Generational Change? The Effects of Family, Age, and Time on Moral Foundations

Amanda Friesen, IUPUI
amfrie@iupui.edu

Amanda Friesen is Associate Professor of Political Science and Project Director for the Center for the Study of Religion & American Culture at IUPUI.

Abstract: One way to uncover the persistent role of religion across generations is to look past traditional understandings of religious belief and denominational belonging and examine the presence of bedrock principles that could influence political beliefs in families. The Moral Foundations framework was developed for this purpose – to describe human behavior and attitudes in the moral realm without relying upon country, culture, or time specific labels. In an original and rare three-generation dataset, college students, their parents, and their grandparents were asked about political attitudes and preferences for the Moral Foundations of Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. The Foundations are not equally shared across generations as preferences for each Foundation increase with the age of the cohorts in this sample, with especially large differences on Authority and Purity. A follow-up survey reveals that Moral Foundations may not be stable across even short periods of time. These findings suggest that the political appeals that may work on older Americans may be less effective on the younger generations. If individuals indeed make moral decisions based on these types of bedrock principles, understanding which of these principles or Foundations drive particular age groups can help us better understand shifts in public opinion.

Key words: Moral Foundations, Family Socialization, Moral Development

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Americans are increasingly secular, following the trends of their counterparts in other advanced democracies. Still, religion and morality continue to play a strong role in our politics. Particularly in 2016, there was a strong focus on white evangelical Christians and their overwhelming support for Donald Trump, whose behavior and rhetoric seemed divorced from conservative Christian beliefs. Evangelicals have been the stalwart party faithful for the GOP for decades, and, even as some scholars warn the “end of white Christian America” is near (Jones 2016), the fusion of Christian nationalism and white identity (Whitehead, Perry and Baker 2018; Jardina 2019) may persist even as formal religious participation declines.

One way to uncover the persistent role of religion across generations is to look past traditional understandings of religious belief and denominational belonging and examine the presence of bedrock principles that could influence political beliefs in families. The Moral Foundations framework (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009) was developed for this purpose – to describe human behavior and attitudes in the moral realm without relying upon country, culture, or time specific labels. Specifically, the five Foundations – Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity -- have been used to explain differences between liberals and conservatives regarding political ideology as well as religious beliefs (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009; Koleva et al. 2012; McAdams et al. 2008). I am interested in understanding whether these foundational principles help explain how political and religious beliefs are transmitted in families.

In a rare look at political and social attitudes in three, related generations, I surveyed college students, their parents, and grandparents about their political attitudes and Moral Foundations. The Foundations are not equally shared across generations as preferences for each Foundation increase with the age of the cohorts in this sample, and there are especially large

differences on Authority and Purity, such that the grandparents in these families rate these Foundations as more important in moral decision making. A follow-up survey sent to participants at a later time period reveals that the Moral Foundations of individuals may not be particularly stable across even short periods of time. These findings suggest that the political appeals that may work on older Americans may be less effective on the younger generations. For example, older Americans may see same-sex marriage and trans-gender rights as Purity issues. In turn, given stronger attitudes on Purity, framing these issues in that way can shape public opinion. Alternatively, younger generations may be less interested in Purity concerns and may view LGBTQ rights in the realm of Fairness. If individuals indeed make moral decisions based on these types of bedrock principles, understanding which of these principles or Foundations drive particular age groups can help us better understand shifts in public opinion.

Moral Foundations and Political Attitudes

The Moral Foundations theory suggests there are five dimensions in how individuals make moral decisions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Authority/Respect, Ingroup/Loyalty, and Purity/Sanctity. The five dimensions of moral decision making are described as automatic, culturally widespread, demonstrate an “innate preparedness,” and are consistent with notions of evolutionary adaptive advantages (Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik, and Ditto 2013; Haidt and Graham 2007). Haidt (2012) explains the origins and development of these Foundations are a combination of innate human tendencies and cultural/societal/religious teachings in one’s upbringing and throughout the life course. These dimensions are uncovered by asking individuals a series of questions along these lines: “when you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?”¹

- Whether or not someone suffered emotionally (Harm)

¹ A complete list of questions and the answer key can be found at www.moralfoundations.org.

