, and TrustAfrica) I contend that the
oft-cited domestic “obstacles” are actually the preexisting local conditions that Ford should have taken into consideration during the formulation and implementation of its philanthropy promotion program in African countries.

Using institutional transplantation theories as a framework, I argue that Ford failed to achieve its local resource mobilization goal in African countries because the American-inspired foundation model that it transplanted in those countries for the purpose was incompatible with the local African cultures of giving and philanthropy.

Lauren Matthews Morris MacLean, PhD., Chair
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGN</td>
<td>African Grantmakers Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akuapem CF</td>
<td>Akuapem Community Foundation</td>
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<td>API</td>
<td>Africa Philanthropy Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWDF</td>
<td>African Women’s Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVICUS</td>
<td>World Alliance for Citizen Participation</td>
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<td>CS MOTT</td>
<td>Charles Stewart Mott Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFCF</td>
<td>Global Fund for Community Foundations</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNWI</td>
<td>High Net Worth Individual</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISP</td>
<td>International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCDF</td>
<td>Kenya Community Development Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Leadership Program for Community Foundations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDCFI</td>
<td>Rural Development and Community Foundation Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROSCO</td>
<td>Rotating Savings and Credit Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAGA</td>
<td>Southern Africa Grantmakers’ Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Special Initiative for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WARF  West African Rural Foundation
WINGS  Worldwide Initiative for Grantmaker Support
990-PF  IRS Tax Returns for Private Foundations
Chapter I: *Introduction and Background to the Study*

The exportation of institutional models from developed economies to developing countries to speed up the latter’s advancement is not new (Heydemann and Hammack 2009). In fact, the European colonization effort in African (and other developing) countries in the 19th century culminated in the largest imposition of institutions on the African continent, of which the modern state model is the most enduring example. Studies have found that these transplanted institutions, notably the state, have turned out to be ineffective, weak, and dysfunctional in the receiving African environment (Englebert 1997; Migdal 1988; Herbst 2000; van de Walle 2007).

In the 1980s and 1990s, as part of the post-Cold War democratization effort in developing and transitional countries, international funders (including the Ford Foundation) transferred other kinds of Western-inspired institutional models, namely professionalized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) (Salamon 1993; 1994; Katz 1994b). Also transplanted at this time was the American-inspired philanthropic foundation model, a process of institutionalization which McCarthy (1988: 89) referred to as “the dissemination and internationalization of the foundation movement.” Just like most of the other institutional models transferred over the course of time from developed to developing economies, the transplantation of the foundation model by the Ford Foundation and other international donors to stimulate local institutional philanthropy in African (and other developing) countries also failed to produce the desired outcomes. However, whereas donor-founded NGOs and CSOs in Africa have received a lot of scholarly attention as to their performance, donor-founded philanthropic foundations have attracted very little interest.
Some of the foundation officials interviewed for this study used agricultural terms to describe the transplantation of the foreign philanthropic institutional models onto African countries. Publications on the worldwide propagation of philanthropic institutions did likewise. In fact, the CS Mott Foundation’s\textsuperscript{1} 2000 special report on its 20 years of work in the community foundation field was titled “Sowing the Seeds of Local Philanthropy: Two Decades in the Field of Community Foundations.”\textsuperscript{2} Inspired by the concept of philanthropy promotion as planting and harvesting,\textsuperscript{3} I devised the horticultural analogy below to capture the puzzle that this dissertation set out to investigate.

To boost local production and self-reliant economic development in selected sub-Saharan African countries, an international donor exported an exotic variety of tree crop (native to temperate climates in North America). The donor provided the resources (to mostly foreign horticultural experts familiar with that exotic variety) to transplant the tree crops at the selected sites in collaboration with local partners trained to nurture and grow the transplants. Many of the latter suffered “transplanting shock”\textsuperscript{4} and either died right away or became stunted. More than a decade afterwards, few of the surviving transplants had grown well in their new African tropical habitat. Though some of them turned out to be structurally strong and healthy, they had difficulty drawing the nutrients needed for their growth from the local soil; only bearing fruit with the aid of imported fertilizer.

\textsuperscript{1}The CS Mott Foundation was one of the international private foundations that propagated community foundations and community philanthropy in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s.
\textsuperscript{2}Available online at CSMFPublication19.pdf
\textsuperscript{3}One of the chapters of the CS Mott Foundation special report is titled “Planting Seeds, Harvesting Results.”
\textsuperscript{4}According to Jeffrey H. Gillman and Gary R. Johnson (n.d) “trees and shrubs should be selected for a site based on the ability of the plant to tolerate the soil, light, climate, and …conditions present at that location. … Soil type and… available water, … must be considered. Attempting to match the requirements of the plant to the site increases the survivability, performance, and longevity of the plant selected. “Planting and Transplanting Trees and Shrubs” [onlinedate] https://www.extension.umn.edu/garden/yard-garden/trees-shrubs/pla... Accessed July 27, 2017
Unlike the foreign variety, the local species sprouted naturally, did not need expert management, and were nurtured with local organic manure. Though smaller in structure than the imported variety, the local species were hardy, drought-tolerant and resilient; and continued over time to produce enough harvest to meet the basic (and not-so basic needs) of the local people.

The above horticultural analogy is illustrative of the Ford Foundation’s exportation and institutionalization of foundation philanthropy in African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s. Like the other international funders involved in the promotion of institutional philanthropy in developing countries, Ford set up its foundation grantees to not only channel international funding to local community development organizations (The Ford Foundation Annual Report 1989) but to also attract large-scale local giving to formal philanthropic institutions (The Ford Foundation 2000 Annual Report; the Ford Foundation 2006). This was meant especially to develop local philanthropic giving to ensure the availability of sustainable locally-generated philanthropic resources to fund community development, civil society development, and the strengthening of democratic institutions (Johnson et al. 2004; The Ford Foundation 2006).

Unlike most home-grown African philanthropic institutions (including faith-based organizations and churches) which have been raising the bulk of their resources locally for a long time (Little1965; Ngondi-Houghton 2005; Kanyinga et al. 2007; Kiljian 2013; Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; Honey and Okafor 1998; McCarthy 1988) none of the philanthropic foundations that Ford established in African countries were mobilizing

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5These included the CS Mott, Kellogg, and Rockefeller Foundations, as well the UNDP and USAID.
6One of the most important functions of philanthropic foundations is the mobilization of local resources.
7Driven by local initiative, as opposed to being driven by external influence and funding.
the bulk of their resources locally (Moyo 2013; Sy and Hathie 2013) as expected, almost two decades into Ford’s philanthropy-promotion program in Africa. They were unable to do so, notwithstanding Ford’s capacity-building efforts through the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) and the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP). In other words, by the time the Ford Foundation abruptly terminated its philanthropy promotion program in developing countries in 2010, none of the foundations that it had established in African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s was mobilizing up to 10% of its resources from within its own country or the continent of Africa (The Ford Foundation 2006; Kanyinga et al. 2007) as Ford had expected. In fact, one of the reasons that Ford president Luis Ubiñas gave for terminating the foundation’s philanthropy promotion program in developing countries in 2010 was that its foundation grantees had failed to mobilize local resources to become financially self-sustaining, and had become a financial burden on the Ford Foundation.

**Statement of the Research Question**

By terminating its global philanthropy promotion program due to the failure of its foundation grantees to develop into locally-supported and financially self-sustaining institutions, the Ford Foundation was acknowledging the failure of its global program with respect to local resource mobilization. The question this research sought to answer, therefore, was: “Why did the Ford Foundation fail in its attempt to use the American-

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8The API and the IISP were initiatives that the Ford Foundation launched in 1998 and 2005 respectively to try to build the capacity of its foundation grantees in developing countries. While the API was limited to new foundations in African countries, the IISP was open to selected foundations from many developing countries.

9Also, Participant Y, phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013.

10As Participant F, a former Ford official, described it: “Luis Ubiñas came in as the new president… There is the famous quote that [Ubiñas] looked at the IISP (International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy) and he said: ‘All I see are triple overheads’ and he pulled the plug [on the global philanthropy promotion program].” (Phone interview with the author, June 18, 2013)
inspired philanthropic foundation model to catalyze the mobilization of large-scale philanthropic resources in African countries?"

**Argument**

The study’s argument is that Ford’s institutional imposition approach to philanthropy promotion in African countries, and the resultant top-down strategies and tactics that it employed, contributed towards its failure to attain its local resource mobilization goal in those countries. Derived from its experience in the United States, Ford’s philanthropy promotion approach in African countries was based on the assumption that the foundation model had universal applicability and would be as successful at attracting local resources in African countries as it had been in the US, irrespective of the different African institutional context and the various local giving cultures in place. It turned out, in fact, that the philanthropic concepts, structures, values, and expectations inherent in the American-inspired foundation model that Ford exported to African countries were incongruent with those of the local informal institutions of social exchange embodied in African economies of affection and caring (Hyden 2006; Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; Feierman 1998; MacLean 2010). Ford’s neglect of the contextual differences between the American institutional and philanthropic landscape, on the one hand, and that of African countries, on the other, led to its use of capacity-building strategies and tactics that had been successful in the US, but were inapplicable to its African foundation grantees.

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1. The two previous capacity building initiatives Ford had implemented on US foundations were the Leadership Program (LP) and the Rural Community Foundations Development Initiative (RCFDI).
2. Chen et al. (2013) state that there is a relationship between organizational form (formal or informal) and organizational values.
3. Ford instituted the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) to provide capacity building support to the new foundations that Ford had established in African countries in the late 1990s, many of which were floundering. Ford then went on to institute the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP) in
I, therefore, attribute Ford’s failure to meet its local resource mobilization goal in African countries\textsuperscript{14} to its imposition of the foreign (formal) philanthropic foundation model, and the foundation’s failure to address the incompatibility between that model and the prevalent informal philanthropic/giving cultures in African countries, to facilitate the local adaptation of its foundation grantees.

**The Independent Variable: Ford’s Approach and Strategies**

The independent variable in this study is, therefore, the philanthropy promotion approach that Ford employed in African countries. It was top-down,\textsuperscript{15} disconnected from, and uninformed by, the local socio-economic and cultural environment and norms in African countries. The Ford-founded African philanthropies’ lack of local roots and social embeddedness, and their subsequent lack of local resource mobilization effectiveness can be explained by that approach, which consisted of transferring and transplanting the American-inspired foundation philanthropy model to African countries with little consideration for the existing local philanthropic practices, values and institutions in place.\textsuperscript{16} It also consisted of applying some techniques of institutional isomorphism during the transplantation process. The institutional isomorphism ensured the transplants’ conformity with formal organizational requirements and standards but

\textsuperscript{14}As indicated by the failure of its African foundation grantees to attract the expected large-scale local financial support; failure to mobilize at least 50% of their resources from local sources

\textsuperscript{15}"Top-down" here means that Ford brought the ideas for developing institutional philanthropy in Africa from its US experience and transplanted the foreign institutional model without recourse to the already existing local African philanthropic structures and practices on the ground.

\textsuperscript{16}The CS Mott Foundation, which propagated the community foundation concept in South Africa and other parts of the world, stated in a special report titled “Sowing the Seeds of Local Philanthropy: 20 Years of Experience in the Community Foundation Field”: “Our experience has given us some insights…We have discovered, through trial and error, that you can’t take an American idea, export it and replicate it exactly. It must be shaped by the local community, values, traditions and needs.” p. 3 Available online at CSMFPublication19.pdf
left little room for local adaptation and constituency-building for local resource mobilization.

**The Dependent Variable: Extent of Ford’s Effectiveness**

The dependent variable to be explained is the extent of the Ford Foundation’s effectiveness (across various dimensions) in achieving its philanthropy-promotion objectives in sub-Saharan African countries during the period under consideration. Ford did succeed in transferring formal institutional structures and logics to the African foundations, thus equipping them to run according to acceptable international standards and to attract huge grants from international donors. The structures and skills included governance/board structures, managerial/leadership skills, grantmaking structures, and proposal writing skills for fundraising from international donors. These features were easily transferred through training because they were formal and were not shaped by or attached to local cultures and individual beliefs and values.

In contrast, Ford was unsuccessful in helping its African foundation grantees to position themselves in the local philanthropic landscape to mobilize the bulk of their resources from within their countries, though that was a key reason for establishing them. It failed to provide funding for the context-specific capacity-building that its foundation grantees needed to acquire organizational social capital, to be able to attract substantial local giving. It did not consider the fact that charitable giving habits are embedded in informal socio-cultural and socio-economic norms (Smith and Grønbjerg 2006; Katz 1994; Hammack and Heydemann 2009) that are inaccessible to foreign-inspired philanthropic foundations with a lot of formal training, but few local roots.
The variation in the outcome consists, therefore, of Ford’s relative effectiveness in developing its African foundation grantees into well-managed and well-governed grantmaking institutions, on the one hand, and, on the other, its ineffectiveness in developing them into locally-supported self-sustaining institutions able to attract local charitable resources on a large scale.

**Conceptualization of the Dependent Variable: Foundation Effectiveness**

Organizational effectiveness is not a monolithic concept (Lecy et al. 2012). Likewise, effectiveness in the nonprofit sector is a complex issue around which there is no consensus (Slater et al. 2004; Frumkin 2006). Lecy et al.’s (2012) review of the literature on nonprofit organization effectiveness concluded that there is hardly any adequate definition of effectiveness as a measure of organizational success in the field. Indeed, Ostrower (2007) argues in her work on philanthropic foundations that foundation effectiveness is context-dependent, as the different types of foundations have different functions and goals, and, therefore, define their success or effectiveness differently.

Another problem with measuring effectiveness in the nonprofit sector is the question of whose effectiveness is at issue --- the funding agencies/donors’ (such as the Ford Foundation) or their grantees’ (McIlnay 1998; Frumkin 2006). While some definitions focus on the efficiency and effectiveness of the programmatic work of the recipient organizations/grantees, others focus on the quality of grantmaking, and how well donors themselves are doing at achieving their stated goals (Frumkin 2006). To

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17Philanthropic foundations are regarded as civil society organizations (CSOs) as they are often vehicles for individuals and corporations to mobilize and distribute resources for public purposes (Prewitt 2009; Frumkin 2006)

18Philanthropic foundations can be classified broadly into two categories: private independent foundations such as the Ford Foundation or the Lilly Endowment (which are usually endowed by individuals, families or corporate entities) and community foundations (which raise their funds from a variety of sources and may or may not have an endowment).
determine why the Ford Foundation’s philanthropy promotion efforts fell short of producing the expected local resource mobilization outcomes in African countries, this study employs both definitions of effectiveness: that of the founder/donor (the Ford Foundation) and that of its grantees (the selected Ford-founded African foundations). I use its foundation grantees’ effectiveness along key dimensions as the indicator for assessing the extent to which the Ford Foundation itself has been effective at using its capacity-building initiatives to develop its foundation grantees into the locally-supported self-sustaining African philanthropic foundations that it had set out to build in the 1990s and early 2000s. I base my assessment of Ford’s effectiveness on its foundation grantees’ assessment of their founder/donor’s performance in the key areas. This follows Stufflebeam (2001:18) who suggests that objectives-based studies “can be strengthened by judging project objectives against the intended beneficiaries’ assessed needs… and studying the process as well as the outcomes”.

Despite the “elusiveness” of the concept (Ostrower 2007; Lecy et al. 2012) scholars have developed approaches for determining organizational effectiveness, including the goal attainment/objectives-based approach (Stufflebeam 2001) and the system-resource (survival and organizational growth) perspective (Lecy et al. 2012). Under the goal attainment perspective, organizational effectiveness is determined by progress towards the organization’s stated goals. The system-resource approach links goal attainment to organizational survival by assuming that organizations achieving their goals are also likely to receive continued financial support. This study adopts both the goal attainment perspective and the system-resource approach. The former framed the measurement of Ford’s effectiveness at attaining its stated local resource mobilization
goal in African countries in the 1990s, while the latter helped frame how effective Ford’s foundation grantees were in attracting support (local and international) as per the system-resource approach.

**Dimensions of the Dependent Variable**

Five dimensions that scholars have developed for measuring foundation effectiveness include managerial effectiveness (Lewis 2001), board effectiveness (Herman and Renz 1999), grantmaking effectiveness (Ostrower 2007; Ford Foundation 2006), resource mobilization effectiveness (Ostrower 2007; Ford Foundation 2006), and endowment-building effectiveness (Ostrower 2007; Fleishman 2007; Frumkin 2006). Broadly speaking, therefore, foundation effectiveness includes good governance and effective management, organizational survival\(^{19}\), attractiveness to international donors, as well as the mobilization of local resources. In all of this, the ability of an organization to mobilize its resources from the local environment is the most critical for effectiveness, survival, and long-term sustainability (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). However, because studies on resource mobilization in the nonprofit sector have mostly focused on philanthropic institutions in developed economies (Froelich 1999; Moulton and Eckerd 2012) there has been little differentiation in the nonprofit sector literature between resource mobilization *per se*, and *local* resource mobilization.\(^{20}\) I make that distinction in

\(^{19}\)Some the former Ford Foundation officials interviewed for this study were quick to point at the continued existence of the Ford-founded African philanthropies and their effective grantmaking (channeling donor funds) as a sign of success. When asked about local resource mobilization, though, they admitted that that did not work out as expected.

\(^{20}\)Nonprofit organizations in developed economies, such as the US, tend to mobilize all their resources from within their own countries.
this study and highlight *local* resource mobilization as a critical dimension for measuring the effectiveness of philanthropic foundations in developing economies.\textsuperscript{21}

Without downplaying the other dimensions of foundation effectiveness, I conceptualize and highlight *local* resource mobilization as the most important measure of effectiveness for the African philanthropic institutions under study. In the same vein, the key indicator of Ford’s success (or otherwise) in its philanthropy promotion and foundation-building program in African countries is the local resource mobilization effectiveness of its foundation grantees. This is measured by the extent to which the Ford Foundation (1) equipped its foundation grantees with context-specific capacity to mobilize the bulk of their resources locally; (2) helped them to “cultivate the field” through local constituency-building; (3) assisted them with resources to hire local fund development professionals; and (4) the actual amount of local resources its foundation grantees mobilized as a proportion of total revenue

**Theorizing the Outcome of Institutional Transplantations**

Whereas there is a rich literature on institutional transplantations in other areas of academic endeavor, scholarly work on the effectiveness of transplanted institutional models in the philanthropic foundation literature is limited.\textsuperscript{22} To understand, therefore,

\textsuperscript{21} Scholars have found that the credibility, legitimacy, and long-term survival of civil society organizations, including philanthropic foundations, hinges on their ability to embed themselves in their local societies, gain trust and organizational social capital, and attract local financial support (Parks 2008; Edwards 2009; Schneider 2009; Fowler 1992; Ottaway 2000. Hager et al. 2004). This is especially true in the context of developing countries where the concept of philanthropic foundations was new in the 1990s and early 2000s and where the legitimacy of imported/transplanted philanthropic organizational models was problematic (Johnson et al. 2004).

\textsuperscript{22} The few works on the transfer of foreign philanthropic institutional logics to developing countries have focused more on the use of philanthropy as a foreign policy and ideological tool than on the effectiveness of the exported institutional models. See, for example, Berman (1983) and Arnove (1984). Heydemann and Hammack’s (2009) edited book, though a great attempt at filling the gap, focuses on NGOs and CSOs in general; and does not tackle the transfer of the philanthropic foundation model to developing countries in the 1990s.
how transplanting an institutional model from one context to another affects the transplant’s effectiveness in the recipient society, I relied on theoretical perspectives from areas outside the philanthropic foundation literature, including comparative law, policy, civil society, and institutional economics. This literature (combined) provided a framework for gaining insights into the Ford Foundation’s introduction of the philanthropic foundation model from an industrialized context (America) to non-industrialized African countries with socio-cultural environments where informal forms of social exchange are prevalent. More importantly, this literature helped to explain why Ford’s transplanted foundations in African countries could not perform as expected and were ineffective at local resource mobilization in the selected African countries.

**Comparative Law Literature on Institutional Transplantations**

One group of legal scholars posit that legal precepts and institutions can be easily (and successfully) transplanted across cultures (Watson 1974). These “law as autonomous of society” proponents argue that laws are just sets of bare propositional statements that are autonomous from historical, social and cultural structures, with no attachment to any particular society (Dowdle 2008). Legal transplants can, therefore, thrive and perform well in any social context. This argument coincides with the assumptions behind international donors’ transplantation of the American-inspired professionalized foundation model in developing (including African) countries in the late 1980s and 1990s. It helps us appreciate the international donors’ reasoning that, in a

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23Ford had expected that these foundations would be able to mobilize the bulk of their resources from within African countries, just as foundations in the US mobilize the bulk of their resources from within their own country.

24In comparative law, legal transfers “are generally understood as the movement of laws and institutional structures across geopolitical, cultural or religious borders” (Gillepsie 2008: 27).
globalized world, models of philanthropic institutions that have been successful in the industrialized world could be introduced into developing and transitional societies and expected to produce similar outcomes as in the country of origin (Katz 1994b; The Ford Foundation 1998; 2006).

On their part, the “law in context” scholars have argued that law (like other social institutions) is culturally embedded in societal beliefs (Legrand 1997; Sharlet 1998; Berkowitz et al. 2001). They espouse the mirror theory of law which posits that laws mirror/reflect the environment from which they emerge, that they have limited autonomy from societal economic, political, and moral influences, and are closely bound to particular cultures (Legrand 1997). According to this school of thought, laws transferred across borders cannot have successful outcomes in the new environment, where they lack the socio-cultural context from which they originally emerged. Such transplanted laws, therefore, end up diverging from the original model (Legrand 1997; Pistor and Wellons 1999; Teubner 1998).

Empirical studies on the transfer of constitutional models from the West to Eastern Europe (Russia and the Newly Independent States) in the 1990s concluded that the transfer failed because the American Constitution (which was the preferred transferred model) came out of specific historical circumstances in America and could, therefore, not be successfully transferred to the different historical and institutional environments in Eastern and Central Europe (Sharlet 1998; Katz 1994). As Robert Sharlet (1998) explains:

The reception of Western constitutional ideas did not proceed as smoothly as anticipated…, by either donors or donees… It had been assumed -- in retrospect, naively -- that new, liberal post-Soviet constitutions could be put in place relatively quickly and easily … Forgotten in the mutual rush
to borrow and lend were the indigenous cultural scrims, and even more-opaque barriers through or over which liberal constitutional concepts would have to pass in order to enter each society (Sharlet 1998:59).

However, notwithstanding their stance on the “impossibility” of successful legal transfers, Legrand (1997) and others admit that some laws may be successfully transferred, but only under certain conditions. There needs to be congruence or a “fit” between the exporting country’s political, legal, economic, and cultural institutions, and those of the recipient country (Legrand 1997; Kahn-Freund 1974). In other words, the exporting and importing countries must belong to the same “family”25 (De Jong & Mamadouh 2002). Given the differences in their historical trajectories and socio-economic development (which are context and path dependent), the US and African countries do not belong to the same “family.” The concept of “families of nations” provides insights into why institutional models exported from the United States and transplanted into African or Central and Eastern European countries would, for example, be expected to encounter local difficulties and perform poorly in the recipient countries.

Berkowitz et al. (2001) also found that countries that have a population that was already familiar with the basic legal principles of a transplanted law (i.e. whose previous laws were similar to the transplanted one) go on to build effective legal systems and display higher overall institutional quality. Alternatively, countries that receive foreign legal systems (transplants) without similar pre-dispositions in their local environment (i.e. countries that are not members of the same family) are much more constrained in their ability to develop the formal legal order; and will have greater difficulties in developing

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25Nations sharing common historical and institutional features are deemed to be members of the same “family” who could successfully borrow and transplant institutional models from one another (De Jong and Mamadouh 2002)
effective legal systems. In the public policy arena, De Jong and Mamadouh (2002:20) also found that “newly introduced policies copied or adopted from elsewhere have unforeseen consequences.” They emphasize that the compatibility of the policy transplant with its new institutional environment is vital to its success.

The above theoretical perspectives suggest that since philanthropy, like law, is a socio-cultural construct, transferring a philanthropic institutional model into a country where the people are not predisposed towards the values and structures of the new model could be fraught with difficulties for the transplant’s performance.

**Civil Society Literature on Institutional Transplantations**

Scholars writing about international funders’ establishment of nongovernmental (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) in developing and transitional countries have also employed variants of the “goodness of fit”/compatibility argument to explain the inability of the donor-founded/funded organizations to attract local financial and moral support (Ottaway 2000; Johnson et al. 2004; Holmén 2010). They point to transplanted institutions’ lack of organizational social capital, connectedness with their local constituents, and minimal embeddedness in their local socio-economic and socio-cultural environment (Ottaway 2000; Quigley 2000; Edwards 2009; Nezhina and Ibrayeva 2013; Brown and Kalegaonkar 1999; Baum and Oliver 1992). Given that philanthropic foundations are also civil society organizations (Prewitt 2009) and are reflective of the institutional environments out of which they emerge, it is conceivable that the transfer of American-inspired philanthropic foundations to African countries would result in a lack of social embeddedness in the recipient countries; and difficulty attracting financial support from the local populace.
Institutional Economics Literature on Transplant Performance

Finally, scholars in the field of Institutional Economics also offer a variant of the “goodness of fit” argument which focuses on the formal/informal dimensions of institutions and their contextual environments. They ascribe the failure of institutional transfers to the fact that the formal framework transplanted onto recipient societies does not fit well with the corresponding prevalent informal institutional framework (North 1991; 1994; Mukand and Rodrik 2002; Roland 2004; Greif 1998). Institutions, according to these scholars, consist of both (1) informal constraints, such as customs, traditions, and codes of conduct; and (2) formal rules, which include constitutions, laws, etc. Together, formal and informal institutions make up the institutional complex, which then creates the conditions for the emergence of new organizations. Since existing informal norms and customs must undergird formal institutions for them to perform as expected, the latter will not work well if taken from their original institutional context and transposed on informal institutions (customs, norms and codes of conduct) in a different environment (North 1991; 1994).

North’s position on this is worth quoting as it encapsulates one of the clearest explanations for the non-performance of transplanted institutional models, and helps illuminate the case under study:

It is the admixture of formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement characteristics that shapes economic performance… It is the [informal] norms that provide "legitimacy" to a set of [formal] rules … And economies that adopt the formal rules of another economy will have very different performance characteristics than the first economy because of different informal norms and enforcement. The implication is that transferring the formal political and economic rules of successful Western market economies to third-world and Eastern European economies is not a sufficient condition for good economic performance (North 1994:366).
All in all, the above theoretical viewpoints and perspectives from the legal, policy, civil society and institutional economics literature on institutional transplantations suggest that the quality of transplants’ performance in a new environment will fail to meet expectations when (1) there is no congruence or “goodness of fit” between the transplanted institution and the political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural structures of the recipient country; (2) the originating country and the recipient country do not belong to the same “family”; and (3) formal institutions from one context are superimposed on the informal ones of a different institutional environment.

**Foundation Philanthropy vs. African Giving Cultures**

While the legal, civil society and institutional economics literature on institutional transplantations provided insights into why transplanted institutions fail to perform well in recipient societies, I drew on the nonprofit and philanthropy literature to help show how much “fit” or incongruence to expect between the formal institutional (foundation) philanthropy model that Ford exported to African countries, and the prevailing informal institutions of African philanthropy.

Studies show that institutional philanthropy in the United States, including the modern philanthropic foundation, emerged out of the country’s historical, economic, political and social evolution (Prewitt 1999; Karl and Katz 1981; Hall 2006), implying that it is context specific. Smith and Grønbjerg (2006) have also argued that the nature of nonprofit and philanthropic institutions in any given country depends on the nature of existing institutional relations in the country. Where large formal bureaucratic institutions dominate, such as in the US, the nonprofit and philanthropic sector will tend to be
characterized by large, bureaucratic, “impersonal, formal structures” (Smith and Grønbjerg 2006: 223) such as the modern American philanthropic foundation.

In the same way, philanthropic organization, practices, and values in other countries (including sub-Saharan African countries) have emerged from, and been shaped by, their own history, culture, political past, religions, as well as their socio-economic circumstances (Atingdui; James 1987; Smith and Grønbjerg 2006; Anheier and Salamon 2006; Kanyinga et al. 2007; Darkwa et al. 2006). In societies that are dominated by “more intimate social institutions and primary relationships, such as those found in tribal groups or village societies” nonprofit and philanthropic institutions are expected to correspond to the institutional structure of their wider society; and will be small and informal, rather than large and bureaucratic (Smith and Grønbjerg 2006: 223). Since many African countries are still dominated by “intimate social institutions and primary relationships” we should expect the philanthropic institutions that emerge organically in those countries to be small and informal. Based on the context-specific nature of its original institutional environment in the US and its formal organizational structure, the American-inspired philanthropic foundation that Ford introduced into African countries would be expected to differ from the informal philanthropic structures prevalent in African countries.

Differences in Giving Norms and Values

The literature on indigenous African philanthropy and social exchange indicate that Africans’ ways of giving and “doing charity” are different from the formalized, bureaucratized, and professionalized forms of organized philanthropy that the Ford Foundation introduced into African countries in the 1990s. Unlike the formal,
impersonal, unidirectional, and nonreciprocal grantmaking processes of professionalized foundations, the norms and values that undergird African philanthropic practices include (but are not limited to) interpersonal relationships between givers and recipients, interdependence, reciprocity, solidarity, and a strong attachment of donors to their own community and/or place of origin (Hyden 2006; Feierman 1998; Honey and Okafor 1998; MacLean 2010; Ngondi-Houghton 2005; Komter 2005).

One important characteristic that differentiates traditional African forms of giving from the formal giving and grantmaking processes associated with philanthropic foundations is disintermediation (a preference on the part of African givers for direct exchanges between benefactors and beneficiaries). The mediation of professionalized philanthropic institutions separates the original donor from the beneficiaries, fosters donor anonymity, and leads to the loss of personal gratitude, which is necessary for the reciprocity that is so important in African philanthropy (Atibil 2013). The interpersonal relationship-building values in African cultures that motivate charitable giving in those countries are incompatible with the impersonal mediated giving associated with the formal philanthropic foundation form that Ford exported to African countries.

Another difference is the tendency for philanthropy in African societies to involve resource-pooling in voluntary associational settings, rather than resource mobilization in professional organizational settings (Little 1965; Honey and Okafor 1998; Kanyinga et al. 2007). Examples of this volunteer-led resource-pooling include harambees in Kenya, mutual aid mechanisms like the susu26 in West Africa, as well as stokvels and burial societies in Southern Africa (Kuljian 2013; Hyden 2006; Ngondi-Houghton 2005).

26These associations are also known as Rotating Savings and Credit Organizations (ROSCOs)
Furthermore, unlike formal philanthropic foundations that need to be established and regulated by law (formal rules), the informal institutions of African philanthropy are self-organized and self-regulating, emerging in an un-designed (but not disorganized) way through structured interactions between agents (Hodgson 2006).

Moreover, unlike modern foundation philanthropy which emerged from wealth accumulation\textsuperscript{27} in the US and is sustained by huge sums of money, philanthropic practice in African societies is not dependent on wealth. It involves most people in the community, regardless of their level of wealth (Copeland-Carson 2005; Johnson et al. 2004; Kuljian 2005; Everatt et al. 2005). This is because both instrumental and expressive giving are valued in the African context (Frumkin 2006). Whereas giving to philanthropic foundations is mostly instrumental (giving cash or in-kind donations for a defined tangible public purpose); there are many opportunities for expressive giving in African societies that do not involve cash exchanges (Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; Payton and Moody 2008).

Lastly, Wilkinson-Maposa et al.'s (2005) distinction between “horizontal philanthropy” and “vertical philanthropy” in their study of Southern African philanthropic practices is useful in distinguishing between the various types of informal exchanges within African societies/communities (horizontal) and the formal philanthropy embodied by philanthropic foundations (vertical). In view of their professionalized and bureaucratic set up (as well as their foreign origins), donor-founded philanthropic

\textsuperscript{27}The modern philanthropic foundation emerged in the United States in the era of massive wealth accumulation in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Industrialists such as John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie wanted to rationalize and institutionalize their giving to make their wealth go farther to improve the human condition. Foundation philanthropy, as a variant of organized philanthropy, has therefore necessarily been dependent on having access to huge sums of money. The literature shows that this is not the case with the prevalent philanthropic structures in African societies.
institutions tend to be viewed as external institutional actors mobilizing resources from elsewhere to help poor local communities in a top-down manner. In “vertical” (formal) foundation philanthropy, the communities become grant recipients, but fail to become donors; as they hardly identify with the logic of the benefactor foundations; or see them as appropriate vehicles for reciprocal giving in true African fashion.

Overall, the literature suggests that the organizational structure, norms, and values of indigenous African philanthropic institutions are distinct from the formal bureaucratic structures and institutional logics of the American foundation model (Chen et al. 2013). The philanthropic practices and traditions (institutions) in the recipient African countries were thus unrelated to the formal structures of the imposed American philanthropic model. It should be expected, therefore, that the latter would be incompatible with the former; and that it would be challenging for the prevailing informal philanthropic systems and structures in African countries to provide the kind of support (financial and otherwise) that the transplanted formal American-inspired foundations required.

Receptivity and Adaptation to the Local Soil

The literature identifies local receptivity28 and adaptation as solutions to the challenges associated with cross-cultural institutional transfers. Again, I draw on the comparative law, policy, and civil society/NGO literature for insights. According to scholars, the transplanting process itself29 and local actors’ ability to adapt the formal transplant to local conditions, are critical for successful outcomes (Berkowitz et al. 2001; Teubner 1998; De Jong and Mamadouh 2002). In order for the transplanted institution to survive and perform well in its new environment, it must be carefully adapted to the

28 They define “receptivity” as the recipient country’s ability to give meaning to the imported concept.
29 How it was carried out and whether the transplanting agent made room for local adaptation or not.
underlying socio-economic and political structures (Katz 1994; Teubner 1998; Sharlet 1998; Gillepsie 2008; Berkowitz et al. 2001). 30

Gillepsie (2008) underscores the importance of locals imprinting their beliefs and understandings on new concepts to make the latter work effectively in the new environment. He states that the way transplants appear to a recipient community is conditioned by how the recipients interpret them from their own sets of beliefs, practices and goals. The recipients’ deeply-held beliefs determine “what ideas, arguments, and facts members find compelling” and adoptable (Gillepsie 2008:42). De Jong and Mamadouh (2002: 30) also emphasize the critical role of the adjustment and adaptation process in the successful receptivity of new concepts by new hosts:

When local actors have less opportunities to adapt models to their situation, the transplantation process is likely to lead to resistance, non-compliance and/or ineffective outcomes. When local actors have more opportunities to adjust the transplant the process is facilitated.

Dowdle’s (2008:172) emphasis on the necessity for “careful implantation and cultivation” of transplants in local soils aptly summarizes the thinking of scholars from the various disciplines on the pre-conditions for successful implementation and adoption of new institutional transplants in recipient societies.

