Eberl, Jason T.2013-08-222013-08-222005-01Eberl, Jason. "Pomponazzi and Aquinas on the Intellective Soul." Modern Schoolman: A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 1 (2005): 65-77.0026-8402https://hdl.handle.net/1805/3461Post-printOne of Thomas Aquinas’s primary philosophical concerns is to provide an account of the nature of a human soul. He bases his account on Aristotle’s De anima [DA], wherein Aristotle gives an account of “soul” (psuchē) as divided into three distinct types: vegetative, sensitive, and intellective. Aristotle defines an intellective soul as proper to human beings and the only type of soul that may potentially exist separated from a material body. Aquinas argues that an intellective soul is indeed separable from its body and conceives of it as essentially, or unqualifiedly (simpliciter), immortal and separable from its body, and relatively (secundum quid) mortal and conjoined to its body. Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), a Renaissance philosopher concerned with ridding neo-Aristotelianism of Platonic or Averroistic influences, criticizes Aquinas’s account as not being properly Aristotelian and having been influenced by Platonism. In this paper, I will present summaries of Aquinas’s arguments concerning an intellective soul’s essential immortality, as well as Pomponazzi’s criticisms of Aquinas’s position. I then propose ways in which Aquinas may respond to these criticisms.en-USimmortalitymetaphysicssoulAquinasAristotlePomponazzi, PietroArticle