- Whether or not some people were treated differently than others (Fairness)
- Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country (Loyalty)
- Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority (Authority)
- Whether or not someone did something disgusting (Purity)

When applied to the political spectrum, ideological liberals and conservatives both rely upon Harm and Fairness intuitions in moral judgments, but conservatives also endorse notions of Loyalty, Authority and Purity in their decisions (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009; Graham et al. 2013). This partially explains why liberals and conservatives seem to talk past one another – Fairness and Harm usually outweigh the other moral considerations for liberals whereas conservatives rely on all five dimensions equally. Extending individual moral decision-making to political attitudes, Koleva, Graham, Haidt, Iyer, and Ditto (2012) discover that the Moral Foundations are predictive of certain “culture war” issues (Hunter 1991) that are often grounded in religious beliefs. These types of issues – abortion, gay marriage, the death penalty – polarize Americans, both politically and religiously (Hunter 1991; Wuthnow 1988; Carmines and Layman 1997; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Layman 2001). A common thread underlying this culture divide is a general set of preferences on social order and behavior. On one side are orthodox individuals who believe in unchanging moral codes emanating from an authoritative source while progressives adhere to an ever-evolving understanding of the human condition and associated morality (Koleva et al. 2012; Hunter 1991). Orthodox folks may cling to the Constitution (politically), the Bible (religiously), and tradition (patriarchy) as a way to solve society's ills, and progressives advocate a “modern, liberationist, or relativist position” to address ever-changing circumstances (Koleva et al. 2012).

Analyzing all five Moral Foundations components, Koleva et al. (2012) predicted participants' personal disapproval of the culture war issues, with Harm and Purity demonstrating the strongest relationships. Purity was associated with disagreement on sexual issues (e.g. casual

sex and same-sex marriage) as well as “sanctity of life” issues (e.g. stem-cell research and abortion) (Koleva et al. 2012), and Harm was associated with disapproval of the death penalty and medical testing of animals. These results make sense in that an individual’s Moral Foundations create personal notions of right and wrong, but often times we are able to separate those personal preferences from dictating decisions for everyone in society. The consistent evidence of Moral Foundations predicting right-left, liberal-conservative differences (Graham et al. 2013) suggest this theoretical framework and measurement tool is quite valuable for political scientists seeking to understand the origins of ideology and issue attitudes and helps move us beyond the low predictability of one-dimensional ideology.

If Moral Foundations can be thought of as a measure of first principles that influence downstream attitudes like political preferences, what are the origins of the Foundations themselves? Haidt (2012) suggests some of these Foundations are present at birth, as even infants seem to display an innate sense of Fairness, while the other Foundations can be learned through cultural or religious instruction. Indeed, Djupe and Friesen (2018) find that American clergy members espouse Moral Foundations that reflect the left-right theological positions of their religious traditions, but there is variation to when they subscribe to the “binding” foundations of Purity, Loyalty and Authority and when they appeal to the “individualizing” foundations of Harm and Fairness.

What has been previously unexplored is whether these Foundations are shared in families and across generations, similar to political or religious beliefs. Indeed, in a comprehensive collection of Moral Foundation findings, current state of the measurement paradigm and response to criticisms, Graham et al. (2013) make a call for developmental psychologists to examine the development and possible shifts in these Foundations throughout childhood and the

life course. In keeping with the major findings in political socialization studies, a trait or attitude like a first principle Moral Foundation would seem a likely candidate for generational transmission.

Family Socialization

Most of the political socialization literature focuses on partisanship, political interest and participation or attitudes on issues of the day (Jennings and Niemi 1974; Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009; Tedin 1974; Thomas 1971). This literature notes that the most successful transmission corresponds to “when the parents’ political views are crystallized, stable, and communicated via consistent cues over long stretches of time” (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009, 788). After children had left the home, Jennings and Niemi (1974) found the strongest parent-child agreement on political preferences that had religious components associated with emotion and tradition. Most socialization scholars explain these results with the powerful, consistent parental cues that often accompany moral issue attitudes (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009; Tedin 1974; Thomas 1971). In addition, the strength of parental socialization depends upon the importance of an issue to the parent and how correctly a child identifies a parent’s position (Tedin 1974; Thomas 1971). Because socialization is “low-key and haphazard” (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 330), it may be more likely that general values or “broad orientations” (Pearson-Merkowitz and Gimpel 2009, 166), like Moral Foundations, are more successfully transmitted than specific issues of the day, though the general orientations may lead to agreement in some of the latter attitudes. There is also evidence that religious and political beliefs could derive from heritable traits reflective of bedrock principles (Friesen and Ksiazkiewicz 2015), though Moral Foundations themselves appear to be products of

environmental learning and socialization rather than heritable traits and may not be stable across time (Smith et al. 2017).