In the specific context of African countries, scholars who have investigated the transplantation of legal and various types of economic and social institutions in African countries have also documented the need for local adaptation as a prerequisite for the effectiveness of transplants in new environments. Whether it was the imposition of foreign legal systems on colonized African peoples (Merry 1988), the imposition of

30 In the short to medium term it is much more difficult to try to modify the informal local cultures and traditions to suit the formal imported models/transplants (Hodges 2006).
foreign land tenure and property tax systems on the Siin region of west-central Senegal by the French colonial powers (Galvan 1997), or the establishment of NGOs, CSOs and new systems of NGO governance in African countries (Ottaway 2000; Swidler 2006; Galvan 2007) these scholars found that when transplanted models were infused with local values, meanings, and logics, and adapted to the relevant local cultural environment, they proved to be more successful than imported institutions and logics that resisted local adaptation.

Just like the “goodness of fit” perspective, the above scholars’ take on institutional adaptation is applicable to Ford’s transplantation of the American-inspired philanthropic foundation model in African countries. Philanthropic foundation models exported to African countries from the US (or other Western contexts) without much adaptation to the local institutional environment are likely not to find congruence or “fit” with the prevalent African philanthropic traditions. Continuing the horticultural analogy stated at the beginning, the American-inspired transplants will most likely not find fertile soil in the African socio-economic, socio-cultural, and political landscape to be able to perform effectively unless they adapt to the local environment. This dissertation argues that the Ford Foundation failed to do what was needed during the transplantation process (and afterwards during its capacity-building initiatives) to facilitate local receptivity and adaptation of the foreign model to the African socio-cultural environment.

**Alternative Explanations**

In contrast to the above “goodness of fit” literature which attributes the ineffectiveness of transplanted institutions to the tension or incongruence between foreign-inspired transplanted models and existing norms and cultures in recipient
countries, the current explanations in the CSO and NGO literature revolve around the failure of recipient countries to replicate the formal structural and institutional conditions that govern the transplanted models in their country of origin. These explanations are often state-centric (what the state needs to provide to encourage the development of institutional philanthropy). They tend to ignore the effect of the local indigenous philanthropic institutions and practices in place, hardly touching on the challenges of trying to develop institutional philanthropy by transferring institutional models (with their own logics and values) from their original context to a completely different one.\textsuperscript{31}

\textit{Economic Explanations}

One of the oft-cited explanations for the inability of donor-founded/funded philanthropic institutions to attract substantial local philanthropic support in African countries is the poor economic conditions in many of the countries (McCarthy 1984; Johnson et al. 2004; The Ford Foundation 2006). This argument points at (1) high levels of poverty among the population, and (2) the lack of a middle class, both resulting in few individuals having disposable income to participate in philanthropic giving. This argument presupposes that philanthropic giving in African countries is based on being wealthy and having disposable income. It also presupposes that philanthropic giving has to go through formal philanthropic institutions; so that if people are not donating to foundations or other such organizations, then they are not participating in philanthropy.

Other scholars have, however, rejected the notion that philanthropy in African countries is somehow dependent on individual wealth (Ngondi-Houghton 2005; 31

\textsuperscript{31}Unlike the alternative explanations which fault the recipient countries for not providing an enabling environment, “the goodness-of-fit” literature implicitly holds institutional transplanting agents --- international donors and other global actors --- responsible for ensuring that there is a fit between the institution they are transplanting and the recipient society in order to enhance the success of the transplant.
Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; Kuljian 2005). Kuljian (2005) cites a survey in South Africa which found that the ‘poor and non-poor respondents were equally likely to have given in the month prior to being interviewed;” and concludes that “giving is not the domain of the wealthy: it is part of everyday life for all South Africans, rich and poor alike’ (Kuljian 2005:7). MacLean’s (2010) work on informal networks and reciprocity in Ghana found that individuals of all levels of wealth gave informally to support their neighbors and their communities. Ngondi-Houghton (2005) also points out that while there is little local giving to donor-founded CSOs, Kenyans do give directly to their communities for public purposes through *harambees*, and to their places of worship. She suggests that “with greater and better organized cultivation of individual philanthropy, local civil society [organizations] could mobilize larger sums from among individual Kenyans” (Ngondi-Houghton 2005:72). The issue, therefore, is not that Kenyans, Ghanaians, and other Africans, are not able to participate in charitable giving due to poverty (as this explanation claims), but that donor-founded/funded philanthropic institutions have not been successful at attracting their generosity.

On the lack of an African middle class with sufficient money to make substantial donations to donor-founded philanthropies (Johnson et al. 2004), the literature shows otherwise. Lukham et al. (2005) have documented the existence of a Ghanaian middle class from early in the country’s modern history, and Ghanaian elites’ creation of associations for philanthropic purposes. Kenneth Little (1965) documented the philanthropic activities of such associations, including those formed by urban elites in many West African cities. In East Africa Ngondi-Houghton (2005) describes the
emergence of a Kenyan middle class in the 1980s that is capable of giving substantial amounts to philanthropy:

Since the emergence of a middle class in Kenya in the mid-1980s, the number of people who are in a position to donate money to charitable causes has grown steadily. ...There is a good deal of wealth held by individuals who would like to share it with compatriots but who need to be aware of effective methods of doing so (Ngondi-Houghton 2005:71).

Though the economic explanations are not without merit, their explanatory power is somehow limited. They would be most useful for explaining the amounts of money that individuals are able to give to donor-founded philanthropic institutions but would not be that useful in explaining why individuals would (or would not) be moved to contribute to donor-founded philanthropic organizations or CSOs. For example, if large numbers of individuals in African countries gave to donor-founded philanthropic institutions but were able to give only small amounts, high levels of poverty or the lack of a large middle class would be a good explanation. However, if only a few individuals gave anything at all to these organizations, economic factors alone would not be an adequate explanation. Whereas people’s level of wealth affects how much they are able to contribute to charity, it rarely determines whether or not to give, and to whom (or to which organization) to give.

\textit{Regulatory and Legal Explanations}

Another alternative explanation argues that the lack of laws and regulations germane to the registration and establishment of NGOs and CSOs (including philanthropic foundations) has hampered the development of organized philanthropy and local sources of funding in many African countries (The Ford Foundation 2006; Johnson
et al. 2004; McCarty 1988; Malombe 2000). The legal and regulatory argument is, however, weakened by the fact that charitable giving by individuals in African countries is, for the most part, informal (Feierman 1998; MacLean 2010; Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; Hyden 2006; Moyo 2013). The lack of an enabling formal legal and regulatory environment would impact the establishment, registration, and functioning of donor-founded/funded organizations.

The lack of laws ensuring the accountability of formal philanthropic organizations to donors could affect local giving to such organizations; but in the informal giving environment prevalent in African countries such a situation would hardly have much of an impact on who gives, to whom (or to which organization), and how much. This is seen in the fact that self-organized volunteer-led philanthropic organizations in African countries attract and mobilize the bulk of their resources locally in the same “weak” legal and regulatory environment (Honey and Okafor 1998; Ngondi-Houghton 2005; Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; Kanyinga et al. 2007; Kuljian 2013). There must, therefore, be stronger explanations for why donor-founded/funded institutions have difficulty attracting local giving where homegrown philanthropic organizations and associations have been successful.

**Tax Incentives Explanation**

The lack of fiscal policy and tax incentives for individual and corporate giving in many developing countries has also been cited as an obstacle to donor-founded philanthropies’ local resource mobilization effectiveness (The Ford Foundation 2006; Johnson et al. 2004; Ngondi-Houghton 2004; 2005; Fowler 1992). These scholars observe that (unlike the US) many developing countries offer no tax deductibility to
donors. There is, however, a lack of empirical support for the efficacy of tax incentives as a stimulant for charitable giving in developing and developed economies alike (Frumkin 2006; Johnson et al. 2004). While tax incentives may influence the amount to give, they hardly influence the initial decision to give, and whom to give to. As Johnson et al. (2004:10) explain, “… there is limited evidence supporting, or agreement about, the correlation between a favorable legal and tax environment and an increased volume of philanthropic giving.”

Moreover, in developing country environments where only a small proportion of the population (those in formal employment) pay taxes to the state and/or prepare tax returns, the existence of tax incentives would not necessarily steer local donors towards philanthropic foundations or other foreign-inspired formal philanthropic institutions.

Nevertheless, while tax incentives may not necessarily increase the number of rank and file givers to donor-founded philanthropic institutions, incentives for tax deductibility could be attractive to wealthy individuals and corporate donors in developing countries who are most likely to prepare tax returns. Like other alternative explanations discussed above, the fiscal explanation does have some merit, but is inadequate by itself to explain why donor-founded philanthropic institutions attract little local funding in African (and other developing) countries.

**Lack of Trust in Formal Institutions**

One alternative explanation that comes close to acknowledging the importance of givers/donors’ values in the giving relationship (Ostrander and Schervish 1990) is the one about the lack of trust in formal institutions due to prevalent corruption in public places (McCarthy 1988; Fowler 1994; Hodges 2013; Lukalo-Owino 2008; Johnson et al. 2004).
According to this view, locals are wary of making charitable donations to professionalized philanthropic institutions for fear that their money will go towards huge salaries and emoluments; rather than towards the execution of programs (McCarthy 1988). This explanation does have merit but does not go far enough. Other scholars go further to attribute the lack of trust in formal political, administrative, and other institutions in African countries to the fact that these institutions were external impositions that have been incongruent with the informal political and social institutions that many Africans are still connected to (Ekeh 1975).

The distrust for public institutions argument (though a viable explanation for the lack of local financial support for unfamiliar foreign-inspired philanthropic institutions) is, therefore, also inadequate. It does not address the fact that this distrust itself goes back to the tension between foreign transplanted formal institutions, on the one hand; and the prevalent indigenous informal ones, on the other. In other words, the current formulation of this argument fails to address the tension between the civic and “primordial” publics in African countries (Ekeh 1975).

**Limitations of the Alternative Explanations**

The alternative arguments are not entirely without merit and could provide varying degrees of explanations for the lack of local financial support for donor-founded philanthropic institutions and charitable organizations in developing economies. However, focused as most of them are on the need for formal governmental rules and regulations, they fail to factor in the interaction (and tensions) between the values and practices associated with the formal transplanted philanthropies, on the one hand; and those of the existing informal philanthropic institutions and giving cultures of the host
societies, on the other. They also fail to address the context-specific institutional framework in host countries.

The state-centric perspectives are also limited in assuming that the creation of a formal “enabling environment” for institutional philanthropy (like what pertains in the US) would make the transplanted foundations attractive to African donors, regardless of the differences in giving values and practices (especially the informal nature of local giving). Unlike the “goodness of fit” and local adaptation theories which emphasize the need for compatibility between the transplanted and the local institutions as a prerequisite for transplant effectiveness, the alternative explanations are weakened by their silence on the predominant informal institutions that govern most philanthropic giving in contexts outside the US.

Ultimately, though the alternative perspectives have a certain level of explanatory merit, the perspectives that I use --- the “goodness of fit”, formal/informal institutional tensions, local receptivity of transplanted institutions, and the institutional adaptability perspectives --- together provide the most appropriate theoretical framework for explaining the case under study. They help explain why the Ford Foundation’s attempt to use the American-inspired philanthropic foundation model to catalyze large-scale local (philanthropic) resource mobilization in African countries failed.

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32For the proponents of these arguments, the enabling environment for institutional philanthropy in the United States has been the reference point for what is needed in developing countries to strengthen institutional philanthropy in those countries.
33Studies have found that informal ways of giving exist among African-Americans, ethnic minorities, and immigrant communities within the United States (Copeland-Carson 2005; Chao 1999)
Contribution to the Literature

While there is a rich literature on institutional transplantations in other fields (including institutional economics, comparative law, constitutional law, public policy, and international relations) there is not enough scholarly discourse on cross-cultural institutional transplantations in the field of nonprofit and philanthropic studies. This despite the attempt by international donors to export American-inspired professionalized philanthropic institutions to developing and transitional countries in the 1990s. The available work has been rather descriptive (Malombe 2000; Sacks 2000; WINGS 2008; 2010) with little analytical work on the effectiveness of the transplanted philanthropies over time.\(^{34}\)

There is even less scholarly work on philanthropy (formal and informal alike) in African countries. This in-depth analytical study of Ford’s transplantation of philanthropic institutions in African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s will contribute to the literature on cross-cultural institutional transfers, in general, and to that on philanthropic transplantations in non-Western contexts, in particular. It hopes to fill the gap in the current state of knowledge on the local resource mobilization effectiveness of donor-founded philanthropic transplants in African countries. The overall objective is, therefore, to contribute to knowledge-building on the phenomenon of institutional transplantations (in this case the transplantation of philanthropic models) from developed economies to non-Western landscapes.

\(^{34}\)These works (usually funded by international donors such as the Ford Foundation) have tended to downplay the transplanted/imposed nature of the foundation concept in developing countries. They have focused more on promoting the concept than trying to explain why they may not be working as expected.
Research Design: Research Strategy and Case Selection

Case Study Design

This dissertation is a qualitative case study of the Ford Foundation’s philanthropy-promotion and foundation-building program in African countries in the 1990s. Since an in-depth understanding of Ford’s philanthropy promotion program was needed to determine the foundation’s success or failure in catalyzing local resource mobilization, the case study design was deemed most suitable. The case study design allows for an in-depth exploration and understanding of the complexity of organizations and phenomena from multiple perspectives (Starman 2013; Simons 2009; Thomas 2011; George and Bennett 2005). One other reason for using the qualitative case study approach was because of its suitability for conducting explanatory studies (George and Bennett 2005; Stufflebeam 2001), and its flexibility in allowing for multiple data collection methods. Data triangulation was necessary to minimize data loss and increase data accuracy.

The dissertation was also designed as an embedded single case study (Yin 2003). Explaining why Ford was unsuccessful at using the American-inspired foundations that it established in African countries to catalyze large-scale local resource mobilization in those countries required two steps: (1) an investigation of the foundation’s philanthropy promotion approach (the main unit of analysis), and (2) an assessment of the impact of this approach on the local resource mobilization effectiveness of its foundation grantees (the subunits of analysis). The embedded single case study design was the most appropriate for accommodating the two levels of analysis within the single case (Yin

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35 As measured by the amount of local resources mobilized as a percentage of total revenue.
2003). As Yin (2003:42-43) explains “though a case might be about a single organization…the analysis might include outcomes …which would then be the embedded units.” The embedded subunits (Ford’s African foundation grantees) provided opportunities for greater insights into the main case, the Ford Foundation’s philanthropy promotion program in Africa.

The embedded case study design also made it possible to examine Ford’s philanthropy promotion program in Africa not only from the perspective of the Ford Foundation itself, but also that of its African foundation grantees. This was important for getting a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon from multiple perspectives --- that of the donor as well as the grantees.

**Subject Matter Selection: Foundation Philanthropy in Africa**

The transplantation of American-inspired philanthropic institutions in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s was not an isolated phenomenon; it was part of the ongoing global phenomenon of international donors and other global actors transferring various types of institutions to developing countries, ostensibly, to speed up development in those countries. In fact, during the same period that it was establishing foundations in African countries, Ford was creating foundations in Latin America, Asia, South America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Caribbean, and the Middle East (Johnson et al. 2004; Ford Foundation Annual Report 1998; 1999; 2000). Since colonial times African countries (like their counterparts in other non-industrialized parts of the world) have been the recipients of various transplanted legal, political, economic, and educational institutions and concepts that have failed to work as effectively as had been hoped. Was the
transplantation of “modern” philanthropic foundations in African countries going to be any different?

While there has been some scholarly interest in the local resource mobilization effectiveness of donor-founded NGOs and CSOs in Africa (Fafchamps and Owens 2006; Holmén 2010; Fowler 1992; Ottaway 2000) that of the donor-founded/funded foundations has received little attention from scholars. Indeed, there has been little scholarly work on philanthropy in Africa, and even less work on foundation philanthropy and the donor-founded philanthropic institutions on the African continent. The gap in the literature presented an opportunity for scholarly inquiry.

As African countries are characterized by institutional contexts and philanthropic institutions and cultures that are distinct from those in the United States, Ford’s African foundation grantees looked perfect as subunits for investigating the impact of international donors’ exportation of yet another category of Western-inspired institutions into African countries. The stark differences between the philanthropic foundation form and the local informal African philanthropic norms and practices provided a window of opportunity for studying the consequences of transferring philanthropic institutional forms from one context to another.

**Rationale for Selecting the Ford Foundation as the Case for Study**

The transplantation of American-style foundations in sub-Saharan African and other developing countries was a trend among international donors in the 1990s and 2000s and was by no means unique to the Ford Foundation (Aksartova 2009; Johnson et al. 2004; Henderson 2003). However, I selected Ford for examination rather than the
other international funders because, unlike them\textsuperscript{36} Ford was more consistent in its efforts to establish philanthropic foundations in various parts of the world. It had regional field offices in Eastern, Western, Northern and Southern Africa. Few other international funders had as long a history in institutional philanthropy promotion in developing countries as Ford. The foundation, therefore, had a track record that potentially lent itself to the systematic study of the phenomenon in question.

Moreover, though Ford was just one among a core group of international funders\textsuperscript{37} promoting the foundation model in developing countries, its massive resources,\textsuperscript{38} as well as its investment in global capacity-building strategies and initiatives, put it ahead of its peers. Unlike the others, Ford made a long-term commitment (in terms of operational, institution-building and grantmaking support) to some of the foundations that it established, for up to ten years (Ford Annual Report 2006). Given its long-term focus and more elaborate global capacity-building strategies and initiatives, Ford’s effort at transplanting American-inspired philanthropic foundations in sub-Saharan African countries provided the right long-term timeframe within which to determine the effectiveness of such transplantation strategies.

Ultimately, my selection of Ford as the case for study was based on the potential of its philanthropy transplantation program in African countries to provide the best opportunity for successfully investigating the phenomenon of interest. As George and

\textsuperscript{36}Some of the other international funders operated in just one or two African countries. The CS Mott Foundation, for example, operated only in South Africa.

\textsuperscript{37}These were mostly major American private foundations (Johnson et al. 2005)

\textsuperscript{38}Until the Gates Foundation was established in 2000 the Ford Foundation was the largest private foundation in the world in terms of assets size.
Bennett (2005:83) state, “case selection is an opportunistic as well as a structured process…”

Selection of Ford’s African Foundation Grantees as Subunits of the Case Study

The three Ford-founded/funded grantees selected as subunits for the case study were the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF), The African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF) located in Accra, Ghana, and TrustAfrica, in Dakar, Senegal. This was based on their participation in Ford’s signature international philanthropy initiative, the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP). Their participation in the IISP signified that they had relatively better organizational strength, were active, and had the potential for future growth. Compared to other Ford foundation grantees that had not benefitted from participation in Ford’s initiatives, these three benefitted most from Ford’s long-term support in terms of strengthening their managerial abilities, their grantmaking skills, their governance structures, and their fundraising skills. They would, therefore, have more information (than less engaged Ford-founded grantees) about how Ford’s transplantation strategies impacted its local foundations’ effectiveness in local resource mobilization over the years. The KCDF, having participated as well in the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API), would also provide information on the earlier Ford Africa-based initiative.

Methodology: Data Collection Methods

As there had been no previous analytical studies on the local resource mobilization effectiveness of transplanted philanthropic foundations in African countries, original data had to be collected for this study. The data collection methods included in-depth interviews of former Ford Foundation senior officials as well as current senior
officials of the selected Ford-founded African philanthropic institutions. I also conducted archival research and analyzed internal documents and public records. The qualitative case study design was chosen precisely for its flexibility in allowing the use of a variety of data collection methods. The multi-method approach of data collection helped me to get at multiple perspectives of the phenomenon under study.

*In-depth Qualitative Interviews: Sampling Methods and Sample Size*

The main source of data for this research was the in-depth, semi-structured, open-ended, one-on-one interviews that were conducted over a 9-month period from February 2013 to October 2013, in the US as well as with respondents in Africa and Europe. For the purposes of this research, it was more important to interview the right individuals with the most knowledge about the topic than to interview a large number of individuals with little of the relevant knowledge. That consideration determined the number of people I sought out for interviewing. A total of twenty (20)\(^3\) senior-level officials were interviewed, including former Ford officials and consultants, as well as officials of the Ford-founded/funded African foundations. Also interviewed were officials of a homegrown Ghanaian foundation to allow for some contrast with the Ford-founded philanthropic institutions.

Why in-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews? As there had been little previous research on this topic it was important to use the interviews as both an exploratory and explanatory tool. It was necessary to allow the research participants to

\(^3\)Though the respondents were 20 in number, one of them had served in two capacities --- as a senior Ford official in Africa in the 1990s when Ford began to propagate its institutional philanthropy concept in African countries; and later as a senior official of a Ford-founded African foundation in the 2000s. He therefore provided information on the Ford Foundation’s program in Africa from (1) the position of a Ford Program Officer and Africa Representative as well as (2) from the position of the executive of a Ford-founded African foundation. He was interviewed twice.
answer the questions in their own words, and to share their experiences, knowledge, and their opinions about the topic in all its complexity, without being restricted to a structured format. It was important to understand the philanthropy promotion and foundation-building process from the perspective of the individual actors themselves. I needed to understand what it meant to (1) the Ford Foundation officials who helped to build the African foundations; and (2) the African officials who were running the foundations and striving to raise local resources with difficulty. Denzin and Lincoln (1998) emphasize that researchers should endeavor to make sense of phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. The semi-structured format helped to accomplish that. Interviewees pointed me in directions that I would not have otherwise considered if I had used a structured format based on preconceived ideas about the topic. The archival and other documents provided insights into the administrative and decision-making processes that went into the formulation and implementation of Ford’s philanthropy promotion initiatives in the relevant African countries.

Two non-probability sampling techniques (criterion and snowball sampling) were employed to carefully select a total of twenty (20) Ford and non-Ford expert interviewees who were among the small number of individuals who had the information that I sought. As the interviewees had to meet certain criteria, criterion sampling was employed first. They had to be individuals who had been responsible for, or were intimately involved with, the Ford Foundation’s global philanthropy promotion program in the 1990s and early 2000s. They, therefore, had to possess in-depth knowledge about Ford’s foundation-building activities in sub-Saharan Africa. In the same way, the non-Ford interviewees, including the officials of the Ford-founded/funded philanthropic institutions, had to be
knowledgeable about their own foundation’s establishment, as well as its participation in the Ford capacity-building initiatives (the API and/or the IISP), where applicable. In the case of interviewees from other international foundations, they had to be knowledgeable about their foundation’s philanthropy promotion activities in African countries as well as the Ford Foundation’s global philanthropy promotion program.

The selection was thus based on the individuals’ functions in their organizations and/or their expert knowledge of the issues under study. This limited the pool of knowledgeable interviewees to a few former Ford senior staff, former Ford consultants, and a few of the high-level officials of the Ford-founded/funded grantee foundations in sub-Saharan Africa. While criterion sampling helped to decide who to interview, snowball sampling was the strategy for gaining access to many of the interviewees, as the category of people with the information that I needed was not easily accessible to people outside foundation philanthropy circles. For instance, almost all the relevant Ford Foundation officials had left the organization by 2013 when I conducted the interviews and it would have been difficult to find them otherwise, without the help of an insider.

Based on the criteria established and recommendations from insiders, twenty-two (22) prospective interviewees were contacted and twenty (20) were ultimately interviewed. Ten (10) were former Ford Foundation senior officials, with one of them interviewing twice to share his experience and expert knowledge, first as a former Ford senior official in sub-Saharan Africa, and then as the executive of a Ford-founded African foundation. Though twenty (20) might come across as a small number, it included most of the senior officials who had been directly involved in (and had managed) the
philanthropy transplantation program at the Ford Foundation (in New York and at the Ford Africa regional offices) between 1990 and 2010. It also included those among the staff of the three Ford-founded African foundations who had in-depth knowledge about their own foundation, its history with Ford, and had participated in the IISP. In order to protect the identity of my research participants, their names have been replaced with randomly selected letters of the alphabet.

**Documents: Archival Records, Annual Reports, Tax Returns, and Press Releases**

The interview data was supplemented with data from the Ford Foundation archival records held at the Rockefeller Archives Center in Sleepy Hollow, New York. The archival records, examined in May 2013, included memoranda, concept and program papers, and some evaluation reports. These internal Ford Foundation documents were important for providing background information on the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) and the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP), including the decision-making process that went into the creation of these global philanthropy promotion initiatives. Access to recent documents on the philanthropy promotion program, that would have included those of the termination of the IISP by 2010, was, however, limited. Nevertheless, the data loss due to inaccessibility was mitigated by the fact that I interviewed the senior officials who were intimately involved with the relevant programs and events, as well as the consultants who worked on the IISP.

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40 This information was based on the recommendations received from those who participated in the events and knew who else was involved in New York and in sub-Saharan African countries.

41 Some of the officials of the African foundations had little knowledge about the events under study as they were hired after the events in question.

42 According to the Archivist, documents had to be 10 years old after their production before becoming accessible to the public. By 2013, when this archival research was conducted, certain documents associated with the IISP were not yet accessible.
The Ford Foundation’s annual reports and its form 990 PFs were examined to find information about grants made to the Ford grantees under study, and for what purpose. Ford’s 990 PFs during the relevant years were used to cross-check and supplement the relevant information from the annual reports. The annual reports of the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF), TrustAfrica, and the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) (where these were available) were also examined to determine how much money they had succeeded in raising from local sources, as opposed to funds from international donors. Where the information in the annual reports was presented in a way that made it difficult to differentiate between local and foreign funds the interview data were used to supplement the documentary evidence. Press releases provided contemporaneous information about important events such as the foundation’s leadership and policy changes, its foundation-building activities at home and abroad, and other relevant Foundation programs. This was useful for understanding how the foundation presented its global philanthropy promotion program to the world.

Collecting data from all the sources discussed above allowed for data triangulation, as the multiple sources of evidence provided multiple and complementary measures of the phenomenon under study. Data that could not be found at the Ford Foundation archives were sought during the interviews; and the archival data were often used to verify and substantiate some of the interview data. The use of the various techniques of data collection and the multiplicity of data sources was meant to increase the trustworthiness of the data and to strengthen the internal validity of the study. Every research design and methodology decision made was aimed not only at gathering the

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41IRS Annual Tax Return for Private Foundations
right information needed to answer the research question, but also at minimizing data loss and enhancing the completeness and accuracy of the data.

**Roadmap for the Dissertation**

This chapter provided a roadmap for the dissertation. It introduced the puzzle to be explained and presented the main argument I make in the rest of the dissertation to support my thesis. It provided the theoretical and analytical framework for explaining why the Ford Foundation failed in its bid to use the transplantation of American-inspired philanthropic institutions to catalyze the large-scale mobilization of local philanthropic resources in African countries. The chapter provided the framework for explaining why Ford was ineffective at equipping its foundation grantees for attracting local resources (which was their raison d’être), whereas it was successful in transferring managerial, governance, grantmaking, and proposal writing skills.\(^4\) I argue that the variation in goal attainment was due to Ford’s philanthropy promotion approach, which did not account for the lack of fit between the formal philanthropic structures it introduced, and the informal African philanthropic cultures and systems within which local charitable resources were embedded. To strengthen the “goodness of fit” socio-cultural argument that I make, I present the prevalent (state-centric) alternative explanations and point out their explanatory weaknesses. I end the chapter with my research methodology, the rationale behind my research strategy, case selection, and my data collection methods and sources. The rest of the dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapters II, III, and IV highlight and illustrate various aspects of the dissertation’s argument previewed here in

\(^4\)Proposal writing skills were targeted at helping the foundations to solicit funding from international donors and corporate entities. They were not well suited for soliciting donations from local individuals and groups.
Chapter I. Chapter V concludes the dissertation, while Chapter VI contains the tables referred to in Chapter III.

Chapter II tackles the independent variable. It provides the background to Ford’s 1990s’ philanthropy promotion and foundation-building program in developing countries (in general) and in sub-Saharan Africa (in particular). It describes the philosophy behind Ford’s exportation of the American-inspired philanthropic foundation model to African countries. It analyzes the strategies and techniques that went into the foundation’s institutional transplantation process (foundation-building) in African countries and sets the stage for demonstrating the disconnect between Ford’s local philanthropy promotion goal in African countries, and the transplantation (as well as isomorphic) approach that it employed to try to attain that objective.

Chapter III analyzes the dependent variable along the relevant dimensions of foundation effectiveness discussed in Chapter I. It takes each of the key dimensions of effectiveness and analyzes the extent to which the Ford Foundation, through the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) and the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP), provided what its African foundation grantees needed to build the internal capacity necessary for developing local funding bases, mobilizing and managing large-scale local philanthropic resources. This chapter highlights the fact that Ford’s efforts were successful at transferring formal organizational development skills to its African foundation grantees; but failed to enable local “field cultivation” to facilitate adaptation to the relevant African countries’ institutional landscapes.
Chapter IV explains why Ford’s attempt to foster large-scale local (philanthropic) resource mobilization in African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s failed. Without dismissing the state-centric explanations altogether, this chapter attributes the failure of Ford’s local philanthropy promotion program in African countries to the mismatch between the transplanted formal philanthropic form, on the one hand, and the values and practices of the informal African philanthropic institutions, on the other. Chapter IV explains that Ford’s attempt to use a non-African philanthropic organizational form to promote local giving failed because the exported institutional model had difficulty developing deep enough roots in the local African soil to tap into local resources.

Chapter V summarizes the findings of the dissertation, draws conclusions and makes policy recommendations. It also discusses the study’s relevance to areas beyond sub-Saharan African countries and suggests where future research will be needed.

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As measured by the failure of its African foundation grantees to mobilize the bulk of their resources from local philanthropic sources.
Chapter II: Transplantation of Foundation Philanthropy onto African Soil

Introduction

Ford’s decision in the 1990s to build American-inspired foundations in sub-Saharan African countries had a number of objectives. To a large extent, it was aimed at improving and strengthening local philanthropy by catalyzing large-scale charitable giving in African countries for public purposes. This was to support the strengthening of civil society, community development and socio-economic advancement, and the reduction of donor dependency. The foundation had several options for improving and strengthening local philanthropy in African countries. One option would have been to build on the existing African philanthropic structures, values, and cultures of giving, and helped to scale them up for wider and greater impact. Another could have been to “graft” some aspects of the American-inspired foundation model onto the African philanthropic “root stock”¹ to produce an improved hybrid with the desirable attributes of both. Thirdly, the Ford Foundation had the option of transplanting and trying to replicate the American institutional philanthropic model as a parallel to the local African institutions of philanthropy. It chose the third option of institutional transplantation and replication.

Chapter II addresses the independent variable, namely the Ford Foundation’s approach to philanthropy promotion in African countries in the 1990s. In this chapter I argue that (1) by using isomorphic² organizational development techniques, the Ford

¹This horticultural image emanates from the analogy used in chapter 1 to illustrate the process and outcome of Ford’s transplantation of the American-inspired foundation model in African countries.
²DiMaggio & Powell (1983) describe three types of institutional isomorphism: (1) normative isomorphism; (2) mimetic isomorphism; and (3) coercive isomorphism. Normative isomorphism takes place when organizations (especially new ones) adopt certain features and characteristics because these have become the norm in their industry. In mimetic isomorphism organizations voluntarily imitate certain organizational behaviors and models from their peers. In the coercive type, superordinate organizations in the institutional field coerce their subordinate counterparts to conform by adopting certain institutional features to achieve institutional homogenization. In this case study, the Ford Foundation took steps to ensure that its African
Foundation built its African foundation grantees into formal professionalized institutions that were structurally comparable to similar institutions elsewhere, but were very different from the existing informal (and semi-formal)\(^3\) philanthropic institutions and structures in place in African countries; (2) that while it aimed at promoting local philanthropic giving in African countries, Ford’s institutional transplantation processes demanded conformity with (international) industry standards, and discouraged adaptation to the local culture and institutional context. I also argue that Ford conceptualized its philanthropy-promotion task in African countries as foundation-building and the transfer of expertise, formal technical skills, and generally-accepted organizational norms, ignoring the role of the informal philanthropic institutions and the local people’s giving cultures and values.\(^4\)

The chapter begins by briefly describing the Ford Foundation’s history from the 1930s, its foray into international development in the 1950s, as well as its involvement with civil society strengthening and the promotion of institutional philanthropy in developing countries in the 1990s. It goes on to analyze the prevailing thinking that framed Ford’s approach to global philanthropy promotion, notably its decision to transplant an American institutional model as its philanthropic vehicle for catalyzing large-scale local giving in African countries. In the main, the chapter analyzes the institutional transplantation process that Ford employed to create and institutionalize its

\(^3\)I use this to describe the many home-grown philanthropic institutions in African countries that are formal in the sense that they have been registered with the authorities as nongovernmental organizations to be able to open bank accounts, etc., but are informal in their governance and management structures.

\(^4\)The appropriate alternative would have been to approach its philanthropy promotion task as a socio-cultural intervention (beyond the transfer of formal skills and competencies) that involves local people’s customs, beliefs, values, and longstanding giving practices.
African foundation grantees. It contributes towards answering the research question by showing how Ford’s transplantation processes created and reinforced formal American-inspired Africa-based philanthropies that were incongruent with, and unconnected to, the local philanthropic cultures, values, and practices that were expected to provide local resources and sustenance to the former.5

**The Ford Foundation and International Development**

*Historical Background*

The Ford Foundation was established by Edsel Ford, son of Henry Ford of Ford Motor Company fame, in Detroit, Michigan, in 1936. This was reportedly done in response to the Revenue Act of 1935, which raised the estate tax rate to seventy percent for estates valued above $50 million, but exempted bequests to charitable, religious, and educational organizations (Sutton 1987). The 1935 estate tax hike reportedly pushed the Ford family to establish the Ford Foundation so as to avoid paying the steep estate tax upon the deaths of Henry and Edsel Ford. With its close ties to the Ford family fortunes from the Ford Motor Company, the Ford Foundation started as a local foundation focused on local issues, with most of its grants going to organizations in the Detroit area. The Edison Institute (now the Henry Ford Museum) and the Henry Ford Hospital (both located in Detroit, Michigan) were among its largest grantees at the time. Upon the deaths of Henry and Edsel Ford in the mid-1940s, however, their bequests tremendously increased the resources available to the Ford Foundation and transformed it into the

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5See Ottaway (2000) for a discussion of what she calls “free-floating” donor-created charitable institutions in African countries, and local people’s lack of interest in supporting them financially.
largest US foundation, and, also the largest philanthropic foundation in the world at the time (Magat 1987).⁶

With greater resources came great responsibilities, so the foundation’s Board of Trustees commissioned a study to help it explore and determine the best use of its increased resources. The Gaither Report, published in 1950 as the Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program recommended that “the Ford Foundation become an international philanthropy dedicated to the advancement of human welfare through reducing poverty and promoting democratic values, peace, and educational opportunity.”⁷ The Gaither Report marked the beginning of Ford’s expansion into international philanthropy in the early 1950s. Ford opened its first office outside the United States in Delhi, India, in 1952. The Ford Foundation operationalized the Gaither Report’s recommendations by expanding its programs beyond local mid-western problems and issues to “enhance the prospects of peace, strengthen democracy, education, and economic development in the United States and globally” (Atwater and Walsh 2011:11).

