such architect is employed to supervise the construction, enlargement or alteration of any building the same must be done under his immediate personal supervision.”

Section 63-127 Burns' 1943 Replacement, supra, specifically authorizes a corporation or partnership to engage in the practice of architecture in this state. If authorized to engage in the practice of architecture they are certainly authorized to advertise such business, the limitation on such practice being that set out in this section of the statute that the person “in responsible charge of the designing, specifying or supervision which constitutes such practice is or are registered as herein required of registered architects.”

Therefore, in answer to each of the questions submitted it is my opinion a partnership or a corporation may advertise their business as “architects” providing some person connected with such corporation or partnership, and in responsible charge of the work constituting such practice as an architect, is in the immediate personal charge of such work. I am therefore of the opinion such partnership or corporation could advertise their business under either of the forms set out in each of your questions numbered one and two.

OFFICIAL OPINION NO. 48

May 23, 1945.

Hon. Clement T. Malan,
State Superintendent of Public Instruction,
State House,
Indianapolis 4, Indiana.

Dear Dr. Malan:

Your letter of April 19, 1945 received requesting an official opinion on the following questions:

“1. Under Chapter 156, Acts of 1945 can a county school corporation receive a unit of tuition support funds from the state for the services of a duly licensed county superintendent of schools?

“2. Under Chapter 156, Acts of 1945 can a county school corporation receive units of tuition support
funds from the state for the services of duly licensed county attendance officers employed full time?

"3. Under Chapter 156, Acts of 1945 can a city school corporation receive units of tuition support funds from the state for the services of duly licensed attendance officers employed full time by the city school corporation?"

Section 1 of Chapter 156 of the Acts of 1945 provides in part as follows:

"* * * Such additional persons as are employed for the necessary administration of the county school system shall be selected and voted upon by a vote of at least two-thirds of the members of the County Board of Education. The county superintendent of schools together with such other persons employed for supervisory or administrative duties shall be deemed to be supervisors of instruction and as such eligible, subject to the rules that have been or shall be adopted by the state board of education, to qualify for teaching units in accordance with the terms of Chapter 263 of the Acts of 1943. * * *" (Our emphasis.)

Section 28-916 Burns' 1943 Supplement, same being Section 5, Chapter 263, Acts 1943, in part reads as follows:

"The state board of education also shall determine by uniform rule, applicable throughout the state, when and if the services of full time principals and supervisors shall be deemed to constitute units under this act."

1. In answer to your first question I wish to advise Chapter 156 of the Acts of 1945 expressly states the county superintendent of schools shall be eligible to qualify as a teaching unit if the state board of education properly adopts a rule to that effect in accordance with the terms of Section 5 of Chapter 263 of the Acts of 1943, supra.

2. In answer to your second question I wish to advise that under Chapter 156 of the Acts of 1945 the class of persons, other than the county superintendent of schools, entitled to
qualify for teaching units are those employed for "supervisory or administrative duties."

Section 28-4201 Burns' 1933, same being Section 1, Chapter 11, Acts 1923, provides for the licensing of school officers and employees and reads as follows:

"The licensing of all superintendents, supervisors, principals, teachers, attendance officers, and of all other regular public school employees shall hereafter be vested in the state board of education."

Section 28-502 Burns' 1943 Supplement, same being Section 1, Chapter 294, Acts 1943, provides in part as follows:

"Every appointive and ex officio attendance officer shall serve subject to the rules, direction and control of the superintendent of schools of the attendance district of said attendance officer. * * *"

The above statutes are subject to the following well recognized rules of statutory construction:

Statutes must be construed as a whole in order to determine the legislative intent.

Snider v. State, ex rel. Leap (1934), 206 Ind. 474, 478.

Courts will look to the general purpose and scope of a statute to determine the legislative intent.

City of Indianapolis v. Evans (1940), 216 Ind. 555, 567.

It is likewise true that in ascertaining the legislative intent as to a statute, the courts may take into consideration other Acts in pari materia, whether passed before or after the Act in question.

Sherfey v. City of Brazil (1938), 213 Ind. 493, 497, 498.

From a consideration of each of the above statutes I am of the opinion a county attendance officer is not a person em-
ployed for “supervisory or administrative duties” within the meaning of Section 1 of Chapter 156 of the Acts of 1945, and therefore such county attendance officer could not qualify for teaching units under the provision of said statute.

3. In answer to your third question I wish to advise that for the same reasons set forth in the answer to your question number two it is my opinion Chapter 156 of the Acts of 1945 does not authorize a city school corporation to receive units of tuition support funds from the state for the services of attendance officers employed by the city school corporation, such persons not being employed for supervisory or administrative duties within the meaning of said statute.

OFFICIAL OPINION NO. 49

June 2, 1945.

Hon. Rue J. Alexander, Commissioner,
Bureau of Motor Vehicles,
State House,
Indianapolis, Indiana.

Dear Sir:

This acknowledges receipt of your letter of May 15, 1945, asking for an opinion relative to insurance coverage under Section 39, Chapter 304 of the Acts of 1945, to become effective December 31, 1945.

Your question is what would be the minimum coverage for public liability and property damage “for the benefit of customers and the public” in the forepart of the section in question, and also the minimum amount of similar coverage to be required on dealer’s vehicles described in the latter part of such section.

The Act does not provide the amounts or limits of the insurance coverage mentioned.

Section 5 (b) of the Act provides:

“The commissioner is hereby authorized to adopt and enforce such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.”