Nearly all of the political socialization studies involve parent-child dyads, but this paper extends the unit analysis to include grandparents, a rarity in political science studies. The logic behind adding a third generation is to determine whether a “multiplier effect” exists, in that when paternal and maternal grandparents agree on political and religious preferences, mothers and fathers will agree and then be more likely to act as “middlepersons” in relaying these values to the third generation (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 156; Beck and Jennings 1975). Unfortunately, because of the data limitations of my sample, I am unable to model these relationships on both sides of the family with mothers and fathers and their respective parents, as there are only eight families where there is data for college students (G3), mothers and fathers (G2, and maternal *and* paternal grandparents (G1). As such, the following hypotheses will reflect a proxy to these relationships by examining the association between the third generation, each parent and each set of grandparents. Thus, the relationships will be examined in aggregate across the sample because I am unable to model full family relationships. If there are positive associations between the generations’ preferences, however, this may suggest a multiplier effect could be occurring in that parents (G2) enter marriage with shared preferences from their parents (G1), and then agreement with their spouse may increase the likelihood of agreement with their children (G3). But without modeling each family unit across generations on both sides of the family, a true test of the multiplier effect is not possible.

In addition, recent studies have suggested that children are more likely to share political preferences with their mothers because they tend to spend more time with them (Zuckerman et al. 2007); yet earlier studies indicated that fathers were the purveyors of these political

orientations (Beck and Jennings 1975). Because there are not consistent theoretical findings on such gender effects and the majority of the measures in this paper have not been examined across three generations, the hypotheses will not reflect directionality or strength of relationship based upon parental gender and/or side of the family. That is, I do not expect that fathers will exert more influence on their children than mothers or paternal grandparents more than maternal grandparents, but the statistical tests of the hypotheses will be divided by sides of the family to try to approximate the “multiplier effect” of intergenerational agreement and explore possible maternal/paternal differences. Finally, the only three-generation study of political preferences (Beck and Jennings 1975) indicated that generations nearest one another (Generation 1 and Generation 2, Generation 2 and Generation 3) are more likely to agree than those furthest apart (Generation 1 and Generation 3) because of the significant difference in level of contact. Because Moral Foundations Theory posits that these are stable, enduring first principles for individuals and across a population, there should be no difference in the scores between generations.

Sample and Methods

In January 2011, undergraduates at a Midwestern university were sent an email inviting them to participate in an online survey about religion and politics. The invitation included a link to Qualtrics.com where individuals completed the 20-minute survey in exchange for course credit. The survey was repeated in September 2011 by having students take the survey at a computer lab on campus. The total sample included 583 subjects, after dropping those who did not complete the entire questionnaire, international students², three participants whose ages (greater than 45) indicated they were not representative of this population and 75 individuals

² The political questions in the survey are based upon the U.S. system, culture and society and may not be applicable to individuals from other nations.

who did not “pass” the survey accuracy check detailed below. The sample is split almost equally between genders (281 males, 302 females), with an average age of 19.5 years and a median family income of \$80,001 to \$100,000. Ninety-six percent of participants are single, 93% identify as white/Caucasian and there is a fair division between those who grew up on a rural farm (16%), in a rural town (23%), in a suburban (29%) or urban area (28%).

In order to create a three-generation sample, the spring 2011 subjects were asked to voluntarily provide the names and addresses of their parents and grandparents; after receiving a National Science Foundation grant for the project, the fall 2011 subjects were given \$5 for providing this same information. A professional survey organization was contracted to design and mail surveys to the parents of the subjects. In the first mailing, a self-addressed stamped envelope and \$2 were included as a thank you incentive for completing the questionnaire (Singer et al. 1999; Warriner et al. 1996). A few weeks later, a second copy of the survey was mailed to those who had not yet returned the questionnaire. At the end of this survey, the parent subjects were asked to provide contact information for their parents. This information was combined with the grandparent names and addresses already obtained from the student subjects, and the grandparents were mailed surveys, with a self-addressed stamped envelope and a \$2 incentive. A few weeks later, a second copy of the survey was mailed. These series of surveys were mailed, completed and returned between November 2011 and February 2012. With a 64% response rate, the parent sample included 227 individuals, which were 53% female and 99% white, with an average age of 50.41, a median income of \$80,001 to \$100,000 and median education of “college graduate.” The grandparent sample contains 102 individuals, a 67% response rate, which were 68% female and 99% white, with an average age of 73.25, a median income of \$60,001 to