During the first couple of years the Ford Foundation’s programs outside the United States were concentrated in South and Southeast Asia, notably in India, Pakistan, and Indonesia; and were focused mainly on providing development assistance to the governments of these countries (Magat 1987). Around the same time, in the early 1950s, Ford began to carry out some programs in sub-Saharan African countries as well.

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⁶Until the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation was established in 2000 the Ford Foundation was the largest foundation in the world in terms of asset size.
Civil Society-Strengthening in Developing Countries

Prior to the late 1980s, Ford’s grantmaking support to developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa focused on poverty reduction, economic growth and development, as well as urban and rural development. This was in such areas as higher education, agricultural production, micro-enterprise, the preservation and management of natural resources, as well as the provision of employment opportunities and better housing for the urban poor (The Ford Foundation Annual Report 1989; 1994). It was in the late 1980s that (in addition to supporting socio-economic development) Ford began to support the promotion of good governance and the strengthening of civil society organizations in developing and transitional countries (The Ford Foundation 1989 Annual Report). With the resurgence of the concept of civil society in association with the political turmoil in Central and Eastern Europe in the mid to late 1980s, Ford embraced the idea that the development and sustainability of civil society were essential for the development of social capital and democratic values in the newly independent nations of Eastern Europe and other developing countries in transition:

Civil society --- forms of communal and associational life that are organized neither by the self-interest of the market nor the power of the state --- is a growing interest of the foundation.8 [Civil society is] essential to maintaining cooperation, trust, altruism and other values essential to the health of democratic society (The Ford Foundation 1997 Annual Report: 82).

This support for civil society organizations in developing countries was part of the larger phenomenon of rolling back the public sector (the state) and strengthening the private

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8See Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration by Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce (2001, Lynne Rienner) for an exploration of how donor agencies and foundations took up the concept of civil society; and how some, like the Ford Foundation, restructured their programs to reflect the new emphasis on the role of civil society in the democratization process.
(nonprofit and for-profit) sectors in these countries. Philanthropic, bilateral, and multilateral donors turned away from the state as a preferred partner in the execution of development programs (Holmén 2009; Hyden 2006; Henderson 2000; Aksartova 2000). They invested instead in building and strengthening civil society organizations (including philanthropic foundations) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)\(^9\) to lead the development effort in those countries.

**Ford’s Diffusion of Institutional Philanthropy in Developing Countries**

By 1989 the Ford Foundation had begun to consider supporting the development of foundation philanthropy in developing countries.\(^10\) That year Ford started to explore the possibility of promoting institutional philanthropy in East and Southeast Asia through a grant to Columbia University (The Ford Foundation 1989 Annual Report). The grant was to support a symposium in Bangkok “to examine new forms of organized philanthropy in East and Southeast Asia” (The Ford Foundation 1989 Annual Report: 74). It was also for planning a follow-up conference in the Philippines to consider “opportunities to increase corporate philanthropy in the region” (The Ford Foundation 1989 Annual Report: 91). In other words, by 1989 Ford had made the decision to invest in the promotion of institutional philanthropy outside the United States and declared its

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\(^9\)Donor-founded philanthropic institutions in developing countries are distinguished from donor-founded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in that technically (if not always in actuality) the former are established to mobilize philanthropic resources from various sources (especially local sources) and to distribute these resources as grants to local NGOs or use the resources to implement their own programs if they are an operational foundation. Philanthropic institutions are also expected to develop local philanthropy/private giving to support their local resource mobilization efforts. In contrast donors create local NGOs to provide services closer to recipients, with little expectation that they mobilize local resources or encourage local giving.

\(^10\)Barry Gaberman, one-time Ford Senior Vice-President, indicated that it was Ford’s successful establishment of the Puerto Rico Community Foundation (PRCF) in 1985 that encouraged it to consider launching a philanthropy-promotion and foundation-building program in the developing world (The Ford Foundation 2006).
intention to propagate the (community) foundation model as its means for philanthropy promotion and community development. As Ford explained, “The funding of local support systems through community foundations will be an increasingly important part of the foundation’s community development efforts” (The Ford Foundation 1989 Annual Report: 7).

One of Ford’s objectives for the creation of, and support for, philanthropic foundations in African and other developing countries in the 1990s was to provide resources to local organizations to boost civic engagement, self-help, and community-driven economic development (Laird 2007) in these countries. As the foundation explained:

[The foundation-building] initiative will endow newly created foundations at home and abroad to increase the resources available for local economic development, women's rights, the arts, and other concerns (The Ford Foundation Press Line 1997).

This meant the creation of efficient philanthropic institutions that would channel international resources to grassroots organizations for rural socio-economic development in developing countries. This was expressed in Ford’s 1993 annual report, the year that it established the West Africa Rural Foundation (WARF) in Senegal and the Nigeria Community Development Trust Fund, its first foundations in sub-Saharan Africa:

The foundation believes that in many countries local philanthropies, such as community foundations, can help expand economic opportunities in rural areas by assuming a key role in channeling financial and technical assistance to community-based organizations (The Ford Foundation 1993 Annual Report: 18).

Around 1996, however, under the new leadership of Susan V. Berresford as Ford president, the foundation added the promotion of local philanthropy to its foundation-building objectives.
From then on, alongside the creation of pass-through mechanisms for channeling financial and technical support to local communities, an equally important objective of Ford’s foundation-building program in developing countries was to encourage local giving to the Ford-founded philanthropic institutions. This was ultimately to help reduce the prevailing heavy dependence of donor-founded CSOs and NGOs on international donors (Johnson et al. 2004; Pinter 2001). A former Ford Foundation senior official interviewed for this study explained how support for civil society development through local (philanthropic) resource mobilization was a strategic objective of Ford’s:

Most [civil society and philanthropic] organizations don’t want to be dependent on foreign resources forever, partly because it hurts their legitimacy, [as] they could be seen as pawns of Western powers. And so, generating more financial independence for civil society on the ground in Africa and elsewhere was one of our strategic objectives, and we saw expanding local philanthropy as one way of answering that need.\textsuperscript{11}

Barry Gaberman, a former Ford Senior Vice-President also emphasized Ford’s philanthropy development and local resource mobilization expectations in developing countries thus:

Local or community-rooted philanthropy is necessary to a community’s self-determination and development. In this conceptualization, philanthropy cannot only be the introduction of resources into a community from the outside, but the ability for a community to invest in itself. Outside investors can reinforce this vision, as the Ford Foundation has done when it helps communities not only to define their own needs but meet them with their own resources (The Ford Foundation 2006:4)

Ford’s philanthropy promotion program in developing countries, therefore, had a dual objective: to create philanthropic institutions capable of efficiently channeling resources from international donors to local communities for development, but more importantly for the development of local philanthropy,

\textsuperscript{11}Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
to mobilize large-scale local resources for development. As stated by the Ford Foundation, the philanthropy promotion program in developing (including African) countries was “to encourage the growth of indigenous philanthropy abroad” (The Ford Foundation 1991 Annual Report: 75).

**The Thinking Behind Ford’s Exportation of Foundation Philanthropy**

Unlike the proponents of the mirror theory of institutions who posit that institutions reflect the societies from which they emerge and can therefore not be successfully transplanted in different societies, actors that support the exportation of institutional models from one country to another tend to believe that institutions are autonomous of society and can be transplanted successfully across borders. ¹² One important phenomenon that encouraged Ford’s transplantation of the (community) foundation model in developing countries in the 1990s was the increasing interconnectedness among nations brought on by globalization (Pinter 2001). The boundary-spanning ideas that became popular with globalization in the 1990s undergirded Ford’s philanthropy promotion and foundation-building program in developing countries. The foundation conceptualized globalization as the “diminishing importance of national borders and the strengthening of [cross-cutting] identities that stretch beyond those rooted in a particular region or country” (The Ford Foundation 1997 Annual Report: 9).

The foundation’s 1997 annual report also stated that globalization not only implied that local identities and cultures had been weakened, but also that many parts of the world were experiencing an “increasing openness to ideas from afar” (The Ford Foundation 1997 Annual Report: 9).

¹²These theoretical perspectives were discussed in Chapter I
Foundation 1997 Annual Report:11) that facilitated the cross-border transfer of new concepts:

This increasing openness to ideas from afar enables the Ford Foundation to connect men and women working to improve conditions in their own communities with people elsewhere who have similar goals. …We are doing this in fields as diverse as development finance…and the creation of new foundations (The Ford Foundation 1997 Annual Report: 11).

Besides the idea of people across the world being open to new ideas, the globalizing trends of the 1990s also engendered the notion that all countries (whether developed or developing) had more in common than they had differences; and that institutions and solutions that had been effective in one country could be successfully transferred to another country. That this was the thinking at Ford is seen in the 1989 annual report:

The United States and many other nations were wrestling with many of the same problems, however different they might appear on the surface, and approaches and solutions conceived in one place might be relevant in other places. We believed there was a great deal to be learned across national boundaries --- certainly between the United States and developing countries, but also among the countries of the developing world (The Ford Foundation 1989 Annual Report: xvi).

As a result, Ford Foundation officials responsible for the philanthropy promotion program believed that communities in developing countries were open to new concepts and ideas and would be quick to adopt the new American-inspired philanthropic institutions that it was transplanting in those societies. The

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13Invariably, these new ideas are usually concepts and institutions from the developed world that international donors transfer to developing countries believing that they will boost the development of the latter.
14This idea is contrary to the theory (discussed in Chapter 1) that institutions and concepts can only be successfully transplanted when the exporting and importing countries belong to the same “family” and share a common history and socio-cultural development (De Jong & Mamadouh 2002).
15This was precisely when Ford was beginning to expand its philanthropy promotion program to developing countries.

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Ford Foundation assumed that the (community) foundation concept was near-universal and no matter where Ford transplanted such philanthropic institutions, they would flourish and produce the desired results, including the large-scale mobilization of local philanthropic resources. One of the former Ford senior officials interviewed for this study summarized the boundary-spanning thinking at Ford:

The idea of a community foundation on the surface [sounded] pretty damn good; ‘Yes, let's put the ownership of local resources in local hands to support the development of that community, whatever that kind of community is. Whether it’s in Cleveland, Ohio or Nairobi, Kenya, it doesn't matter. If you build an institution like that, it will do ... good things’. And, you know, with hindsight we look back and say, ‘Oh, my God! That was so naïve!’

Ford believed, therefore, that local populations, regardless of their socio-cultural background, would welcome the new (but unfamiliar) institutions with open arms and minds, and provide them with the needed local support (financial and otherwise).

**Exporting the Foundation Model to African Countries**

Despite the Ford Foundation’s ideas about the importance of supporting community-rooted, indigenous philanthropy for the self-determination of communities in African countries (The Ford Foundation 1991 Annual Report; the Ford Foundation 2006) it did not model its foundation grantees on an African philanthropic form. It chose instead to build philanthropic institutions modeled on the American grantmaking endowed foundation. Ford’s exportation of the foundation form to African countries is an example

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16Participant H. Phone interview with the author, Feb. 8, 2013
of what Heydemann and Hammack (2009) refer to as the West’s “projection of institutional logics abroad.”

For example, when the Ford Foundation had the opportunity in the early 1990s to help Kenyans mobilize their own resources and manage their national development through local philanthropy,17 the foundation turned to the philanthropic foundation model that it already knew from the US and hired the founder of the East Tennessee Community Foundation18 to help create African foundations similar to the one she had created in East Tennessee. The assumption was that what had worked to raise local resources in East Tennessee would definitely work in the Kenyan philanthropic terrain. As she described it, she was hired as Ford’s East Africa Regional Representative expressly to apply the experience that she had acquired from the Rural Development Community Foundation Initiative (RDCFI) in the US19 to the creation of the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF):

[My coming to East Africa) was with the notion that the experience of the Rural Development Community Foundation Initiative and my own experience [would be relevant in the Kenyan context]. …The time was ripe, the ground was fertile,20 and I just happened to be the person that had had that kind of experience.21

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17This is in contrast to Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) which was deemed to perpetuate dependency on external funders. Ford built its African foundations around the same period that international donors were holding conversations about aid effectiveness.
18Katharine Pearson Criss, former Executive Director of the East Tennessee Community Foundation, was hired by Ford in 1998 to support the creation and development of community foundations in African countries.
19The RDCFI was one of two initiatives that Ford launched in the US to help build the capacity of select US foundations for resource mobilization and endowment-building. Ford subsequently modeled its international initiatives --- the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) and the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP) --- on key aspects of the RDCFI.
20Like many of her colleagues, this former Ford senior official used agricultural terms to describe the transplantation of the foundation model in African countries.
21Participant B. Phone interview with author, April 17, 2013
Because they were initiated by an external actor --- the Ford Foundation --- and modeled on a foreign institutional form, Ford’s foundation grantees were regarded as foreign philanthropic institutions by the local populations. The Ford-founded African philanthropies were an example of philanthropy in Africa as opposed to philanthropy of Africa or African philanthropy (see for example Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005).

As one former Ford Foundation senior official acknowledged, “…Just because [we] launch a foundation in Africa doesn't mean it's [going to] be seen as an African institution.”

**Ford’s Foundation-Building in West, East and Southern Africa**

Following the Ford Foundation’s declaration in its 1989 Annual Report that the establishment of community foundations was going to be an important part of its community development efforts internationally (The Ford Foundation 1989 Annual Report: 7) Ford established two foundations in West Africa in 1993. These were the West Africa Rural Foundation (WARF) in Senegal and the Nigeria Community Development Trust Fund. Unlike the Nigeria Community Development Trust Fund whose area of operation was national, the West Africa Rural Foundation (WARF) was set up to cater to the needs of community-based agricultural organizations in five francophone West African countries (Malombe 2000). Ford went on to create, and to support the establishment of, many other professionalized community foundations in other African

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22Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
23 Senegal and Nigeria were the two countries where Ford had field offices in West Africa at the time.
24 An online search showed that the Nigeria Community Development Trust Fund has changed its name to the Community Development Foundation. However, the organization is still focused on channeling resources to local development organizations and associations for individual and community development, rather than mobilizing local resources.
countries including Kenya and South Africa. In 1998 it established the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) in Nairobi, Kenya. The Uthungulu and Greater Rustenburg Community Foundations were the two Ford-founded philanthropic institutions that survived at the end of Ford’s foundation-building efforts in South Africa.

After establishing national-level foundations in the 1990s, Ford supported the establishment of two Africa-wide (pan-African) foundations in the 2000s to help address issues of cross-national and continental import. The African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF), headquartered in Ghana, was founded in 2001. That same year Ford established the Special Initiative for Africa (SIA) and incubated it at its New York office until 2006, when the SIA was renamed TrustAfrica and relocated to Dakar, Senegal, as an independent foundation. TrustAfrica was the last foundation that Ford built in West Africa. The Ford Foundation ended its support for foundation-building and institutional philanthropy promotion in developing countries in 2010.

**Ford’s Institutional Transplantation Process in Africa**

Contrary to Ford’s thinking (discussed above) that countries across the world had similar problems (whether they were developed or developing) and that solutions (and institutions) devised in one country could successfully solve problems in another country, the reality was that there were significant contextual differences among countries.

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25 According to Kuljian (2013) and several participants in this study, most of the foundations that Ford and other international funders attempted to establish in Southern Africa in the 1990s did not survive the initial transplantation shock. The few that survived from that period are in Kenya, Senegal and South Africa. 26 The AWDF was established by three African women with a small (but symbolic) contribution of seed money from a few African women who met in New York (Participant P. Interviewed on July 17 & 18, 2013). But the large amounts that the AWDF needed in seed money and institutional development to make it functional came from the Ford Foundation, with some support from Match International, and the MacArthur Foundation. Ford supported the AWDF’s establishment in 2001 with a grant of $500,000 for institutional development and grantmaking (The Ford Foundation 2001 Annual Report: 120). Ford went on to make grant after grant over the years to the AWDF in operational and endowment challenge funds.
affecting the effectiveness of exported philanthropic (and other nonprofit sector) institutions. In fact, a former Ford Foundation Program Officer at the headquarters in New York acknowledged these contextual differences when she noted in an exit memo to the foundation that “… in practice...the issues affecting the US nonprofit sector have little or nothing in common with those driving global civil society.”

Acknowledging the importance of local contexts in institutional transfers, scholars such as Berkowitz et al. (2001) have contended that the successful performance of an institutional transplant in a recipient country is highly dependent on the transplantation process. If the transplantation process takes local conditions into account and facilitates local adaptation, the chances of the transplant performing effectively in the recipient country are increased. In contrast, if the transplantation process tries to reproduce the original model without regard for local conditions or local adaptation, the chances of success in the recipient society are limited. In the case under study, the Ford Foundation neglected the local contextual differences between the United States and the relevant African countries and tried to replicate the foundation model in the latter. A former Ford Africa Regional Representative, comparing the Ford Foundation’s philanthropy promotion process to that of the Global Fund for Community Foundations (GFCF), noted that unlike the GFCF that had an “organic approach” to local philanthropy promotion, Ford lacked regard for the local philanthropic landscape:

[There was] a kind of zeal [on Ford’s part] to try to create community foundations [in African countries] without a recognition that there was something very strong already on the ground [in terms of philanthropic organization]. If you look at what’s happening with, for example, the

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2Rockefeller Archives Center, the Ford Foundation records, Peace and Social Justice Program (PSJ), Governance and Civil Society, Office Files of Michael Edwards, Program Management Files, Batliwala, Srilatha, Exit Memo (p. 4) November 2000
Global Fund for Community Foundations;\textsuperscript{28} it has a much more organic approach to helping support the growth of [local philanthropy] and is less ideological. [It does not say (as Ford did)]: ‘Oh…we have the answer in the [United] States, let's try and do exactly the same in South Africa’.\textsuperscript{29}

Ford’s approach was to try to impose a foreign philanthropic model, as if what worked in the US would work similarly in African countries.

In order “to set up mini African versions of the Ford Foundation”\textsuperscript{30}, Ford employed specific isomorphic organization-building mechanisms to ensure that its African foundation grantees conformed to its “particular vision”\textsuperscript{31} of a formal professionalized philanthropic institution. The major ones included (1) the use of foreign intermediary organizations well-versed in foundation-building to help create its African foundation grantees in “Ford’s image”;\textsuperscript{32} (2) the use of institutional incubation to ensure that the incubating institutions inculcated the requisite formal skills and capacities into the African philanthropic institutions; (3) the use of site visits to selected community foundations in the United States to demonstrate to African elites how to manage and govern the new foundations according to generally accepted standards; and (4) the use of capacity building workshops, initiatives and peer-learning networks to impart institutional norms and organizational best practices to ensure efficiency as well as conformity. Overall, Ford used these mechanisms to ensure that the formal aspects of

\textsuperscript{28}The Global Fund for Community Foundations (GFCF) was created by a number of international funders, including the Ford Foundation, to support the development of sustainable community foundations across the world. Now headquartered in South Africa, the GFCF has apparently learned from its experience on the ground in developing countries and has developed a more organic approach to foundation-building and local philanthropy promotion than Ford did in the 1990s and early 2000s.

\textsuperscript{29}Participant I. Phone interview with the author, Oct. 1, 2013

\textsuperscript{30}Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013

\textsuperscript{31}Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013

\textsuperscript{32}Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
organizational development were inculcated into its foundation grantees in African countries.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{Use of Western Intermediaries to Replicate Formal Structures}

As Ford had chosen to use professionalized philanthropic foundations as the vehicle for promoting local philanthropy in African countries, it made grants to foreign intermediary organizations that had expert knowledge about the foundation model to establish many of the new foundations and to provide capacity-building training for their management, governance and grantmaking.\textsuperscript{34} This ensured that the Ford-founded African philanthropies were established with formal institutional features that made them similar to foundations in the US or Western Europe. Being similar to philanthropic institutions in the Western world meant that they were dissimilar to local African philanthropic institutions and associations, and, therefore, incompatible with the local informal cultures of giving.

The European and American intermediary organizations with which Ford worked to establish its foundation grantees in Africa include Development Innovations and Networks, a Swiss organization which established the West Africa Rural Foundation (WARF) in 1993 (The Ford Foundation 1993 Annual Report: 18), and Technoserve, an American organization which was contracted to

\textsuperscript{33}Ford had tried to help establish more than ten (10) foundations in Eastern and Southern Africa in the 1990s, but most of them floundered and died (Kuljian 2005). The few foundations that survived the initial “transplantation shock” are the general subject matter of this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{34}Even the non-Ford-founded philanthropic organizations that Ford supported in Eastern African countries received their capacity-building training from the same foreign intermediaries. As many of these non-Ford-founded philanthropic organizations were informally run by the founding families, Ford’s support was directed at “modernizing” their management, governance and grantmaking structures; and encouraging them to build endowment funds. The whole idea was to formalize philanthropy in Africa.
establish the Nigeria Community Development Trust Fund (The Ford Foundation 1993 Annual Report: 18). Other international organizations that received grants to support Ford’s foundation-building in African countries included the Aga Khan Foundation (Switzerland), Synergos Institute (USA), and the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF)(England). A local philanthropy intermediary, the Southern Africa Grantmakers Association (SAGA), which was established by a group of American funders (including the Ford Foundation) to promote the community foundation concept in South Africa and to build foundations, collapsed after a brief existence due to a lack of local demand and support.

Ford also used international intermediary organizations to provide the necessary skills training to the new foundations. The Aga Khan Foundation (Switzerland) was also one of the institutions that Ford funded to promote resource mobilization among the emerging African philanthropic institutions (The Ford Foundation Annual Reports 2001; 2002). Resource Alliance, Inc., a US-based organization, received Ford grants to train the African foundation grantees in formal fundraising techniques (The Ford Foundation 2003 Annual Report: 99). However, the fundraising skills that the African foundations acquired from the expert (but foreign) foundation-builders and capacity-building consultants were more suitable for raising funds from institutional donors in the US and

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35 Senegal and Nigeria were the two countries where Ford had field offices in West Africa at the time.
36 The Nigeria Community Development Trust Fund is now known as the Community Development Foundation.
37 For example, between 1997 and 1999 the Aga Khan Foundation (Switzerland) received a total of $2,100,000 to provide “endowment and program support for a Kenyan intermediary institution to advance community development and philanthropy” (The Ford Foundation 990-PF 2000). The Kenyan intermediary in question was the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF). In 2002, the Synergos Institute, Inc. (New York) received a grant “to strengthen emerging and established foundations and associations of foundations in Southern Africa” (The Ford Foundation 2000 Annual Report: 90).
elsewhere than they were for mobilizing local philanthropic resources from individuals and groups in African countries (Ngondi-Houghton 2005).

In the end, Ford’s use of foreign intermediary organizations with foundation-building expertise to establish its foundation grantees ensured that the Ford-founded African philanthropies were set up as formal institutions, equipped with the formal institutional features (including managerial, governance, and grantmaking skills) that they needed to become efficient in their operations and grantmaking. The foreign intermediary organizations advanced one aspect of Ford’s philanthropy promotion approach, the building of formal grantmaking foundations with the capacity to deliver services (grants) to community development and civil society organizations, efficiently and effectively. But the foreign foundation-building experts could not advance Ford’s local resource mobilization objective, which had to do with the informal philanthropic landscape prevalent in the relevant African countries; as well as the local people’s motivations for giving, their giving values and practices.

Using Organizational Incubation\(^{38}\) as an Instrument of Isomorphism

Besides the use of foreign intermediary organizations to establish its African foundation grantees, Ford also used institutional incubation to further its reinforce the formalization and bureaucratization of the new foundations. The foundation used incubation as a means to effect institutional isomorphism and harmonization. Institutional isomorphism results from the tendency of superordinate institutions to ensure that smaller organizations in their organizational field (especially those dependent on them for

\(^{38}\)Just like business incubators are companies that support the development of start-up companies by providing management services, office space, etc. incubating institutions in the world of philanthropy support start-up foundations and other philanthropic organizations by providing managerial, fiscal and other institutional support during the latter’s early years.
funding) adopt certain structures and institutional behaviors that make the latter conform to organizational behaviors required by the more powerful organizations (Scott 1987; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) was incubated by the Aga Khan Foundation for about four years, while TrustAfrica (started as the Special Initiative for Africa (SIA)) was incubated by the Ford Foundation at its headquarters in New York for five years. The Uthungulu Community Foundation in South Africa had to be incubated by the Zululand Chamber of Business Foundation.

One reason for incubating new African foundations was because the incubating foundations needed to act as fiscal agents for the start-up foundations during their formative years, when they were not yet registered as foundations and could not accept donor funds in their own name. More importantly, though, Ford also used incubation to train the fledgling foundations in the practical skills they needed to manage themselves as formal bureaucratic institutions according to generally accepted principles of foundation management. Incubation was therefore used as a tool to foster and reinforce the formalization and bureaucratization of the Ford-founded African philanthropic institutions. The process for establishing TrustAfrica provides a good example of how Ford used incubation for institutional isomorphism. A former Ford senior official explained TrustAfrica’s incubation in New York:

[Ford] gave [the selected Executive Director] at least a year… in New York, [at Ford headquarters]. …They had him move several weeks or a month at a time from one department to another to learn. [It] was essentially to apprentice [him] in each of the major functions internally in the foundation, so he learned how these different units operate. …It was his sort of graduate course on foundation management [until] he was ready

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39Participant H. Phone conversation with the author, Sept. 11, 2013
40Ford selected one of its senior Africa Regional Representatives to head the new Africa-wide foundation.
to begin to design the institution. … He was given experience and learning about the internal workings [of a philanthropic foundation].

The former Ford official who led the then Special Initiative for Africa (SIA) attested to how the incubation process succeeded in ultimately creating TrustAfrica in Ford’s image. TrustAfrica was inculcated with the formal aspects of organizational development and made to resemble its “parent”, the Ford Foundation, as much as possible:

TrustAfrica had a five-year incubation period (five years is a long time) during which we were based in the Ford Foundation…as a [Ford] project. … That already created a very organic umbilical cord… and [a] sentimental value attachment [to Ford]. …Which means then that the modus operandi of the new foundation, its policies, its manuals, its procedures, its grantmaking style, its nomenclature, … all of that, consciously, and largely unconsciously, tended to reflect its parent's systems and approaches…. [Ford’s] footprint… was strong, largely because (and it’s understandable) if you set up a foundation and you invest tens of millions of dollars [in it], you're going to really be very close to it. You may even be [over-protective] …

Ford’s “footprint” on TrustAfrica (a result of the incubation) was so heavy that the latter was seen as a subsidiary of the Ford Foundation in Africa. It was seen as a foreign organization, rather than an authentic African philanthropic institution. A senior official of TrustAfrica explained the situation in which the transplanted African institution found itself:

We were set up by the Ford Foundation so…for a long time we had the footprint of the Ford Foundation on us; we had the identity of the Ford Foundation. … [In the process], we learned the hard way that [the

41Participant F. Phone interview with the author, June 18, 2013
42The parent-child relationship has often been invoked to describe the relationship between institutional founders and their institutional creations (McIlray 1998; Slater et al. 2004). Several of the experts interviewed for this study (those from the Ford Foundation as well as the Ford-founded African philanthropies) described the relationship between the Ford Foundation and its African foundation grantees in parent-child terms.
43Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 19, 2013
founding institution has to] be very careful to ensure that... its footprint, thumbprint, identity, DNA... is not too much [on the local institution].

In the same way that the Ford Foundation incubated TrustAfrica in New York, the other institutions that Ford contracted to develop foundations in African countries also used incubation as part of their foundation building and organizational development processes. A description of how one such incubating organization tried to impose specific modes of operation on a new Ford-founded African philanthropy reveals some of the isomorphic pressures that the new foundations experienced to make them conform to industry standards:

The thing about another [organization] midwifing [your organization] is that they also bring their own baggage about how they think things have to be done. And so, once the [incubating] relationship is going on you (the new foundation) struggle to say [to the incubating organization] '... That is how you do things; but we are a new organization, and this is how we want to do it.' There was a lot of that happening at the time, including simple things like [the incubating organization] telling us “This is how we deal with HR (Human Resources) issues. [And we would say to them]: “This is how we want to deal with HR issues in this new organization”.

The incubation process, therefore, pressured the Ford-founded institutions to adopt specific institutional norms, values, and ways of working, that consolidated the formal institutional structures and systems. Ford’s transplantation process was usually inflexible and made little room for the local leadership of the new foundations to adapt the foreign-inspired philanthropic structures and concepts to the local context and cultures of giving. As one of the former Ford senior officials explained:

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44Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 19, 2013
45This senior African foundation official referred to the incubating institutions that Ford engaged to establish or birth its foundation grantees as institutional midwives.
46Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013
That gets us back to the definition that we (Ford) had of philanthropy, … too rigidly tied to the Western idea of the endowed foundation, the in-
perpetuity foundation, which is what the Ford Foundation is…So these
problems are linked. …[We should have] been more flexible and willing
to countenance lots of different kinds of [philanthropic] structures.\footnote{Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013}

With varying degrees of resistance,\footnote{See Rose Lukalo-Owino’s (2008) account of the establishment of the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) for the contentious relationship that developed between the KCDF and the Ford Foundation during the early years of the former’s development. It mostly had to do with the KCDF trying to resist the Ford Foundation’s pressures for it to conform to Ford’s US-inspired ideas of philanthropy and philanthropic organization.} the new African foundations adopted
the institutional structures and practices that the incubating institutions, as well as Ford itself, pressed upon them. In the process, the African foundations’
organizational structure and operating procedures ended up being more like those of professionalized foundations in America than those of non-donor supported informal philanthropic organizations in African countries. In particular, the incubation and formalization process (reinforced with the use of foreign intermediary organizations as institutional “midwives” and coaches) left the Ford-founded philanthropies with little connectedness to the informal local cultures of giving, and the philanthropic organizational forms that people were familiar with and supported. One of the former Ford senior officials interviewed for this study wished that Ford’s local philanthropy promotion process had been more flexible, and that it had not insisted upon the formal foundation model:

\begin{quote}
We could have… [been] much more flexible about the kinds of initiatives we were supporting, so they didn't have to be a foundation even…; we could have just supported different forms of African philanthropy….\footnote{Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013}
\end{quote}

The inflexibility of Ford’s institutional transplantation process left the Ford-founded African philanthropies unable to acquire organizational social
capital, local legitimacy, or trust. One of the former Ford Foundation Africa Regional Representatives explained that the endogenous informal philanthropic institutions are what Africans rely on, participate in, and trust:

The bulk of African philanthropy is at the community level. I don't know many Africans that have been to school or who got a school uniform or who had to go to university who didn't depend in a sense on a community mobilization effort. So, I think that what works on the continent are the rotating credit and savings [associations]… burial associations, and so on. …At the local level they are working. They continue to work, and people depend on them, they rely on them, they keep them alive, they keep using them, they keep modifying them, they keep morphing.\textsuperscript{50}

One of the important ways that Ford strengthened its institutional transplantation in African countries was, therefore, by using incubation as a foundation-building mechanism to ensure conformity with the formal standards of organizational development. However, as the Ford-founded philanthropies conformed in form and function to formal bureaucratic structures and standards, they became incompatible with the local giving cultures.

\textit{Study Tours of American Community Foundations}

Besides incubating the new foundations to inculcate in them the required formal organizational features, one of the other methods that the Ford Foundation employed to try to promote the American-inspired foundation model to African elites was to organize study tours of community foundations in the United States. One of the institution-building support provided during the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) was to help local elites, new executives, and board members of the new African foundations to learn about the American philanthropic

\textsuperscript{50}Participant I. Phone interview with the author, October 1, 2013
foundation, especially the community foundation model. Some of these leaders received scholarships and fellowships to tour the United States to observe and learn about community foundations first-hand (Aina 2013). The idea was that the African elites would be able to apply the lessons learned in the US to the administration of the up and coming philanthropic institutions in their own countries in Africa. The training that the new African foundation leaders and executives received from touring American foundations did help them to strengthen the management and governance of their philanthropic institutions based on what they had observed in the US. They had to meet required standards to not only make them acceptable in the foundation field, but also to become attractive to other international donors as well. This, however, reinforced their resemblance to American foundations, but their dissemblance to homegrown indigenous African philanthropic organizational structures.

**Capacity-Building Initiatives and Infrastructure Organizations**

Ford also used capacity-building workshops and peer-learning initiatives and networks to ensure that its African foundation grantees acquired the requisite formal

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51Hager et al. (2004:160), drawing from organizational ecology theory, have stated that when a new organizational form is established in a place where few such organizational forms exist, the new organizational form suffers what they call “the liability of newness”. They argue, based on neo-institutional and social capital theory, that the negative effects of the liability of newness are mitigated when the new organizations’ leaders “connect” with others in the relevant field.

52The Southern Africa Grantmakers Association (SAGA), established in 1996 by Ford and CS Mott to lead a community foundation building pilot program in South Africa, received $80, 000 (grant #09851463) in 1998 as “partial support for a study tour of US community foundations” (The Ford Foundation 2000 Annual Tax Return Form 990-PF). The US-based Aspen Institute, Inc. received the other portion of the grant ($63, 250) to help organize the study tour.

53Aksartova (2009) found that international donors in Russia employed several means, including conferences and workshops, to impose institutional ideas that they wanted their grantees to adopt and practice. Though this often appeared to be a case of mimetic isomorphism where new foundations simply emulated ideas from established ones, it was also a form of coercive isomorphism (Powell and DiMaggio 1983) because grantees often did not have alternatives and knew that there was a price to pay (in terms of lost funding) for noncompliance.
organizational skills and generally accepted principles and behaviors. They were to provide capacity-building resources and training to help the Ford-founded institutions to become efficient philanthropic institutions, comparable to their counterparts in the US. In 1998 and 2005 Ford launched two major international initiatives --- the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) and the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP) --- to consolidate and strengthen its foundation grantees in African and other developing countries respectively. The five major objectives that both the API and the IISP sought to achieve were (1) managerial effectiveness; (2) governance effectiveness; (3) grantmaking effectiveness; (4) resource mobilization effectiveness; and (5) endowment-building effectiveness. These will be analyzed in the next chapter to assess the effectiveness of Ford’s approach and initiatives in terms of these dimensions of foundation effectiveness.

Aksartova (2009) found that the workshops and capacity-building training that international donors funded for their grantees in developing countries facilitated institutional isomorphism and, thus, fostered institutional homogenization. According to her, many of the donor-founded/funded organizations often end up more akin to their counterparts abroad than their homegrown and locally-funded counterparts and are accountable upward to their funders. They often have little accountability or linkages to their local institutional and philanthropic environment since they do not need to mobilize any resources locally.