\$80,000 and median education of “some college.” Coding and explanation of the key variables are listed below, with summary statistics displayed in Table 1.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Moral Foundations and Demographics

	Student (G3)	Parent (G2)	Grandparent (G1)
Harm	M=4.30, SD=.79	M=4.35, SD=.81	M=4.71, SD=.73
Fairness	M=4.50, SD=.73	M=4.54, SD=.75	M=4.95, SD=.65
Ingroup	M=4.29, SD=.79	M=4.26, SD=.81	M=4.95, SD=.65
Authority	M=4.09, SD=.76	M=4.26, SD=.77	M=4.72, SD=.66
Purity	M=3.69, SD=.90	M=4.27, SD=.95	M=4.77, SD=.73
Age	M=19.48, SD=1.74	M=50.42 SD=6.05	M=73.25, SD=6.20
Income	Median=\$80,001 to \$100,000	Median=\$80,001 to \$100,000	Median=\$60,001 to \$80,000
Education	Median=Some college	Median=College graduate	Median=Some college
Sex	48% Male 52% Female	47% Male 53% Female	32% Male 68% Female
N	583	225	94

Moral Foundations. A 20-item questionnaire was used to measure an individual’s Moral Foundations’ scores (www.moralfoundations.org). For the first set of items, participants were asked to rate statements from “not at all relevant” (1) to “extremely relevant” (5) to whether the consideration in question influences their judgments of right and wrong. Two statements are tied to each of the five Moral Foundations, as indicated in the Appendix. This set also included an item, which tested for accuracy and full use of the scale: “Whether or not someone was good at math.” Thirty-six individuals scored a four (“somewhat relevant”) or above and were dropped from the analysis. The second set of questions provided a list of statements with which

participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement – “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (6), as well as an item response check --“It is better to do good than to do bad” – and individuals who slightly disagreed through strongly disagreed were dropped. When combined with the math item, a total of 75 participants were removed from this measure.³ Because of the small sample size from the parent and grandparent generations, individuals were only removed from the analysis if they “inaccurately” marked both the “math” and “good” items; this resulted in dropping one case in the parent sample and zero cases in the grandparent sample. Conforming to Haidt and Graham’s coding scheme,⁴ the scores for the four statements per Moral Foundation were averaged.

The data files from all three samples were combined into one dataset where one row represents a family unit, including the variables for students, the mother and/or father and the maternal and/or paternal grandparents. To examine the transmission of Moral Foundations and political beliefs across generations, I created separate models for maternal and paternal relatives. Regarding the grandparent measures, the score from one grandparent will be used if the other one is not present, and their scores will be averaged if they are both present. For example, if a maternal grandmother answered the survey but the maternal grandfather did not, her score on Harm will be used in the models. In the matched family sample, there are 100 biological mothers, 117 biological fathers, two adoptive mothers, eight stepparents, 43 maternal grandmothers, 20 maternal grandfathers, 26 paternal grandmothers, and 13 paternal grandfathers. For the purposes of the following analyses, only biological relatives were included.

If Moral Foundations are enduring, innate belief systems, formed by our social worlds, and reflect the types of beliefs that are often successfully transmitted in families, then we would

³ Dropping these cases did not substantially alter the demographic make-up of this sample.

⁴ www.moralfoundations.org

expect that the college students, their parents and grandparents would report similar preferences for the five Foundations.

Hypothesis 1: Moral Foundation scores will be positively related within families.

Table 2 displays the bivariate relationships of Moral Foundations between the student, his or her mother and his or her maternal grandparents. Table 3 displays these same correlations for the paternal side. There are significant, positive relationships between Harm, Fairness, Authority and Purity for parents (G2) and the college students (G3) in the maternal family sample, but only Ingroup and Authority reach traditional significance levels between G2 and G3 on the paternal side. A possible explanation for these findings is that women tend to score higher on Harm, Fairness and Purity and therefore may be more likely to pass these Foundations along to their children (Graham et al. 2011). Ingroup views are the only shared relationship on one Moral Foundation between G1 and G3. On the paternal side, G1 Purity is positively associated with G3 Purity, but the Ingroup scores are negatively associated between the two generations. More relationships emerge between the five Moral Foundations across generations than within them. For example, Fairness in G1 is significantly related to Ingroup views in G3.