In an attempt to provide ongoing capacity-building to its foundation grantees in African countries, Ford also transplanted philanthropy infrastructure organizations as part
of its philanthropy transplantation process in African countries. In Kenya, for example, the Ford Foundation (through the intermediary of the UK-based Charities Aid Foundation) created the Ufadhili Trust (also known as the Center for Philanthropy and Social Responsibility) in 2001. Ufadhili’s purpose was to “strengthen the infrastructure of local philanthropy and build a philanthropic culture in Eastern Africa” (The Ford Foundation 2002 Annual tax Return Form 990-F). Ford also funded the creation of the East Africa Association of Grantmakers (EAAG) as an umbrella organization to “strengthen philanthropy” in the East African region. The East Africa Philanthropy Learning Group, another of Ford’s networking and peer learning efforts in East Africa, brought together Ford-founded and non-Ford-founded philanthropic institutions in that sub-region to share ideas. The infrastructure/support and umbrella organizations were generally expected to help build and provide on-going support to the new foundations that Ford had established. They were expected to help make the institutional environment in the relevant African countries more accommodating of, and enabling for, the formal Ford-founded institutions; as well as the other formally organized local philanthropic institutions. Overall, they were expected to help develop and strengthen the civil society and philanthropic sectors in African countries.

Johnson et al. (2004) cited the lack of philanthropic infrastructure organizations as one of the factors militating against the development of institutional philanthropy in many developing countries. But these, like the foundations, were also modeled on philanthropy infrastructure organizations in the US, with little connection to local philanthropic cultures.

The Ford Foundation 2000 Annual Tax Return Form 990-PF Grant #10002014; grant to CAF “to establish the East Africa Centre for the Promotion of Philanthropy and Social Responsibility”. Charities Aid Foundation (UK) later opened local offices in Kenya and South Africa, named its Kenya affiliate Allavida, and continued to receive grants from the Ford Foundation to promote philanthropy in Eastern and Southern Africa. One such grant, made in 2003 (grant #10300423), was “to build foundations and advance the field of philanthropy in East Africa”.

The Ford Foundation 2002 Annual Tax Return Form 990-PF Grant #10350501

Participant B. Phone interview with the author, April 17, 2013 & Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013
However, much like the Southern Africa Grantmakers Association (SAGA), the Ford-founded umbrella and support organizations that were transplanted in African countries did not (or were unable to) carry out their functions as expected (Ngondi-Houghton 2005). Individual foundations such as the KCDF found themselves in a situation where they had to try to balance their own specific struggles for survival with the work that needed to be done to create a more trusting and enabling local environment for institutional philanthropy to put down roots, to grow, and to thrive in their respective countries.\textsuperscript{59}

**Conclusion**

Having chosen to use the formal American-inspired foundation model to attain its local resource mobilization goal in African countries, Ford’s approach to promoting local philanthropy consisted of using experts and organizational development mechanisms and initiatives to build, inculcate, and consolidate the necessary formal structures and organizational values and behaviors into its foundation grantees; to make them efficient and effective at their functions. Chapter II dealt with the Ford Foundation’s transplantation approach to philanthropy promotion in African countries, which is the independent variable. It focused on the institutional transplantation process that Ford employed to try to accomplish its goal of catalyzing the mobilization of local philanthropic resources in African countries.

\textsuperscript{58}Created by Ford and other American private foundations in their usual top-down fashion, SAGA was not locally-demanded and lacked local embeddedness. It was, therefore, unable to garner the financial and moral support of local people and institutions; and collapsed around 2006.

\textsuperscript{59}Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013
The chapter briefly placed the Ford Foundation in its historical context in the 1930s and described how, in the 1950s, the foundation went from being a small midwestern foundation focused on local issues, to a global philanthropic actor in international development. I described how the foundation’s choice to transplant the American-inspired foundation model in African countries\(^{60}\) was undergirded by the globalizing and boundary-spanning thinking of the 1990s that encouraged the minimization of local contexts and differences among countries. I analyzed the main institution-building (and isomorphic) techniques that Ford employed to transplant and institutionalize its foundation grantees in African countries; showing how Ford’s approach to local philanthropy promotion produced formal and bureaucratized foundations that were different from, and out of synch with, the existing African cultures of giving and informal structures for social exchange.

Overall, chapter II showed that Ford’s philanthropy-promotion program in African countries was essentially foundation-building; which was shaped by isomorphic mechanisms that did not make allowance for local elites to adapt the Ford-founded philanthropic institutions to the local socio-cultural and socio-economic environments. The chapter argued that Ford ended up building formal local intermediaries that were efficient at raising and channeling international funds to local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). But they were different from, and ill-equipped for

\(^{60}\)As opposed, for example, to supporting the existing cultures of giving and philanthropic practices
connecting with, the predominantly informal institutions in the African philanthropic landscape that are critical for effective local resource mobilization.\textsuperscript{61}

The next chapter, chapter III, tackles the dependent/outcome variable, which is the extent of Ford’s effectiveness in accomplishing its philanthropy promotion goals (particularly its local resource mobilization goal) through the establishment and strengthening of formal American-inspired\textsuperscript{62} philanthropic foundations. The chapter analyzes and assesses the level of effectiveness of the foundation’s philanthropy promotion program in African countries; focusing on its local resource mobilization effectiveness, as measured by the effectiveness of the Ford-founded/funded philanthropic foundations.\textsuperscript{63} The outcome of Ford’s two international capacity-building initiatives (the API and IISP) as determined by its African foundation grantees under study (who were beneficiaries of the initiatives) will provide evidence for assessing the outcome of the Ford Foundation’s philanthropy promotion effort in African countries in the 1990s with respect to local resource mobilization.

\textsuperscript{61}I define effective local resource mobilization as the ability of a Ford-founded African philanthropic foundation to mobilize more than 50\% of its revenues from local sources.
\textsuperscript{62}As opposed to informal and non-professionalized African-style philanthropic models.
\textsuperscript{63}As pointed out in Chapter I, this study determines the effectiveness of Ford’s philanthropy promotion program in African countries by looking at the effectiveness of the local philanthropies that it established for the purpose of implementing its philanthropy agenda in African countries.
Chapter III: Ford’s Success at Formalization, Failure at Local Resource Mobilization

Introduction

Chapter II dealt with the independent variable --- namely the Ford Foundation’s approach to local philanthropy promotion in African countries. The chapter focused on the transplantation process and the institution-building techniques that Ford employed to transfer the formal features of American-inspired foundation philanthropy to African countries. That chapter argued that Ford’s very decision to transplant the American-inspired grantmaking philanthropic foundation model in African countries; and the isomorphic processes that it employed in the transplantation process, produced philanthropic institutions that were formal in form and function; different and disconnected from the informal philanthropic institutions and practices prevalent in African countries.

Chapter III now tackles the dependent/outcome variable --- the extent of Ford’s effectiveness in achieving its objective of boosting philanthropy and local resource mobilization in African countries through the creation of, and support for, American-inspired grantmaking philanthropic foundations. The empirical evidence for determining Ford’s effectiveness (especially in building its foundation grantees’ capacity for, and effectiveness at, local resource mobilization) is provided by the three Ford-founded African philanthropies which participated in the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) and the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP). I assess their effectiveness along the relevant dimensions of foundation effectiveness identified in Chapter I.

1Of the three African philanthropies under study, only the Kenya Community Development Foundation had participated in the API. The other two, the African Women’s Development Fund and TrustAfrica had not yet been established. All three were beneficiaries of the IISP.
Chapter III’s assessment of the three Ford-founded African philanthropies shows that the Ford Foundation’s international capacity building initiatives successfully consolidated and strengthened the (generic) formal dimensions of foundation effectiveness among the selected African foundations. More significantly for the study’s argument, this chapter also shows that Ford’s international initiatives failed to provide the kind of (context-specific) support that the African foundations needed to build their internal capacity, to adapt to the African philanthropic landscape, and to enable them to cultivate local funding sources for effective local resource mobilization.

Following is a brief background as well as the main objectives of the API and the IISP. I discuss their main objectives and go on to assess the extent of Ford’s effectiveness at inculcating the relevant skills and capacities that its African foundation grantees needed to carry out their functions effectively, especially their local resource mobilization function. As mentioned elsewhere, the effectiveness of the Ford-founded/funded African philanthropies under study is deemed to indicate Ford’s effectiveness in its local philanthropy promotion effort in African countries.

**The API and IISP: Brief Background, Goals and Objectives**

The Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API), launched in 1998, was Ford’s attempt in the mid-1990s to strengthen the foundations that it had just established in African countries, to enable them mobilize local philanthropic resources for financing community development and the growth of local civil society (The Ford Foundation 2006; Aina 2013). The philanthropic institutions that participated in the API were the West Africa Rural Foundation (Senegal), the Kenya Community Development Foundation (Kenya), the Uthungulu Community Foundation (South Africa), and the Community Development
Foundation (Mozambique) (The Ford Foundation 2006). According to Gaberman, the API was “designed to increase knowledge and capacity among five newly created African foundations through technical assistance, convenings, peer learning, and networking” (Gaberman 2006:1). Among other things, the API’s objectives included building the capacity of the new Ford-founded philanthropic institutions in the key areas of “governance and management”, “resource mobilization and endowment building”, and “grant making;” as well as helping them to “mobilize resources or philanthropic contributions for local development.”

On its part, the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP), launched in 2005, was billed as Ford’s largest global philanthropic initiative to support and reenergize its foundation grantees in developing countries (Hartnell 2006; Raman 2005). It was meant to assist 18 foundations in 13 countries and 5 continents “to add to their assets and enhance their capacities as grantmaking and social development organizations” (The Ford Foundation 2006:3). Ford indicated that “the set of institutions ultimately chosen [to participate] would include those where:

- The foundation has played an instrumental role in their establishment or development, and where they have reached a stage of organizational maturity, but where the resources available for grantmaking are not yet at a level to ensure significant impact."

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3The Community Development Foundation (Mozambique) was not a Ford-founded philanthropic institution. It was established by Mrs. Graça Machel, the former First Lady of Mozambique, with major support from the MacArthur Foundation. It was selected to participate in the API because the MacArthur Foundation had collaborated with the Ford Foundation on Ford’s capacity-building initiatives in the United States, which allowed MacArthur’s foundation grantee in Mozambique to participate in Ford’s API (The Ford Foundation 2006).

3Barry Gaberman was the Senior Vice-President at Ford when the API and IISP were launched.

4Participant R. Phone interview with the author on March 27, 2013

Based on those criteria, the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF), the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF), and Trust Africa\(^6\) were selected from the African continent to participate in the IISP.

From the beneficiaries’ perspective, the African participants explained how they understood the objectives of the IISP. According to the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF), the IISP aimed “to enhance the impact, scale and effectiveness of key [Ford-founded/funded] foundations based primarily outside the United States” (AWDF 2007-08 Annual Report:22).\(^7\) The Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) described the IISP as “an effort to build the financial and programmatic capacities of [Ford]-supported foundations to enable them to [become] substantial players” in their countries and areas of operation (KCDF 2005 Annual Report:21). The capabilities that Ford set out to impart to its African foundation grantees through the two international initiatives, therefore, included: (1) management; (2) board/governance; (3) grantmaking; (4) resource mobilization (local and international); and (5) endowment-building\(^8\) capacities.\(^9\)

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\(^6\)The philanthropic institutions that Ford established in African countries in the 2000s tended to be pan-African, located in one country but responsible for making grants to nonprofit and civil society organizations throughout the continent. They included the AWDF (2001) in Ghana; TrustAfrica (2006) in Senegal; and Akiba Uhaki (2006) in Kenya. Even the West Africa Rural Foundation which Ford established in the early 1990s was mandated to serve Senegal (where it was located) as well as the neighboring Francophone countries.


\(^8\)Endowment-building effectiveness assumes local resource mobilization effectiveness as most international funders and other types of institutional donors rarely contribute towards endowment funds. Ford offered endowment challenge grants to its foundation grantees but expected them to make the match by mobilizing local resources.

\(^9\)These coincide with the dimensions of foundation effectiveness identified in the literature in Chapter I.
The technical assistance that the Ford Foundation provided as part of the API consisted of core institutional development support to help the new foundations acquire the managerial, governance, and grantmaking capabilities that they so badly needed in their early years to function according to acceptable international standards. The core support also helped to build the African foundations’ absorptive capacity to handle large sums of grant money. Their ability to manage large sums of money efficiently eventually made them attractive to other international donors looking for such intermediaries to help them reach local community development organizations. A senior official of one of the Ford-founded philanthropic institutions under study described the long-term institutional development support that Ford (unlike other donors) so generously provided:

There are few donors who put money in core costs. [My organization] was lucky because for nearly nine or ten years since its formation\(^\text{10}\) the Ford Foundation was one of the [few] organizations that committed to supporting core costs for the organization, including board development, to make sure that we had good systems and structures to be able to spur [the organization] to greater growth and development.\(^\text{11}\)

As a follow-up to the API, the IISP focused on, and tried to shored up, Ford’s ongoing capacity-building support to the selected philanthropies in the areas of increased grantmaking, local resource mobilization and endowment-building.

\(^{10}\)The API was started when Ford had just established this foundation.
\(^{11}\)Participant S. Face-to-face interview with author, July 15, 2013
The IISP as a ‘Second Bounce’ to Boost Local Resource Mobilization

Ford described the IISP as a “second bounce”\(^{12}\) in its philanthropy promotion effort in developing countries, through which the foundation was attempting to take a second look at the philanthropic foundations that it had established in developing countries in the late 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. The IISP was “to fast track a little bit the kind of growth…that Ford had hoped to see earlier, but that… hadn't happened.”\(^{13}\) This initiative was to go beyond the API to put a selected group of Ford’s foundation grantees in developing countries on their way to mobilizing more resources locally, building bigger endowment funds, increasing their grantmaking, and becoming game-changers in their countries. As one former Ford senior official put it: “With the foundations that had been around for a long time, [the IISP] was to help boost their resources to get them to the next level, and to just recharge them, revitalize them”.\(^{14}\)

Strengthening the ability of the IISP participants to build and increase their endowment funds with locally mobilized resources was, therefore, an important goal of the IISP. The following statement by a former Ford senior official underscores the importance of local resource mobilization:

We all believed, not only that philanthropy was important, but that …indigenizing\(^{15}\) philanthropy was important, whether we were talking about Africa, Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East. This is because most organizations don't want to be dependent on foreign resources

\(^{12}\)The Ford Foundation. Inter-Office Memorandum from Linetta Gilbert, Sushma Raman, and Christopher Harris (co-chairs of the Philanthropy Learning Group) to Susan V. Berresford (Ford President) Unpublished Report, June 20, 2003.

\(^{13}\)Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013

\(^{14}\)Participant Q. Phone interview with the author, Sept. 18, 2013

\(^{15}\)“Indigenization” as used here meant building local foundations that will be supported financially by local people; it did not mean supporting the already existing indigenous forms of charitable giving.
forever… So, generating more financial independence for civil society on the ground in Africa and elsewhere was one of our strategic objectives...\(^1^6\)

Raman (2005) \(^1^7\) summarized the objectives of the IISP and Ford’s hopes for building its foundation grantees’ capacity for increased local resource mobilization for greater socio-economic impact:

> The initiative seeks to increase the impact of these local institutions by helping participants to strengthen governance structures, augment endowments, mobilize local resources, and enhance grantmaking programmes. In developing this network of foundations, primarily outside the US, the [Ford] Foundation hopes to build the local capacity and legitimacy required to achieve lasting positive change on important issues of poverty and equity (Raman 2005).

What is clear from the above is that Ford aimed at using the API and the IISP to build its foundation grantees’ effectiveness, including that of local resource mobilization. However, the assessment of these initiatives shows that, in practice, the initiatives were successful in other areas, but failed to build the latter’s capacity for local resource mobilization.

**Assessment of the Ford Foundation’s Effectiveness**

One unique thing about Ford was its long-term commitment to the institutional development of its African foundation grantees.\(^1^8\) Ford’s technical assistance and capacity building support to its foundation grantees under study succeeded in helping them to develop into efficient philanthropic intermediaries with strong management, governance, and grantmaking capabilities.\(^1^9\) Ford’s institutional support to the KCDF, for

\(^1^6\)Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013

\(^1^7\)Sushma Raman was the former Ford program officer who managed the implementation of the IISP during the first part of the program’s life-cycle.

\(^1^8\)In a way, the API and IISP were part of this commitment.

\(^1^9\)The KCDF, AWDF and TrustAfrica were unanimous in their praise for, and gratitude to, the Ford Foundation for providing their institutions with the long-term organizational development support that had helped them to be the strong organizations that they had become. However, when asked about their
example, is illustrative of the institutional support that the foundation provided to the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies; and contributed to their managerial and board effectiveness:

The Ford Foundation …provided the KCDF with institutional development support, [with] having a strong and good board, and [made] sure [the KCDF] [was] able to recruit a qualified CEO conversant and relevant with the issues, to lead the organization. For a while Ford … paid for certain costs of the core team; [it] met the board costs and … supported the CEO and some of the management staff costs. I … believe that that was the most important contribution Ford put in.  

By 2010, when it ended its support for philanthropy-promotion and foundation-building in African (and other developing) countries, Ford’s transplantation processes and its capacity-building initiatives had succeeded in building African foundations that functioned much like their counterparts in the United States in terms of the formal characteristics of organizational development and behavior, including managerial, (international) fundraising and board effectiveness.  

Board Effectiveness  

The three Ford-founded philanthropies all had well constituted boards of directors, thanks to support and training from the Ford Foundation. By providing them with consultants and capacity-building support, Ford helped them to constitute governing boards that met acceptable organizational standards. For example, unlike the Akuapem Community Foundation (Akuapem CF) whose governing body was selected based on place of origin, ethnic identity, and stature in the traditional hierarchy, the KCDF selected its board members based on formal expertise and skills, as well as educational and  

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capacity for local resource mobilization, they admitted that despite the capacity building support they received during the initiatives, they were still very weak in that area.

20Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013
professional qualifications. The Akuapem CF is a homegrown Ghanaian philanthropic foundation, that was initiated and established by the people of the Akuapem Traditional Area in the Eastern Region of Ghana without international seed money or funding. Its governing body was made up of a group of elders and patrons (including traditional rulers from the area of operation).

The KCDF was also mindful of sectoral diversity, including considerations for gender, regional balance, race and religion. A senior official of the KCDF described how the first governing board of the foundation was constituted:

They (the board members) were from all forms of sectors. Some were in Business, [others in] Development. Some were doctors, teachers, and others were from the insurance and banking sectors. That mix was very carefully calculated. It was calculated that way because it was intended that in the future KCDF would be looking for local financial support from those kinds of sectors or actors in those sectors. And so, it was natural that once they were included in the board at that time, they would provide value in terms of networks, in terms of linkages, in terms of insights on how it would be possible to actually raise money from those kinds of institutions.²¹

As the first CEO of the KCDF explained in the 2005 Annual Report: “We were very aware of the high public expectation of organizations handling grant funds and we wanted to keep high levels of governance right from the outset” (KCDF 2005 Annual Report: 9). The KCDF has since maintained a professional board well-suited to the formal philanthropic institution that it is.

As mentioned in Chapter II, TrustAfrica (as the then Special Initiative for Africa) had to go through several years of incubation at the Ford headquarters in New York. During that process, Ford built and structured TrustAfrica as a formal philanthropic institution with a formal governing board. This was made up of Africans (men and

²¹Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013
women) from various parts of the continent, from various sectors, and with various types of relevant expertise. On its part, because the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF) was a women’s organization championing women’s rights and gender equality, its governing body was gender-based and was made up of accomplished women from various African countries.

All in all, through the incubation process and the capacity-building training provided during the API and the IISP, as well as the resultant coercive and mimetic isomorphism,22 the Ford Foundation successfully transferred the formal skills of board development to all the Ford-founded philanthropies under study. A former senior official of the Ford Foundation explained how Ford’s board development support to its foundation grantees worked: “There was technical assistance. They (Ford’s foundation grantees) were given consultants …that helped them to develop…their governance structures, to strengthen their boards.”23

These formally constituted boards not only supported the good governance of the KCDF, the AWDF and TrustAfrica, they also enhanced the credibility of these organizations, making them attractive to other international donors. In other words, the effective governance structures that Ford helped its foundation grantees to put in place also served to boost fundraising from international sources, as other international funders felt comfortable partnering with them and using them as intermediaries for channeling grants (regranting) to communities of the funders’ choice. But unlike its effect on fundraising from international sources, board effectiveness had little effect on local

22The coercive isomorphism came from the incubation that many Ford-founded philanthropies had to submit to, while the mimetic isomorphism resulted from the networking and peer-learning sessions (including the API and IISP) that they all benefitted from.
23Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013
resource mobilization. This is seen from how little each of the foundations under study raised locally as a percentage of total revenue, despite their good governance structures (see Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5).

**Managerial Effectiveness**

Just as the Ford Foundation provided its African foundation grantees with resources for board development as well as other types of institutional capacity-building and strengthening, it also provided resources for hiring seasoned professionals as Executive Directors and CEOs to manage the transplanted African philanthropies. Ford’s long-term core support for institutional development (which included money for paying the salaries and emoluments of the foundations’ managers and staff) made it possible for its foundation grantees to attract highly qualified executives and staff. An examination of the qualifications of the CEOs, executive directors, and program officers of the Ford-founded/funded African foundations revealed that they were all highly educated and had a lot of experience as leaders in the civil society and philanthropic sector in their respective countries, and on the continent. For example, the founding CEO of the KCDF, Monica Mutuku, was a seasoned development practitioner with years of experience in the Kenyan NGO sector. Her successor, Janet Mawiyoo, also had a lot of experience in the development and nonprofit world, having worked in her native Kenya as well as in Tanzania. In the case of TrustAfrica, Ford designated one of its own seasoned senior officials to become the first Executive Director. All of the foundations under study were, therefore, run by competent CEOs and Executive Directors, whose hiring was facilitated and (mostly) paid for by the Ford Foundation.

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24Participant H. Phone interview with the author on September 11, 2013
Through the API’s and the IISP’s networking, peer-learning, and capacity building programs (as well as the site visits to community foundations in the United States as mentioned in Chapter II) the Ford Foundation helped the managers of the Ford-founded philanthropies to acquire the specifics of foundation management. Ford was, therefore, able to successfully transfer (through formal training) the skills and competencies needed to strengthen the managerial effectiveness of its three African foundation grantees under study --- TrustAfrica, KCDF, and AWDF. The good governance and effective management systems that Ford helped its African foundation grantees to build (as discussed in the previous sections) contributed to effective grantmaking.

**Grantmaking Effectiveness**

Grantmaking was a priority among the Ford-founded/funded African philanthropies soon after they were established. The local elites who worked with Ford to establish them were initially interested in the opportunity for them to channel resources from Ford (and other international donors) to local communities and identified vulnerable groups (such as women and youth) in their countries (Lukalo-Owino 2008). Though local resource mobilization had been identified as a critical component of any strategy for their long-term financial sustainability, they all decided to focus first on grantmaking. Due, partly, to the history of corruption in African countries, the Ford-founded African philanthropies determined that before attempting to ask people (and corporations) to support them locally, it was best to first give the local communities and

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25 Also, Participant K. Phone interview with author on June 26, 2013
constituencies something. It was hoped that channeling grants efficiently to local communities would establish some mutual trust between the foundations and their constituents. The rationale was that giving money away (in countries where money is usually being stolen by public authorities) would help the African foundations gain the confidence of the local populations; become visible and establish the credibility that they needed to be able to tackle local resource mobilization. As the first CEO of the KCDF explained: “Our main option at that point was to immediately embark on grant making” (KCDF 2005 Annual Report: 9). Grantmaking skills were, therefore, one of the first competencies that Ford imparted to its foundation grantees through its capacity-building efforts, mainly the API and the IISP.

Grantmaking skills, being institutional skills, are formal and easily transmitted through training. Ford was therefore successful at transferring them through the API, the IISP, and other Ford-sponsored peer-learning and networking structures. The AWDF, the KCDF, and TrustAfrica formed partnerships with local organizations (grantees) through which they solicited feedback to help them make their grants more effectively.

Donor-created and/or funded philanthropic institutions such as TrustAfrica, KCDF and AWDF that have well-established grantmaking skills and capabilities (based on their connections with local grant-seeking communities) tend to be seen as reputable, credible and authentic by international funders (even

Participant P. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 17, 2013

The relationship that the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies had with their local constituents was geared towards developing the latter as effective grant seekers and community project implementers; not as local donors.
if locals do not necessarily view them that way). International funders looking for viable and trusted intermediaries (partners) through which to get their funding to local communities sought out the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies, among others; a testament to their effectiveness as grant makers.

Moreover, the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies (like other donor-founded organizations) are usually easier for international funders to relate to, and partner with, than philanthropic institutions created by local people (without the isomorphic influence of international donors). A senior official of one of the Ford-founded African foundations under study described how their institution’s effectiveness at grantmaking and other bureaucratic functions attracted international partnerships and funding to it:

Most of our funding up to now has really come from foreign institutions because they want to do some work in Africa, but they don't have physical presence in the continent. They like what we are doing, they believe in our systems… and so they seem really comfortable...to come and get their programs supported through [our foundation].

The same official described how international donors would offer grants without being asked:

We actually have donors [that] have come to us and said: ‘Here are some resources for the work that you want to do’…. Most [international donors] want to work with us ... The majority of them have budgets that are bigger than ours and so all they want is... an association [with us].

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the millions of dollars that two of the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies under study successfully gave away (or channeled)

28 Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013
29 Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013
as grants to women’s organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) in various African countries.

Almost all of the grant money was raised from international donors (for regranting) as is shown in Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. In fact, the three Ford-founded/funded African philanthropies became so successful at channeling grants money to local organizations that they began to feel almost overwhelmed with the demands for local partnerships from international donors. Officials of the Ford-founded institutions under study expressed concern about the risk of mission drift associated with acting as intermediaries and channeling pass-through grants to carry out donors’ projects. As one of them explained:

We …actually find ourselves really inundated by some of these requests from outside to an extent that it might really kind of take us away from our core business...When you have groups that come with the money and they are supporting you, your priorities will kind of shift. And I mean, honestly, … that is what is happening, not just with [the Ford-founded philanthropies] but with a number of groups [in African countries] that depend on funding from outside…. That is [how] [foreign funding] can influence some of the programming. 30

In sum, as far as grantmaking effectiveness is concerned, the Ford Foundation was highly effective at transferring the grantmaking knowledge and skills that its foundation grantees needed to become successful grant makers. Ford’s success is seen in the grantmaking effectiveness of its foundation grantees, and how much attention and funds the AWDF, TrustAfrica and the KCDF have attracted from international donors, relative to funds mobilized from local sources.

30Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013
Resource Mobilization Effectiveness

One of Ford’s rationales for establishing philanthropic foundations in developing countries was to stimulate the mobilization of local resources. Local resource mobilization was not only expected to raise money for self-reliant community-driven development in the selected countries; it was also expected to become an avenue for community mobilization, building organizational social capital, and strengthening civil society. As Ford explained:

To be rooted in community, a foundation’s resources must at least in part come from that community....A primary objective was for grantees to diversify their funding sources — facilitating broader accountability and community participation. In this conceptualization, fundraising is not only a means of building the institution’s budget but also a way to build social capital within the community, strengthening the institution’s relationships and reputation (The Ford Foundation 2006:16).

It was, therefore, important for Ford to ensure that the philanthropic foundations that it had established in African countries acquired the necessary skills and competencies to carry out effective resource mobilization (both international and local), but especially local. As part of the capacity building support of the API, Ford funded training in resource mobilization for its foundation grantees. In 2003, for example, Ford funded Resource Alliance, Inc., a US-based organization, to implement “a program of research and training in fundraising for NGOs in Eastern Africa,” including the Ford-founded philanthropies (The Ford Foundation 2003 Annual Report: 99). Also, as part of the IISP,

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31 As mentioned in Chapter I, resource mobilization in contexts outside the United States has an international and local dimension. This study therefore distinguishes between funds raised from international sources and those mobilized from local sources, since local resource mobilization is the focus of the study.

32 Organizational social capital acquired through community mobilization and constituency-building are deemed to be prerequisites for boosting local resource mobilization. See Hager et al. (2004) and Schneider (2009)
Ford brought in experts in strategic communication to take the participants through principles of fundraising and donor relations.

**Success at Transferring International Fundraising Skills**

As a result of the trainings in formal proposal writing and fundraising that Ford provided its foundation grantees through the API and the IISP, as well as the peer-learning and networking opportunities that were always part of these initiatives, its three African foundation grantees under study became very effective and successful at securing funding from international donors.\(^\text{33}\) The Ford Foundation remained their main long-term funder until 2010, when it ended its foundation-building and philanthropy promotion program in developing countries. And due to their relationship with Ford, their grantmaking effectiveness, as well as their management, and board effectiveness (as described above), the Ford-founded African foundations became attractive as intermediaries for pass-through grants from international donors looking to benefit from their local expertise. This increased the amounts of money that they raised from international donors, though most of it was restricted for specific projects of the donors’ choosing.

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the millions of dollars that the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF) and TrustAfrica succeeded in raising from external sources during the stated years. From 2004-2010, the AWDF raised a total of $30,398,218; almost 98% of which was from international sources. Likewise, from 2006 to 2010,

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\(^{\text{33}}\)The Ford-founded/funded African foundations indicated that the proposal writing and other formal fundraising skills that they learned from the API and IISP were more suitable for raising money from international sources than for mobilizing resources from local individuals and groups. However, the formal skills were useful for soliciting funds from some local institutional donors such as banks.
TrustAfrica raised almost a hundred percent of its resources from international sources. It was in 2006 that TrustAfrica became a full-fledged foundation after its incubation at the Ford headquarters. It was in 2010 that the Ford Foundation ended its philanthropy promotion and foundation-building program in developing countries. The Kenyan Community Development Foundation (KCDF) was no different. Having benefitted from the API as well as the IISP, it acquired the skills and developed the credibility to equally attract almost 98% of its funding from international sources.

**Ford’s Inability to Catalyze Local Resource Mobilization**

Unlike its effectiveness in helping the three African foundations under study to successfully raise relatively huge sums of international funds as shown above, Ford was unsuccessful in providing them with the adaptive capacity that they needed to be able to build local donor bases and constituencies; to make them attractive to local donors. Despite their objective of supporting the participating foundations to mobilize the bulk of their resources locally, the API and IISP were structured more for the transfer of formal skills. They, therefore, reinforced and strengthened the participating foundations along the formal dimensions of effectiveness discussed earlier. Ford did not (or could not) provide local resource mobilization support to its transplants in the predominantly informal contexts of their various countries. Local resource mobilization, being dependent on each participating foundation’s local socio-cultural and socio-economic environment and context, was beyond the reach of formal standardized strategies and

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34 The Ford Foundation set up TrustAfrica with $30 million to be distributed to it over ten years.
skills training modeled on successful initiatives from the US. A former Ford consultant described the limitations of the initiative when it came to local resource mobilization:

You couldn't do a session on … [local] fund mobilization to suit everybody. And …probably fund mobilization was one of the weakest parts [of the IISP] because everyone needed different types of strategies according to…[where and why] they were trying to raise local money.

The officials of the three Ford-founded African philanthropies who participated in this study stated that the resource mobilization skills and techniques that were imparted to them through the API and IISP were often “Western-oriented”, more suited for use in developed economies such as the US, than for use in their own developing countries and informal local contexts. One of them described the capacity-building trainings thus:

The things they talked about were very Western-oriented... But it is not peculiar to Ford. In the philanthropic world (the work I have done up to now) … more than half of the things are… tailored to suit the developed countries, and I don't fault them. That is what they know; that is what they've experienced; that's what has worked for them.

A former Ford consultant underscored the unsuitability of the formal fundraising trainings for local resource mobilization; and described how local donors cared little for the types of formal resource mobilization skills that international donors like Ford instilled in their grantees in developing countries:

One of the things that I found so interesting, working in the field [in Sub-Saharan Africa] for a number of years now, …is that everyone (African NGO leaders and development practitioners included) is so conditioned to talking about logical frameworks and all that kind of thing. But that crowds out everything one might...think of creatively; about what resources one could mobilize locally. … All around the [developing]
world ... there really has been a big cultural shift to stop producing log frames because local donors don't want to see them.\textsuperscript{38}

The skills and strategies that organizations needed to raise money from private foundations were generic, formulaic and easy:

A lot of [organizations] [will continue to seek] international funding as long as it is easier to get the money, easier to write proposals...It is easier to write grant proposals for private foundations [than it is to solicit donations from local sources]. [You don't have] to answer a lot of difficult questions... It is really easy.\textsuperscript{39}

In contrast, unlike the ease of writing proposals to secure international funding, what is needed to mobilize resources from local individuals and groups is more complex:

Fundraising locally uses a completely different set of tools and strategies and messages. ...To look someone in the eye from your own country or community and say, 'trust me to do the right thing with your money', is a different kind of dynamic; and it really kind of requires an entrepreneurial spirit and a vision.\textsuperscript{40}

Having an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ and ‘vision’ are qualities that are also needed to embed transplanted philanthropic institutions in the local cultures of giving and espouse organizational values that make sense to prospective donors in African countries to facilitate local resource mobilization. Scholars have found that transplants’ successful performance in host countries depends on the extent to which the recipient population is able to stamp their own ideas and meaning on the new concept.

This is corroborated by a senior official of one of the Ford-founded/funded African philanthropies under study who explained that raising money from local individuals in African countries was indeed more complicated. Among other things, it is

\textsuperscript{38}Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013
\textsuperscript{39}Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013
\textsuperscript{40}Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013
based on place of origin; and needs knowledge and skills beyond proposal writing and other formal fundraising strategies borrowed from developed economy contexts and thinking. He explained that:

In most cases [individual donors in this African country] … want to know that that child, or that woman, or that young person [you are supporting] is from their village, or that the community where they come from is benefitting from what you are doing. And you [have to] demonstrate to them and say: "Where do you come from?" "I come from the Western part of [the country]." "Here are twenty or thirty local community initiatives that we (this foundation) are working with." And [hopefully] … one of them will relate to their village.41

Local resource mobilization, therefore, called for context-specific culturally-sensitive capacity-building support. Notwithstanding this need for local acculturation, Ford’s long-term institutional development and capacity building support did not include resources for its foundation grantees to secure the services of staff with experience in the complex area of local resource mobilization. As the major funders of the African foundations were Ford and other international and institutional donors, proposal writing was the main fundraising tool. Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 do show that the formal fundraising approach worked well for fundraising from international and institutional donors. By 2010 the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies had succeeded in raising large sums of international money.

Conversely, the tables also show that during the period under study Ford’s foundation grantees mobilized few of their resources locally. Neither the API nor the IISP were capable of imparting the kind of socio-cultural knowledge, “entrepreneurial spirit”, and grounding that the Ford-founded transplanted philanthropies needed to be effective at carrying out their local resource mobilization functions. The next section provides a

41Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013
focused assessment of the local resource mobilization readiness and effectiveness of the three Ford-founded/funded philanthropies under study.