Regarding the relationships between G1 and G2, no significant relationships emerge on the maternal side, but with small to medium effect sizes ($r = -.17$ to $.23$), there is most likely a power problem with the small sample. Furthermore, the relationships are not even all in the expected direction, as Harm, Fairness and Ingroup are negatively related. Similar puzzling results occur in the paternal G1-G2 correlations, as the nonsignificant relationships demonstrate decent effect sizes ($r = .08$ to $-.39$), but in positive and negative directions. When the G3 sample is split by gender, the relationships between mothers in G2 and children in G3 shift a little bit but stay in the same general direction, with sons demonstrating stronger relationships than daughters with

their mothers. No relationships, apart from a nearly significant association in Ingroup attitudes between fathers and sons, emerge on the paternal side when splitting G3 by gender. Though this finding supports work that demonstrates men score higher on the Ingroup/Loyalty dimension, which can explain phenomena such as higher levels of sports team loyalty and fandom (Winegard and Deaner 2010).

Table 2: Bivariate correlations of Moral Foundations between college students (G3) and their mothers (G2) and maternal grandparents (G1)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
G3														
1. Harm														
2. Fairness	.60													
3. Ingroup	.11	.20												
4. Authority	.10	.18	.56											
5. Purity	.21	.17	.41	.52										
G2														
6. Harm	.37	.13	-.18	-.01	.15									
7. Fairness	.21	<i>.19</i>	-.09	.09	.06	.58								
8. Ingroup	.13	.00	.08	<i>.19</i>	.25	.50	.40							
9. Authority	.06	.05	.27	.31	.29	.24	<i>.19</i>	.51						
10. Purity	.01	-.06	.11	.33	.37	<i>.19</i>	.13	.42	.62					
G1														
11. Harm	.19	-.06	.17	.09	.24	-.17	-.09	-.17	-.04	-.16				
12. Fairness	.00	-.11	.43	.34	.15	-.16	-.09	-.11	.08	-.29	.64			
13. Ingroup	-.02	.12	.48	.28	.07	-.18	.08	-.19	.17	-.35	.56	.78		
14. Authority	-.16	.10	.08	.09	.12	.14	.11	.33	.24	<i>.41</i>	.19	.15	.35	
15. Purity	-.36	-.03	.11	.14	.09	-.26	-.09	.21	.29	.23	.24	.02	.32	.63

Notes: All bolded correlations are significant at $p < .05$; italics are $p < .10$. N for G3-G2 relationships ranges from 88 to 91, G2-G1 ranges from 19 to 23 and G3-G1 ranges from 34 to 38.

Table 3: Bivariate correlations of Moral Foundations between college students (G3) and their fathers (G2) and paternal grandparents (G1)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
G3														
1. Harm														
2. Fairness	.60													
3. Ingroup	.11	.20												
4. Authority	.10	.18	.56											
5. Purity	.21	.17	.41	.52										
G2														
6. Harm	.06	-.01	-.01	-.10	-.06									
7. Fairness	.06	<i>.07</i>	-.02	-.08	-.03	.72								
8. Ingroup	-.07	.01	.22	<i>.18</i>	.13	.41	.47							
9. Authority	-.09	-.08	.21	.16	.07	.33	.36	.56						
10. Purity	-.05	-.14	.06	.12	<i>.18</i>	.27	.28	.47	.66					
G1														
11. Harm	-.10	-.14	-.01	.01	-.03	.37	.26	.01	-.12	-.09				
12. Fairness	.17	.20	-.24	-.04	.02	.17	.08	-.37	-.52	-.58	.64			
13. Ingroup	.04	.19	-.13	.26	.19	.19	.31	-.39	-.38	-.41	.54	.75		
14. Authority	-.11	-.27	.00	.21	.20	.04	.20	-.05	-.28	-.04	.69	.54	.62	
15. Purity	.06	-.19	.17	.47	.61	-.07	-.13	-.21	<i>-.44</i>	-.17	.33	.39	.39	.52

Notes: All bolded correlations are significant at $p < .05$; italics are $p < .10$. N for G3-G2 relationships ranges from 99 to 103, G2-G1 ranges from 14 to 16 and G3-G1 ranges from 25 to 26.

Because the relationships do not form a coherent pattern, it is difficult to speculate about any sort of multiplier effect or parents acting as middlepersons, relaying values between generations. Examining the correlations between mothers and fathers in G2 may be part of the answer: the only Moral Foundation relationship that achieves traditional levels of statistical significance is

Purity ($r=.24$, $p<.05$). Harm, Fairness and Ingroup display positive relationships between parents at the .10 level, but all demonstrate low effect sizes (right around .2). This supports earlier literature that the most successful transmission occurs between attitudes that are shared by both parents (Jennings and Niemi 1974). That is, Hypothesis 1 is partially supported in that some Moral Foundations are passed down in families, but this may be moderated by parental agreement. One possibility for the sporadic relationships could be due to differences in means across the generations, which would be contrary to Hypothesis 2. That is, if Moral Foundations run in families and are persistent across the life course, then the distribution of preferences for each Foundations should be similar across each generation.

Hypothesis 2: Each generation will have the same mean (average) score on each Moral Foundation.

Two-sample, unpaired t tests were performed on the Moral Foundation measures between generations, displayed in Table 4. There were significant mean differences between scores on nearly all of the Moral Foundations between college students (G3) and both sets of grandparents and between grandparents (G1) and the parents (G2), with higher scores corresponding with age of the generation. That is, the grandparents rated nearly every Moral Foundation higher than G2 and G3, regarding its relevance in making moral decisions. Parents and children in G2 and G3 demonstrated more similar scores on the Foundations, with Authority and Purity both demonstrating higher means for mothers and fathers as compared to their children. This suggests that perhaps concerns for Authority and Purity increase with one's age or may be a remnant of period effects.

Table 4: Two-sample T Tests of Moral Foundations between college students (G3), their parents (G2) and grandparents (G1)

	Significant Mean Difference	No Mean Difference
G1: Maternal G2: Mother	Harm Fairness Ingroup Authority Purity	
G2: Mother G3: Student	Authority Purity	Harm Fairness Ingroup
G1: Maternal G3: Student	Harm Ingroup Authority Purity	Fairness
G1: Paternal G2: Father	Fairness Ingroup Authority Purity	Harm
G2: Father G3: Student	Harm Purity	Authority Fairness Ingroup
G1: Paternal G3: Student	Harm Ingroup Authority Purity	Fairness

Note: $p < .05$

If Moral Foundations are not necessarily stable across generations, are they stable across time?

Hypothesis 3: *Moral Foundation scores at time 1 and time 2 will be the same.*

Though the best test would be longitudinal data similar to that collected by Jennings and Niemi across several decades, I sought to test whether these attitudes were stable within a year's time. At the end of the first questionnaire, the parents and grandparents were asked for their

contact information if they were interested in participating in future research, and 182 individuals were mailed surveys and another \$2 bill in the summer of 2012. With a response rate of 70%, 74 parents and 54 grandparents completed the MF battery and some additional questions for the second time. The purpose of this second wave was to determine the relative stability of these belief sets. Beginning with Moral Foundations, the five indices from wave 1 were significantly correlated with their respective indices in wave 2, ranging from $r = .60$ for Fairness and $r = .80$ for Purity, nearly mirroring Graham et al.'s (2011) test-retest results on 123 undergraduates. They conclude that "item responses are quite stable over time and that within-occasion variation is more a function of the broad diversity of measurement rather than instability" (Graham et al. 2011, 371). Yet, if there are significant mean differences in a test-retest situation, we may be better able to uncover what types of characteristics, life stages or experiences contribute to the development of the Foundations.

To test Hypothesis 3, I conducted repeated measure ANOVAs⁵ for each of the five Moral Foundations. Results are displayed in Table 5. There are no mean differences across time for Fairness or Ingroup preferences, but the other three Foundations demonstrated mean differences at the .10 significance level, though the latter is a more liberal test than the traditional .05, the small sample sizes indicate a probable power problem. These results suggest that Harm, Authority and Purity may be less stable across time, and provide support for other studies that find lower longitudinal correlations for Moral Foundations as compared to political orientations (Smith et al. 2017). Perhaps the issue here is that individuals do not uniformly prefer each Moral

⁵ Hilbe, Joseph. 1998. "RANOVA: Stata module to estimate single factor repeated measures ANOVA," Statistical Software Components S341201, Boston College Department of Economics.

Foundation. That is, are liberals more stable on the individualizing Foundations and conservatives on the binding Foundations?