**The Ford-Founded Philanthropies’ Failure to Tap into Local Resources**

Almost two decades after Ford established them and tried to build their capacity for local resource mobilization effectiveness (through the API and IISP), the Ford-founded/funded African foundations under study were still not tapping into resources from within their respective countries or within the African continent; as had been expected of them. Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 show that during the stated years the AWDF, TrustAfrica, and the KCDF each mobilized less than 3% of their funding from local sources. A senior official of one of the African foundations described the state (and status) of the transplanted African philanthropies with respect to local resource mobilization:

> Basically… we have reached a stage where African foundations cannot only be receiving [resources] from the developed countries; but must tap into their own. … This should have happened like yesterday and it still hasn't happened; and the need is [even] greater today than it was yesterday. So how do we tap into our own [resources]? What do we need to put in place [to be able to tap into local resources]? What resources can they (the Ford Foundation and other international funders) give us [for that purpose]? We need the resources…the support.

A senior official of another Ford-founded/funded African foundation described how (despite the API and the IISP) they still had little understanding of how to tap into local resources to ensure their long-term financial sustainability:

> We still need to get a better understanding of resource mobilization opportunities on the continent… as well as the [actual] practice of mobilizing resources locally... So that African foundations like

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42By 2013 when this interview was conducted
43Participant N. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 18, 2013
TrustAfrica, KCDF, Southern African Trust and...AWDF, can all become a lot more resource sustainable and mobilize resources within Africa...  

The comment below from another senior official of one of the African Ford-founded philanthropies described how their foundation received queries from the public for its heavy dependence on outside money, despite the effort it had made to cast itself as an authentic “in Africa, by Africans, for Africans” philanthropic institution:

There is money in the continent; the challenge is how to tap into that money …The question of funding [from local sources] [is] still a challenge... [Though] we look African, we talk African, we do everything in an African manner, money is still largely from outside. [So] people say [to us]: “Oh... you are in Africa, you are led by Africans, but your money comes from outside…?”

By all accounts, then, at the time Ford ended its foundation-building and philanthropy-promotion program in developing countries in 2010, all the three Ford-founded philanthropies under study were still highly dependent on the Ford Foundation and other international donors for almost 100% of their resources.

*Lack of Capacity for Local Resource Mobilization*

In terms of capacity for local resource mobilization, all the three Ford-founded African philanthropic institutions --- AWDF, TrustAfrica, and KCDF --- had few internal institutional structures in place dedicated to local fund development and local resource mobilization by the time Ford brought its philanthropy promotion program in developing countries to an end in 2010. There was little support from the Ford Foundation (and the other international donors) to tackle the more complex task of helping its foreign philanthropic transplants to build the internal capacity needed to carry out local fund

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44Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 20, 2013.
45Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013
development; as well as local resource mobilization in the African (philanthropic) institutional environment. An official of one of the Ford-founded philanthropies explained the organization’s predicament regarding its capacity for local resource mobilization:

Internally one of the challenges we have found with local resource mobilization (whether you are dealing with individuals, with companies, or with families) is that you need dedicated capacity within [the foundation], and that's a big challenge. … We realized that we needed a good database; that we needed to invest in software; that we needed to invest in individuals. In fact, this year we moved to have one person to work with me on corporate fundraising; and then retained a different person on institutional fundraising; so that we now have dedicated capacity on both. But these are not the normal typical positions that you can convince a donor to pay for. It [has been] a challenge institutionally to develop the capacity to follow through [with the development of local] philanthropic giving. …

Moreover, the ease of raising large amounts of international money (as opposed to the complexity of raising local money in the predominantly informal environment of African countries) encouraged the transplanted philanthropies to focus on mobilizing international funding as long as that money was available to them. A senior official of one of the African philanthropies knowledgeable about the Ford Foundation’s strategies in developing countries summarized Ford’s failure with regards to helping its foundation grantees to build their capacity for local resource mobilization:

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46This would be equivalent to local constituency-building and the cultivation of local donor bases
472013 when this interview was conducted. This is three years after the Ford Foundation, under President Ubiñas, stopped funding Ford’s global philanthropy promotion program. It took this long (and the cessation of Ford funding) for this organization (and the other Ford-founded/funded African philanthropies) to realize that they needed to have the internal capacity and dedicated staff to mobilize local resources.
48They still had no staff responsible for developing and attracting local individual donors
49Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013
50Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013. Also, Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013
[There was] very little on building or strengthening the [local] resource mobilization capacities of these organizations, whether they were philanthropic organizations like TrustAfrica or … NGOs.\(^{51}\)

**Ceased Ford Funding and Local Resource Mobilization**

One outcome of Ford’s abrupt ending of the IISP along with its philanthropy promotion program in developing countries in 2010 was that it forced some of its African foundation grantees to give very serious consideration to diversifying their funding sources. It was after these foundations went through the “traumatic”\(^{52}\) experience of losing their founder and largest funder (Ford) that some of them\(^{53}\) began to take serious steps towards developing structures for mobilizing local resources. At that point they felt compelled to begin investing in their internal capacity for the mobilization and management of local resources. For example, it was after 2010 that the KCDF hired staff specifically for local resource mobilization.\(^{54}\)

Even then, the KCDF and the AWDF did not go far enough with local resource mobilization, as they continued to depend heavily on other international donors who stepped in to fill the gap that had been created by the Ford

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\(^{51}\)Participant C. Phone interview with author, June 19, 2013.

\(^{52}\)This is how one of the senior officials of the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies described how her organization experienced Ford’s abrupt cessation of funding.

\(^{53}\)In 2013 when the interviews were conducted TrustAfrica was the one African IISP participant that was making little effort to mobilize local resources after the initiative was terminated. That was because it still had access to funds from the $30 million that Ford had committed to giving it at its establishment. The other two IISP participants (the AWDF and the KCDF) were acutely aware of the dangers of depending on a few international funders for the bulk of their resources and were trying various strategies for cultivating local donors and for building their endowment funds as best they could.

\(^{54}\)Participant H. Phone interview with the author, Sept. 11, 2013. Significantly, the new hires for local resource mobilization were to work on raising money from local corporations and institutions. No staff was hired as yet to focus on soliciting donations from local individuals; despite the fact that one of the aims of Ford’s local philanthropy promotion program (the establishment of foundations such as the KCDF and TrustAfrica) in African countries was to encourage local African philanthropy, for individuals to give in a big way for public purposes; for community mobilization and the strengthening of civic participation.
Foundation (and other international funders that also ended their support by 2010). In fact, the year Ford ended its funding support, the KCDF increased its grantmaking budget as a result of increased support from other international donors. As the KCDF’s board chairman mentioned in the 2010-11 Annual Report:

The direct impact [of the 2008 financial crisis] on KCDF was that a number of traditional funders who have been supporting KCDF from its inception had to phase out their support... The investments made over the years in strengthening the systems and structures in KCDF have paid dividends as new funders find KCDF an attractive partner to work with. This led to a … budget increase of 63% making it possible for the foundation to widen its reach to more communities (KCDF 2010 Annual Report:2).

The KCDF and the other African IISP participants effectively continued to receive the bulk of their support (notably funds for regranting) from other international funders that were looking for efficient and credible local partners. The Ford-founded/funded African foundations (having benefited from the formal training of the API and IISP) were among the best candidates for such partnerships with international donors. With so much international funding available for regranting, local resource mobilization continued to be a challenge for the Ford-founded/funded African philanthropies.

Besides local resource mobilization, endowment-building was the other area where Ford’s foundation-building and local philanthropy promotion effort in African countries faced challenges. Endowment-building was dependent to a large degree on local resource mobilization which turned out to be problematic. With some support from the Ford Foundation, the Ford-founded philanthropies were expected to build endowment

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55 This was referred to as ‘serial dependency’ by a KCDF staff writing in the foundation’s 2005-06 Annual Report, p. 26
56 The Ford Foundation, which had been the KCDF’s largest funder since its establishment, was the major funder pulling out around this time.
funds from local money, as was the practice in the US. The next section addresses the
endowment-building effectiveness of the three Ford-founded/funded African
philanthropies under study ---AWDF, KCDF and TrustAfrica.

**Endowment-Building Effectiveness**

Ford had set out to replicate itself by attempting to build endowed
philanthropic foundations in African countries.\(^{57}\) Endowment-building was an
integral part of the institutional model that Ford propagated in the selected
African countries. It was Ford’s main tactic for supporting the long-term financial
sustainability of its foundation-grantees in these countries. Endowment-building
was, therefore, high on the objectives of both the API and the IISP.\(^{58}\) In preparing
for the launching of the IISP, Ford had stated that its role in the initiative would
include “participating in, perhaps leading a campaign to increase substantially the
endowments of these foundations.”\(^{59}\) However, during the actual implementation
of the IISP, Ford only offered its African foundation grantees matching grants to
challenge them to mobilize local resources for their endowment funds.\(^{60}\) The fact

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\(^{57}\)Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013

\(^{58}\)Endowment-building had also been central in the foundation’s initiatives for US-based foundation
grantees.

\(^{59}\)The Ford Foundation. Inter-Office Memorandum from Linetta Gilbert, Sushma Raman, and Christopher
Harris (co-chairs of the Philanthropy Learning Group) to Susan V. Berresford (Ford President).

\(^{60}\)According to Ngondi-Houghton (2005) and Lukalo-Owino (2008), one of the reasons why the Kenyan
NGO elites went along with Ford’s idea of establishing a community foundation (even though they did not
understand the concept at the time) was Ford’s promise that it would provide the Kenya Community
Development Foundation (KCDF) with grants to build an endowment fund. The attractiveness of the idea
was that the proposed endowment fund would provide a permanent source of funding for grantmaking and,
therefore, would make frequent fundraising from local individuals unnecessary. However, to the
disappointment of the Kenyans, Ford’s endowment grants were not given outright, but were structured as
challenge grants. This meant that the KCDF was required to raise a stipulated matching amount from local
sources before Ford would release the promised amount. Among other things, the misunderstanding over
the promise of an endowment grant (that turned out to be a challenge grant) soured the relationship between
the KCDF and its founder, the Ford Foundation (Lukalo-Owino 2008).
that its foundation grantees in Africa and other parts of the developing world were having serious problems with local resource mobilization was not taken into account. Ford had successfully utilized matching grants to promote endowment-building among foundations in the US and expected them to work just as successfully in Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, and the African continent in general.

Out of the three Ford-founded/funded philanthropies under study, only the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) had, by 2010, succeeded in building a small endowment fund. Whereas Ford prioritized the building of endowment funds as a critical component of foundations and assumed that all its foundation grantees would need to build one, not all of its African foundation grantees saw endowment-building as a priority in their local context and under their circumstances. The African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF) and TrustAfrica, for instance, took the endowment-building support, but did not build endowment funds as expected. TrustAfrica maintained a reserve fund rather than an endowment fund, while AWDF eventually diverted the IISP endowment grant towards a different (and what they considered to be a more appropriate and urgent) need. It chose to expand its grantmaking program instead. According to one of the senior officials of the AWDF:

Ford gave us the [endowment challenge grant] of $3 million of which we had to raise $1.5 million. … For most endowments you are not allowed to…spend the capital, you know…But we said we were going to spend it immediately; it's not money that we were going to invest. Because we were able to raise this money, we could scale up a certain area of work

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61 At $5.42 million (US) by 2010, according to the KCDF 2010-11 Annual Report. As endowments go, this is a relatively small endowment fund. This amount includes what belonged to local Kenyan communities (and families) that had built their own endowment funds (equivalent to donor-advised funds) and placed them with KCDF to manage. The KCDF counted all those funds under its care as part of its own endowment fund.
62 A reserve fund had fewer restrictions than an endowment fund.
63 At first Ford insisted that the endowment-building challenge grant be matched with only funds raised from local sources. But eventually it relented based on the African foundations’ local resource mobilization.
that we have been doing. So, for example, the huge amount of money we raised built our grantmaking program to almost double the size of what it was. So that money made a significant impact on the work that we are currently doing. And so, we said we would spend [the endowment grant] down immediately; it would not be confined [as in] the American endowment model. 

The fact that only the KCDF had an endowment fund resembling what Ford expected is an indication that the AWDF and TrustAfrica had been less than effective (from the start) at endowment-building, in spite of Ford’s support through the IISP. The Kenyan foundation’s relatively more successful experience with endowment-building will provide our empirical evidence and illustrate the extent of Ford’s effectiveness at promoting endowment-building effectiveness among its African foundation grantees.

*Ford, the KCDF, Challenge Grants and Endowment-Building*

Lukalo-Owino (2008) recounts how, after Ford staff from the United States traveled to Kenya to explain the concept of the endowed grantmaking foundation to Kenyan NGO leaders and elites, the latter agreed that the proposed local community foundation would eventually be able to raise enough local resources for its work, and for an endowment fund as well. They reasoned that since Kenyans were accustomed to contributing to *harambee* and other local forms of fundraising, they would be just as happy to make contributions to the transplanted Ford-founded philanthropic institution. They, however, quickly

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challenges and accepted matches raised from international donors. The AWDF therefore raised the bulk of its $1.5 million match from other international donors.

64Participant P. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 18, 2013

65A senior staff of the KCDF described *harambee* thus: “People raised money within the community to send children to school, particularly universities; and that is how many Kenyans in the early days managed to go to Europe and America to study. People raised money for air-tickets and for the students’ upkeep abroad. ...The same concept is replicated in funerals, in weddings, in all other social initiatives...in the communities.” Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013
found out that they had been mistaken about the ease with which local Kenyans would take to the transplanted foundation model as a vehicle for their charitable giving for community development (Lukalo-Owino 2008).

Just like the AWDF and TrustAfrica, endowment-building proved to be an onerous task for the KCDF. In its 2005 Annual Report, the foundation’s board chair observed, “The biggest challenge facing KCDF after 10 years of its progressive establishment is the creation of an endowment fund to meet its running and project costs”. He noted also that “the foundation still has a challenge to build an endowment fund big enough that its yields will be sufficient to run its secretariat (which reaches out to communities country wide)” (KCDF 2005 Annual Report p. 5).

To support its endowment building, Ford offered the KCDF an endowment challenge grant of $650,000 (The Ford Foundation 2006) for which the latter had to raise local funds to the tune of $162,500 (25% of the amount) over four years (Lukalo-Owino 2008). When the KCDF asked individuals and local companies to contribute to the endowment fund, it was met with resistance. They were accustomed to giving through the harambee system, not through the new philanthropic organization promoting endowment funds:

The Ford Foundation had provided a matching endowment grant of US $650,000 --- about fifty million shillings at the time. …The Management Committee came up with an asset development strategy but met a lot of resistance on the ground when it tried to implement it. People were used to

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66Ford had originally wanted the KCDF to raise 50% of the challenge grant to qualify for the endowment grant but relented and reduced the match to 25% when KCDF pleaded that, as a new and unfamiliar philanthropic institution in the country, it would be a difficult task to raise such a huge amount from local sources in only four years (Lukalo-Owino (2008: 40).

67While the KCDF was being incubated by the Aga Khan Foundation a Management Committee governed the organization until it came into its own in 2001 and instituted a Board of Directors.
giving to causes… through the *harambee* system, but they would not buy into the concept of giving for [an endowment fund] (Lukalo-Owino 2008:40).

Ford had previously employed challenge grants successfully to encourage the participating foundations in its US-based philanthropic initiatives (the Leadership Program (LP) and the Rural Development and Community Foundation Initiative (RDCF)) to boost their endowment funds. They all succeeded in increasing their asset base, thanks to Ford’s challenge grants. Ford, therefore, believed that its foundation grantees in African countries would also be able to use the matching grants strategy to attract local resources for their endowment-building.

The matching/challenge grants that Ford offered to the African foundations as an incentive for endowment-building attracted few local donors. The senior staff of the foundations under study listed some of the local realities that made it difficult for them to convince local donors to contribute towards endowment-building, the matching grants notwithstanding. For example, the few local donors who were willing to make contributions to the KCDF refused to give to the endowment fund; they would prefer to give towards grantmaking to solve serious immediate problems. Looking at the local context and the current socio-economic problems at hand such as unemployment, food insecurity, and poverty it felt inappropriate to talk about an endowment fund. A senior official of the KCDF recounted the difficulty they had trying to ask people for contributions towards the endowment fund:

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68The American foundations that had participated in the LP and the RDCF were each able to mobilize local resources to raise their assets from an average of $3-$5 million when the initiatives began, to at least $10 million at the end, with the help of the Ford Foundation challenge grants (Ford Foundation 2006).
First of all, … we still have people who are unemployed; we still have very low incomes and very high inflation rates. Children need to go to school, families need to eat, food security is a challenge, and youth need employment skills... All these things are needed today. …And upon all that [we have to say to] somebody that, ‘I want you to give me ten shillings …to keep…somewhere forever in order to help you in the future?’ They can’t understand what you are talking about …Because you can't tell somebody, ‘give me some money to keep in my bank to spend next year’; while they are starving.69

The endowment-building problem expressed above was corroborated by Hodgson (2013):

Selling the concept of endowments [to local populations] … was …difficult. In times of dire poverty, how could it be justifiable to lock money up in perpetuity, spending only the income it earned? And in an environment of distrust of institutions, … how could people be convinced to place their faith not only in the current leadership of an institution, but that of the future too? (Hodgson 2013:371)

Like the individuals, local Kenyan corporations showed little interest in the idea that the Ford Foundation would match their donation if they contributed to the KCDF endowment fund:

When you tell companies…to contribute to you because somebody is going to match the money they contribute, [they] don't see why they should give you money to put into a fund that is to be invested. They will rather give you money to be used immediately… The people we were talking to were not willing generally to contribute towards endowments, even if their contribution would allow us to get a match from Ford. They just did not believe in that strategy.70

Nevertheless, the KCDF managed to raise the total matching amount over the four-year period to meet the challenge71, amidst some disagreements with the

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69Participant S. Face-to-face interview with author, July 15, 2013
70Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013
71The KCDF eventually received a huge donation from another international funder (the Bernard van Leer Foundation) to help it make the match, to enable it to qualify for the endowment grant from Ford (Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013). Initially Ford tried to reject that match because it was not all from local sources but eventually relented, considering the difficulties that KCDF was encountering trying to raise local money.
Ford Foundation. By the end of the 2010-11 fiscal year, with support from Ford’s matching grants, KCDF’s endowment fund stood at $5.42 Million, of which 78% belonged to KCDF, the remaining 22% being funds that Kenyan communities and families established with the KCDF (KCDF 2010-11 Annual Report:1).

The KCDF succeeded in its endowment-building, where its two West-African counterparts failed, because KCDF quickly learned from its initial mistake of trying to use the matching grant in the way that Ford had intended (based on its US experience). It had initially asked people to contribute to its own endowment fund, with the promise that Ford would give the KCDF extra money if they gave. When the KCDF found that people would not contribute to its endowment fund (regardless of the matching grant) it decided to attract local contributions to endowment-building through a strategy that took account of local giving values and practices and made sense to the local communities. Rather than persist in trying to build its own endowment fund (that few would contribute to) the KCDF decided to offer Ford’s matching grants to the local communities to entice them to set up community endowment funds for their own communities’ benefit, not KCDF’s or the general Kenyan public. For every shilling that communities contributed to their own endowment fund, KCDF gave them a shilling (from the Ford matching grant). Though KCDF would manage the investment of the community funds, the returns on the investment would be controlled by the contributing communities for their own development projects.

The KCDF’s creative endowment-building strategy worked, as it was easier to convince people to build endowment funds for the sustainable
development of their own specific communities of origin, than it was to talk them into contributing towards the KCDF’s endowment for the future development of Kenyan communities in general. However, in principle, since the funds had to be lodged with the KCDF for investing, the latter counted the community and legacy funds as part of its endowment fund. By adapting its strategies to suit the local context, therefore, KCDF was able to build an endowment fund (albeit a small one) where its counterparts failed.

Given that of all Ford’s foundation grantees in African countries only the KCDF was able to build an endowment fund by 2010, I conclude that Ford failed to meet its objective of building endowed grantmaking foundations in African countries. By using the challenge/matching grant as a tactic for catalyzing endowment-building among its African foundation grantees, Ford may have eventually accomplished its goal of leveraging its resources. However, it did not accomplish its goal of stimulating substantial local philanthropic giving to its local foundation grantees for community mobilization, and for their own long-term financial sustainability. Restricted as they were to endowment-building, Ford’s challenge grants did not promote local giving to its foundation grantees; as it turned off many potential local donors who believed that the idea of putting their donations away for years amidst current dire need was senseless.

In general, therefore, Ford’s attempt to promote endowment-building as an essential component of foundation-building and local philanthropy development in African countries failed. As pointed out elsewhere, endowment-building

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72 Scholars such as Frumkin (2006) have described matching/challenge grants as one of the tactics that foundations employ to leverage their resources in order to make their money go farther.
73 Participant H. Phone interview with author, Sept. 11, 2013 and Participant S. Face-to-face interview with author, July 15, 2013
effectiveness is closely associated with local resource mobilization effectiveness; so, once the Ford-founded philanthropies had challenges developing local funding bases and mobilizing local resources, they automatically also had challenges building viable endowment funds to meet Ford’s requirements. More importantly, Ford’s insistence on endowment-building was without regard to the socio-economic context and circumstances of the relevant African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s. It was an example of the Ford Foundation’s top-down philanthropy promotion strategies, as well as the disconnect between the institutional philanthropy model that it transplanted in African countries and the local philanthropic landscape.

**Conclusion**

Chapter III dealt with the Dependent/Outcome Variable. Using the dimensions of foundation effectiveness identified in Chapter I, I assessed the Ford Foundation’s effectiveness in attaining its philanthropy promotion and foundation-building goals in African countries in the 1990s and 2000s; notably its goal of catalyzing large-scale local giving through its formal philanthropies. The dimensions included managerial, governance, grantmaking, resource mobilization (local and international), and endowment-building effectiveness.

The analysis showed that whereas Ford was able to successfully equip its foundation grantees under study with the requisite personnel, skills, and competencies for managerial, board, grantmaking and international fundraising effectiveness, it was unsuccessful at helping to prepare them for local fund development and local resource mobilization; as well as endowment-building. This was illustrated with tables showing
that all the three Ford-founded/funded philanthropies under study (which it established and/or funded to catalyze local giving for self-reliant development) were very successful at attracting “pass-through” international funding for regranting; but raised very few of their resources from local sources. By 2010, therefore, when Ford ended its philanthropy promotion program in developing countries, its African foundation grantees were highly dependent on the foundation and other international donors for the bulk of their funding.

Chapter III concluded that the Ford Foundation ultimately failed in its attempt to use the formal American-inspired endowed philanthropic foundation model to catalyze the mobilization of bulk philanthropic resources in the (different and predominantly informal) institutional context of African countries. I showed that Ford used the API and the IISP (modeled on previous Ford initiatives in the US) to successfully transfer the formal organizational skills necessary for running the formal philanthropic institutions that it transplanted in African countries; but that the two Ford capacity-building initiatives were not designed to help the transplants adapt to the informal local philanthropic landscape and contexts of African countries.

The next chapter explains why the Ford Foundation failed in its attempt to use the American-inspired philanthropic foundation model to catalyze large-scale local philanthropic giving in African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Chapter IV: Why Ford Failed to Meet its Local Resource Mobilization Objective

Introduction

The previous empirical chapters described and analyzed what the Ford Foundation did to implement its philanthropy promotion and foundation-building program in African countries. In particular, Chapter III analyzed the extent of Ford’s effectiveness in achieving its local philanthropy promotion goal in African countries by examining the effectiveness of its foundation grantees --- the KCDF, AWDF and TrustAfrica --- at various functions, including local resource mobilization. The criteria that I used to judge the success and financial sustainability of the Ford-founded/funded African foundations were not limited to the extent to which the transplanted institutions possessed a good governance structure, good grantmaking programs, or how much impact they were having on the lives of the local communities to which they channeled international resources.¹ My criteria included whether or not these foundations were able to mobilize the bulk of their resources (more than 50% of total revenue) from local sources.

In that sense, the mobilization of local resources being at the core of their founding, I treat the inability of the Ford-founded African philanthropies to attract at least 50% of their total revenue from local sources as a failure.² By extension, since Ford’s objective was to build African foundations that would attract substantial local support for community-driven development, the Ford-founded philanthropies’ ineffectiveness at

¹Some scholars, including Golub (2000), assess the success of NGOs and CSOs in developing countries by their programs’ impact on recipients, regardless of their dependency on foreign funding. I argue that without the local resource mobilization element, donor-founded philanthropic institutions, such as those that Ford founded in Africa, would be no different from NGOs.
²In actual fact, as demonstrated in Chapter III, they raised less than 3% of their resources from local sources during the period under study.
local resource mobilization reflects Ford’s failure to meet its own philanthropy promotion objective of catalyzing the mobilization of substantial local philanthropic resources in African countries. The present chapter draws upon the evidence provided by Ford’s philanthropy promotion strategies and tactics (discussed in chapter II) as well as the effectiveness (or otherwise) of these on the local resource mobilization efforts of its African foundation grantees (as shown in chapter III) to explain why the foundation failed to achieve its local resource mobilization goal in African countries.

After transplanting the foreign model of philanthropic organization, there was still a chance for Ford to mitigate the transplantation shock to enhance the possibility of adaptation and local embeddedness in the African philanthropic landscape. That would have most probably made the transplanted philanthropic form attractive to the local populace. Instead, as discussed in chapter II, Ford assumed that what worked for the US-based foundations (in an environment where foundation philanthropy was part of the fabric of philanthropy) would equally work for foundations located in African countries (where foundation philanthropy was a foreign concept). This chapter draws on the evidence to explain, for example, how and why Ford’s failure to take contextual differences between the US and African countries into account in its philanthropy-promotion strategies and tactics contributed to the foundation’s failure to catalyze local philanthropy in African countries as it had set out to do.

To highlight the contextual differences and the institutional and philanthropic incongruence that accounted for Ford’s failure, I contrast the political economy from which the modern philanthropic foundation emerged in the United States with that of the African institutional landscape upon which it was imposed. I also juxtapose the
prevailing values and practices of African cultures of giving with those undergirding the foundation form of institutional philanthropy. The institutional and socio-cultural mismatch between the two contexts and systems of philanthropy then provides the backdrop for the analysis of the other factors that led to or contributed towards Ford’s failure to achieve its philanthropy promotion goal in African countries.

The first and overarching factor that explains Ford’s failure was its exportation of the American-inspired institutional philanthropy model as its vehicle for promoting and stimulating large-scale local African philanthropy.

**The Exportation of American Foundation Philanthropy**

The Ford Foundation’s very act of exporting the American-inspired foundation philanthropy model to African countries was the primary source of its failure to achieve its goal of promoting locally-supported and financially self-sustaining institutional philanthropy in those countries. Since the informal institutions of one country or culture cannot successfully undergird formal concepts and institutions borrowed from another country or context (North 1994), Ford’s transplanted formal philanthropic foundations could not find meaningful moral and/or financial support in the predominantly informal (and very different) African philanthropic landscape. According to a former Ford senior official Ford’s conception of philanthropy vis-à-vis the concept of philanthropy in African countries was a big challenge to local resource mobilization: “One big challenge was what we (Ford) meant by philanthropy”.3

The Ford-founded philanthropies’ lack of social embeddedness and local rootedness in African giving cultures (one of the reasons for their unattractiveness

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3Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
to local people as giving mechanisms) was blamed on Ford’s fixation with the
(foreign) philanthropic foundation model. A number of former Ford senior
officials stated that had Ford not been so bent on transplanting the American-
inspired endowed foundation model in African countries, and had it been flexible
and supported existing indigenous philanthropic organizational forms, the
resulting organizations might have been grounded in the local giving cultures and
faced fewer challenges attracting financial support from local constituents. One of
the former Ford senior officials explained it this way:

It’s certainly because we (Ford) put the emphasis on endowed staffed
substantial foundations; institutions … which cost money --- offices,
salaries, overheads and everything else … That puts more demands than
had [the philanthropic organizations] been less formal, less expensive,
more flexible entities of different kinds. …We could have done more to
address the [local resource mobilization issue] upfront by being much
more flexible about the kinds of initiatives that we were supporting. So
[that] they didn’t have to be a foundation even. We could have just
supported different forms of African philanthropy. 4

The same former Ford senior official acknowledged the tough situation in which Ford
had placed its foundation grantees with respect to local resource mobilization,
transplanting them as it did in areas with no history of such philanthropic institutions and
no grounding in local civil society. Expecting its exotic philanthropic seedlings to grow
and bear fruit in the unfamiliar African soil in which it had transplanted them was a tall
order:

It's tough...when you have a new institution, which doesn't have a track
record, which isn't strongly located in its own civil society, where there
isn't very much money, anyway… It is a very tough task to get [such
institutions] to raise substantial resources from their local environment. It
sounds great on paper, but it’s just very difficult to do.5

4Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
5Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
Another former Ford senior official also acknowledged that Ford’s creation of foundations in African countries based on an American model was problematic:

The mistakes of some of the kinds of foundations that got created on the ground was [due to the fact] that [Ford was] trying to model things that worked in the United States but won't necessarily work in … Africa. …When I came to [work at] the Ford Foundation… there were already some experimental Ford grants that had been made for [the establishment of a number of community foundations]. And for me that was problematic, because I did feel that this was a model that was being… picked up from somewhere and brought somewhere else.6

The inflexibility of Ford’s transplantation process made it even more difficult to adapt the form and functions of the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies to the local philanthropic landscape and the social values that would have made them more acceptable and adoptable to local donors:

Had we (Ford) been more flexible… and willing to countenance lots of different kinds of [philanthropic organizational] structures, with different cost bases, it would have been easier to approach the question of local resource generation.7

The main factor that worked against Ford’s attempt to promote large-scale local philanthropic resource mobilization in African countries was, therefore, the foundation’s exportation of the American-inspired philanthropic foundation form to the very different African philanthropic environment for the purpose. The next sub-section explains how Ford’s “heavy footprint” on its foundation grantees negatively impacted their local identity and chances of attracting local support.

**Negative Effects of Isomorphism on Local Foundations’ Identity**

The fact that Ford’s foundation grantees were incubated and trained (as part of the transplantation process) to operate and function like their foreign counterparts made them

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6Participant I. Phone interview with the author, October 1, 2013
7Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
to be perceived as foreign entities by the local populace. This meant (1) that their local constituents had difficulty identifying with them; and (2) that they were expected to be well-endowed with foreign money and not need local contributions. Their image as foreign institutions made them unattractive to local donors; ultimately jeopardizing Ford’s achievement of its local resource mobilization objective in African countries. The case of TrustAfrica, which was incubated by Ford for several years, is illustrative. A senior official of the foundation explained how TrustAfrica had to struggle to get out from under Ford’s shadow so as to be able to establish its own identity:

We were set up by the Ford Foundation, so for a long time we had the footprint, the thumbprint… of the Ford Foundation on us. We struggled. People [would say to us]: ‘Oh TrustAfrica, you mean the Ford Foundation, right?’ …Over the last seven years we've worked very hard…to a point where we now have our own identity. We are [no longer] simply an extension of the identity of our parent, the Ford Foundation.

However, the more serious consequence of institutional isomorphism and the identity ‘crisis’ that confronted Ford’s African foundation grantees was their lack of rootedness in the local soil. As “free-floating” (Ottaway 2000:81) organizations, they were disconnected from the prevalent African giving cultures and the values that motivate giving in those cultures. A senior official of one of the Ford-founded philanthropies described this situation --- of foundations in Africa imprinted with foreign identities, unreflective of African culture, and sustained by foreign funding --- as a stumbling block to the development of institutional philanthropy in Africa, and, thus, to local resource mobilization:

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8Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
9In general, people tend to give to organizations with which they can identify; and, in particular, African giving is often influenced by the identity of both the giver and the receiving individual or organization.
10Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 19, 2013
How do these organizations truly emerge as African foundations, as independent institutions, not just in financial terms but also in identity terms? [How do they emerge as] …foundations rooted in Africa, reflective of African reality, and reflective of African culture…? What is African about us [Ford-founded philanthropies]? [We should be] able to say that we are African because … most of our money comes from Africa; and …[that] we are organically connected to African issues. … [But we cannot]…Philanthropic institutions abroad can help grow the field [in Africa] [but they should] not leave their identities and footprints all over the place.  

Ford’s heavy ‘footprint’ on its foundation grantees (a result of the inflexible transplantation process and the use of institutional isomorphism) reinforced the transplants’ foreignness in the eyes of local people and complicated local adaptation. Social embeddedness is a prerequisite for attracting local donors to consider using the Ford-founded philanthropic institutions as channels for charitable giving.

**Negative Local Reactions to the Imposition of the Foundation Form**

In some African countries, the new foundations were met with skepticism and suspicion. In Kenya and South Africa, for instance, some people’s initial reaction to Ford’s establishment of community foundations was that of anger, as recalled by a former Ford consultant:

*When I started working in Kenya… on this (philanthropy promotion) agenda there were a lot of people who were angry and… hurt about the whole community foundation thing. It was really quite divisive, and in South Africa it was the same. You get people that say the word ‘community foundation’, and they spit the words out ... It was a bit like things had been shoved down people's throats.*

A former Ford senior official corroborated the suspicion that Ford’s foundation grantees elicited in some African countries:

*All we (Ford) wanted to do [was] plant the seed (of institutional philanthropy) and move out; let it be African-driven, African-owned. But*

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11Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 19, 2013

12Participant K. Phone interview with author, June 26, 2013
there was a lot of suspicion at the beginning. ...People thought KCDF was a foreign institution and, even within the board, there were …times of very intense tension….13

A senior staff of one of the Ford-founded philanthropies confirmed the public suspicion that met his organization’s establishment, attributing it to the public’s lack of knowledge about the imposed philanthropic model:

For me the suspicions were natural, particularly … because the concept of endowed foundations had never been an African thing. Other than the few [foreign ones] we knew -- Aga Khan, Rockefeller, Ford Foundation -- we didn't know any … African organization that was endowed. So, people were curious about whether or not this project was doomed to fail.14

The negative reactions and suspicions indicated a certain level of local (elite) discontent at the imposition of the foreign philanthropic form on their countries (and giving cultures). This did not augur well for the large-scale local giving that Ford was hoping would come to its foundation grantees.

*Easy Transfer of the Formal, Difficulty Impacting the Informal*

A related obstacle to Ford’s local philanthropy promotion efforts in African countries was the virtual impossibility of an external actor impacting the complex moral, religious, socio-economic, socio-cultural and political factors that shape and influence charitable giving in any context, including African countries. Managerial, governance, and grantmaking effectiveness (as well as international fundraising skills), being formal organizational skills and functions, are independent of the agency of local populations and are, for the most part, easily inculcated through formal capacity-building training and facilitated by cash transfers/grants. In contrast, local (philanthropic) resource

13Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013. Lukalo-Owino (2008) has documented the contentious relationship between Ford and the KCDF Board in the early years.
14Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013
mobilization and endowment-building effectiveness depend on the local giving cultures and the various forms of local philanthropic organization\textsuperscript{15}.

Also, by its very nature the context-specific capacity-building that the transplanted foundations needed to be effective at local resource mobilization could not be transferred at networking and peer-learning sessions, in the same way that other types of expertise could. Raising money from individuals and groups in African countries had to do with informal norms, beliefs and values, which, according to scholars such as North (1990) and others, are not easily transferable across socio-cultural lines. Ford’s ability to transfer the formal attributes of foundation effectiveness, and its inability to influence the informal African giving cultures in favor of its foundation grantees, constituted an obstacle to the local resource mobilization effectiveness of the latter. This is another instance of how Ford’s transplantation of the foundation model (and the ensuing incompatibility between that model and the informal African philanthropic terrain) undermined the foundation’s objective of catalyzing large-scale local African giving via its foundation grantees.

The above problems notwithstanding, the issue was not just that there were significant differences between the American institutional framework from which the philanthropic foundation form emerged and the African context in which it was transplanted. It was that Ford failed to take the contextual differences into account in devising and implementing its philanthropy-promotion strategies and capacity-building initiatives.

\textsuperscript{15}People’s cultures, values, and habits are informal by nature (North 1990)
Failure to Take Contextual Differences into Account

Being a socio-cultural as well as a socio-economic and political construct charitable giving is highly context-dependent and people-dependent. Aside from the mistake it made trying to use a foreign philanthropic form to promote local philanthropy in African countries, Ford’s failure to factor in the contextual differences between the American and African institutional landscapes was another big reason for its failure to achieve its local resource mobilization agenda in African countries. One former Ford senior official interviewed for this study acknowledged the importance of contextual differences in the development of local philanthropy; and the fact that Ford had not been ‘sensitive’ enough to those differences in its philanthropy promotion strategy:

There you [have] the problem of culture; culture and context. Just because something worked in Poland doesn't mean it will work in South Africa or vice versa. Probably we (Ford) should have been a bit more sensitive…to that fact.\(^{16}\)

Some of the contextual differences that Ford ignored, but which impaired local giving to the Ford-founded African philanthropies, were the differences in the social division of labor, as well as the socio-economic and socio-cultural environment. These included the differences between formal (foundation) philanthropy, on the one hand, and the informal philanthropy widely practiced in African cultures, on the other.

Differences in the Social Division of Labor

The social division of labor between the public and private sectors determines the role of philanthropy. Where the public sector is expected to (and does) provide most social services to citizens, individuals contribute little to philanthropy. In contrast, where the provision of social services is the purview of

\(^{16}\)Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
the private nonprofit sector, individuals are inclined to make charitable contributions to that sector. Unlike the United States where the socio-political culture has increasingly tried to limit the role of government in social and economic development, and has allocated that function to the private (for-profit and nonprofit) sector (Karl and Katz 1981; Prewitt 1999), the social division of labor in many African countries has tended to place the responsibility for social and economic development mainly on the public sector. In many African countries, where the government has long been the provider of basic services, there is typically a strong feeling that this responsibility remain the state’s, despite enormous cutbacks in governments’ provision of such services (Johnson et al. 2004:11).

Individuals, as well as traditional African philanthropic associations and organizations described in previous chapters (such as harambees, Hometown Associations, and Rotating Savings and Credit Organizations) do mobilize private resources for mutual aid and the development of their communities of residence or communities of origin. However, they do so as a coping mechanism in the absence of government action, not that they see it as their philanthropic responsibility. One former Ford senior official described the mentality of many of the individuals from whom the Ford-founded philanthropies tried to raise money:

[The Ford-founded philanthropies] found that the competitive advantage was with writing proposals [for international money], vis-à-vis going out there and getting [individuals] to give them money. Because at times [the

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17See for example Anheier and Salamon (2006) on the social origins of the nonprofit sector in various countries
18In reality the private nonprofit sector in the United States receives the bulk of its resources for social development from the public sector (see Salamon 1987)
19This is also referred to as “government-failure”.
people they approached] wondered: ‘Why should I give you money? Government is the one that's supposed to do this’.\textsuperscript{20}

This is in contrast to the US institutional environment and culture, where individuals and corporations are more willing to give to formal/professionalized philanthropies for public purposes because (among other things) it is the norm to do so.\textsuperscript{21}

Therefore, Ford’s building of foundations in African countries with the expectation that they would be able to attract local resources from individuals and corporations (just like in the US), without considering the differences in the political economy of the two contexts, was a mistake; one that hampered local giving to Ford’s foundation grantees. In most African countries where governments are expected to provide the bulk of social services, people tend to give to their place of worship and/or their hometown association, etc. to mitigate government failure, but tend not to give to professionalized philanthropic institutions that purport to do public work that the government is expected to perform in the first place.

\textit{Socio-Economic Contextual Differences}

Ford also failed to factor in the fundamental dissimilarity between the US economy out of which the modern philanthropic foundation emerged and continues to thrive and the economies of the African countries in which it transplanted the foundation model. This failure to take cognizance of the socio-economic differences between the US

\textsuperscript{20}Participant R. Phone interview with the author, Mar. 27, 2013
\textsuperscript{21}According to \textit{Giving USA} individuals contribute the largest amount to the philanthropic sector year in, year out.
and the host countries contributed to the foundation’s failure to achieve its local resource mobilization goal in those countries.\textsuperscript{22}

The emergence of modern endowed private foundations during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, such as the Russell Sage Foundation (1907), the Carnegie Corporation of New York (1911), the Rockefeller Foundation (1913), and the Ford Foundation (1936), coincided with the industrialization of the American economy and the enormous private wealth that business tycoons like John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie accumulated \cite{Nielsen1985, Berman1983, Schramm2006}.

When Frederick Goff created the first modern community foundation in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1914, it was to provide an efficient and effective mechanism for pooling the resources of Cleveland’s wealthy philanthropists, including their bequests, into a permanently endowed fund whose proceeds would be distributed and used for public purposes.

The foundation model (independent private foundations as well as community foundations), therefore, emerged in the United States thanks to the development of the capitalist free market economic environment in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries. That economic environment not only produced great wealth and facilitated the accumulation of that wealth by individuals \cite{Karl1981, Prewitt1999}, but it also created the need for efficient organizations to distribute that wealth for public purposes. According to Schramm:

\footnote{Current studies tend to cast the existing socio-economic characteristics of non-US contexts as deficiencies that need to be fixed to make way for the development of the imposed foundation model. They basically fault the host countries for not being like the US, for not having the necessary structures to provide the kind of financial resources that the US-inspired foundation model needs to function effectively. Unlike those studies, this dissertation posits that the existing conditions reflect those countries’ political economy and culture, which external development actors should take into account before intervening with the transplantation of foreign institutions.}

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[The American private foundation] arose as an institutional response to the rapid social, economic, and cultural changes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Before this, charitable endowments in the United States had operated largely at the local level and had focused on specific issues. Such an approach to charity and philanthropy, however, was not immune to the broad forces reshaping the country. These broad forces included a widespread and accelerating tendency toward organization, professionalization, and hierarchy. ...The evolving process of democratic capitalism thus necessitated the creation of the private foundation to bring a new approach to the changing needs and demands of society and apply the enormous wealth being created (Schramm 2006: 368).

The modern philanthropic foundation’s emergence in America was thus demand-driven, as it developed to solve the problem that excessively wealthy individuals faced, namely their need for efficient professionalized institutions to redistribute their immense wealth for the purpose of ameliorating the human condition.

In contrast, the creation of philanthropic foundations in African countries by Ford (and other major American foundations) in the 1990s was supply-driven, initiated by the external actors, and not demanded by local wealthy people looking to redistribute their wealth for public purposes. In fact, Ford transplanted the foundation model in African countries at a time when those economies were characterized by declining earnings from exports, stunted economic growth, and debt crises (Hyden 2006; van de Walle 2007). The Economist (2000) went as far as to describe the African continent during this period as “hopeless”. 23

Given their need for huge amounts of money and resources to function, Ford’s creation of professionalized foundations in African countries was without regard to the local socio-economic conditions of the selected African countries. One could say that, under the circumstances, Ford’s African foundation grantees

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were doomed to dependency on international donors, with few chances of ever being able to garner locally the huge amounts of money they require for operations, grantmaking, and endowment-building. In trying to replicate the endowed foundation model in Africa, Ford failed to consider the professional foundation’s need to be undergirded by wealth. It did not account for the fact that professionalized foundations imposed on developing economies (such as those in most of Africa) would have trouble asking local individuals and corporations (unfamiliar with them) to provide the substantial sums of money that such institutions would necessarily need to function. A former Ford senior official acknowledged that Ford should have considered the model’s requirement for huge sums of money before deciding to use it to promote institutional philanthropy in African countries:

To be effective [endowed grantmaking] foundations have to be quite large, not huge, but they have to have millions of dollars to give away…. Building an endowed grantmaking foundation… requires a lot of money… Most of these [African foundations that Ford built had no money and] were almost entirely funded by Ford … It was a mistake made by the Ford Foundation from the start. We should have done that differently.24

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the distressed economies of African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s, many had a middle class (Ngondi-Houghton 2005) and pockets of wealth in the hands of individuals (especially in countries like South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya). Ford could have used its convening power to bring some of these major wealth holders to the table to seek their support for its philanthropy-promotion program in African countries. Ford’s failure to involve (sensitize) African HNWIs25 and

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24Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
25High Net Worth Individuals
philanthropists shows that the foundation approached its philanthropy promotion task in African countries the same way it did in the US, without being concerned about where and how its foundation grantees would seek the huge amounts of money needed for their operations, grantmaking, and endowments-building. One of the former Ford senior officials interviewed for this study acknowledged that it was a mistake for Ford not to have reached out to African HNWIs for their buy-in and support, to enhance the success of its local resource mobilization objective in African countries:

We didn't think about leveraging money from large private donors in Africa...Business people --- the kind of...superrich that are now launching their own foundations in South Africa and elsewhere --- weren't really on [the foundation’s] radar screen in the mid-2000s... But, of course, they have a lot of money...[And] as far as I know they are not giving it to [local] foundations; they are spending it themselves [as operating foundations]. So... that was another mistake [not to have involved the wealthy African business people].

Had Ford taken account of the state of the African socio-economic environment (and the huge monetary requirements of the American endowed foundation model) it very well may have built upon and helped upscale the local forms of philanthropic organization --- self-organized, small-scale, and non-professionalized, with minimal overhead costs, and easier for local constituents to support (Ottaway 2000).

As it is, the very transplantation of the American-inspired foundation model without regard to the economic conditions in the selected African countries was a recipe for financial dependency. This partly explains why Ford’s foundation grantees failed to attract the kind of large-scale local resources they needed to become financially self-reliant and self-sustaining as Ford had set them up to be.

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26Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
Differences in Socio-Cultural Context and Philanthropic Landscapes

Just as it had failed to take account of the socio-economic differences, Ford also failed to consider the socio-cultural differences, with particular reference to its formal concept of philanthropy, and that held in many African cultures. The very fact that the foundation chose to use an American philanthropic organizational model as its means for orienting African giving practices towards large-scale formal giving implied Ford’s prioritization of the formal organizational values of the foundation model over the values of the informal African ways of organized giving. Chen et al. (2013) explain how organizational forms often express particular values:

All organizations reflect, enact, and propagate values. These values both shape and are shaped by the social worlds in which organizations are embedded. That is, values influence how organizations and their field, consisting of other organizations…operate (Chen et al. 2013:858)

In this case, the inherent mismatch between the values of the formal American foundation philanthropy model and those of the home-grown ways of philanthropic organization in African countries made Ford’s transplanted philanthropies unattractive to many Africans as appropriate channels for their charitable giving. I posit that Ford failed to achieve its local resource mobilization objective in African countries partly because its transplants espoused logics and values that were at cross purposes with many of those underpinning Africans’ giving practices.

For instance, the Ford-founded philanthropies under study (KCDF, TrustAfrica, and AWDF) espoused institutional logics and philanthropic values that included bureaucratic rules, division of labor, hierarchy, efficiency and effectiveness, universalistic over personalistic treatment (Chen et al. 2013), and a
detachment from the grant recipient (as relationships created through grantmaking are professional rather than personal). Other values that they enacted included unidirectional giving (as opposed to reciprocal giving) to unfamiliar people “across the board,”\(^{27}\) and instrumentality.\(^{28}\)

In contrast, the prevalent forms of giving in African societies and the values they engender (close social bonds, kinship, interpersonal reciprocal relationships, etc.) are closer to being expressive than instrumental. African giving cultures, mostly informal, enact values which depend on familiarity, repeated interactions and closeness. Charitable giving in those settings is used for strengthening personal, family, and communal relationships, the development of one’s own community, patron-client networks, and other social bonds (Hyden 2006). A senior official of one of the Ford-founded African foundations explained the peculiarity of African giving:

> We give to our brothers and sisters and our uncles and relatives; and give to funerals and to weddings. But when you tell us there’s a child somewhere whom we know nothing about, who needs to go to school, we tell you: ‘I don't know that one; I can't give you [money for that]’... We (the Ford-founded African foundations) are asking ourselves what the… enablers of organized [local] giving are. For example, how can we make citizens of Kenya responsive to the need to give across the board and break that barrier of ‘the person I know’?\(^{29}\)

Ford neglected to take these contextual differences into account in its effort to promote formal charitable giving in African countries. It tried to promote philanthropy for the benefit of the wider public; in cultures where (as described above) many donors will

\(^{27}\)Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013

\(^{28}\)Scholars of philanthropy, such as Frumkin (2006), differentiate between instrumental giving and expressive giving. Instrumental giving is giving that goes towards specific projects and objectives for public purposes; whereas expressive giving, as the name suggests, is when the donor uses her giving as a form of self-expression or to reinforce certain values that mean a lot to them, even if this does not result in specific measurable public works. Expressive giving focuses on what the giver gets out of their giving in the form of “psychic rewards” (Frumkin 2006).

\(^{29}\)Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013
generally only give to people they know or communities to which they are already affiliated.

Besides, unlike the prevailing African cultures of giving and philanthropic organizations which are self-regulating/enforcing and do not need a government-created formal “enabling environment” to function adequately, the Ford-founded philanthropies needed such an environment, as the model functions that way in the US. While the absence of a government-enacted regulatory, legal, and fiscal framework for charitable giving has been cited as an obstacle to the development of formal philanthropic institutions in many African countries, this absence is a testament to the informal (no-need-for-government-intervention) nature of the prevailing indigenous African ways of giving that Ford failed to take into account in its intervention strategy. A senior official of one of the Ford-founded/funded African philanthropies underscored this:

Do you need regulation [to encourage] an African to continue giving? If you go to Ghana today do you need a written law to encourage the African in Ghana to continue giving? But it has been difficult [for us formal foundations to attract local giving]. Is it about the law? Is it about the policies? Is it about regulation? Or is it [because] being African we [tend to] give in particular ways?  

The personalized informal nature of giving in many Africans societies was incompatible with, and unsupportive of, the impersonal and anonymized giving associated with the formal institutional philanthropy of the Ford-founded/funded African foundations. Ford’s failure to catalyze large-scale local giving through its African foundation grantees was, therefore, not only due to its imposition of the foreign philanthropic institutional form, but also due to its failure to anticipate the philanthropic incongruence from the contextual differences between the US and

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30Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013
African countries. A former Ford senior official stated that Ford should have been more sensitive to the local context. As he put it:

The [philanthropy promotion] program could be criticized as not having been sensitive enough to [the diversity of philanthropic forms across Africa]. Simply wanting to set up mini African versions of the Ford Foundation was probably doomed, [as] they have no legitimacy or [local] support base… [It] is a fair criticism of some [of Ford’s foundation grantees] … such as TrustAfrica which… has struggled … to raise money within Africa, even though that was its specific objective.\(^\text{31}\)

Had Ford taken the contextual differences between the US and the host African countries into account in devising its local philanthropy promotion strategies and capacity building tactics, it might have been more flexible and been more prepared to help build the latter’s capacity for accessing the local resources available in their countries. As the same former Ford senior official as above acknowledged:

There is money available, particularly in countries like South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya… The problem isn't an absolute scarcity of resources. The problem is, how do you unlock them? And… that's an important distinction to make.\(^\text{32}\)

That has indeed been the problem. And I contend that the Ford-founded philanthropies failed to unlock the available local resources because Ford transplanted them in the “tropical” African climate but did not take account of the contextual challenges to prepare them appropriately for putting down deep enough roots to tap into local resources.

\(^{31}\)Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
\(^{32}\)Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
Fall Back on Experience with Capacity-Building in the USA

A variant of Ford’s failure to take contextual differences into account in its local philanthropy promotion effort in Africa is the foundation’s use of capacity-building tactics that it had used successfully in the United States to boost resource mobilization, but which did not work as well for its African foundation grantees. One such capacity building tactic was networking and peer-learning.

Peer-Learning and Networking as Capacity Building Mechanisms

Because Ford had employed networks and peer-learning successfully in previous initiatives in the United States, it assumed that putting foundations from different developing countries together in a peer-learning network would produce similar outcomes; but it did not. Unlike their American counterparts who were familiar with foundations and were operating in a country where foundations have a long history, many of the foundation officials in developing countries knew little about foundations. They, therefore, had little relevant knowledge to share with one another, especially when it came to tackling the thorny issue of local resource mobilization. After participating in the peer-learning meetings, they would return to their countries still “lost”. According to a senior official of one of the African foundations under study, the peer-learning structure of the capacity building training was not very helpful with local resource mobilization back in her country:

It’s true that those meetings (the networking and peer-learning sessions) helped you learn good tips; but you still have to come back to your organization and figure out: ‘Now, which bit can I adopt?’ …That's why they say that you can support people with training, but when they come back [home] they are still lost as before.33

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33Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013
What Ford’s foundation grantees needed was context-specific support tailored to each country’s local environment and giving cultures. If Ford had asked them what they needed with respect to capacity building for local resource mobilization, they would have requested for an “accompanying consultant” to work with them in-country, over time, in their local context. As one of them explained:

I am saying that I don't think Ford had a good [handle on] the whole thing (IISP). If there was an overall clear strategy, maybe they (Ford) would have known that there's the need to ‘accompany’ [participating] countries… May be somebody would have figured out that [the context in each African country] requires an ‘accompanying’ person34… to help us do a plan, meet the board, meet the staff, and help us come up with something, and then support us to implement it.35

In other words, the participating Ford-founded philanthropies would have benefitted more (in terms of local resource mobilization) had the initiatives not been limited to peer-learning exercises based on Ford’s experience in the US and had included more targeted concrete capacity-building support based on participants’ local circumstances. A senior African foundation official talked about how support for local resource mobilization needs to go beyond knowledge-sharing meetings:

There is room for [sharing ideas and learning] about what somebody from Brazil has done... That should happen once in a while. But there is also a place for [a] targeted action plan which [one] will [need to] work on from [ones] home country as opposed to [attending workshops in other countries] ...There are things that need to happen to enable the board to support me in that process, to help me develop the staff, and change the

34What the African foundation officials called “accompaniment” James (1994:23-25) calls “organizational development consultancy.” James explains that “the value of an Organizational Development (OD) specialist lies in helping organizations to identify what combination of system, structure, style and environmental factor is limiting performance and in assisting the organization to select the right mix of tools, methods and strategies to bring about the required changes or create a climate in which the organization is enabled to respond to future changes”

35Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013
situation in Kenya… Like [a consultant] working with me to customize a support mechanism from where I am now, in my context as it is now.36

Incidentally, the African foundations were not alone in finding fault with the networking structure. Former Ford Foundation senior officials also saw (in hindsight) the limitations of the peer-learning focus of the foundation’s capacity building initiatives, especially with respect to local resource mobilization. One of them stated that the networking structure did not work out as well as envisioned:

It didn't work. Other things worked, but this just didn't. Again, I think it was naïve. I was thinking, well, if we get these folks together as a learning group the more experienced ones can share with the newer ones their experience of management…, fundraising, and resource mobilization…. In some cases that did happen, not as powerfully as I had hoped. And as I said, it was much more complicated than that.37

Another former Ford senior official acknowledged that Ford’s lumping of foundations from different geographical and cultural backgrounds into “inorganic” networks had been ineffective:

There was something… artificial about the networks…[The participating African foundations] came to these [meetings] because they felt they had to…; …I am not sure they felt … part of an organic network… I think it was like: ‘We have to do this because Ford is the funder and we have to be polite, but I am not really that interested in meeting the Brazilian Human Rights Fund, … or a group from Thailand. I am much more interested in meeting people in my own milieu, whether it’s in West Africa or South Africa.’ So...it was a bit romantic [for] Ford … to put quite so much money and effort into building a network of groups who weren't naturally of a network.38

Ford’s use of networking/peer-learning as the main capacity-building tool in both the API and the IISP limited its effectiveness in building its African foundation grantees’ capacities for “tilling the soil” for local resource mobilization.

36Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013
37Participant F. Phone interview with the author, Feb. 8, 2013
38Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
Inadequate Support for Local Resource Mobilization

Because Ford focused on networking/knowledge-sharing among its foundation grantees and neglected to address their specific local needs, it failed to provide the context-specific support that they needed to be effective at local resource mobilization. One consequence of not paying attention to local contextual issues was Ford’s assumption that its foundation grantees would be able to mobilize the bulk of their resources locally with little more than challenge/matching grants. According to a former Ford senior official familiar with the philanthropy promotion program, Ford had left it to the individual foundations to prepare themselves for their local resource mobilization tasks:

We (Ford) certainly encouraged them to [take steps to mobilize local resources], but I am not sure that there was a plan [to provide them with context-specific support]. It was left up to individual organizations to decide how they approached the task and how much energy they put into it.

A senior official from another major American foundation interviewed for this study, however, criticized assumptions that donor-founded philanthropies in developing countries would know what to do on their own with regards to local resource mobilization:

Matching grants are great, but not without other support that helps the (local) foundations learn how to approach people… There is a whole set of skills, the planning that has to happen, and resources that the [local foundation] needs, to be able to…prioritize, in order to build an internal apparatus, to seek [local] support. But not just to get the money but also [to] do the stewardship, so that…trust can be built. …If you have a lot of individual contributions coming in, it’s a very different process. And so, we (American foundation-builders) can't just assume that foundations [in

39 Challenge grants encourage charitable giving in situations where donors are already inclined to give to an organization. They do not work where people have no interest in giving in the first place.

40 Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, Mar. 1, 2013
developing countries] know all this. And… that's been… one of the problems.\textsuperscript{41}

\textit{Failure to Provide Context-Specific Support}

What Ford had overlooked was that because the transplanted African foundations were operating in environments with very little history of professionalized philanthropy, they would need context-specific support to help them explore their local institutional environment and come up with appropriate strategies. Oftentimes, the officials of the Ford-founded African philanthropies felt helpless trying to figure these things out by themselves. As one of them explained:

You [are asked] to figure it out yourself and sometimes you don't even know well what to ask. … You are supposed to figure out something which you yourself don't know. So, we had a lot of false starts. …Eventually, overtime, we figured out our way ourselves, but it's been hard.\textsuperscript{42}

A senior official of another Ford-founded African institution similarly expressed the need for, and the lack of, context-specific support for local resource mobilization:

They (Ford and the other external founders/funders) should have… said: ‘…We are going to give you this [money] for two years, but in the third year we’ve got to start working with you on how you will start raising resources from within the continent [of Africa].’ … I have said this over the years… looking at the frustrations and the challenges: we need resources, we need the thinking, the support, our hands to be held.\textsuperscript{43}

It was not just the African foundations which complained in this regard. A former Ford senior official also acknowledged Ford’s failure to provide the requisite support for local resource mobilization:

\textsuperscript{41}Participant D. Phone interview with the author, May 30, 2013
\textsuperscript{42}Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013
\textsuperscript{43}Participant N. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 18, 2013
The basic idea for setting up the [local] foundations was that if these foundations are successful then the dependence of Africa on external aid would come down. …The theory of change has to be that not only should we (Ford) set up foundations, but we should also really provide them with what they need to become sustainable, to become fully independent…It's not enough to say [that] we've created a foundation… [The Ford-founded philanthropies] have been struggling…because the Ford Foundation did not prepare them to become financially sustainable.\textsuperscript{44}

The same former Ford senior official elaborated on the human and material resources that Ford ought to have provided to support its foundation grantees to build the internal capacity for cultivating local donor relationships, mobilizing, managing, and accounting for local funds:

For an organization to be financially secure, to mobilize resources properly … they need the capacity, they need to be prepared… And that means that they need to have the staff, … the communication materials, … the physical information technology infrastructure and all of that. … And they also need to have a good sense of their [local philanthropic] landscape and a good understanding of where the money will come from. …Ford…was largely programmatic [in its approach] … [There was] very little on building or strengthening the [local] resource mobilization capacities of [its grantees], whether they were philanthropic organizations like TrustAfrica or NGOs.\textsuperscript{45}

The officials of the African foundations under study corroborated, also spelling out their need for internal capacity for local resource mobilization, and the challenges they faced getting support for that:

Internally one of the challenges we found with [local resource mobilization] --- whether you are dealing with individuals, with companies, or with families --- is that you need dedicated [internal] capacity. And that's a big challenge because… nobody\textsuperscript{46} gives you money to do stuff like that. We realized we needed a good data base to allow us to know who gave us last year, and when did they give us, and to remind them this year. We realized we needed to invest in software, we needed to

\textsuperscript{44}Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 19, 2013
\textsuperscript{45}Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 19, 2013
\textsuperscript{46}Whereas there was unanimous praise from the Ford-founded philanthropies under study for what Ford had done for them in terms of institutional support (other than local resource mobilization) there was a tendency to not be too critical of the Ford Foundation by name.
invest in individuals… It [has been] a challenge institutionally to develop the capacity to follow through with [local] philanthropic giving. Growing local philanthropy is not something anybody is giving you money for and yet it requires a lot of time.\textsuperscript{47}

A senior official of another African foundation also expressed frustration with Ford’s capacity-building initiatives that were unaccompanied by concrete support to build the necessary internal capacity:

There was definitely some capacity building work around [resource mobilization] in terms of strengthening our awareness and understanding of how these processes are managed and things like that. But the point I am making is that…which comes first? You understand? Which comes first? … Is it talking about strategic communication when you can't afford a communications officer in the organization; … When you don't have the money to pay for that?\textsuperscript{48}

Just like many other international funders, Ford talked about the need for its foundation grantees to mobilize local resources but did not invest enough to make it actually happen. The fact that Ford supported the hiring of other core staff but failed to support the hiring of staff dedicated to local resource mobilization showed that, despite its rhetoric, the Ford Foundation did not prioritize local resource mobilization. A former Ford senior official summarized donors’ attitude (including Ford’s) towards providing support for local resource mobilization:

Donors are not inherently interested in the fundraising capacity of their grantees. They talk about it, they want the grantees to diversify their donor base…, but when you look at the structure of the grants they give…there's practically no room to enable the grantee to build the capacity and the infrastructure it needs to successfully…mobilize [local] resources. …Resource mobilization has always been a very tricky thing. …It’s almost like the other side of the coin that [donors] don't seem to understand. They understand the need for it, but they are…focused on

\textsuperscript{47}Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 201

\textsuperscript{48}Participant P. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 17, 2013
project support and organizational development in areas other than [local] fundraising. The Ford Foundation was no different. 49

In that regard, a senior official of another major American private foundation noted that international funders building foundations in developing countries ought to factor in the cost associated with helping the local philanthropies to develop the needed internal capacity for local resource mobilization:

There's a lot of things that [newly-established foundations in African countries] need to know; therefore, [international] foundations … supporting the development of local foundations…and wanting them to diversify and start tapping into local resources… have to understand that there's a cost associated with building that capacity. [They have to] be willing to subsidize that for a while… If you don't get that as an outside (international) funder…then you are setting [the local foundations] up to fail basically. 50

Asked if Ford had a responsibility as founder to strengthen its African foundation grantees’ capacity for local resource mobilization, a former Ford senior official answered that Ford did have a responsibility; and ought to have given much more thought “at the front end” to preparing its grantees for that function:

[The problematic nature of local resource mobilization] doesn't release Ford of any responsibility… I think [that] there could have been more, and better thought given at the front end to [support the local foundations]. … If I were to redesign [the philanthropy promotion program] I would spend a lot more effort finding very good [local] sources of advice and guidance and training for the people involved [with local resource mobilization]; recognizing that it is simply a difficult problem. That won't make the problem go away but… we could have done more work to help find solutions. 51

In its attempt to cultivate and grow institutional philanthropy in Africa Ford failed to provide the appropriate tools and resources for tilling and fertilizing the local terrain.

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49 Participant C. Phone interview with author, June 19, 2013
50 Participant D. Phone interview with the author, May 30, 2013
51 Participant F. Phone interview with the author, Feb. 8, 2013
Tilling the land to the right depth and adding organic manure (rather than using imported fertilizer) was needed to facilitate the transplants’ adaptation to the local soil. It was particularly needed for the development of root systems capable of tapping into available local nutrients/resources. Ford’s failure to prioritize support for the development of local resource mobilization within the local environment of its African foundation grantees, therefore, contributed to its failure to meet its (philanthropic) resource mobilization objective in African countries.

**Failure to Publicize the New Philanthropic Institutions**

Due to the lack of familiarity with and knowledge about professionalized foundations in African countries, few in the local populace could identify with them as channels for charitable giving. This lack of information exacerbated the suspicions discussed in previous sections. This situation notwithstanding, the Ford Foundation did not invest in a public awareness and education strategy to help create local understanding, to get local buy-in and support for the new philanthropic form it was promoting in African countries.  

A senior official of one of the African foundations under study attributed Kenyans’ suspicions not just to the fact that the foundation form was imposed from the outside, but also to the failure to familiarize the local people with the new philanthropic form:

> What I know is that every time an organization is created by somebody for a community it is natural that everybody wonders ‘So what is the intention?’ Because the intention (behind KCDF’s establishment) was not extensively sold [to the Kenyan populace]. …Only a few people who were familiar with Ford and familiar with the concept of community foundations were aware of what was happening.

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52 Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013  
53 Read “imposed by outsiders”  
54 Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013
In Kenya, Ford did work with only a small number of local elites to build the KCDF (Lukalo-Owino 2008). It was assumed that Kenyans already gave towards public causes through mechanisms such as harambees and would readily support the new foundations. The fact that the American-inspired foundation form was completely different from the harambee system as well as the other indigenous African forms of giving, and that there would be the need for a public campaign, was hardly considered. Asked why Ford did not invest in a public awareness campaign as part of its philanthropy promotion strategy in African countries, a former Ford senior official stated that public awareness creation had not been a priority when the foundations were established. He explained that Ford’s focus had been to strengthen the foundations themselves; adding that ultimately it was the responsibility of the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies themselves to create that awareness in their respective countries:

When you … do programming you …understand how you prioritize, where you put your resources. [Of what use is it to] fund public awareness while the [philanthropic] institutions are not yet on the ground?... [Besides] who should be working on public and community awareness? The [local] institutions themselves.55

Just as it had left it to the African foundations to tackle local resource mobilization by themselves, Ford also left it to them to raise public awareness about foundation philanthropy in their countries.56 The KCDF’s experience with the ‘liability of newness’ illustrates the effect of imposing a foreign form of philanthropy on a developing country without any form of public awareness raising:

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55Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013
56The African foundations complained of not receiving enough unrestricted funding to carry out such public awareness and field-building tasks on their own.
When you (Ford) start an organization and you say ‘We want it to operate in this [particular] way, we want it to raise money locally, we want you to build an endowment’…People will ask: ‘If there's no other example like that in Kenya, why do you think we'll succeed?... We are starting an organization from scratch...’

Ford’s failure to include support for public communication as part of its philanthropy promotion strategy in African countries was a shortcoming that affected the local people’s knowledge and awareness about its foundation grantees. This in turn fostered the skepticism and suspicions discussed above and jeopardized the latter’s local resource mobilization effectiveness. I contend that the absence of public awareness-raising to gain local acceptance and buy-in in African countries made local financial support for Ford’s foundation grantees even more difficult and posed an obstacle to the achievement of Ford’s own local resource mobilization goal.

**Availability of International Funds as a Disincentive**

The easy availability of international funding made it possible for the Ford-founded philanthropies to operate and function as grant makers without having to mobilize local funds in any serious way. One of the first things that philanthropic foundations are supposed to determine before they even incorporate and start their operations is where they intend to find the resources to carry out their grantmaking or operational programs. In its zeal to build foundations in developing countries, the Ford Foundation downplayed the need for the elites in the targeted African countries (with whom it worked to start the foundations) to show upfront that the envisioned foundations would be able to attract and mobilize local resources. By providing the seed money for start-up costs and supplying the resources for operational costs and grantmaking, Ford

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57Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013
allowed its foundation grantees to initially decouple their operations and grantmaking from the need to mobilize local resources.

This decoupling is seen in the fact that rather than start with local resource mobilization (to support their operations and grantmaking), Ford’s foundation grantees (with no local money at all) started out with grantmaking to channel funds from Ford and other international donors to local communities. They reasoned that grantmaking would give them visibility and build their credibility to facilitate local resource mobilization later.58 The assertion that international funding stymied local resource mobilization is borne out by the fact that it was only after Ford’s support ended abruptly around 2010 that the KCDF (and also the AWDF) took a serious look at local resource mobilization. A senior official of the KCDF explained:

KCDF was lucky that for nearly seven or nine years since its formation Ford was one of the organizations that committed to supporting core costs for the organization… But since their support came to an end we had to now diversify [our funding sources] and are looking at different ways of making sure that we sustain an extremely efficient team.59

This diversification of funding sources, however, still involved attracting more foreign funding from donors other than Ford.

Making Hay While the Sun Was Still Shining

The relative ease of raising international funding allowed the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies to get by without doing the hard work needed to cultivate and mobilize local funds. With their lack of local roots, the incongruence between them and local cultures of giving, and their lack of internal capacity to raise local money, the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies (like other donor-

58 Participant P. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 17, 2013
59 Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013
founded organizations) found it easier to attract international funding. There was little incentive to struggle for local resources. A senior official of one of the Ford-founded African philanthropies explained their strategy of using international funding to address today’s pressing problems while trying to figure out how to mobilize local resources for long-term sustainability:

Although we have a long-term plan for our self-sustainability, we are… aware that our host communities need help today; children need to go to school, families need to eat... All these things are needed today, and so our fundraising from elsewhere (international donors) ...is to help us to continue to deliver solutions to these challenges.60

Incidentally, besides the relative ease of raising money from international donors, there seemed to have also been a tacit agenda to focus on attracting foreign funding (while this was still available to them). The huge amounts raised internationally would help them achieve their development goals faster than hard-to-get local philanthropic resources. The foundations under study therefore actively pursued and took advantage of the availability of foreign money to carry out their grantmaking programs, while giving themselves time to figure out how best to tackle the mobilization of local resources under their difficult circumstances. A former Ford senior official familiar with the phenomenon explained this tacit agenda:

The [Ford-founded/funded philanthropies] and all these African NGOs are not fools.61 They are playing a game; they are playing a game with the international donors. At times international donors do not know; it's only the Africans within them that know. And they know that if they don't use the international donors they will not have the resources to develop … [while they strengthen] the…traditions of giving within… their countries.62

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60Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013
61Meaning that they are very much aware of the need to develop local sources of funding for their long-term sustainability.
62Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013
Indeed, scholars have found that resource dependent organizations respond to institutional pressures and try to cope with environmental uncertainty with a variety of tactics, including acquiescence, defiance, and manipulation (Oliver 1991).