Table 5: Mean Differences between self-reported Moral Foundations at Time 1 and Time 2

	All	Liberals	Conservatives
Harm	F=3.12, p=.08	F=12.48, p=.002	F=.21, p=.65
Fairness	F=.18, p=.673	F=1.72, p=.202	F=1.87, p=.176
Ingroup	F=.09, p=.769	F= 0, p=1.0	F=.54, p=.466
Authority	F=2.88, p=.092	F=.03, p=.875	F=6.51, p=.013
Purity	F=2.98, p=.087	F=.83, p=.373	F=3.04, p=.086
N	112-118	22-26	63-66

Note: Repeated measures ANOVA performed with Stata's "ranova."

Political Ideology. There has been some evidence that Moral Foundations can be manipulated; for example, a recent study on cognition and the Foundations suggests that when under cognitive stress, conservatives suppress the binding Foundations of Ingroup, Authority and Purity and are more likely to highlight concerns of Harm and Fairness, similar to their liberal counterparts (Wright and Baril 2011), though this was not replicated on two separate follow-up samples (Graham et al. 2013). On the other hand, using implicit association tests, Graham (2010) found that liberals implicitly endorse the binding Foundations that they normally eschew explicitly. The current study does not employ an experimental manipulation, but it might be possible that the binding Foundations are less stable or that political conservatives may be more malleable in these preferences. To test this assumption, I divided the sample into liberals and conservatives using a 7-point, self-placement scale ranging from Extremely Liberal (1) to Extremely Conservative (7). Those scoring 1 through 3 (slightly liberal) were coded 0; moderates (4) were dropped and slightly conservative (5) through extremely conservative (7)

were coded as 1. Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed again with results displayed in Table V. Even with the very small sample of liberals, there was a significant mean difference between Harm scores at time 1 and time 2, which seems to be driving the overall relationship reported in column 1 as there is no difference for conservatives. Likewise, the pattern of significant mean differences for Authority and Purity are driven by the significant differences for conservatives.

To account for possible other factors that may influence the difference across time, I computed an absolute value difference score between each Foundation at time 1 and the respective Foundation at time 2, and regressed ideology (the full 7-point scale), age, income, education and gender on the resulting variable. None of the models reached statistical significance and thus cannot be interpreted. In looking at bivariate relationships between these variables, there was a significant negative correlation between the difference of Harm scores at T1 and T2 and income, such that increases in income results in closer scores between the two time periods ($r = -.18$, $p = .057$) and a significant positive relationship between the Purity difference score and education, in that increases in education are associated with greater differences in the scores ($r = .20$, $p = .039$). It isn't clear why participants with higher incomes would have more stable Harm scores or those with high levels of education demonstrate more movement on Purity, and without consistent relationships across all five Foundations, it may not be prudent to draw conclusions from these possibly spurious correlations.

Discussion

In sum, there are stronger relationships between the generations closest to one another (G1-G2 and G2-G3) than between generations one and three, which is consistent with previous three-generation findings on political items (Beck and Jennings 1975). It is possible that some of the

relationships are mediated by demographic variables, such as income and education, or relational variables measuring level of contact between the generations. With the limitations of the small sample size due to incomplete three-generation triads, it is difficult to model these added parameters without jeopardizing already precious degrees of freedom. In addition, the G3 population is nearly identical on individual-level socio-economic status so should the model include the education and income of the parents or the grandparents? There is a dearth of theory as to whether demographic variables influence transmission of attitudes across three generations. With sample sizes ranging from 14 to 103 in the between-generation correlations, it is also difficult to determine whether these associations, or lack thereof, are due to actual differences in the participants and samples or due to statistical problems that plague small samples, such as measurement error. This is the first known examination of Moral Foundations across three generations, and even with challenges of measurement error and sample size, this analysis demonstrates that some aspects of moral intuition belief sets are transmitted within families. The higher agreement between adjacent generations also hints at the possibility of both sides of the family in G1 and G2 spouses may serve as multipliers in the passage of these values to children in G3.