The Ford-founded philanthropies, therefore, exercised their agency by choosing to focus their energies (during their first decade or two) on mobilizing international resources to build their organizations and strengthen their grantmaking programs. They hoped to be able to fulfill their local resource mobilization functions (and thus advance Ford’s philanthropy promotion agenda) with time, after gaining trust as grant makers. Once their identity as grant makers took hold, however, it became difficult for them to present themselves to the public as seekers of local funding. The AWDF’s experience is common to the other two Ford-founded institutions under study:

We’ve raised the visibility of the organization within Africa. People are aware of the AWDF; they’ve seen the change that AWDF is making. The challenge for us is now how to translate that capital into encouraging people to give [us donations]. People very much see us as an organization that gives... funds. The challenge for us now is to turn that huge capital that we have in terms of networks to say… ‘If you think the AWDF is doing a good job, then give’. 64

Ultimately, TrustAfrica (with $30 million from Ford and support from other international funders) is the best example of how international funding became a disincentive for the Ford-founded philanthropies to seek local resources. One senior official explained why the foundation had not prioritized local resource mobilization:

63The networks that the AWDF, TrustAfrica, and KCDF developed were networks of grantee organizations (recipients) to facilitate their grantmaking effectiveness. They were yet to be successful at developing networks for boosting local resource mobilization (local donors).
64Participant P. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 17, 2013
65This was to be disbursed over 10 years
To be honest with you … [local resource mobilization] hasn't been a priority for TrustAfrica, simply because… TrustAfrica …is like a kid that was born rich …The issue is not so much the difficulty in terms of [local] fundraising. I just think that we haven't prioritized that, simply because we have enjoyed...wealth that has come to us from elsewhere...\(^6\)

In a perverse way, therefore, one of the factors that stymied the local resource mobilization goal of Ford’s philanthropy promotion program in African countries was the foundation’s long-term financial commitment to its foundation grantees, especially TrustAfrica. Equally problematic was the ready availability of funding from other international donors eager to use the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies as conduits for their pass-through grants.

**Underestimation of the Complexity of Philanthropy Promotion**

Finally, Ford’s failure to achieve its local resource mobilization goal in African countries was due, in large part, to the fact that it underestimated the complexity of exporting (philanthropic) institutional forms across borders. Ford failed to realize that philanthropy promotion outside the US would take more than grantmaking. And that it would not only need to help its new foundations to set up managerial, governance, and grantmaking structures; but more importantly, it would need to help “plough the field” to make the African soil more receptive to the exotic philanthropic seedlings that it was trying to propagate.

Ford’s underestimation of the work that needed to be done is evidenced by the many times that former Ford senior officials stated that they had not thought things through well enough with regards to the local resource mobilization needs of the African foundations. They had also not thought through the design and implementation of the

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\(^6\)Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013
capacity-building programs with respect to the local context. The confusion at the launching of the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP), in Budapest, Hungary, illustrates this. The participating foundations, including the three African participants, pushed back at the lack of clarity surrounding the initiative, especially with regards to support for local resource mobilization. A former Ford senior official described what happened in Budapest and how Ford had failed to anticipate the pertinent issues before the launching of the IISP:

The first meeting we had...was at the European Foundation Center in Budapest...where a lot of the confusion that we (Ford) hadn't anticipated came to the surface... There was plenty of storming...and a large part of it, although not all, was [because]...there was ambiguity about expectations. What did Ford expect of them? What could they expect of Ford?... So, there was some very good push back; there was some tough questioning... about how to figure out how this was all going to work, because there were things that we hadn't thought through all the way.67

A former Ford consultant described Ford’s simplistic thinking with respect to its capacity building strategies and tactics for the foundations it established outside the US.

According to him, Ford believed that all it needed to do was to put them in peer-groups and give them matching grants and they would flourish:

Ford operated under the assumption that if you brought nice good people together in a room, magic would happen. ...There was a belief that if you … gave people endowment [grants], if you gave them peer-learning, if you gave them technical assistance, those foundations would develop. …The Ford Foundation didn't think through well enough what it was trying to do.68

The statements above from a former Ford senior official and a former Ford consultant underscore the fact that Ford approached the task of trying to influence

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67Participant F. Phone interview with the author, June 18, 2013
68Participant E. Phone interview with the author, April 30, 2013
and institutionalize giving behaviors in contexts outside the US without much thought about the challenges it should have anticipated.

Moreover, by leaving the issue of local resource mobilization to the transplanted foundations to figure out on their own in the ‘unsupportive’ institutional environments in which it had transplanted them, Ford underestimated the complex (and costly) context-specific work that was required to help its “free-floating” foundations (Ottaway 2000:81) to put down roots in the local African soil. Given that growing roots in the local soil is a prerequisite for effectively tapping into local resources, Ford’s underestimation of its task (and its subsequent failure to provide context-specific support for its foundation grantees) undermined the attainment of its local philanthropy promotion goal in African countries.

**Conclusion**

This chapter outlined and analyzed the major factors that contributed to Ford’s failure to meet its philanthropy promotion objective of helping to mobilize large-scale private resources in African countries for the public good; through the establishment of foundations. The fundamental contributory factor to Ford’s failure was the foundation’s imposition of the American-inspired formal foundation model on African countries characterized by different institutional frameworks and predominantly informal philanthropic landscapes. The inherent incongruence between the values of the American-inspired formal foundation model and the informal African cultures of giving made the transplants unattractive to local donors.

Ford’s failure to take the contextual differences into account (and to tailor its capacity-building strategies and tactics to the various African contexts) was
another major contributing factor to its foundation grantees’ (and ultimately its own) lack of local resource mobilization effectiveness. Due to its neglect of contextual differences, Ford employed some of the same strategies that it had successfully used in previous initiatives in the US, expecting them to be just as successful in African countries.

Ford’s long-term commitment to fund its foundation grantees for extended periods of time (sometimes for 10 years) provided a financial cushion that allowed the latter to avoid engaging in the very difficult task of trying to mobilize substantial local resources while the Ford funding was still available. The chapter’s final explanation was the fact that (lulled by its experience in the US institutional and philanthropic environment) the Ford Foundation underestimated the enormity of exporting and trying to promote institutional philanthropy in contexts outside the US. Ford was, therefore, ill-prepared to provide the kind of support and internal capacity that its African foundation grantees required to have a real good chance at local resource mobilization in the African contexts.

Drawing from the theoretical perspectives from Chapter I and the two empirical chapters, Chapter IV provided a socio-cultural explanation for the local resource mobilization ineffectiveness of Ford’s philanthropic transplants in African countries. Together, the above factors stymied the Ford-founded philanthropies’ ability (and desire) to do the required work to adapt to the local environment, develop local roots, and cultivate the appropriate local relationships for resource mobilization within their countries, in particular; and the African continent, in general. As pointed out above, Ford’s foundation grantees’ failure at
local resource mobilization reflected Ford’s own failure, as these foundations were the mechanism through which it had sought to accomplish its own philanthropy agenda in Africa. The next chapter concludes the dissertation and makes recommendations for policy and practice.
Chapter V: Conclusion and Broader Implications

I introduced this dissertation with an agricultural analogy, not only because Africa’s development (and the well-being of its people) is linked to agriculture, but also, because many of the former Ford Foundation officials (as well as others) who participated in the study used agricultural metaphors to describe the foundation’s attempt to grow local philanthropy in Sub-Saharan African countries. In their mind the act of building foundations in Africa was akin to planting a field. It is therefore appropriate to begin the concluding chapter with an update of the agricultural analogy.

The analogy described an international donor who had set out to promote sustainable improved local horticulture in African countries to stimulate bumper crop harvests and food security. To achieve this objective the international donor exported an exotic variety of fruit tree from the temperate zones of North America to the tropical climate of sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the transplanted tree crops died and the few that survived the transplantation shock had difficulty drawing upon nutrients from the local environment and only survived because the international donor continued to support them with foreign-sourced chemical fertilizers. Two decades later the international donor had failed to achieve its objective of promoting sustainable improved local horticulture and bumper

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One former Ford Africa Representative explained that the building of community foundations in African countries in the 1990s was an idea whose time had come because “the time was ripe, and the ground was fertile.” Another described what it would take for philanthropic foundations to grow and flourish in Africa: “…It’s like growing corn or cassava or any plant. If the soil is not fertile enough, it’s not going to happen; …if the rains don’t come, it’s not going to happen; …and if there are predators, you know, the crows or animals that come to eat the seeds even before they have a chance to germinate, it’s not going to happen. So, when I look at the environment [of institutional philanthropy in Africa] I use that metaphor of farming”. He went on to explain that the rain represented local financial resources needed to fund the sustainable growth of formal foundations on the continent.
harvests in the targeted African countries. My quest was to find out why, despite its well-intentioned efforts, the international donor (the Ford Foundation) failed to achieve its goal.

In the final analysis, the international donor failed to achieve its goal because (to continue the horticultural analogy) the temperate fruit trees that it transplanted to bring about the improvement were incompatible with the climatic conditions, the rainfall patterns, and the soil type in the tropics. In particular, they lacked the root systems necessary to draw organic nourishment from the local African soil. They also lacked what they needed to be able to adapt to the local terrain.

The above analogy, in a nutshell, recaps the story of the Ford Foundation’s philanthropy promotion program in African countries. With this as the subject of inquiry, I set out to investigate the challenges associated with international development actors’ attempts to boost development in countries of the global South via the transplantation of institutional models from developed economies. In particular, this dissertation explains why Ford’s attempt to use the American-inspired philanthropic foundation form to catalyze large-scale local resource mobilization in African countries failed to produce the desired results.

Given the newness of the foundation concept in African countries (among other institutional problems that dogged the transplanted foundations) Ford needed to have used a more “bottom-up” grantmaking style and helped to engage resource people knowledgeable about African cultures of giving and local resource mobilization, rather than the international resource institutions it funded to transplant its African foundation.
grantees. Based on the informal characteristics of African giving cultures (compared to the formal giving that Ford was trying to promote), the foundation should have used capacity-building tactics tailored to the specific context and realities in the African countries of interest, rather than the generic philanthropic tactics that it had used elsewhere.

Having imposed a foreign philanthropic model on African societies (where the prevalent institutional systems were inherently not structured to provide financial support to the American-inspired philanthropic foundation model) Ford should have funded activities targeted at “preparing and tilling the African soil” as an important part of its philanthropy promotion strategy in African countries. That would have probably facilitated its transplants’ adaptation to, and rooting in, the African soil; a prerequisite for tapping into and mobilizing local support. Ford did otherwise, as shown by the evidence.

**Summary of Findings**

The data (from the relevant literature and the expert interviews) provide strong support for my socio-cultural thesis attributing Ford’s local resource mobilization failure to the incongruence between the values and practices associated with the local African cultures of giving and those of the transplanted (imposed) American-inspired philanthropic institutional model. The analysis and assessment of both the independent and dependent variables showed that whereas Ford was successful at building and strengthening its African foundation grantees’ organizational development in terms of managerial, board, and grantmaking effectiveness, the foundation was unsuccessful at using the professionalized philanthropic institutions to catalyze large-scale local formal giving. While it was effective at transferring the skills and competencies that its African
foundation grantees needed to run as efficient formal philanthropic organizations, the foundation failed to provide the requisite resources and appropriate context-specific support that the latter needed to build their capacity for local resource mobilization effectiveness.

Consequently, the financial data showed that all three Ford-founded/funded African philanthropies under study were highly dependent on Ford and other international donors for about 98% of their revenues by 2010, when Ford ended its philanthropy promotion program in developing countries. Even though Ford set them up to attract the bulk of their resources locally (which would have signified local buy-in, ownership, and legitimacy) and to lead self-reliant community-driven development, they all turned out to be intermediaries/conduits, mostly regranting funds often restricted by international donors’ interests.

The analysis shows that Ford’s very choice to replicate the American-inspired foundation model as its means for promoting local philanthropy in African countries was the first flawed act that triggered all the others which (together) caused it to fail in its bid to catalyze and boost large-scale local giving through formal philanthropic foundations. That choice was undergirded by Ford’s disregard for the socio-economic, political and socio-cultural differences between the United States (where the philanthropic foundation model emerged organically) and the African countries in which the foundation imposed the foreign philanthropic model. The disregard for contextual differences was exemplified by Ford’s failure to take the different (informal) nature of African philanthropic organization and giving patterns into account in devising its philanthropy promotion and foundation-building strategy, including its capacity-building initiatives.
The isomorphic nature of its foundation-building (transplantation) process ensured that Ford built its African foundations ‘in its own image’, but the process also inherently created identity issues for the latter and stymied donations from the local populations (for whom authenticity and familiarity between the giver and the recipient were important). Ford’s use of capacity-building strategies and tactics that it had successfully employed in the US, with the expectation that they would work equally well for its African foundation grantees, was another example of the foundation’s disregard for the contextual differences between the US and African contexts.

The most critical finding with respect to the contextual issues is Ford’s disregard for the differences in values, organizational logics and practices between formal professionalized foundation philanthropy as Ford knew it and the prevalent informal local African cultures of giving. The foundation’s staff responsible for its philanthropy promotion program in African countries had not taken the time to think through the complexities of cross-border institutional transfers before implementing the foundation-building and the capacity-building initiatives. Had Ford taken these differences into account it would have anticipated the enormity and complexity of the task and prioritized local resource mobilization by providing the appropriate resources to help its transplanted foundation grantees adapt to the local philanthropic soil and climate. As it is, the evidence shows that Ford grossly underestimated what it took to export a new form of philanthropic institution to another context, and to have it make sense to the host society and become locally adoptable in practice. As charitable giving in African countries is shaped by and highly dependent on the informal local culture, values, religious beliefs, and norms (among other things), Ford’s failure to take the local concepts of philanthropy
into account in its foundation-building and local philanthropy promotion effort resulted in the creation of local foundations that were more akin to their counterparts in the US than they were to resource-pooling informal African philanthropies. They were, therefore, incompatible with local philanthropic values and practices. That made them unacceptable and unattractive to many Africans as vehicles for charitable giving.

Finally, the evidence shows that Ford’s long-term financial commitment to its foundation grantees (as well as the availability of funding from other international donors) acted as a disincentive for its African grantees to do the much harder work of trying to mobilize the bulk of their resources locally in environments with which they were incompatible. The availability of foreign funding allowed the African foundations the space to operate and make grants for a decade and more, without needing to take serious steps to mobilize local resources as they were supposed to. The fact that the Ford Foundation (as the founding institution) had not prepared its African foundation grantees adequately for local resource mobilization was a challenge, but it was not fatal to their continuous existence as long as international funding (mostly from Ford) was available for their operations, grantmaking, and endowment-building.

With respect to the availability of international funding, the evidence also shows that Ford’s African foundation grantees were not just passive conduits for international funds. In fact, the Ford-founded African foundations (like other donor-founded organizations) saw an opportunity to focus their energies on attracting as much foreign funding as possible while these resources were available to them. That was easier than stretching the few unrestricted resources available to them to tackle resource mobilization in the difficult local terrain in which they had been transplanted. It was easier for them to
use the foreign funding to solve major development problems while buying time to figure out the best strategies for attracting sustainable local support in their particular context.

Overall, the evidence shows that Ford failed ultimately to achieve its local resource mobilization goal in African countries because the formal American-inspired foundation model that it transplanted in those countries for the purpose of boosting local contributions towards the public good was incongruent with the informal African cultures of giving that were supposed to provide the local support to the former. The situation could have been ameliorated if Ford had recognized the incongruence between its foundation grantees and the African philanthropic terrain and taken the necessary steps to mitigate the latter’s challenges through context-specific support for local resource mobilization. Instead, Ford assumed that its experience in the United States would be applicable to the African institutional and philanthropic context and would work just as successfully. The evidence shows that it did not.

Significance of the Study and Findings

Theoretical Significance

The theoretical significance of my subject of inquiry (the exportation of institutions from developed industrialized countries to developing countries to speed up modernization and development) and the findings of my case study is its importance and relevance to different important audiences. It is significant not only to scholars of international development, but particularly, to scholars of nonprofit and philanthropic studies. As pointed out in the introduction to this study, scholars of international development, international relations, comparative law, institutional economics,
constitutional law, and civil society have had an ongoing debate over the effectiveness of transplanted or borrowed institutional models, usually from developed economies to developing economies (Watson 1974; Merry 1988; Katz 1994; Legrand 1997; De Jong and Mamadouh 2002; Swidler 2006; Perju 2012).

One side of the debate has argued that institutions are independent of society, and therefore, could be transferred from one context to another and expected to perform successfully (Watson 1974). The other side has argued that institutions are not independent of society. Instead, they mirror the socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural environment out of which they emerge, and will fail to perform as expected when transferred from their context of origin and transplanted in a completely different environment (Legrand 1997). This dissertation’s analysis of the Ford Foundation’s 1990s philanthropy promotion and foundation-building program in African countries, by finding support for the latter argument, has added to the merit of the “institutions-as-mirrors-of-society” argument with a case from the field of philanthropy.

Though major American private foundations (including Ford, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Gates Foundation) have been in the business of transferring educational, health, agricultural, socio-cultural and philanthropic institutional models to developing and transitional countries over the years (Berman 1983; Arnowe 1984; Ogilvie 1997), there has not been much theoretical discussion or theory-building in the field of philanthropy with respect to the performance (or lack thereof) of exported philanthropic institutions in recipient countries. What is most significant about this dissertation, therefore, is its contribution to the literature on the development of institutional
philanthropy in sub-Saharan Africa; and the role of international funders and other external actors in that endeavor.

Thus far the development of institutional philanthropy (and foundation-building) in sub-Saharan Africa has received little attention from nonprofit and philanthropy scholars, with the few works on the establishment of community foundations in African (and other developing) countries being mostly descriptive and laudatory (Malombe 2000; Sacks 2000), rather than analytical and critical. My in-depth interviews with both former Ford officials and officials of the Ford-founded African philanthropies under study revealed, for example, that contrary to the current belief that the community foundation concept was embraced in developing countries and had near-universal applicability and success (Sacks 2000), the imposition of that philanthropic institutional form elicited skepticism, anger, frustration, and suspicion among some elites in some African countries.

Finally, the stark differences between the American-inspired formal form of philanthropy, on the one hand, and the prevalent informal African ways of philanthropic organization and practice, on the other, allowed a demonstration of the incongruence between the transplanted philanthropies and the prevailing African cultures of giving. My selection of Ford’s African foundation grantees as the sub-units of analysis provided an opportunity for this dissertation to contribute to the theoretical discourse on the nonperformance of transplanted formal institutions due to the mismatch between the formal institutional models of foreign origin and the local informal institutions that ultimately fail to support the former (North 1991, 1994). This intellectual discourse is

These works were usually funded by the Ford Foundation and other major American private foundations involved in the propagation of institutional philanthropy abroad.
long overdue in the field of Philanthropic Studies. The field is, therefore, all the richer for the theoretical insights that this dissertation brings to scholars interested in international donors’ efforts to speed up self-reliant and self-directed development in African (and other developing) countries through support for the growth of local philanthropy.

**Practical Significance for Development Practitioners**

This dissertation’s significance is not only theoretical, as it is also of practical significance to both international development practitioners (including international public and private donors) and their local beneficiary institutions and partners in development.

**Private Foundations and Other International Donors**

Many American private foundations including the Kellogg, CS Mott, MacArthur, Rockefeller Foundations, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, as well as other actors such as USAID, the World Bank, and UNDP, all believed in the 1990s that the best way to improve aid effectiveness and foster sustainable development in African and other developing countries was to propagate the (community) foundation form in these countries. Because this philanthropic organizational form had worked in rural America and facilitated the mobilization of local resources for community improvement they expected it to work just as successfully in contexts outside the United States, with the transfer of cash (grants) and technical assistance. International donors’ development strategy (especially that of the major American private foundations that were the subject of Berman’s inquiry --- Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller) has been “undergirded by the belief in the ability of technical expertise to solve the myriad problems associated with societal betterment and Third World Development” (Berman (1983:9). International
donors in international development would benefit from my finding that the transfer of technical expertise to developing countries without reference to the local socio-cultural environment and institutions could spell institutional ineffectiveness in the host countries.

My findings are of practical significance to international donors as they suggest that culture and context do matter (Swidler 2006; Galvan 1997; and Holmén 2010), particularly when it comes to socially-constructed institutions such as philanthropy. They echo Holmén’s (2010) observations in cautioning international donors against the tendency to act in ways that suggest that developing countries need to emulate the developed world and adopt institutions and solutions that worked successfully in those countries:

One would expect donors and INGOs not to be only knowledgeable about the intricacies of development but also to be sensible about social and cultural diversity, and hence to be prepared to allow for a wide range of solutions to difficulties encountered. That appears, however, not to be the case. Despite a jargon that indicates the opposite, the West (as interpreted by Western donors and aid agencies) remains the model others should copy (Holmén 2010:27).

International funders would also find useful my finding that exporting formal organizational forms (that invariably lack roots in the local socio-cultural landscape) to stimulate development in contexts where informal institutions prevail can cause the former to under-perform, as Holmén (2010) found earlier:

There are good reasons to believe that organizations mirror their environment more than they reshape it. …Whether society is strong or not largely depends upon the strength of its institutions, and where they are strong, imported organizational solutions are likely to be captured and ‘perverted’ or at least to ‘under-perform’. Of course, this can be blamed on the ‘inadequate’ context, but that wouldn’t help us much (Holmén 2010:18).
The overall significance of my research findings to international donors is that it draws attention to the fact that exporting institutions from the developed world to developing countries to change lives may be counter-productive if there is no adaptation to the local context.

Finally, the findings of this dissertation buttress the idea that development (in all areas, including the philanthropic arena) needs to be endogenous, demand-driven, and culturally appropriate. If it is supply-driven and imposed from the outside by international donors, it is hard for development to be locally-owned, locally-supported, or sustainable. My findings, therefore, join others to suggest to international donors that they cannot develop others according to their own definition of progress, with their own institutional forms. Local people, who are the end of development efforts, need to be the means of their own development (Ake 2001). They have to be able to decide the kind of development they need and be able to mobilize the resources to pursue their own development agenda (Närman 1995). International donors interested in supporting the growth of local philanthropy (as well as other forms of development) in developing countries would do well to take the local context --- people’s cultures of giving and ways of philanthropic organization --- into account.

*Donor-Founded Philanthropies, NGOs, and CSOs*

Ford’s failure to meet its local resource mobilization goals in African countries is linked to the local resource mobilization challenges of the Ford-founded philanthropies. The findings of this research are, therefore, also significant for the Ford-founded philanthropies under study. Not only that, they are for other donor-founded CSOs in developing countries. Governments in countries as diverse as Kenya, Ethiopia, India and
Russia (to name a few) have enacted laws to regulate the amount of foreign money that NGOs and civil society organizations (including philanthropic foundations) can access without attracting state scrutiny and stigma. As an example, Russia’s 2012 foreign agent law was so stringent that it attracted a lot of outcry (ICNL). Proponents of these laws consider donor-founded NGOs and CSOs as instruments of foreign political and cultural interference that need to be monitored by host governments. Given the attitude of these (and other) governments towards NGOs’ and CSOs’ receipt of foreign funding, the survival and long-term sustainability of these organizations are dependent on their ability to mobilize the bulk of their resources locally. This dissertation’s findings with respect to some of the obstacles to the local resource mobilization efforts of the Ford-founded philanthropies could enlighten and help donor-founded/funded CSOs and NGOs in developing countries to strategize better, find context-specific solutions, and work to ensure their long-term sustainability.

**Relevance/Insights into Other Cases**

The findings from the case study of the Ford Foundation’s effort to support the growth of local philanthropy for public purposes in African countries\(^3\) can be relevant (1) to the development efforts of other international donors who were involved in the same endeavor; and (2) other developing parts of the world where these donors have provided (and continue to) provide support for the growth of local philanthropy.

The findings would be applicable to the other American private philanthropies (including the Kellogg, CS Mott, and MacArthur Foundations) that also established philanthropic foundations in African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s. Ford’s

\(^3\)While the KCDF was set up as a national foundation, the AWDF and TrustAfrica had a pan-African reach.
failure to achieve its local resource mobilization and the factors that accounted for that state of affairs will be relevant to these other international funders who also used similar strategies and tactics.

Finally, these findings’ relevance goes beyond African countries. They could be relevant for other non-Western countries and cultures in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Asia, where Western private foundations and other donors have equally attempted in the 1990s to export and propagate their own conceptions of civil society and philanthropy (Ogilvie 1997; Quigley 2000; Petrescu 2000; Henderson 2003; Aksartova 2009). All in all, these research findings, centering as they are on the incongruence between imposed philanthropic concepts and values from the industrialized West, on the one hand, and entrenched local institutional frameworks, on the other, will be of relevance to many other non-Western regions of the world.

**Limitations of Research Methodology**

There are a few limitations to my research findings. They would have been stronger, with much wider applicability, if I had conducted a multiple case study involving some of the other American private foundations that (alongside the Ford Foundation) exported and propagated the American-inspired philanthropic form in African (and other developing) countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Though the single case study of the Ford Foundation has illuminated the phenomenon of interest, an analysis of the other donors’ philanthropy promotion efforts and strategies would have been better.

With respect to the dependent/outcome variable, survey data would have complemented the qualitative data from the in-depth semi-structured interviews to help
capture the local people’s reasons for not giving to the Ford-founded philanthropies in African countries. Subject to the availability of resources, surveys in Ghana, Senegal and Kenya (and a number of other African countries) would have provided information about local peoples’ perception of the incongruence between the formal philanthropy model that Ford propagated and the local informal giving cultures and practices. Relying on the literature to determine the extent of incongruence was adequate; but the findings would have been stronger if I had been able to combine the qualitative data with survey data covering local individuals (especially the growing middle class) in the relevant African countries. However, the lack of breadth was compensated for with depth from the in-depth semi-structured open-ended expert interviews.

Policy Recommendations

One of the objectives of this research was to offer recommendations that could help improve international donors’ practice in the area of local philanthropy strengthening in African (and other non-Western) countries. The policy recommendations below could be useful to the major American private foundations (such as the Rockefeller and CS Mott Foundations) still involved with the propagation of institutional philanthropy in developing countries. Though Ford ended its global philanthropy promotion program in 2010, the recommendations could be useful to it as well in its general effort to effect social change in non-Western regions of the world. It could also decide to help address some of the problems that it unwittingly created in the past.

Asked how the Ford Foundation could have been more effective in terms of its support for local philanthropy in African countries in the 1990s, especially with respect to local resource mobilization for public purposes, a number of the former Ford Foundation
senior officials and the executives of the Ford-founded African foundations interviewed for this study provided answers that form the basis for my recommendations. Some stated that Ford should have just supported the existing forms of African philanthropic organization since African communities have used them successfully over the ages for resource-pooling for the public good. A former Ford senior official suggested that Ford could have just provided support to the different forms of indigenous self-organized philanthropic associations in African societies:

We could have just supported different forms of African philanthropy… If our goal is to promote philanthropy, and giving, and sharing, in African societies it may well be that the endowed foundation is a much less important part of the future than we thought it was.\(^4\)

Others suggested a “marriage” between the desirable attributes of the foreign philanthropic form and the local philanthropic structures, values and giving practices. For instance, a former Ford senior official who worked in the Africa region, talked about how Africans were interested in the coming together of the modern (foreign) and the traditional:

You had Africans who were very interested in this idea of private resources going to the public good; and the marriage between a modern kind of philanthropy that’s really pushing for the public good, that’s also connected with the vision of [local] giving… A marriage between … modern philanthropy and what… works at the local level: that [local] people understand self-help, that people understand the need to pool resources, that people understand that they need to be independent from …outside sources.\(^5\)

On their part, some of the senior officials of the Ford-founded African foundations felt strongly that the future of African philanthropy and African philanthropic institutions lay in strengthening the traditional philanthropic

\(^4\)Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013
\(^5\)Participant I. Phone interview with the author, October 1, 2013
institutional forms and landscape to enable them provide the building blocks and
the foundation upon which modern (authentic) African philanthropic institutions
can be built. One of them explained at length:

Our own traditional forms of philanthropy… how do we strengthen those institutions…? We need to build the base; and the base is really around the cultural foundations, the social, economic, and political [foundations]… Once that is done, we can then think of building… these other organizational forms;⁶ institutions…like TrustAfrica… and others can then have a sound foundation. What I am trying to propose is that for us to really build strong [philanthropic] institutions [in Africa] we need to link them very, very, strongly with our own indigenous traditions and cultures which are the foundation… for further [institution] building… We need to begin to [build] the bridge between what is usually considered indigenous philanthropy and what is considered institutional philanthropy. If we don’t make that link in the African continent, we will continue to have a discrepancy between institutions that are not grounded… and not linked to [the local culture]⁷...I am simply saying that when you look at mobilizing [local] resources… that should be linked to… how we [Africans] do things. That's my point.⁸

A senior official of a different African foundation under study talked about the establishment of the African Grantmakers’ Network (AGN) as a step forward in that direction. He believed that the AGN’s attempt to redirect African institutional philanthropy towards the giving traditions of the continent of Africa was the path to the future:

[The AGN] is saying that we are African, and we behave in a peculiar way. We give in a certain interesting way and we must build on that behavior of the African giver to bind everything else together… [The AGN is] saying we must be clear about the African context, which many people don't understand… We⁹ must ride on the Africans' natural behavior in giving. [And] we must get Africans to work around all these… issues,

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⁶Adapting and adopting new philanthropic institutional forms such as the American-inspired foundation model that Ford propagated.
⁷Ottaway (2000) has referred to such institutions as ‘free-floating’
⁸Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013
⁹The Ford-founded/funded philanthropic institutions and the other members of the AGN
on how they give, and their context, and to find African solutions to those problems.\textsuperscript{10}

…If [Africans] only give through funerals [an African philanthropic institution ought to be able to] create a program which basically makes sure that everybody in that community gets a decent burial. Why not? Who will say that’s a bad program?... You set up a welfare mechanism based on philanthropy so that young people who have no money can get married; they can have a wedding. And communities which have nobody, have no land, have no one to pay for their funeral expenses, would get decent burials.\textsuperscript{11}

The Africa Grantmakers’ Network (AGN) was formed by the Ford-founded/funded African philanthropies --- TrustAfrica, the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF), and the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) as a result of their participation in Ford’s International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP). They came away from the IISP disappointed that it did not address many of the local resource mobilization issues that they experienced in their local African context. They felt that only an Africa-centered philanthropy network would address those needs. Membership was originally open to only African philanthropic organizations; but was later extended to institutions from outside the African continent.

The idea of “marrying” traditional African philanthropic practices and philanthropic values to modern forms of philanthropy has also been the wish of scholars of African philanthropy (Odembo and Kisinga 2005; Ngondi-Houghton 2005; Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005). There was consensus that for Africans to be able to develop a modernized form of African philanthropy rooted in the

\textsuperscript{10}This is a sentiment that came across in some of the interviews: that external (mostly American) philanthropic institutions and infrastructure organizations that knew little about African philanthropy and African problems were deeply involved in creating philanthropic institutions on the African continent and offering solutions, often based on their American experience. As one African foundation official put it: “Everyone is out there …saying ‘we are African this…we are this for Africa, we are the other for Africa...’ But they don't live in Africa… The truth of the matter is that it is only us who live and work in Africa who know what affects Africa...” (Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013)

\textsuperscript{11}Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013
continent’s cultures of giving (free of foreign influence and direction) they would have to be able to mobilize the bulk of the required resources from within the African continent. As one of the former Ford senior officials pointed out, when a foreign institution invests thousands of dollars into another institution (in Africa or elsewhere), it is natural for the former to want to mold and stamp their identity on the latter.

My recommendations to international funders/donors interested in supporting the growth and strengthening of locally-supported philanthropy in African countries are two-fold. The first --- support for organizational syncretism and hybridization --- is for any philanthropic or civil society organizations that they might decide to support in the future. The second set --- support for adaptation to local cultures of giving and providing local populations with information to help them make sense of and adopt the foreign philanthropic transplants --- is for addressing the major challenges facing the existing Ford-founded/funded philanthropic institutions with regards to local resource mobilization.

**Support for Organizational Syncretism/Hybridization**

Putting it in horticultural terms, my recommendation for the most appropriate cultivation of local philanthropy for public purposes in African countries would be to graft scions from the temperate variety onto the rootstock of the tropical variety, bringing together the good qualities/attributes of both to create an improved hybrid.\(^{12}\) The

\(^{12}\)Some scholars describe the philanthropic foundations in African and other developing countries as ‘hybrids’ or ‘foundation-like’, not because local people have been able to incorporate indigenous giving practices and values into their operations, but because they have been unable to operate exactly like their counterparts in the US (Sacks 2000).
desirable attributes of the imported variety would be grafted onto the local one to take advantage of the latter’s durability and hardiness against drought and other negative conditions. Developing a hybrid model based on the local rootstock would build on the already established healthy root system of the latter. That would make such a model easy for everyone so inclined (rich and poor alike) to cultivate. In plain words, I recommend that international funders interested in promoting and strengthening local philanthropy in African (and other developing) countries acknowledge the local philanthropic organizations in place, support the inculcation of desirable ‘semi-formal’ organizational attributes such as efficiency and accountability into the prevalent indigenous forms of philanthropic organization, and use those culturally appropriate values and practices as the basis for social change.

Some of the interviewees suggested that international funders help to scale up indigenous African philanthropic institutions. Based on a careful examination of the evidence, I find that simply scaling up indigenous organizations may entail an increase in size (due to role differentiation) and the professionalization of indigenous philanthropic institutions. That would make them no different from the current donor-founded institutions under study --- too big and too costly for local communities to maintain through local giving. My recommendation would, therefore, be that the hybridized/syncretized philanthropies be kept small, volunteer-led, and membership-based. They should be operational (rather than grantmaking), and closer to the structure and functions of indigenous philanthropies to ensure local ownership and support. Their small size, with members tied together by a common bond such as place of origin or other
ascriptive value (as in indigenous philanthropic organizations) will provide a strong motivation for loyalty and popular participation. The blend of modern management and accountability procedures and systems will ensure that they are efficient, nimble, and responsive (interpersonal) to the local constituents.