What seems to be happening in the current data is some sort of age effect: concerns for each Foundation increases with the age of the cohorts in this sample, and there are especially large differences on Authority and Purity, such that the grandparents find these Foundations most relevant. This theoretical framework used in this paper conceptualizes Moral Foundations as a stable and universal set of dimensions, as is posited in Moral Foundations Theory, though its authors are usually quick to point out we know little of the origins or development of these beliefs and the Foundations are a “first draft” of innate preparedness that is continually edited by

one's environment (Graham et al. 2011; Graham et al. 2013). The findings in this paper offer evidence that these intuitive ethical systems may change with age or are significantly influenced by the larger cultural context of generational cohorts. In most of the Moral Foundations Theory work, age is used as an independent variable, along with Moral Foundations, in predicting another variable of interest. There have been no long-term longitudinal studies to determine whether Moral Foundations are stable across one's life course, similar to the Big 5 Personality traits, or if they change over time. That is, when the G3 students of the current study become parents and eventually grandparents, will their concerns for Purity and Authority increase? Or will each cohort moving forward, at least in modernizing societies, have less and less concern for the binding foundations of Ingroup, Authority and Purity?

For example, the Pew Research Center (June 8, 2015) reports an age divide for support for same-sex marriage, with 73% of Millennials (born after 1980) in favor, as compared to 59% of Generation X (born 1965-1980), 45% of Baby Boomers (1946-1964) and 39% of the Silent Generation (1928-1945).⁶ Support for gay marriage has been associated with notions of purity and attitudes toward disgust (Inbar et al. 2009a; Smith et al. 2010; Balzer and Jacobs 2011); so is it the case that younger individuals are not as concerned with purity or that they do not associate gay marriage with disgust/purity? If the latter is the case, then broad orientations may be transmitted within families but manifest themselves differently when applied to issues of the day.

Several previous studies have demonstrated that value transmission is enhanced when parental views match the public mood or surrounding society (Jennings and Niemi 1974). Some

⁶ The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. June 8, 2015. "Support for Same-Sex Marriage at Record High, but Key Segments Remain Opposed." <http://www.people-press.org/2015/06/08/support-for-same-sex-marriage-at-record-high-but-key-segments-remain-opposed/>

issue attitudes, like race relations, seem to be shaped more by societal influences, or the prevailing “Zeitgeist,” if it is in opposition to parental views (Beck and Jennings 1991, 757; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Jennings and Niemi 1974). For example, Jennings and Niemi (1974) found the largest discrepancies between parent and child attitudes on issues like busing and segregation – civil rights issues that definitely have a generational component similar to that of gay rights today. What is unknown, then, is whether different generations apply different Moral Foundations to their political preferences and if this can help explain generational shifts in public opinion. When thinking about gay marriage, do the G3 individuals rely upon notions of Fairness and G1 on notions of Purity? Indeed, differences between generations on the “binding” Foundations suggest that Harm and Fairness concerns may be more relevant to younger generations than notions of Authority and Purity, yet the older generations seem to score at relatively the same level for all five Foundations. Attitudes toward gay marriage are changing within generations as support for gay marriage has increased over the past 10 years in each cohort, which may reflect arguments that emphasize the issue as a civil right – shifting the frame from purity and traditional values to appeals to fairness and equality.

These Moral Foundations may be learned – and possibly unlearned – but some individuals may have a propensity to endorse certain Foundations that then must be activated by one’s culture, religious exposure and family. Then when individuals do not agree with one of these externalities (e.g. their parents or grandparents), there may be a hierarchy of influence at work that results in something like a cohort effect. Understanding the development and possible change in these Foundations may help illuminate how public opinion can shift on issues such as segregation or busing or gay marriage in that traditional arguments of Ingroup, in the former

case, and Purity, in the latter, are challenged by arguments built upon notions of Fairness or Harm.

What we do not know is if this generational effect keeps cycling with regard to morally-charged issues; that is, as cohorts get older, they find more appeal in Authority, Purity, and Ingroup concerns whereas the upcoming young people are more open to Harm and Fairness arguments. This type of effect may be particularly salient to policy entrepreneurs or political campaigns as older individuals tend to be more politically involved. It is also likely that younger generations of Americans will continue to diversify by race/ethnicity and religious affiliation, leading to a disruption in how we understand conservative Foundations like Purity and Authority and the relationship to the conservative Republican Party. Young people of color may demonstrate similar religious and moral leanings as their white counterparts, but the current direction of white identity fused with Christian nationalism politics (Whitehead, Perry and Baker 2018; Jardina 2019) suggests that these peers may interpret Moral Foundation links to political attitudes and partisanship in different ways. For example, Ingroup/Loyalty preferences may lead Latin(x) Americans to prefer more progressive immigration reform while these same attitudes would drive white Americans to restrictive immigration policies. In sum, morality politics are dependent not only on bedrock principles or religious beliefs, but also political context and group membership.

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