Though not a perfect example of the type of syncretized organization I recommend, the Akuapem Community Foundation (Akuapem CF) is close to the philanthropic rootstock that I recommend that international funders consider building upon. The Akuapem CF is a homegrown semi-formal philanthropic organization established by area elites and traditional rulers of the Akuapem Traditional Area of the Eastern Region of Ghana. It is, therefore, embedded in the indigenous governance systems and structures and draws on the values espoused by the informal giving cultures of the local area. Based on ethnicity, place of origin, or other affiliation, this small volunteer-led membership-based foundation raises money and materials, and draws on expertise, from its members, their businesses, as well as their social capital and networks, to carry out its programs. One of the members (a traditional chief) explained how the Akuapem CF functioned effectively as an informal organization:

Though informal [the Akuapem CF] is effective. When we have our regular meetings, we decide on what to do and you can always tell from the group who will be best able to mobilize funding or resources for the particular activity that we want to engage in. For instance, with our current effort to do a library, a member agreed voluntarily to use his own resources and those of his firm to do the drawings, and so on up to the approval of the drawings. … It’s informal but it’s also done in a way that those who have the know-how, the interest or the qualifications will be the ones who will be requested to follow up on certain activities.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{13}\)Participant T. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 25, 2013
With little access to international funding, the Akuapem CF is reliant on local resources. Though it raises relatively little money (as compared to the donor-founded philanthropies), it takes pride in getting things done from local resources. The same member as above commented on the Akuapem CF’s independence from foreign sources of funding:

You will not see much … about foreign participation. In fact, when I reviewed the contributors to our programs, I saw about 15-20 names, and I didn't see any foreign names at all. It’s neither good nor bad, but what I am saying is… that it is homegrown, the membership is essentially people who are from the Akuapem area or if not from the Akuapem area, but who have lived in the Akuapem area. And most of the sourcing is from local funding, not foreign sources.\textsuperscript{14}

The mobilization of local resources for the public good (that is, the good of the Akuapem Traditional Area) was a core value and an integral part of the Akuapem CF’s establishment and its main strategy for accomplishing its goals:

The concept was that the membership will make contributions, voluntary ones, to keep the organization running. But it was always understood that a lot would be sourced in-kind from institutions which could help. Some of the members had [worked at] the Bank of Ghana and other public institutions so they knew that there were several institutions which had resources lying idle. And there were many institutions which may also be able to provide funding as part of their [corporate] social responsibility, giving back to society. … Apart from the initial endowment which was from the group, the target [has been] to go systematically to a number of [local] institutions which have the computers…books… dictionaries… which [we]… mobilize and then …distribute. [We] always had enough of those items to give out.\textsuperscript{15}

The Akuapem CF chose to remain small because the leaders figured out that a large organization would not be sustainable on local resources alone. Its

\textsuperscript{14}\textsuperscript{14}Participant T. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 25, 2013
\textsuperscript{15}\textsuperscript{15}Participant T. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 25, 2013
small size makes the organization flexible, and easy to manage efficiently on a small budget. The co-founder/volunteer manager of the Akuapem CF explained:

We didn't go out and build a big administration. We kept it small and therefore sustainable. It was a conscious decision [to keep it small]. I always had this view that if we had a large organization (which some people tend to have) …we will never be viable. And the way this is set up, anybody else who picks it up after me should be able to do it. They may be a contractor or somebody who has an office and has one desk there for the community foundation. They should be able to run it because it is a virtual thing… We meet once in a while, but then I am in touch with them by Internet. I call them and… we discuss amongst ourselves…We ... know exactly what we are doing. We take, and we give. ...We have bank accounts, we have financial statements from year to year. Because we fundraise we … have an account for anybody to see how we've used the money.16

A former consultant to the Ford Foundation, with a lot of experience working with home-grown community philanthropies similar to the Akuapem CF, explained how larger was not necessarily better in the world of community philanthropy:

It’s not about building large …infrastructure, it's about being networked horizontally…Most of the organizations we17 work with tend to be very small and they tend to have very small staff. … Particularly, the more local money they have … the smaller the staff they have, because they are trying to get the money out of the door to the groups that they … work with.18 We [tend to] think that things that are large are good…and it’s probably to do with the … development world understanding of scale. …What does growth look like for these types of [homegrown philanthropic] institutions? At what point is big too big? …What does scale look like? Is that really what we are looking for? Is financial growth the best growth or does that kind of destroy the spirit of what we are trying to instill here?... [There] are dangers of becoming too big and then becoming farther away from your constituents.19

16Participant O. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 22, 2013
17The Global Fund for Community Foundations
18McCarthy (1988) found that local people in some Asian countries were reluctant to contribute to professionalized philanthropies because they did not want their money to be used for overheads and high salaries for staff.
19Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013
The Akuapem CF --- homegrown, small, membership-based, built on traditional African values, and largely locally-supported --- illustrates quite well the type of philanthropic organization/association I recommend international funders support and build upon if their objective is to foster local resource mobilization and self-reliant and participatory development. It is a perfect example of the kind of grounded local ‘rootstock’ philanthropy that international funders could help hybridize with the transfer of desirable formal skills (the scion).

For instance, all that the Akuapem CF needs to become the type of hybridized organization I recommend is the adoption of a formal system of management and accountability to make the philanthropic association more efficient and effective in its local fund mobilization and program implementation (while remaining small, associational, and locally-supported). Unlike the transplanted Ford-founded philanthropies, the major challenge facing the Akuapem CF was not local resource mobilization per se. Asked if resource mobilization had been a challenge one of the members of this local philanthropic association answered:

I wouldn't say so... It depends on what you seek to achieve and [up to this point] whatever we have sought to do --- books to be given to the best pupils…, books to donate to libraries, etc. --- [we have done]. … What we always set our minds to do seems to have been achieved.  

Just like most homegrown charitable organizations in African countries, the Akuapem CF mobilized more in-kind contributions than cash.  

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20Participant T. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 25, 2013
21Unlike the Ford-founded (and other donor-founded) philanthropies and CSOs that have to seek thousands of dollars in cash to be able to function properly.
Instead, the challenge they identified was the loose informality of the management structure and the lack of a clear division of labor, which leaves the association dependent on a handful of volunteers (and therefore vulnerable).

According to one of the members, the Akuapem CF could benefit greatly from strengthening (and formalizing) its administrative and management structure:

We've got to find a way of supporting the secretariat of the institution better. As it is now it is very…relaxed, very informal… We’ve had this institution for the last seven years and we've always felt like we are revolving around one family. If the institution is to become a perennial one22…then we should not only use people’s time and resources to [provide services], but we should also look at how we can strengthen the secretariat… There has to be an office, even if it’s somebody’s house…put in an air conditioner if need be, buy desks, let the telephones work… It’s quite important that we look at strengthening the secretariat…23

This Akuapem CF member also explained how the foundation’s local resource mobilization efforts could be improved with some clear division of labor among the members:

We have to also strengthen our resource mobilization mechanism by formalizing it… If we [allow it to remain] very informal as to who is going to be doing what, then not much can be done [going forward]… I will [suggest that] we institutionalize some of our functions by saying ‘Ok this person will be lead for things to do with infrastructure if schools are to be renovated or buildings are to be repainted’. Then we could also have those who will be more involved in sourcing for books and computers; and then a lead person for health-related things. And [all these roles] will be [pre-agreed] like subcommittees of the whole who will be involved in doing things. 24

The data showed that the Ford Foundation was more effective at transferring formal management and governance skills to African philanthropic organizations than it was at supporting their local resource mobilization efforts.

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22Sustainable for the long-term  
23Participant T. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 25, 2013  
24Participant T. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 25, 2013
Formal skills transfer to homegrown philanthropic associations would the best use of its resources and produce the best outcomes in terms of local philanthropy support. Self-organized philanthropic organizations like the Akuapem CF are grounded in the local cultures of giving and are therefore already good at local resource mobilization. All they need is a certain level of formalization (not professionalization) in their administrative functions.

My recommendation is that international funders such as the Ford Foundation support the hybridization of such homegrown informal philanthropies by funding their acquisition of formal skills that the latter deem desirable and necessary for their efficiency and effectiveness; while staying small, associational/membership-based, participatory, and culturally rooted.

In sum, rather than transplant formal American-inspired professionalized philanthropic foundations onto African countries, Ford and other international funders would do well to support locally-initiated and locally embedded philanthropic organizations like the Akuapem CF to acquire the formal managerial and other skills that their volunteer leaders and managers need to make their already well-rooted philanthropic associations more effective, efficient, and accountable.

The rest of my recommendations target the existing “free-floating” Ford-founded/funded philanthropies. How could the Ford Foundation and other international funders help them to do better in terms of overcoming the challenges associated with the incongruence between them and the local cultures of giving in which they were transplanted?
Adaptation to the Local Cultures of Giving

One of the ways in which the KCDF, AWDF, TrustAfrica and others like them could eventually adapt to Africans’ ways of giving would be to incorporate some of the African values into their strategies for local resource mobilization. For example, they could take Africans’ need for reciprocity and the creation of social capital into account, considering that prospective donors are not just interested in the public impact of their giving, but also the personal and psychic rewards they receive (Frumkin 2006) from the beneficiaries of their generosity.

In practical terms, African philanthropic institutions will need to figure out how to provide context-specific and culturally appropriate opportunities for individual donors in their countries to give through them for public impact, while at the same time meeting the donors’ needs. That might eventually change the thinking expressed by some of the interviewees in this study that prospective African donors do not see much value in using donor-founded/funded African intermediaries as vehicles for their giving.

Rendering the Foundation Model Meaningful to Local Donors

Drawing attention to the incongruence between the American-inspired foundation philanthropy model in Africa, and Africans’ long-held giving values and practices is not to suggest that Africans are stuck in their philanthropic ways and cannot change to adopt some of the new ways of giving associated with formal philanthropic foundations. The growing middle class in countries such as Ghana, Kenya and South Africa is in a good

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25Scholars, such as Burlingame (1993), have argued that there is no such thing as pure altruism behind charitable giving; and that altruism and egoism are on a continuum in human giving behaviors. See Dwight Burlingame’s “Altruism and Philanthropy: Definitional Issues” Essays on Philanthropy No. 10. Indianapolis: Indiana University Center on Philanthropy
position to give the kind of support that formal professionalized foundations such as the KCDF, TrustAfrica, and AWDF require. As Ngondi-Houghton (2005) pointed out, Kenya’s middle class had great wealth and was interested in giving back for the public good but did not have the right avenues for doing so.26 With time and the appropriate adjustments and adaptations by the donor-founded philanthropic institutions as discussed above; and the right kind of knowledge about the latter, Africans could be sensitized and convinced to support the imported form of philanthropic institutions alongside their age-old traditional ways of giving. They do not have to give one up to practice the other. As Frumkin (2006) pointed out, scientific philanthropy27 never replaced charity, even in the United States. In fact, charity and philanthropy are on a continuum, each one meeting different societal needs at different times, as necessary.

Chen et al. (2013) cite Swidler (2006) to call attention to the idea of culture not as fixed and unchangeable, but as a “tool kit” from which people select what they determine to be necessary for their progress and development at any particular time. According to Chen et al. (2013):

Swidler argues that culture ‘influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented, but by shaping a repertoire or ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct ‘strategies of action’. Although this tool kit typically supports stable patterns of action, people can also selectively draw on this tool kit to enable change, including new ways of organizing that combine previously unconnected practices (Chen et al. 2013:859)

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26Available avenues such as *harambees* were mostly geared towards helping people and communities with which local donors are affiliated in one way or the other.

27‘Scientific philanthropy’ is deemed to get to the roots of social problems for greater and lasting impact; whereas charity is deemed to be palliative and only offering temporary relief. But both are important, as sometimes ‘charity’ needs to precede ‘philanthropy’ to make the latter effective.
I therefore recommend that international funders still interested in strengthening local philanthropy in African (and other developing) countries support the donor-founded/funded philanthropies in the more difficult process of adapting to their local environment. It will be equally important to support a strategy for helping people to make sense of the transplanted philanthropic values and practices from their own socio-cultural standpoint, so as to enable local adoption of the new.

**Need for Public Awareness, Communication, and Learning**

Finally, in order for the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies to be successful at getting local people to adopt the new ways of giving as part of their philanthropic practice, there would need to be a concerted effort to spread the new concepts and ideas in a culturally appropriate manner. As Chen et al (2013) state alternative practices and values need to be spread through advocacy by tapping into already accepted logics:

> The spread of particular practices and their associated values is not inevitable. Actors, whether individual persons or collectivities such as formal organizations, often must advocate alternative practices and values by tapping accepted logics…Clashes over bureaucracy’s legitimacy underscore the institutional work needed to build acceptance for particular organizational forms and their associated values (Chen et al. 2013:860-861).

The African leaders who worked with the Ford Foundation and the other international donors to help establish the American-inspired philanthropies in their countries must have realized that though indigenous African philanthropic practices had been appropriate for solving the problems of the past, they needed something new to help solve the current more complex problems facing the African people. They acknowledged that Africans’ philanthropic practices needed to expand and draw on new ideas, as long as these are not antithetical to the existing culturally acceptable practices and values.
Cultures need to evolve to meet new societal challenges, but that cannot happen without communication and learning, as expressed by North (1993):

> The current learning of any generation takes place within the context of the perceptions derived from collective learning. Learning…is an incremental process filtered by the culture of a society…, but there is no guarantee that the cumulative past experience of a society will necessarily fit them to solve new problems. Societies that get “stuck” embody belief systems and institutions that fail to confront and solve new problems of societal complexity (North 1994:364)

Besides ignoring the contextual differences, the Ford Foundation neglected the important process of spreading the new ideas of foundation philanthropy in African countries. As the local donor-founded philanthropies themselves have few flexible/unrestricted resources to undertake this critical task, I recommend that international funders (including Ford) that participated in the global philanthropy promotion of the 1990s revisit the problem. They should find ways to support an advocacy and learning campaign in the relevant African countries to speed up their foundation grantees’ local adaptation and acceptance. A former Ford consultant summarized the Ford Foundation’s failed attempt to propagate new mechanisms for local resource mobilization in African countries thus, noting how this needed to have been supported by a bottom-up communication strategy:

> In a sense local resource mobilization was … the one that was … [going to] be impossible for the Ford Foundation to really have the most…[impact]; because that has to come from the ground, it has to be led by a rationale or object of communication message that developed locally…

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28Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013
I recommend that the Ford Foundation and the other American private foundations that started philanthropy promotion programs in African countries in the 1990s fund the development and dissemination of that communication strategy and message in the relevant countries. Though mistakes have been made in the past, international funders still have a chance to help the foundations that they created to adapt to their local environment through a communication strategy (among the other support recommended above). There is still a chance to help them grow the type of roots that they need to be able to tap into local resources, to fulfil the core function and objective of their establishment.

**Future Research**

This qualitative case study has tackled the local resource mobilization issue from the angle of international funders imposing their own conception of institutional philanthropy on African countries. It dealt with the negative effects of the transplantation process on the local resource mobilization capacities of the donor-founded philanthropic institutions. This line of research would be advanced with survey data on how local populations perceive the donor-founded philanthropies, why they have so far not given generously to such institutions, and what it would take for them to consider such philanthropic institutions as legitimate and attractive mechanisms for charitable giving for the public good.

Though there has been survey research in selected Southern African countries on individual giving habits and practices (Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; Everatt et al. 2005), they have been focused on informal giving and have not inquired into giving to formal philanthropic institutions, many of which are donor-founded (by Ford, Kellogg,
CS Mott, to name the most prominent). Resources permitting, such a study would give us more certainty about the extent of alienation and incongruence between the donor-founded philanthropies and their constituents; and whether the situation has improved over time. It would also provide more specific ideas about how the issues can be addressed and resolved in a context-specific way to facilitate local adaptation and local resource mobilization.
Chapter VI: Tables

Table 3.1 Grants Awarded by AWDF from 2002-2010 (US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AWDF</td>
<td>$467,895</td>
<td>$369,635</td>
<td>$519,369</td>
<td>$714,100</td>
<td>$2,171,769</td>
<td>$3,009,917</td>
<td>$3,748,475</td>
<td>$2,680,777</td>
<td>$2,503,000</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: AWDF Annual Report 2010:13

Table 3.2 Grants Awarded by TrustAfrica from 2006-2010 (US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006-07</th>
<th>2007-08</th>
<th>2008-09</th>
<th>2009-10</th>
<th>2010-11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TrustAfrica</td>
<td>$2,144,500</td>
<td>$1,671,186</td>
<td>$1,758,686</td>
<td>$3,141,725</td>
<td>$3,983,893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.3 Resource Mobilization by AWDF from 2005-2010 (US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AWDF</td>
<td>Individuals &amp; Corporates</td>
<td>$61,393</td>
<td>$111,063</td>
<td>$112,396</td>
<td>$297,529</td>
<td>$35,066</td>
<td>$52,592</td>
<td>$711,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>$1,468,952</td>
<td>$5,262,964</td>
<td>$5,924,334</td>
<td>$5,123,281</td>
<td>$5,598,992</td>
<td>$5,136,641</td>
<td>$29,686,457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AWDF Annual Reports 2004-2010

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2 TrustAfrica’s financial year was from April 1-March 31
Table 3.4 Resource Mobilization by TrustAfrica from 2006-2010 (US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006-07</th>
<th>2007-08</th>
<th>2008-09</th>
<th>2009-10</th>
<th>2010-11</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TrustAfrica³</td>
<td>Local⁴</td>
<td>Individual⁵</td>
<td>$18,511</td>
<td>$8,096</td>
<td>$3,260</td>
<td>$3,539</td>
<td>$13,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Int’l</td>
<td>Corporate &amp; Foundation Grants</td>
<td>$3,981,776</td>
<td>$6,550,091</td>
<td>$1,661,362</td>
<td>$6,320,991</td>
<td>$7,068,706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TrustAfrica Annual Reports 2006-2011

Table 3.5 Resource Mobilization by KCDF from 2004-2010 (in 000’s of Kenyan Shillings⁶)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KCDF</td>
<td>Local Donations</td>
<td>4,165</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>134,122</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>48,756</td>
<td>9,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grant Income⁷</td>
<td>34,363</td>
<td>52,589</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>77,916</td>
<td>70,366</td>
<td>98,615</td>
<td>102,000,813</td>
<td>435,850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KCDF Annual Reports⁸

³TrustAfrica’s financial year goes from April 1-March 31
⁴The way TrustAfrica presents its financial report, its local resources are within the individual contributions. The list of corporate agencies and foundations that gave to TrustAfrica shows that these were international donors.
⁵The list of individual contributors included Ford Foundation staff and TrustAfrica board members, but few local people not associated with TrustAfrica.
⁶To give an idea of what this is worth in 2018 dollars, one dollar was equivalent to about 100 Kenyan shillings on May 31, 2018.
⁷Mostly pass-through restricted funds from international donors for regranting to support programs of the donors’ choosing.
⁸The 2006-07 Annual Report was not available to the author, but it most likely would have followed the same pattern: more than 90% of revenues from international sources.
Appendices

Appendix A
Interview Guide

1. Schedule for Interviewees Associated with the Ford Foundation

International Efforts to Promote Local Resource Mobilization for Philanthropy in Africa: Why the Ford Foundation’s Initiatives Failed

Introduction
Thank you for agreeing to speak with me today about the Ford Foundation’s effort to promote institutional philanthropy in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s and 2000s; and the impact of its international initiatives (Africa Philanthropy Initiative and International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy) on the participating African foundations. Please review the Study Information Sheet to refresh your memory about the study. I will like to record the interview to ensure that I accurately represent your answers and views; the recording will not be reviewed by any third party. If you object to being recorded, I will rely on my written notes from this interview. Are you willing to allow the interview to be recorded?

[NB: The interview will not be recorded unless and until the interviewee indicates his or her consent to be recorded. Recording will only start from this point on if the interviewee gives consent.]

Thank you again for agreeing to speak with me today. Our interview will consist of a series of questions that I am asking every interviewee associated with the Ford Foundation, but your responses may lead to follow-up questions unique to your interview. Please feel free to refuse to answer any question if, for any reason, you would rather not answer it.

Interview Questions

1. Please state your name and your official position at the Ford Foundation (or your association with Ford) when you worked on the global philanthropy promotion program?

2. Please tell me about the Ford Foundation’s effort to promote local philanthropy in developing countries in general and in Sub-Saharan African countries in particular.

3. Can you explain why the Ford Foundation determined that supporting foundation philanthropy in African and other developing countries would further its mission of promoting local philanthropy and self-reliant development?

4. How did the Ford Foundation conceptualize philanthropy?
5. Can you talk about the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) that the Ford Foundation implemented in the late 1990s? What were the objectives of the API?

6. What were the strategies that Ford employed to implement the API?

7. How would you rate the success of that initiative in helping participating African foundations to boost local resource mobilization?

8. What challenges, if any, were encountered by the Ford Foundation in its attempt to boost local philanthropy in African countries through foundation-building and the API?

9. What factors led to the Ford Foundation’s decision to launch the IISP in 2005? Was the IISP modeled on previous Ford initiatives? How?

10. What role did you play in conceiving, designing, implementing, and/or managing the initiative? What were the criteria for inviting grantee foundations to participate?

11. What were the objectives of the IISP?

12. As part of the IISP what specific strategies and mechanisms did the Ford Foundation employ to try to help the participating African foundations increase their local resource mobilization effectiveness?

13. Did the Ford Foundation seek the input of participating organizations in designing the program? To what extent did the Ford Foundation factor local contexts (legal, cultural, fiscal, economic and political environments) into fashioning the strategies for helping cohorts of participating grant makers from different regions of the world?

14. In your opinion, what were the priorities of the participating African foundations: (1) local resource mobilization and autonomy from foreign donors; (2) improving governance and administrative structures; (3) grantmaking; (4) endowment-building?

15. Did Ford and its foundation grantees have the same priorities?

16. What challenges (if any) did the Ford Foundation encounter in implementing the IISP?

17. Would you say that the IISP was successful in helping the participating African foundations to improve their local resource mobilization efforts and reduce their dependency on foreign donors? If yes, how? If not, why?

18. The records show that all the foundations that Ford established in African countries, including those that participated in the IISP, were mobilizing few local resources by the time Ford ended the IISP in 2010. Why do you think they were unable to mobilize
local resources so long after their founding, and despite Ford’s capacity-building efforts through the API and IISP?

19. Since Ford’s goal was to catalyze local philanthropy for self-reliant development in African countries, would you say that professionalized foundation philanthropy based on the US model was the best vehicle to accomplish that goal?

20. In hindsight what could the Ford Foundation have done differently?

21. Is there anything else that you would like to add about Ford’s philanthropy promotion and foundation-building program in African countries?

Thank you for participating in this interview. I appreciate your time.

2. Schedule for Senior Staff of Ford-founded African Philanthropies

International Efforts to Promote Local Resource Mobilization for Philanthropy in Africa: Why the Ford Foundation’s Initiatives Failed

Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to speak with me today about the Ford Foundation’s effort to promote institutional philanthropy in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s and 2000s; and the impact of its international initiatives (Africa Philanthropy Initiative and International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy) on the participating African foundations. Please review the Study Information Sheet to refresh your memory about the study. I will like to record the interview to ensure that I accurately represent your answers and views; the recording will not be reviewed by any third party. If you object to being recorded, I will rely on my written notes from this interview. Are you willing to allow the interview to be recorded?

[NB: The interview will not be recorded unless and until the interviewee indicates his or her consent to be recorded. Recording will only start from this point on if the interviewee gives consent.]

Thank you again for agreeing to speak with me today. Our interview will consist of a series of questions that I am asking every interviewee associated with the Ford-founded African philanthropic institutions that participated in the IISP, but your responses may lead to follow-up questions unique to your interview. Please feel free to refuse to answer any question if, for any reason, you would rather not answer it.

Interview Questions

1. Please state your name and your official position at your foundation.

2. Can you tell me about how your foundation was established?
3. How familiar are you with the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) and the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP)? Did your organization participate in one or both of those initiatives?

4. If your organization participated in the API what were the objectives of the initiative and what did your organization expect to get out of it? What were your priorities?

5. Can you tell me the strategies that Ford implemented as part of the Africa Philanthropy Initiative? How much input did your organization have in the design and implementation of the API?

6. Can you tell me how your organization benefited from the API?

7. From your perspective, to what extent did the API specifically help your organization’s local resource mobilization efforts? In other words, to what extent did the API help your organization to build its capacity for local resource mobilization during or after the initiative?

8. The International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP) was launched in 2005. What were the objectives of the IISP?

9. Why do you think your organization was selected to participate in the IISP? What did your organization expect to gain from participating in the initiative?

10. What were your organization’s priorities as you participated in the IISP: (1) help with effective grantmaking; (2) help with governance structures; (3) help with local resource mobilization and reducing dependency on foreign donors; or (4) help with endowment-building?

11. What strategies did the Ford Foundation employ to implement the IISP?

12. Did your organization have any input in fashioning these strategies?

13. From your perspective, where did the Ford Foundation place its focus during the implementation of the IISP: (1) effective grantmaking; (2) governance structures; (3) local resource mobilization; (4) endowment-building?

14. To what extent did the IISP strategies help your organization to increase its mobilization of local resources (as a percentage of total revenues)?

15. If your organization did not succeed in increasing local resource mobilization during and after its participation in the IISP why, in your opinion, did it not succeed?

16. The literature says that some of the factors working against philanthropic local resource mobilization in African countries include the following:
   1. Disenabling legal, regulatory environment
2. People being too poor to engage in charitable giving
3. Lack of tax incentives to encourage giving
4. Lack of trust in formal institutions

Can you tell me, from your experience, if and to what extent these factors have been an impediment in your foundation’s effort to mobilize local resources? We will take them one by one.

17. Can you tell me what (if any) internal organizational factors or challenges have helped or hindered your ability to mobilize local resources (1) before your participation in the IISP in 2005; (2) while you were participating in the IISP; and (3) after your participation in the IISP? How did the IISP help to address or fail to address those challenges?

18. If Ford had asked your foundation to recommend strategies for helping to boost its local resource mobilization efforts, what would you have recommended?

19. What could the Ford Foundation have done differently?

20. Is there anything else that you would like to share with me about your organization, its participation in the IISP, and the impact of the IISP on its ability to mobilize local resources?

21. Is there anything else that you would like to share with me that I did not know to ask?

Thank you for participating in this interview. I appreciate your time.
## Appendix B

### Conceptualization of Foundation Effectiveness in Developing Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Key Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Managerial effectiveness**             | - Foundations with qualified managers/executives with experience in the civil society/nonprofit/NGO sector; - Managers who have received training on philanthropic foundations; and - Ensure the foundation meets sound governance, accounting and management principles                                                                                                           | - Presence of a qualified Executive Director/CEO  
- Presence of qualified staff  
- Preparation and dissemination of Annual Reports & Financial Statements  
- Attractiveness of the foundation to international donors                                                                                   |
| Lewis 2001                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| **Board effectiveness**                  | - Foundations with a properly constituted governing board made up of knowledgeable individuals from a wide range of backgrounds relevant to the foundations’ mission and vision                                                                                                                                                       | - Existence of a board of governors/directors  
- Provision of financial and other oversight  
- Board involved in fundraising for the foundation                                                                                           |
| Herman and Renz 1999                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| **Grantmaking effectiveness**            | - Foundations with established grantmaking structures and procedures  
- Program officers trained in grantmaking                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | - The existence of a grantmaking program  
- Support of international donors                                                                                                             |
| Ostrower 2007                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| **Resource Mobilization effectiveness**  | **External Fundraising:**  
- Foundations with staff trained in proposal writing and donor relations  
- Ability to mobilize external/foreign donor funds                                                                                                                                                                           | - In-house expertise in proposal writing and fundraising from international funders/donors  
- Amount of money raised from international donors as a proportion of total revenues                                                                                                                   |
| Ford Foundation 2006                     | **Local Resource Mobilization:**  
- Ability to attract funds from local individuals, corporate bodies, national and local government, for operations, grantmaking, and endowment building  
- Ability to attract local volunteers (other than board members) to support foundation activities                                                                                                                                             | - In-house expertise in local fund development and resource mobilization  
- Local constituency-building, including communication to create public awareness on foundation philanthropy  
- Development of context-specific strategies for local fund development  
- Resources mobilized locally as a proportion of total revenues                                                                                 |
| **Endowment Building effectiveness**     | - Ability to establish, raise funds, maintain, and grow an endowment fund                                                                                                                                                                                                      | - Existence of an endowment fund  
- Professional management of the endowment fund  
- Creativity in growing the endowment fund                                                                                                      |
| Fleishman 2007                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
# Appendix C

## African Foundations Analyzed for this Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foundation</th>
<th>Level of Operation</th>
<th>Area(s) of Operation</th>
<th>Relationship with the Ford Foundation</th>
<th>Structure/Staff</th>
<th>Dependence on foreign donors for bulk of resources</th>
<th>Size *****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TrustAfrica</td>
<td>Pan-African</td>
<td>Advocacy, civil society, African philanthropy research</td>
<td>Ford-founded</td>
<td>Professional staff</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>$9,484,200*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF)</td>
<td>Pan-African</td>
<td>Women’s empowerment, social justice and human rights</td>
<td>Founded by African women with seed money/grants from the Ford Foundation and other international donors</td>
<td>Professional staff</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>$5,710,000 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF)</td>
<td>National (Kenya)</td>
<td>Community development, Social services, Social justice</td>
<td>Founded by the Ford Foundation in collaboration with Kenyan elites</td>
<td>Professional Staff</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>$5,411,016***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akuapem Community Foundation (Akuapem CF)</td>
<td>Local District (The Akuapem Traditional Area in the Eastern Region of Ghana)</td>
<td>Community development, Health, Environmental Protection</td>
<td>Founded by local elites with no international financial assistance</td>
<td>Membership Association/Part-time staff and volunteers</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>$28,774****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total assets taken from 2012-13 Annual Report

** AWDF total income (most of it restricted for regranting) from 2011 Annual Report. Amounts are already in US dollars

*** KCDF total income (most of it restricted for regranting) from 2011-12 Annual Report converted from KS 465,669,772 at the December 31, 2012 rate of .01162 Kenyan shillings to a dollar

**** Total expenditure for 2012 converted from GH¢ 57,547 at a rate of GH¢ 2 to a dollar, which was the average prevalent rate in 2012

***** By total assets, total grants made, or total expenditure, as available in 2012
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Curriculum Vitae

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Educational Qualifications

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Philanthropic Studies, 2018
The Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, Indiana University, Indianapolis, Indiana

Dissertation Title: "International Efforts to Promote Local Resource Mobilization for Philanthropy in Africa: Why the Ford Foundation’s Initiatives Failed.”

Research Areas: Philanthropy & Sustainable Development in Africa; African Politics; Comparative Civil Society; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); International Development

Master of Public Affairs (MPA), Nonprofit Management, 2003
School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA), Indiana University, Indianapolis
Areas of concentration: Public Affairs, Nonprofit Management

Master of Arts (MA), Political Science, 2000
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana
Areas of concentration: International Relations, Public Policy and Public Administration, Women’s Studies

Master of Arts (MA), Foreign Languages, 1997
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana
Areas of concentration: French Language and Literature

Bachelor of Arts (Honors), 1981
University of Ghana, Legon-Accra, Ghana
Rank: Second Class (Upper) Division
Areas of concentration: French and English

GCE “A” Level Certificate, 1977
St. Louis Secondary School, Kumasi, Ashanti Region, Ghana
Subjects: English; Economics; French; General Paper

GCE “O” Level Certificate, 1975
St. Francis Girls’ Secondary School, Jirapa, Upper West Region, Ghana
Rank: Division 1 Distinction

Research and Work Experience

Director, Research, Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation, 2016–2018
Northern Development Authority (NDA), Tamale, Northern Region, Ghana
• Ensured the development of the Authority’s Research, Planning, Monitoring, &
Evaluation Framework;
- Oversaw the research activities of the Authority;
- Oversaw the monitoring and evaluation systems of the Authority;
- Ensured the development of a single information management repository for data collection, collation, analysis, sharing and learning within the Northern Savannah Ecological Zone (NSEZ);
- Collaborated and built partnerships with government, the public and private sectors, and other stakeholders in carrying out the functions of the RPM&E Directorate

Graduate Teaching Assistant (Graduate Level Courses), 2008 – 2012
Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Indianapolis, Indiana
- Ethical Perspectives of Philanthropy
- Civil Society in Comparative Perspective

Executive Specialist & Staff Liaison for Sub-Saharan Africa, 2003-2006
Kiwanis International (KI) Headquarters, Indianapolis, Indiana
- Liaised between the Kiwanis International headquarters in Indianapolis and Kiwanis clubs in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya)
- Formulated and managed Kiwanis International growth policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
  Supported the establishment of new Kiwanis clubs in Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria to increase the number of volunteers and social entrepreneurs serving children’s needs in those countries
- Designed resource materials and conducted on-site capacity-building training programs for Kiwanis clubs in Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana on a yearly basis

Intern at the Office of Resource Development, May-August 2003
Global Ministries, Division of Overseas Ministries, Indianapolis, Indiana
- Researched foundations and other grant-making sources for proposal writing
- Produced proposals to raise funds in support of international partners in Africa and other developing countries
- Developed reports and project profiles for mailings and website

Graduate Research Assistant, 2001-2003
Center for Urban Policy & the Environment, Indiana University, Indianapolis, Indiana
- Gathered research data using online resources, library research, and telephone contacts
- Organized and analyzed data for use by the Center in publications and presentations

Graduate Teaching Assistant, 1995-2001
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana
- Taught French in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures to undergraduate students, helping to broaden their horizon in a global society
- Designed a syllabus and taught a course titled *US Environmental Policy and Politics* in the Department of Political Science
Volunteer Financial Manager, 1992-1993
Bawku East Women’s Development Association (BEWDA), Bawku, Upper East Region, Ghana
- Volunteered to manage the financial affairs of the Association
- Managed donor relations and produced detailed program reports

Inspector of Taxes, 1990 -1995
Internal Revenue Service, Government of Ghana
- Assessed and collected taxes at the Bawku East District Office, Upper East Region
- Performed tax audits to ensure that government departments withheld the appropriate taxes on contracts and paid same to the Internal Revenue Service in a timely manner

Instructor, 1981-1988
Ghana Education Service, Government of Ghana
- Taught French Language and Literature at 6th Form Level at Tamale Secondary School, Tamale, Northern Region, Ghana (1985-1987)

Peer-Reviewed Publications

Conference Presentations

• “Social Capital and Women’s Agency in the Fight against HIV/AIDS: A Study of Two Women’s Associations in West Africa”; paper presented at the 38th Annual Conference of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA), Cleveland, Ohio, USA, November 19-21, 2009

Awards and Fellowships
• Dissertation Research Grant, Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, Indianapolis, Indiana, 2013
• Eugene R. Tempel Fellowship, The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Indianapolis, Indiana, 2010-2012
• Jacobs Fellowship, The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Indianapolis, Indiana, 2008-2010
• Hearst Minority Fellowship, The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, 2007-2008

Foreign Language Proficiency
• Proficient in written and spoken French

Computer Skills
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